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This thesis is a study of a failed attempt at the formation of a primary commodity cartel. In 
1986, the Grenada Cooperative Nutmeg Association (GCNA) entered into a Joint 
Marketing Agreement with the Association of Indonesian Nutmeg Exporters (ASPIN) to 
create a cartel by agreeing to control the supply of nutmeg and mace onto the 
international market to increase and stabilise the prices of the commodities. At the time of 
the Agreement , Indonesia was the world‘s largest supplier of nutmegs and mace (75 - 80 
per cent of supply), and Grenada the second the second largest (10 - 15 per cent of 
supply). Catz International B V, a Dutch spice trader played a key role in the formation of 
the Agreement and was also instrumental in the formation of ASPIN, as an Indonesian 
association of nutmeg exporters and secured sole buyer status for nutmeg and mace 
exported by ASPIN. The Agreement appeared to be briefly effective raising prices but 
cracks appeared in the Agreement within two years and it formally ended in mid-1990. 
This thesis investigates: (a) the motivations and decision making of Grenadian 
stakeholders in forming the Agreement; (b) the role of external stakeholders in the 
formation, performance and demise of the Agreement, and (c) the ongoing efforts of the 
GCNA to continue the Agreement when it was failing. GCNA‘s archival records, statistical 
data, and discussions with key Grenadian stakeholders and some international traders 
were the sources of data. Stakeholder analysis and the literature on cartels provided the 
theoretical grounding and context. The qualitative case-study approach using triangulation 
to establish what happened and Langley‘s sense-making strategies have been used to 
construct the narrative. The key results of this study are: (a) the fundamental economic 
conditions necessary for the formation and sustenance of the Agreement as a cartel were 
absent; (b) the organisational arrangements for the sustenance of the Agreement on the 
Indonesian side were deficient, and (c) GCNA was active in forming the Agreement and 
persisted in attempts to revive the Agreement because of deficiencies in its information 
and knowledge about the Indonesian and market situation arising out of over-reliance on a 
single source. The study contributes to knowledge on decision making in commodity 
cooperatives in small economies and has wider lessons for management decision making 
in developing countries.      
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Chapter 1 - General Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Historically, agriculture, nutmeg production and the Grenada Cooperative Nutmeg 
Association (GCNA) have a special place in the Grenadian economy, public policy and 
politics. Economically, prior to Hurricane Ivan in 2004, nutmeg was a major source of 
employment, particularly in the rural communities and especially during the nutmeg 
harvesting period, providing weekly income for approximately 30-33 per cent of the 
population (International Trade Centre and Ministry of Agriculture, Grenada, 2010; Brizan, 
1979). It was also a major source of foreign exchange earnings. Nutmeg contributed 22.5 
per cent of the island‘s total commodity exports in 2004, a major revenue earner for the 
national economy, generating an average of EC$35 million per year between 2000 and 
2004 and contributing an average of 21 per cent to the gross domestic product of the 
island (Brizan, 2003; Gordon, 2015). 
Politically, nutmeg farmers, acting collectively through the GCNA, had the ability to 
provide or withhold political support to the major political parties, as they did in 1974 and 
1979, when they called on their membership to participate in political activities such as 
mass demonstrations against the government (Brizan, 1984). Since then, the farmers 
have been perceived by the political parties as being a major stakeholder and political 
grouping having the ability to influence the outcome of elections and political causes. As a 
consequence, they must be treated in a manner that will gain their political support. 
Hence, with regard to public policy, the performance of the GCNA is a critical 
consideration into public policy decision-making, especially as it relates to the issue of 
government public investment programmes, borrowing, rural and agricultural policies. 
Prior to 1947, the export of nutmeg from Grenada was done through a system of multiple 
exporters (local and foreign) who negotiated quantities and prices directly with the 
individual local farmers. Such a system of haggling was a source of much dissatisfaction 
by the farmers since they felt that they were pitted one against the other by the exporters 
who were then able to secure the lowest possible price (Jackson, 1951; Brizan, 1979 & 
1984). On 8 March 1947 the Grenada National Legislature signed into law the Nutmeg 
Industry Act. This act gave the GCNA monopsony control over ―all nutmegs produced in 
Grenada and intended for export‖ (Nutmeg Industry Act, Section 3 (1), p.2). 
The system of haggling was a source of much dissatisfaction for most farmers. As a 
result, some producers led by T.N. Smith (elected member of the Grenada National 
Legislature). F.M. Henry (a legal practitioner of local eminence) and N. Gay (a chartered 
accountant); and by large estate owners felt that such a system favoured the exporters 
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who were able to use their status as buyers (whom the local producers depended on for 
sale and income) as well as their international business experiences to negotiate the 
lowest prices possible. As a consequence, they felt that such a system needed to change 
in order to enhance the capacity and ability of the nutmeg producers (especially the 
smaller ones) to obtain higher prices for their products as well as to retain more of the 
income in Grenada (Jackson, 1951). In order to achieve this change, they agitated for the 
formation of a monopsony organisation to control the export of nutmeg from Grenada. 
This view was opposed by the exporters and some of the large estate owners who 
favoured the existing system. They felt that the proposed changes would lead to 
increased prices through their diminished ability to negotiate prices in their interest, as 
they did before. This group was led by Messrs.‘ Walter De Gale, Victor Wildman, F.D. 
Winslow, F. J. Louison and L. Sargeant (Copy of Dispatch from His Excellency the 
Governor to the Secretary of State for the colonies, No.12 dated 16th, January, 19451). 
According to Jackson (1951), the export of nutmeg and mace from Grenada started in 
1919 following the successful introduction of the plant from Indonesia by Captain Blyth, a 
Dutch ship captain. From the inception of the GCNA (1947) to March 1979, the GCNA 
operated as an independent global exporter of nutmeg; it was in direct competition to 
Indonesian exporters, the world‘s largest supplier of nutmeg. However, over the years, the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Catz International (GCNA‘s overseas agent) Huitema, on 
many occasions suggested to the board of the GCNA that they should seek to collaborate  
with the Indonesian exporters in order to reduce competition and stabilise prices 
(Interview with Renwick, 5 August 2005) 
In March 1979, the GCNA sent its General Manager, Renwick, to Indonesia to explore the 
possibilities of greater collaboration between the world‘s two largest nutmeg suppliers. 
This visit yielded no immediate positive outcomes since there was no single organisation 
for the export of nutmeg from Indonesia through which the GCNA could collaborate 
(Interview with Renwick, 5 August 2005). However in 1985, the Association of Indonesian 
Nutmeg Producers (ASPIN) was formed, thus providing the interlocutor needed for 
cooperation with the GCNA. This, the GCNA longed for since 1979 (Interview with 
Renwick, 5 August 2005) 
In 1986, the GCNA and the Association of Indonesian Nutmeg Producers (ASPIN) 
reached a marketing agreement aimed at restricting the global supply of nutmegs so as to 
achieve high stable prices. The marketing agreement was aimed at creating an 
international nutmeg cartel between the producers of the two countries, which between 
                                                          
1
 The copy of dispatch is an archival source at the GCNA. During that period Grenada was still a 
colony of Great Britain. The Governor was the resident representative of the crown, from whom the 
needed permission to allow such a fundamental change in the trading had to be granted. 
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them exported 90 per cent of the world‘s nutmeg. The attempt to form the cartel was 
short-lived due to the absence of the key conditions necessary for the formation and 
sustainability of cartels. 
This dissertation studies the role of the principal stakeholders in Grenada (the nutmeg 
producers, their representatives in GCNA‘s Board of Directors, the Grenada Government 
and, to a lesser extent, the role of ASPIN) in the attempt to form the first international 
nutmeg cartel. In effect the study is an analysis of a failed attempt to form a commodity 
cartel. It details the absence of the conditions necessary for the formation and 
sustainability of a cartel as well as the existence of information asymmetry which caused 
the GCNA to keep pursuing the idea, even when it was evident that the attempt to form 
the cartel had failed. 
The study required examination of the motivations and actions of the other stakeholders 
involved, principally ASPIN, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the sales 
agent/broker Catz International who mediated the agreement, drawing from the academic 
literature on stakeholder theory (Freeman, 2004. Mitchelle, Agle and Wood, 1997; Jones 
and Wicks,1999), cartels (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006, LeClair, 2000; Stigler, 1964; 
Connor, 2007), and global value chains (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Brown, et al 
2012; Hopkin and Wallerstein, 1977; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). This thesis 
investigates stakeholder intervention in the failed attempt to form the cartel between the 
GCNA and ASPIN. 
This study was process-oriented, and studies the events in their historical context as they 
occurred over a specific period (Maxwell, 1992a; Mohr, 1982). The seven sense-making 
strategies (Langley, 1999) and, in particular, ―temporal bracketing‖ and narratives were 
adopted to study the process within its context to address the research questions.  The 
main research questions are: 
 
Research question 1 
What factors and interactions with other stakeholders influenced the GCNA Board of 
Directors’ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement 
to operate as a cartel? 
 
Research question 2 
How did the interventions of other parties (external stakeholders) impact the creation, 
performance and the eventual collapse of the Marketing Agreement? 
 
Research question 3 
Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA Board persist in trying to keep 








1.2 Introduction to the Topic 
 
The GCNA, the largest agricultural commodity firm on the island (Brizan, 1979; 
Greenhelge and Sylvester, 2007), was concerned about the fluctuations in prices for 
nutmeg and mace on the international market since its formation and wanted to find a 
mechanism to control those prices. The low and fluctuating prices received by the GCNA 
were typical of commodity exporting firms whose place in the Global Value chain (GVC) at 
nodes close to producers deny them the ability to earn greater and more stable prices and 
value added in the nodes in the chain close to final consumers. These firms tended to 
operate in markets that were ―international trader-driven‖ (Gibbon, 2001; 2002) or buyer-
driven rather than producer-driven (Gereffi, 1999). Therefore, the commodity exporting 
firms as businesses and political leaderships consider strategic options secure higher 
incomes and values from the traded commodities. 
This research follows the broad interest of stakeholder analysis, cartels and performance, 
which are discussed within the general strategy as process genre of the strategic 
management literature (Grant, 2003; Cornett et al., 2007; Seidmann and Sundararajan, 
1997; Mintzberg, 1994; Freeman, 1984). In keeping with the underlying spirit of this thesis 
which sees strategy as process, a processual research design (Pettigrew, 1997; Dawson, 
1997) was adopted since business relationships develop and dissolve over time and the 
processual approach is needed to capture the dynamic aspects of such relationships 
(Easton, 1995; Halinen and Törnroos, 1998). GCNA was therefore the organisation 
chosen for the application of the case-study methodology (Yin, 2003) for conducting this 
research.  
This research provides empirical evidence on the applicability of stakeholder theory in a 
small island developing state (SIDS), in understanding the conditions that are necessary 
for the formation and sustainability of commodity cartel and reasons for their failure. The 
characteristics of SIDS include: (a) limited ability to exploit economies of scale; (b) lack of 
natural resources; (c) small markets; dependence on a narrow range of productive 
activities and exports, and (d) an inability to influence international prices (Briguiglio, 
1995). It also contributes to the body of knowledge on agricultural commodity cartels and 







1.3 Motivation for Conducting this Research 
At a practical and personal level, this research is motivated by the need to contribute to 
better strategic policy decisions in a firm which is of significant economic importance to 
the standard of living for a major segment of the Grenadian population. Additionally, the 
sheer size and economic value of GCNA to the national economy and prosperity of the 
country makes it a central focus of public policy discussions and debates. Finally, at the 
academic level, the very nature of GCNA provides an ideal opportunity for the application 
of stakeholder theory, information asymmetry and the necessity of having the ideal 
conditions for the formation and sustainability of cartels in understanding how its many 
stakeholders influenced its behaviour during the period 1986 to 1992. 
 
1.4 Situating the Case and the Problem 
The GCNA is located in the tri-island state of Grenada which has a land mass of 133 
square miles. A former colony of Britain until independence in 1974, it is situated in the 
most southern part of the English-speaking Caribbean, northwest of Trinidad & Tobago, 
northeast of Venezuela, and southwest of St. Vincent & the Grenadines. It is a small, open 
economy, with a population of approximately 100,000 and a per-capita income of 
US$7,890 according to the World Bank, 2013. (World Development Indicators, 2013). The 
economy is based on tourism, financial and educational services, remittances and 
agriculture 
Approximately 62 per cent of the total population reside in rural areas and undertake 
some full-time or part-time farming activities. According to Brizan (1998) over 30 per cent 
of Grenadians were dependent, directly or indirectly, on the nutmeg industry for parts of 
their livelihood (Brizan, 1998). The GCNA was formed in 1947 as part of a response to the 
unregulated marketing, trading and exporting system which had previously been in 
existence. The industry was characterised by a system of free trading in which a number 
of plantation owners, traders and middlemen bought nutmeg from individual small farmers 
for export. The small farmers were played against each other by these buyers and 
exporters, resulting in depressed prices for small producers (Brizan.1979; Jackson, 1951). 
As a result of agitation by those in favour of eliminating the existing system of trading and 
support of the Governor, the Bill entitled ―The Nutmeg Industry Act, 1946‖ for the 
establishment of the nutmeg cooperative was passed by the Legislative Council. The 
GCNA came into being in March 1947 (Brizan, 1979). This led to the creation of the 
GCNA (Jackson, 1951; Brizan, 1979). The Act mandated the GCNA as the sole corporate 
body responsible for the marketing of Grenada‘s nutmeg and mace [Section 3 (2)], and 
that all nutmeg growers be eligible for membership of the GCNA [section 4 (1)] and to be 
managed by a board of directors [Section 6, (2)] comprising of nine members of which six 
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were to be elected by the nutmeg producers, and three by the Minister of Agriculture 
[Section 14 (1)]. It is this section in particular which gave rise to the statutory stakeholder 
composition of the GCNA. 
Following years of preparatory work by a special committee, the Association finally 
became a reality and started purchasing nutmegs on 1 October 1947 (Brizan, 1998). The 
Act established the GCNA as a monopsony producer cooperative owned by its members. 
Its surpluses were to be shared by the members in proportion to the volume of business 
conducted with the cooperative. The GCNA became the sole purchaser and exporter of 
nutmeg and mace from Grenada. Its members were prohibited from selling to any other 
party. 
The GCNA Board of Directors‘ initiative to form a cartel with ASPIN was assisted by its 
agent in Europe, Catz International, whose Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Klass Huitema 
was personally encouraging and instrumental in forming the alliance. Some nutmeg 
industry interest groups in Indonesia had long held the view that such an alliance was 
important for their mutual interest. The rationale for such mutuality of interest was rooted 
in their desire to reduce competition between themselves as the world‘s two largest 
suppliers, and thereby control supply and achieve higher and more stable prices 
(Interview with Renwick, 5 August, 2005; Lord, 19 March, 2015).  
 
1.5 Decision-Making within the GCNA 
The GCNA can be defined as a democratic organisation operating through a structure of 
parish2 representation, leading to the election of the Board of Directors. During June every 
year, the GCNA held its parish meetings where all members of the parish attended. These 
meetings were held to address two matters. They received and discussed the annual 
financial report of the GCNA and they elected nominees to attend the annual general 
meeting at which six ordinary members were elected as members of the GCNA Board of 
Directors. 
The nutmeg producers of Grenada who are the primary stakeholders in the GCNA, had 
similar objectives to those of the Indonesian producers and traders, achieving higher and 
more stable prices. Between them the two countries supplied 90 per cent of the world‘s 
nutmeg and mace. Hence the stakeholders in the nutmeg sector in both the countries had 
a mutual interest in controlling world prices and potentially the ability to exert control 
because of the high share of the world supply.  
                                                          
2
 Parishes are divisions of Grenada. The island is comprised of parishes: St. George, St. Andrew, 
St. David, St. John, St. Patrick and St. Mark. 
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Therefore, the issues surrounding the motivations to form a cartel and the attempts to 
keep it going in spite of its evident failure required exploration of the rationale and context 
for the joint marketing agreement, the role of the primary stakeholders in forming the 
agreement, the eventual impact of the agreement on the GCNA, and how the absence of 
the conditions necessary for the formation of a cartel contributed to the eventual failure of 
the agreement. 
 
1.6 Data Collection Strategy 
In order to bring understanding and clarity to the research question, a qualitative case-
study approach was adopted (Yin, 2003). An eclectic triangulation strategy for data 
collection was adopted using primary and secondary sources. In this regard, the GCNA 
archives provided a significant amount of dormant data, while some active Grenadian 
actors during the cartel formation and demise provided complementary primary data. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is structured into eight chapters. Figure 1.1 provides the outline of 
the research process as captured in the eight chapters, with the details following. The 




Figure 1.1 Outline of Thesis  
 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction to the topic and highlights the issues to be addressed 
and the broad research approach to be adopted. Chapter 2 provides the context and 
background for the case study. It describes the nutmeg industry in Grenada and 
Indonesia, highlights the long-standing problems of the nutmeg industry and the proximate 
problems and motivations for primary stakeholder groups to enter into the cartel 
arrangement with the nutmeg exporters in Indonesia.  
Chapter 3 reviews the literature and sets the conceptual framework to use the stakeholder 
analysis framework in understanding the decision-making process leading to the decision 
to form the agreement with ASPIN, the duration of the agreement, and its eventual 
decline. This section helps set the framework for the study.  Chapter 4 is concerned with 
the research method which is closely intertwined with the data-collection strategy. 
Specifically, it outlines the triangulation approach used in data collection and 
demonstrates its appropriateness for the qualitative case-study research. Overall, it 
demonstrates the close link between theory and empirical evidence in this type of 
research.  
Chapter 5 is concerned with the attempt at forming the cartel between the GCNA and 
ASPIN. It details the process by which the decisions were arrived at regarding the 
Chapter 2: Overview of Grenada and 
the Nutmeg Trade 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
Chapter 5: Attempts at Formation of the 
GCNA-ASPIN Cartel 
Chapter 6: Performance of the GCNA-
ASPIN Nutmeg Marketing Agreement 
Chapter 7: Collapse of the GCNA-
ASPIN Nutmeg Marketing Agreement. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis 
  
25 
establishment of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement; and identifies the key 
stakeholders and their respective roles in forming the process. It also presents the 
application of temporal bracketing and narrative of events, and the text and talk that led to 
the formation and demise of the relationship between the two organisations. Finally, it 
addresses the research question 1:  
 
What factors and interactions with other stakeholders influenced the GCNA Board of 
Directors‘ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement 
to operate as a cartel? 
 
Chapter 6 examines the performance and operations of the GCNA during the period of the 
agreement and, by extension, the agreement. It addresses research question 2: 
 
How did the interventions of other parties (external stakeholders) impact the creation, 
performance and the eventual collapse of the Marketing Agreement? 
Chapter 7 focuses on the reasons for the failure of the agreement. It addresses research 
question 3: 
 
Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA Board persist in trying to keep 
the Agreement going when it started failing? 
 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions, limitations and recommendations arising from the 
study.    
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Chapter 2 - Grenada: Its History, Economy and International Trade 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This section provides the Grenadian national, historical and economic context at the time 
for the formation of the nutmeg cartel between the GCNA and the ASPIN and its demise 
during the period 1986-1990. Three major aspects of the context were: (a) the importance 
of nutmeg, and the GCNA in particular, for Grenada‘s international trade and economy; (b) 
the place of nutmeg in the socio-economic fabric of the country; and (c) the place of 
Grenada‘s nutmeg sector within the global nutmeg value chain. The first two aspects 
above explain the Grenadian policy makers‘ and the other primary stakeholders‘ 
propensity to form and persist with the cartel in order to retain a greater share of the value 
added from the nutmeg trade in Grenada. The third aspect works against the ability of 
Grenada to protect the value of its share from nutmeg exports   
This chapter will establish the historic rationale for Grenada‘s interest in seeking to 
establish the cartel and the desire on the part of two major primary stakeholders in 
Grenada‘s nutmeg industry – the Board of Directors of the GCNA and the Government of 
Grenada – to attempt to fulfill the expectations of the members of the GCNA, another 
primary stakeholder group. 
This chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 2.2 outlines the history and geography of the island of Grenada. It provides an 
understanding of the hemispheric location of the island. It also highlights how the 
prevailing climatic condition is conducive to agriculture in general and nutmeg in 
particular; 
Section 2.3 describes the economic structure of Grenada. It explains the composition of 
the gross domestic product, and demonstrates the importance of agriculture in the 
nation‘s national output of goods and services, as well as the important role of nutmeg in 
the national economy;  
Section 2.4 discusses the structure of the nutmeg industry and the agronomical aspects of 
nutmegs as it relates to the cultivation, harvesting and processing of the crop, and it ends 
with a discussion on the chemistry of nutmeg and mace;  
Section 2.5 provides a detailed explanation of the chronological development of the 
GCNA. It details the pre-1947 phase of the industry, catalogues its development and 
delineates the role of its various stakeholders. This section also details the Nutmeg 
Industry Ordinance, with reference to the specific role of the primary stakeholders, and 
identifies the legitimate basis for their decisions to form a collusive agreement with the 
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intention of forming a cartel. Finally, it discusses the organisational structure of the 
Association.    
Section 2.6 provides a cursory view of the global nutmeg value chain and seeks to situate 
the GCNA within that context. 
 
2.2 The Geography and History of Grenada 
2.2.1 Location, Climate, Geography 
The state of Grenada consists of several islands, some of which are not inhabited. The 
three major islands are Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique, which have a 
combined land mass of 133 square miles (Grenada Handbook, 1969). Grenada is situated 
at 12.50 N and 61.40 W. The main island, Grenada, is 21 miles long and 12 miles wide, 
lying 68 miles southwest of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and about 90 miles north of 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, making it the most southerly of the Windward 
Islands. It is a volcanic, mountainous island, with rich, loamy soil, ideal in many areas for 
agriculture (Government of Grenada, 1991).  
Grenada experiences tropical climatic conditions with temperatures ranging from 280 C to 
310 C, providing ideal climatic conditions for good agricultural soil (Grenada Environmental 
Profile, 1991).  Lower temperatures may be recorded in the higher regions but Grenada‘s 
Meteorological Office does not keep a record of these.  
Christopher Columbus sighted the island of Grenada in 1498. It was inhabited by migrant 
Caribs (Amerindians) from South America. The French were the first Europeans to 
colonise the island around 1650 (Chase, T. and Chase, Z., 2011) with settlers from 
Martinique. The French established a tobacco plantation but conflict soon arose between 
the French and the Caribs. According to Brizan (1984), by 1652, in a fiercely fought battle, 
most of the Caribs were massacred and those who survived chose to commit mass 
suicide rather than live under French rule. 
The island of Grenada fell under British rule by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 1763 but 
soon reverted to the French in 1779 by conquest. It was later returned to the British in 
1783 by the Peace Treaty of Versailles and remained a British dependent territory until it 
gained independence in 1974 (Brizan, 1984) 
Grenada gained its independence from Britain on 7 February 1974 under the leadership of 
a charismatic leader, Sir Eric Mathew Gairy; Prime Minster from 1974 - 1979. His 
government was overthrown in a bloodless revolution by the then opposition party New 
Jewel Movement (NJM), led by Maurice Bishop. Factionalism developed within the NJM, 
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resulting in the assassination in October 1983 of Bishop, some of his cabinet colleagues, 
and an unspecified number of Grenadians (Brizan, 1984). The murder of the Prime 
Minister, Maurice Bishop, along with some members of his cabinet and other Grenadians, 
was followed by an invasion of the island led by the United States of America (USA) on 25 
October 1983. The island held its first election after the fall of the Revolution in 1984 and 
has remained within the fold of the Westminster system of democracy, continuing to hold 
democratic elections since then.  
From colonial times to the period under review, Grenada‘s economy was based largely on 
agricultural products, principally sugarcane, coffee, then later cocoa, nutmeg and 
bananas. The island transitioned from a largely plantation economy to a mixed one of 
large, medium and small holdings, from 1834 to the present time (Brizan, 1984). The 
nutmeg industry rose to prominence at the beginning of the 20th century (Brizan, ibid). 
From 1930 to 1982, three crops (cocoa, nutmeg and banana) formed the substructure of 
the island‘s economy, as directly or indirectly they have generated much of the income 
and employment in the country as the production from the sugar cane, cotton and coffee 
industries declined to economically insignificant  quantities  (Brizan, ibid).  
 
2.2.2 The People 
According to the Grenada Poverty Assessment Report (2008), by 1985 (the year the joint 
marketing agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding, was signed between Grenada 
and Indonesia), the island had a population of 91,500. The population rose to 94,700 in 
1990, comprising persons mainly of African, East Indian, European and mixed descent.  
By 2008 the poverty rate was estimated to be approximately 37.7 per cent of the 
population. Poverty,  is defined as the  inability of persons  to meet their annual per capita 
expenditure including,  the cost of meeting their minimal food and other basic requirement 
the minimum per capita requirement was less than EC$5,842 per adult annually or 







2.3 The Economic Structure of Grenada 
The data in this section focus on the period 1980–1995, which starts before the GCNA–
ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement (1986) was formed and extends beyond the failed 
attempts at cartelisation (1990). This is done so as to provide an extended view of the 
impact of the collapse of the agreement on GCNA, specifically, and the national economy, 
generally. Additionally, the extension provides evidence of attempts to revive the 
agreement. This latter aspect will be discussed in chapter 7. 
The discussion about Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be presented in two parts. The 
first assesses the GDP for the period 1980-1985, with reference to the contribution of 
agriculture and crops such as nutmeg, cocoa and bananas, in particular.  The first part of 
the discussion on the GDP marks the period prior to the formation of the agreement, while 
the second assesses 1986-1995, the period of the existence of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint 
Marketing Agreement and beyond. The latter section will be discussed in chapter 4, when 
examining the impact of the decisions and the decision-making process of the 
stakeholders of the cartel on the GCNA. This approach is useful since it explains the 
economic and trade situation prior to the agreement, thus allowing for a better 
understanding of the impact of the agreement and its collapse on the performance of the 
GCNA. 
Table 2.1 highlights Grenada‘s Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity during the 
period 1980-85. It presents the main sectors contributing to the GDP, as well as the 
performance of the sectors during the period, and establishes its fluctuating pattern.  
Table 2.1 shows that Grenada‘s GDP (1980–1985) increased from EC$205.50 million in 
1980 to EC$309.57 million in 1985, the largest constituents of the GDP were: Agriculture 
(19.4 per cent) and Government Services (17.6 per cent). During the period (1980 to 
1985), the three commodities (cocoa, nutmeg and bananas) combined generated export 
earnings of EC$242.9 million or 16.4 per cent of the Agricultural crops component of GDP. 
According to the Ministry of Finance (1992) the combined crops contributed 61 per cent of 
export earnings in 1985 (Ministry of Finance, 1992).The table shows that while the value 
of agriculture has remained static, the services sectors such as hotels and restaurants, 
transportation, communications, banking and insurance, and government services have 






Table 2.1 Grenada‘s Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity, in Current Prices (EC$ M) 
   SECTOR  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  
Sector 
contribution 






5 yrs total (%)               
Agriculture 47.28 51.21 46.30 45.80 49.01 48.02 287.62 19.4 
  Crops 41.40 45.17 39.16 37.94 39.91 39.32 242.90 16.4 
  Livestock 1.80 2.10 2.20 2.30 2.20 2.50 13.10 0.9 
  Forestry 0.78 0.84 0.94 0.96 1.00 1.10 5.62 0.4 
  Fishing 3.30 3.10 4.00 4.60 5.90 5.10 26.00 1.8 
Mining & Quarrying 0.90 1.08 1.08 1.08 0.90 1.44 6.48 0.4 
Manufacturing 7.19 7.05 11.75 10.48 13.39 17.07 66.93 4.5 
Electricity & Water 3.30 3.22 4.09 4.40 6.39 7.84 29.24 3.9 
Construction 13.75 18.12 21.24 21.86 20.40 22.78 118.15 8.0 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 27.48 22.74 29.23 28.09 30.15 34.47 172.16 11.6 
Hotels & Restaurants 6.80 8.10 8.40 9.20 11.70 15.30 59.50 4.0 
Transport 21.80 24.84 24.63 26.22 28.07 34.55 160.11 10.8 
Communications 3.53 3.33 3.63 4.01 4.51 6.45 25.46 1.7 
Banks & Insurance 10.47 12.03 13.83 15.92 18.32 21.11 91.68 6.2 
Real Estate & Housing 12.20 12.30 12.90 12.98 15.70 17.50 83.58 5.6 
Government Services 35.23 36.50 36.88 45.36 48.97 57.84 260.78 17.6 
Other Services 8.50 9.00 9.70 10.20 10.60 11.00 0.59 4.0 
Sub-Total 198.43 209.52 223.66 235.60 258.11 295.37 1420.69   
Less Imputed Service 
Charge 7.07 8.12 9.34 10.73 12.34 14.20 61.80 2.2 
TOTAL 205.50 217.64 233.00 246.33 270.45 309.57 1482.49   
GROWTH RATE   4.1 6.2 5.7 9.5 15.3   100.0 
 




The above data highlight the contribution of agriculture to GDP and exports. The sector 
was the most important contributor to GDP and trade.  
While future growth might have been seen to have depended on the development of other 
sectors, notably tourism, a large proportion of the population had a stake in farming, either 
as a primary activity or a secondary activity. Cash crops for exports were important 
contributors to the GDP and for earning foreign currencies to pay for the imports the 
country relied on. The following discussion reviews each of these crops and their 
contribution to export earnings and GDP. By so doing, the necessity to maintain stable 
and higher commodity prices, in order to aid Grenada‘s growth and development, will be 
highlighted. 
 
2.3.1 Performance of the Nutmeg Sector, 1980-1985 
By 1979 the GCNA had a membership of approximately 5, 288 farmers,  with 
approximately 89 per cent of them being small farmers producing on small plots of less 
than one and no more than five acres of land, and with the rest  (11 per cent) producing 
on lands ranging from 10 to over 100 acres. This data show that the vast majority of 
producers were small farmers. Additionally, the data show that the 89 per cent of farmers 
delivered 1,970,872 pounds or 55 per cent of the 3,563.142 pounds of nutmegs in 1979 
(GCNA, 1979)3. Therefore, the small farmers were critical suppliers of nutmeg and mace 
to the GCNA and thus stood to benefit from any increases in price as much as the larger 
producers. 
With regards to nutmeg contribution to the value and volume of agricultural exports and its 
contribution GDP, table 2.2 serves to highlight fluctuations in prices and quantities of 
nutmeg and mace exported during the five-year period 1980–1985.   
The table highlights the steady decline in the export unit price per pound of nutmeg 
received by the GCNA. The per-pound price of nutmeg exported steadily fell from 
EC$2.48 in 1980 to EC$1.35 in 1985 or 46.1 per cent. During the same period, and 
despite some fluctuations, the amount of nutmeg exported increased from 3,970,239 
pounds to 6,602,944 pounds or 66 per cent. On the other hand, the price of mace 
experienced steady increases except in 1983 when it fell to EC$2.50 per pound.   
                                                          
3
 Since 1979 there has not been such a census of nutmeg farmers, however, the GCNA is of the 




 Figure 2.1 Distribution of farmers by farmsize (acres) 
 
Source: GCNA (1979) 
The overall income of the GCNA varied slightly but with a general increasing trajectory up 
to 1985. This was due in part to the increased prices experienced by mace, as well as the 
expansion in the export of nutmeg. In each instance the GCNA was responding to market 
offerings rather than the result of a well thought out and planned pricing strategy 
(interview with Renwick, 5 August, 2005). This means that the price received by the 
GCNA reflected the state of the market and was not a deliberate, controlled action by the 
producers but rather it was the deliberate actions by the international nutmeg buyers, who 
increased their purchases in the face of declining prices. It appears that over this period 
the Association was a price-taker and used its ability to increase its supply of nutmegs on 
the international market mainly from stocks, and new crops in the face of the falling price 
to realise an increase in revenue. 
With regards to the level of exports, the data showed that for the first two years (1980 
and1982) sales amounted to 3,970,239 pounds and 3,572,700 pounds respectively but as 
at 1983, the quantity exported started to increase except in 1984 when it fell from 
5,915,016 to 4,962,016 pounds, and finally rising to 6,602,944 pounds. As the price and 
quantity fluctuated, so too did the annual income of the GCNA, as seen in table 2.2. 
Finally, the increased in annual export sales over that of the annual production came from 
stocks held by the GCNA. According to the Nutmeg Act, the GCNA was mandated to 
purchase all of the nutmeg and mace offered for sale by the producers, who were its 
members. The fluctuation in the quantity (and hence exports) demanded by the market in 
any year reflects the demand in the export market, which were forecasts by the agents 
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It could be assumed that the general downward pressure on nutmeg prices, which 
lowered the earnings per pound of nutmeg but kept overall earnings relatively stable 
(mainly due to the increased prices experienced by mace) for the GCNA and its members, 
as well as the lack of GCNA‘s ability to influence the international price of nutmeg, were 
two of the proximate factors that acted as catalysts for the attempt to form the Nutmeg 
Cartel in 1986. This will be demonstrated in chapter 5. 
Table 2.2 Production of Nutmeg and Mace and Exports and Revenue in EC$ 1980 -1985 
Source: GCNA Financial Statement and Report of the Nutmeg Board 1980-1985 
2.3.2 Performance of the Cocoa Sector, 1980-85 
The other important crop during the period 1980-1985 was cocoa. Table 2.3 shows the 
performance of the cocoa industry during the period. Cocoa, like nutmeg, was a regulated 
commodity. The organisation responsible for exporting cocoa was the Grenada Cocoa 
Association (GCA), which was formed in 1964 as the instrument to regulate cocoa 
production and the sole authority to export cocoa beans from Grenada (Report on 

























1980 5,486,294 647,672 3,970,239 2.48 647,672 2.98 11,839,998 
1981 5,300,836 532,129 3,572,700 2.28 532,129 3.41 9,786,726 
1982 6,157,754 502,905 4,210,664 1.95 695,345 3.47 10,640,716 
1983 4,795,991 330,934 5,915,916 1.6 903,225 2.5 11,736,305 
1984 5,036,065 433,532 4,962,016 1.41 308,555 4.49 8,478,401 
1985 4,679,472 365,947 6,602, 944 1.35 447,135 7.93 12,467,528 
Total 
 








Although cocoa was generally considered to be Grenada‘s second-largest export crop, it 
is to be noted that by way of export earnings, cocoa surpassed nutmeg by EC$21.1 
million during the period under study. However, cocoa, like nutmeg, experienced volatility 
in the quantity exported, export price and earnings. Despite some slight fluctuations the 
quantity of cocoa exported experienced an overall increase of 12.5 per cent from 1980 to 
1985. Despite the increase in the quantity exported, income declined to 33 per cent during 
the same period. Table 2.3 also highlights the percentage changes in income during the 
period, highlighting the largest decline of 30.1 per cent occurring between 1981 and 1982, 
with smaller decreases in the following years until 1984 when income started to increase.  
The export sales and pricing behaviour of cocoa indicated the fluctuating nature of 
commodity pricing affecting most commodities – cycles of boom and bust.    
Table 2.3 Cocoa Production, Export, Unit Price and Total Value in EC$, 1980-1985 
Year Production 
(lbs) 
Export (lbs) Unit Price 
(EC$ per 
lb) 




1980 4,689,180 3,990,938 4.56 18,198,677  
1981 5,546,416 5,808,137 3.30 19,143,006 5.2 
1982 5,024,430 4,995,649 2.68 13,388,339 -30.1 
1983 5,218,752 5,045,287 2.25 11,351,895 -15.2 
1984 4,627,843 4,412,625 2.64 11,649,330 2.6 
1985 4,775,964 4,490,412 2.73 12,258,824 5.2 
Total 29,882,585 28,743,048  85,990,073  
Source: Grenada Cocoa Association, 2015. 
In spite of the importance of Cocoa as an export crop for Grenada, the country did not 
have the international market power which offered it the potential to be a significant player 
in controlling global supply. In 1985 of the sixty one cocoa exporting countries, Grenada is 
placed twenty fifth in terms of value, with one per cent share of world exports 
(www.fao.org/statistics/en/5, 1985).   
 
2.3.3 Performance of the Banana Sector 
The third most important agricultural export commodity of Grenada during the years 
1980 to 1985 was bananas. Up until the collapse of Grenada‘s banana industry in the 
mid-1990s as a consequence of the creation of the Single European Market (1992), and 




effect on 1 July 1993 (Sandiford, 2000), the banana export trade was managed by the 
Grenada Banana Cooperative Society (GBCS), the third of the island‘s three major 
commodity boards. 
During the period 1980–1985 banana production amounted to 134,670,100 pounds, 
and exports amounted to 129,805,800 pounds, generating revenue of EC$53,673,800 
(Table 2.4). During the same period, production, exports and revenue showed a 
downward trend while prices fluctuated, a situation typical of agricultural commodities. 
During the period revenue declined from EC$10,688,400 to EC$8,649,400, a decline of 
19.1 per cent, largely because of the decline in production and exports for reasons 
described below. The prices paid to farmers also broadly reflected the prices received 
by the GBCS. During the period under review, the average price per pound received by 
farmers was EC$0.205, while the average price received by the GBCS was EC$0.418. 
It therefore means that the GBCS paid to the farmers an average of 49 per cent of all 
income it received during the period under review.   
This twin phenomena of fluctuations in production and income and crop diseases, 
contributed to the overall decline in the banana industry. The resulting poor quality of 
bananas led to increased rejection by Geest UK Ltd., the UK importing company 
(Sandiford, 2000). Later, as described below, the overall decline in the average price 
per pound for African Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) bananas which accompanied changes 
to the EU SEM and banana regime which was exacerbated by the coming into force of 
the European Union Single Market (1992) led to the eventual closure of the GBCS and 
the severe decline of banana exports. 
Until the creation of the Single European Market (SEM), unlike nutmeg and cocoa, 
Grenada‘s bananas had a secure market in the United Kingdom free of duty and 
quotas, while bananas from Central and South America were faced with quota 
restrictions (Fletcher, 1993). This preferential treatment for Grenada along with other 
ACP countries which was to be extended to the rest of the European Union under the 
SEM was challenged by the USA government and Latin American banana producers. 
The USA interest in banana exports from Latin America was because of the US based 
fruit trading multinationals‘ (Dole and Chiquita) exports from Latin American countries. 
The latter made representations to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to establish a 
special panel/appellant body to hear their complaints against the EU‘s banana regime 
(Sandiford, 2000; Fletcher, 1993).  
The WTO panel found that the EU was in breach of various sections of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services 




As a consequence, the WTO appellate body recommended that the EU make its 
banana regime compliant with the above three mentioned agreements. Against this 
backdrop the US was threatening retaliatory actions against the EU. As a consequence, 
the EU had no choice but to allow banana imports from Latin America on the same 
preferential terms as the ACP countries (Sandiford, 2000). 
With the preferential terms removed, Grenada now had to compete with the lower cost 
Latin American producers. Grenadian banana production costs were higher because of 
the small scale of production and therefore banana production for exports could not 
survive, leading to the demise of the banana industry in Grenada (Fletcher, 1993, 
Sandiford, 2000). 
While bananas were one of Grenada‘s three main export commodities in the early 
1980s, the preceding account shows that its importance was declining and its value as 
an export commodity was dealt a further blow by the loss of preferential treatment in the 
UK and the European Union. Further, Grenada was a very small exporter in the global 
context. The major players in the international banana market were Ecuador, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and Guatemala (http://www.fao.org/statistics/en/1985). As highlighted 
below, the weakness of bananas as an export commodity is an aspect of importance in 
explaining the focus of policy makers and other stakeholders on the control of the 
supply and price of nutmeg.    
Table 2.4 Banana Production and Exports by Volume and Value, 1980–1985 














1980 27,373,600 4,737,900 26,481,700 10,688,400 0.2140 0.4036 
1981 25,609,400 4,429,700 25,090,200 9,301,000 0.2200 0.3707 
1982 22,808,300 3,129,300 22,030,400 8,942,700 0.1780 0.4059 
1983 20,236,000 2,851,900 19,261,800 8,207,400 0.1900 0.4261 
1984 19,725,400 2,895,100 19,005,600 7,884,500 0.1950 0.4184 
1985 18,917,400 3,261,000 17,936,100 8,649,800 0.2319 0.4833 
TOTAL 134,670,100 21,304,900 129,805,800 53,673,800   
Average 19,292,117 3,550,817 21,634,300 8,945,633 0.205 0.418 





Table 2.5 highlights the contribution of the three main agricultural exports from Grenada 
and the relative share of each crop to the country‘s commodity export. Cocoa‘s share 
experienced consistent decline from EC$18.2M in 1980 to EC$8.5M in 1985, while that 
of banana declined from EC$10.7M in 1980 to EC$8.6M in 1985.  
Table 2.5 Grenada‘s Major Commodity Agricultural Exports, as a Percentage of Total 
Exports, 1980 and 1985 
Commodity exports (Units) Year 
  1980 1985 
Cocoa (EC$M) 18.2 12.2 
Nutmeg (EC$M)  10.4 14.9 
Bananas (EC$M) 10.7 8.6 
Total - three commodities (EC$M) 39.3 35.7 
Total Grenada exports (EC$M) 45.5 59.0 
Three commodities share of all exports (%) 86.4 61.1 
Nutmeg‘s share of the three commodity exports (%) 26.5 41.7 
Nutmeg share of total exports (%) 22.9 25.3 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Grenada. 1992 
The performance of the above export commodities (nutmeg, cocoa, bananas) in the early 
1980s therefore paints a picture of an agricultural sector beset by volatile, declining prices 
and income earnings. The evidence shows that the share of agriculture in GDP declined, 
while continuing to be of economic and social importance to Grenada. From Table 2.1 it 
can be deduced that while in 1980 the share of agriculture and the three main 
commodities were 23.8 and 20.9 per cent respectively the shares had declined to 14.0 
and 11.5 per cent respectively in 1985. However, the nutmeg sector was deemed to be 
the one with the most economic and social significance (see 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Further, as 
Table 2.5 shows nutmeg‘s share in the export revenue from the three agricultural 
commodities grew substantially from 26.5 per cent in 1980 to 41.7 per cent in 1985 and its 
share in the total exports of Grenada grew from 22.9 to 25.3 per cent over the same 
period. At the international level, nutmeg was the only one of the three major primary 
export commodities for which Grenada had sufficient international market power to have 
any chance of influencing the world supply and price.    
With volatile but overall declining revenue earnings from the major agricultural export 
commodities, the island‘s overall trading performance was negatively affected as 
demonstrated by the widening trade deficit (Table 2.6). The deficit expanded at a rate 
much greater than the combined (domestic4 and foreign5) export earnings, as imports in 
                                                          
 
5




real value terms exceeded exports by 1995 per cent over the period. On an annual basis 
the real difference between the imports and exports also showed significant difference to 
as much as more than EC$100 Million between 1982 and 1985. It was against this 
background that the economic and political leaders sought to seek innovative 
mechanisms and instruments to stem this decline in the terms of trade. One of the 
mechanisms chosen was the attempt to form a nutmeg cartel. 
 
2.3.4 Impact of Revenue from Nutmeg on Grenada‘s Economy 
The fluctuating and generally declining revenues from the export of nutmeg impacted 
Grenada‘s economy at different levels: (a) on trade balances; (b) the income of the 
GCNA, (c) and the incomes of individual nutmeg farmers. These will be discussed in 
the following sections and chapters of this thesis. Another impact of the  generally 
declining earnings from nutmegs was the number of farmers who were unable to 
maintain their loan payments from the commercial banks and the Grenada 
Development Bank. As a result, many of their payments were in default which, in 
Grenadian society, carries a social stigma. The Grenada Development Bank was 
particularly hard hit as it was the main source of loan financing for farmers (interview 
with Lord, 19 March, 2015). 
The export performance of the visible nutmeg, cocoa, bananas had direct impacts on 
the country‘s balance of trade, the difference between the country‘s exports and its 
imports (Madura, 2006). The data from Table 2.6 show that between 1980 and 1985, 
the country suffered continuous and growing trade deficits. The total balance of 
Grenada‘s visible trade for the years 1980 to 1985 was a deficit of EC$617,661,300. 
Further the deficit grew over this period. In 1980 the deficit was EC$ 88,627,900. By 
1985 the deficit had climbed to EC$126,664,500, an increase by approximately 43 per 
cent. While earnings from exports increased by 28.5 per cent over this period, the 
increase in imports was almost 38 per cent. 
This unsustainable trading situation is a feature of developing countries‘ reliance on 
primary commodities for export earnings and the dependence on imports for investment in 







Table 2.6 Grenada Balance of Visible Trade, 1980 –1985 (Thousand EC$) 
 Source. Developed by researcher from data obtained from Central Statistics Office. 
(Grenada) 
 
2.3.5 Balance of Trade as a Percentage of GDP 
One indicator of the adverse trade and economic situation The general decline which 
occurred in Grenada during the period 1980-85 is the high and growing could be gleaned 
from a comparison of the balance of trade as per cent of to the GDP.  Table 2.7 shows 
that the deficit in the balance of trade experienced slight fluctuations between 1980 and 
1985, ranging from 43.5 per cent in 1980 to 41.6  per cent in 1983 37.7 per cent in 1984 
and 41 in 1985 as imports continued to outstrip exports. The trading and economic 
situations highlighted a real development challenge faced by developing countries, i.e. the 
persistence of trade deficits, which is generally financed by borrowing, remittances and 
increased taxes among other measures. 
Moreover, the table shows the general trend of increasing trade deficits, and the generally 
widening gap between the GDP and the deficit, which demonstrated the country‘s inability 
to finance its imports from its exports, and highlights the deteriorating terms of trade. 
The preceding analysis provides important economic and trade background against which 
the GCNA stakeholders, including the Government of Grenada, contemplated closer 
collaboration with Indonesia to control the international nutmeg market. The proposed 
cartel arrangement could have only been contemplated for nutmeg and not any of the 
other commodities (cocoa and banana) since the potential for such a cartel existed with 
nutmeg because of the high market share held by Grenada and an even higher share by 
its prospective partner Indonesia. In the case of banana and cocoa, Grenada was such a 
small producer that it could not have been an instigator of a cartel or marketing 
agreement. The following section provides a broader overview of Grenada‘s nutmeg 





























1981 50,275 1,081 51,356 9.4 146,709 8.2 (95,353) 
1982 47,748 2,338 50,086 -2.5 152,429 3.9 (102,342) 
1983 50,711 1,076 51,787 3.4 154,479 1.3 (102,691) 
1984 47,858 1,256 49,114 -5.2 151,095 -2.2 (101,981) 
1985 59,000 1,332 60,332 22.8 186,997 23.8 (126,664) 














Trade deficit as % 
to GDP 
1980 205.50 86,28 42.0 
1981 217.64 95.35 43.8 
1982 233.00 102,34 43.9 
1983 246.33 102,69 41.6 
1984 270.45 101.98 37.7 
1985 309.57 126,66 40.9 
Total 1,482.49 615.31 41.5 
 
Source: Developed by researcher from data obtained from the Central Statistical Office 
 
2.4 The Structure of the Grenada Nutmeg Industry 
The Grenada nutmeg industry, in this dissertation, refers to the entire production and 
marketing systems for nutmeg and mace including nutmeg farmers, the GCNA, 
Government of Grenada, the financial institutions in Grenada, overseas agents and 
suppliers of inputs for the growing, storing and exports of nutmeg.  
Some historical context on how nutmeg production came to Grenada and the nature of the 
products will now be provided. The nutmeg tree (Myristicafragrans) is indigenous to the 
Indonesian Moluccas islands. The plant was introduced to Grenada in 1843 (Brizan, 
1978). The tree is tropical evergreen which grows to a height of approximately 75 feet 
(about 23 meters). It produces a peach-like, fleshy fruit from which two separate spices 
are obtained, nutmeg and mace. The nutmeg is the seed in the pericarp6. The seed itself 
is covered with a frill-like scarlet aril, called mace. Interestingly, the nutmeg has become 
an iconic part of Grenada‘s folklore as it is the subject of literature and a musical 
performed locally and overseas The Princess (Keens-Douglas, 1992), which riddles: ―The 
lady in a boat with a red petticoat.‖ The answer is the nutmeg which is one of the symbols 
on the national flag. 
 
2.4.1 The harvesting and Processing of nutmeg 
Nutmeg production takes place year round with peak periods being April/June and 
September/October (Renwick, nd). Approximately nine months after the flowering of the 
nutmeg tree, the fruit ripens and the pericarp splits open, allowing the nut to fall to the 
ground. In order to maintain a grade one quality for the mace, some farmers used bamboo 
rods to pick the fruit from the tree. In this way, the mace was firmer and of grade one 
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 The pericarp is a round fleshy yellow pod in which the nutmeg seed is located until it is sufficiently 




quality, free of mildew (black, white or grey) and mould, and able to sustain more 
handling. 
When the nut falls to the ground, it is collected and separated from the mace. The nutmeg 
is then delivered within a day or two to Nutmeg Receiving Stations. They are then placed 
on drying shelves for approximately eight weeks. On completion of the drying process, the 
nutmeg is then transported from the smaller receiving stations to one of the three 
specialised processing stations to continue the drying, sorting and storage processes in 
preparation for export. 
Almost all of the nutmegs produced were exported. Insignificant amounts were used 
locally in the food industry and local tourist industry (Renwick, nd). The preparation of 
nutmeg and mace for the export market involved additional processes. In the case of 
nutmeg, they included drying, de-shelling – when the moisture content is 10 per cent 
(UNFAO, 2004) – a water (flotation) test for oil content and quality, a second phase of 
drying for another 24 hours (Renwick, nd) and, finally, bagging and treatment for shipping.   
In the case of mace, once the nutmegs were collected from the field, they were removed 
from their shells which enclosed the nut and the mace was put out to dry in the sun by the 
local farmers. When dried, they were sold in grades 1 and 2 to GCNA which stored them 
in bins for about six months, after which they were graded again, by hand and mostly by 
women, before being exported to Europe and North America on demand.  
 
2.4.2 The Chemistry of Nutmeg and Mace  
It is important to obtain some understanding of the chemistry of the nutmeg. One of the 
main reasons for the purchase of nutmeg is for the extraction of its chemical properties for 
industrial use. 
According to Daniel (1994), the nutmeg seed consists of 30-55 per cent oils and 45-65 per 
cent solid matter, including cellulose materials. He identifies two types of oils: essential 
oils of nutmegs also known as ―volatile oil,‖ and fixed oil of nutmeg referred to as ―nutmeg 
butter.‖ He adds that essential oils contain the highest number of individual compounds or 
components most valuable to industries. They contain 12 compounds with sabinese and 
camphene, each constituting 50 per cent of the essential oils. These essential oils are 
generally used in the manufacture of antiseptic, soap and perfume (Brizan, 1984, citing 
Trease and Evans, 1976). 
The other main spice from the nutmeg is mace, which contains 10 per cent fixed oil 




essential oil (Brizan, 1979). The industries that use both nutmeg and mace are meat and 
food processing, pharmaceutical and service sectors such as restaurants and bakeries, as 
well as retail and households.   
 
2.4.3 The Creation and Structure of the Grenada Cooperative Nutmeg Association 
The Grenada Nutmeg Industry Act (1947) established the structure of the Grenada 
nutmeg industry and the GCNA in particular, comprising of, producers, government, 
banks, external agents and brokers. The GCNA is a cooperative of nutmeg farmers, 
developed and protected by law for the purposes of buying and exporting nutmegs. Prior 
to 1947, the export of nutmeg was undertaken in a very competitive environment by 
traders and agents, some of whom were nutmeg plantation owners. This competitive 
system led to the traders playing the individual farmers against each other, which in turn 
led to low prices for the farmers (Brizan, 1984). This was possible since the traders 
bought nutmeg at the farm gate and the vast majority of farmers had no access to market 
information or alternative markets. 
It was that realization which led the farmers (small ones in particular) to demand a more 
equitable price and compensation system. The political pressure on the local legislature 
by the small farmers eventually convinced the then British Governor to provide support for 
the formation of what became the GCNA. On 17 March, 1942, a number of local nutmeg 
producers and producer exporters, under the leadership of N. Gay (a nutmeg plantation 
farmer), decided to form a Cooperative Association for the marketing of Grenada‘s 
nutmeg and mace (Jackson Commission Report, op. cit.).The decision was 
communicated via a resolution which in part reads:  
―That Government be asked to introduce legislation 
somewhat along the lines of the Cacao Reserve Pool Order, 
S.R. & O, and No. 8 of 1942 immediately. And further we 
agree that a working Committee be formed to formulate 
legislation for a Nutmeg Co-operative Association to be laid 
before Government with a view to remedying the disorderly 
marketing of nutmegs produced in the colony (Jackson 
Commission Report, 1951).‖ 
 
2.4.3.1 The Rationale for forming the GCNA 
The rationale for forming such an association was summed up in a dispatch from His 
Excellency the Governor Gimble to the Secretary of State for the colonies, No.12 dated 




―(a) to secure the stablest possible prices for the producers 
by putting an end to the cut–throat competition of 
independent exporters with each other in the open market; 
(b)to bestow upon producers some share of the profits of the 
export trade which is at present handled by middle-men; and 
(c)to increase the saleability of Grenada nutmegs and mace 
by setting standards of quality and providing for the efficient 
inspection and grading of wares destined for export.‖ 
 
2.4.3.2  Colonial Government Support for the Formation of the GCNA 
Governor A. Gimble (1945, p.2), in his dispatch, also 
expressed his support for the idea as presented by the 
committee under the leadership of Gay in these terms:  
―the objects of the producers and the historic reasons which 
have dictated them are, in short, identical ―Mutatis mutandis‖ 
with those which have secured approval for the 
establishment of co-operatives marketing associations in 
many other Colonies, including the Colony of St. Vincent, 
where the local arrowroot industry has benefitted greatly 
from investing a statutory Association with the powers of a 
sole exporter. I accordingly felt justified by established 
precedent in informing Mr. Gay at that stage that I 
sympathised with the general aim of the producers, and in 
asking him to keep me informally in touch with the progress 
of the movement.‖ 
The Working Committee lobbied and planned for almost five years and in 1946 submitted 
for adoption by the Legislative Council, the necessary legislation prepared by its Legal 
Adviser, F. M. Henry.  The bill was passed by the Legislative Council, but there were 
certain aspects to it that were found to be unsatisfactory by the Governor and Secretary of 
State for the colonies.  This led to the revision of the bill, which was later introduced and 
passed as ―The Nutmeg Industry Ordinance, 1946 (No. 8 of 1946).‖ The Ordinance 
provided for the establishment of a body corporate to be called the Grenada Cooperative 
Nutmeg Association. The Association came into being in March 1947 and began receiving 
nutmegs for export on the 1st October, 1947 (Jackson, op. cit.)  
 
2.4.3.3 Statutes and Provisions of the GCNA 
The legal framework that governs the GCNA is contained in Cap 25 of the Nutmeg 
Industry Ordinance, No. 8 of 1946, as amended by Ordinance Nos. 8 and 29 of 1947 and 
10 of 1949 (Cap. 215 1990 Revised Laws of Grenada). The major elements of the 




stakeholder power within the GCNA, as well as to present deeper insights into the 
legitimacy and functioning of the Association.  
Section 3 (1) of the Act constituted GCNA as a legal entity, with the power to enter into 
contracts.  It was granted the authority to be the sole entity to procure and sell all nutmegs 
produced in Grenada and intended for export.  
Section 3 (2) made provision for the Association to:  
(a) process and distil nutmegs and pericarp, and  
(b) manufacture products from the nutmeg or the pericarp, and sell or distribute the 
processed or distilled or manufactured products.‘ 
Section 4 provided that all growers of nutmegs were eligible for membership of the 
Association. 
Section 6 of the ordinance provided for the Association to be managed by the ―Nutmeg 
Board‖. This section of the ordinance continues to provide for the composition of the 
Board to consist of no less than seven and no more than nine persons.   
The functions of the Board, outlined in Section 6 (2) of the Ordinance, were to: 
(a) ―regulate and control the export of nutmegs; 
(b) promote, protect and develop the nutmeg Industry; 
(c) consider and advise the Minister in regard to all matters 
affecting the industry as may be referred to the Board by 
Government or which the Board considers should be 
submitted to Government, or which are referred to the 
Board by the Association;  
(d) expend and account for all expenditures of the Industry.‖  
Section 14 (1) of the ordinance further provided for six members to be elected from the 
membership of the Association by ballot, to become members of the Board in the month 
of May in each year at the annual general meeting, for the ensuing year that starts on July 
1. Section 14 (3) allowed for the Minister of Agriculture to nominate a maximum of three 
persons on the Board of Directors, of which one ought to be a public servant. The 
ordinance did not set out any other criteria by which a person could serve on the Board of 
Directors, except that of ―membership. It therefore excluded other persons who were non-
framers but were involved in other related activities such as value-added processors and 
financiers. The members of the Association therefore controlled the destiny not only of the 





The above section of the ordinance excluded non-farmers from direct participation in the 
operation of the industry and by so doing there was an inherent risk that the Board might 
in fact become its own ―Achilles‘ heel‖, unable to attract the talent needed to fulfill its 
mandate of promoting, protecting and developing the nutmeg industry. 
 
2.4.3.4 Structure and Administration of the GCNA 
Section 7 of the ordinance outlined the administration of the Association. It provided inter 
alia, for the Association to have its head office in the town of St. George. In addition to the 
head office, the Association, in 2004 operated 21 buying and processing depots (receiving 
and processing stations), comprising 18 receiving and three processing stations. Since 
the destruction caused by Hurricane Ivan in 2004, GCNA now has one process and seven 
receiving stations. 
 
2.4.3.5 The Power, Role and Functions of the Chairman and Board of Directors 
The Chairman is mentioned 24 times in the ordinance. This frequency is indicative of the 
role and influence of the position within the GCNA. With regard to the selection for 
chairmanship of the GCNA, the Act provided for the chairman to be elected by a majority 
of the Board members at the first Board Meeting (Section 36), and serve an initial two-
year term, but is eligible for re-election once he/she is a representative of the farmers or 
government.  
Section 37 provided for the chairman to be the ex–officio president of the Association, and 
to preside at every meeting of the Board and at general meetings of the Association. With 
regards to the Board, they had wide-ranging powers. For example, the ordinance provided 
for the Board to appoint: 
―(a) From time to time, any member to act as deputy 
chairman (Section 41)  
(b) So many committees and as such number of persons as 
seen fit (Section 64) 
(c) A person to be manager, who shall be Chief Executive 
Officer (Section 69, 1 and 2) 
(d)A fit and proper person to be Assistant Manager (Section 
70) 
(e)From time to time, the board with the consent of the 
Minister may appoint a fit and proper person to be 
Secretary, who may act as Manager/ Chief Executive Officer 
in the absence of the Manager and Assistant Manager or be 
the ex-officio treasurer of the Association (Section 74). 
(f)From time to time, such officers and employees as may be 




Association, and other employees as may be required for 
the proper administration of the Association (Section 78).‖ 
 
2.4.3.6 Powers of the Government and Minister of Agriculture 
The Nutmeg Industry Ordinance reflects the very essence of an organisation which would 
continue to be influenced by the principal stakeholders, namely the nutmeg farmers and 
the government through the Minister of Agriculture. Section 14 (3) provided that the 
names of the persons who were elected by the farmers be submitted to the Minister within 
14 days of such elections. This section definitely allowed the Minister to approve the 
elected officials. The said section also provided for the Minister to nominate a public 
officer to serve on the board, as well as giving him the power to nominate no more than 
two other persons. 
Section 15 granted the Minister the authority to fill vacancies on the Board on failure of the 
membership of the Association to elect sufficient members. Section 33 provided for the 
Minister to use his discretion to take such action in filling any vacancy on the Board, which 
would arise in the case of a nominated member. This section of the ordinance further 
states ―provided that if any such vacancy shall leave the board without a public officer, the 
Minister shall forthwith nominate such an officer for membership of the Board.‖ 
Section 34 further served to strengthen and consolidate the power of the government by 
granting the Minister the right to dissolve the Board. This section further provided: ―If the 
Board, in the judgment of the Minister, persistently makes default in the performance of 
the duties by this Act or by any other law of Grenada imposed upon it, or exceeds or 
abuses its powers, it shall be lawful for the Minister, by Order, to dissolve the Board.‖ This 
section has been evoked by successive Ministers over the life of the Association and as 
recently as May 2008 by the then Acting Minister of Agriculture, who accused the elected 
Board of mismanagement. 
Section 68 provided for the establishment of a Finance Committee to which the Minister 
―shall appoint‖ a public officer. This section further stated that in the event that there is 
more than one public officer on the board, the minster reserves the right to name the first 
officer nominated to the board to be the member on the finance committee. On the other 
hand the section provides for the Minister to nominate any of the other members who are 
not first elected to the Board, and the Board shall confirm to the desire of the Minister.  
Section 69 (1) granted the Minister overarching authority on the appointment of the 
manager of the Association in the sense that while the ordinance gave the Board the 
responsibility to appoint a manager, it nonetheless granted the authority to approve such 




The above sections sought to highlight the role of the Minister of Agriculture in making 
appointments to the Board and other committees at the strategic / policy level of the 
GCNA, thus demonstrating the strategic stakeholder participatory role of the government. 
The Act deepened the involvement of the government in the operations and administration 
functions of the GCNA. The following sections served to highlight the extent of such 
involvement. It highlights the extent to which the GCNA is vulnerable to political 
involvement by persons who may not have the sufficiency of technical and professional 
skills required for the proper performance of the GCNA. Political considerations may 
override technical competence in the appointment of such persons. 
Furthermore, section 70, while providing for the Board to appoint an Assistant Manager, 
said that such a person had to be confirmed by the Minister. Here again, the ordinance 
allowed the Minister to choose someone out of political considerations and not technical 
competence, thus compromising the efficiency of the GCNA. Sections 71 provided for the 
appointment of a Secretary, while section 72 made provision for the payment of the said 
post. Both decisions, however, had to be made with the consent of the Minister. 
The involvement of the Minister ran deeper into the GCNA, as seen in section 75 where 
the act authorises the appointment of an Assistant Secretary, who shall hold the office at 
the pleasure of the Board and the Minister. Section 85 provided for the ratification of any 
regulations made by the Board to be confirmed by the Minister. Similarly, the Act provided 
for the revocation of any regulation which ceased to have force or effect. Therefore, the 
practical effect of section 85 was to ensure that the Board of Directors and Management 
of the GCNA could not take any substantial actions – strategic/policy and administrative – 
without the consent of the Government via the Minister responsible for Agriculture. 
The role and powers vested in the Minister represent one of the avenues through which 
Government has, and continues to exercise, its legal claim as a primary stakeholder of the 
GCNA, as seen by the actions of the Minister in May 2008, when the Acting Minister of 
Agriculture, Michael Church, moved to dissolve the Board of Directors. The above 
sections served to establish the primary stakeholder role of the government in the GCNA, 
and put into context its support for the efforts to establish a cartel. These efforts will be 
detailed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.   
 
2.4.3.7. The Role of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
A second avenue through which the government‘s legitimate claim on the GCNA was 
enshrined was through the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance.  The role of 




function. In this regard, Section 59 (4) provided for the payment of membership fees of the 
Association to the Permanent Secretary, and for such a person, upon fulfillment of the 
other criteria, to obtain a membership card and a nutmeg producer book. Upon receipt of 
these two documents, then, and only then, did one become a legitimate member of the 
Association. The Ordinance also gives the Permanent Secretary the right to revoke such a 
membership, by cancelling the nutmeg book, and consequently the membership of the 
farmer. Despite the above provisions, the payments of fees have not been implemented 
for many years, and there is no record or recall of any cancellation of membership by the 
Association. 
Therefore, by virtue of the above elements of the Nutmeg Industry Ordinance, direction 
and management of the nutmeg industry was firmly placed in the hands of two primary 
stakeholders; namely, the GCNA and the Government of Grenada. Further discussions on 
the role of these stakeholders and their performance as experienced during the formation, 
operations and demise of the Nutmeg Cartel, will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6 of this 
dissertation. 
 
2.4.3.8 Internal Structure of the GCNA 
The structure of the GCNA is depicted in figure 2.2 for the period 1986 –1995; it provides 
a graphical depiction of the internal administration of the Association. It highlights the two 
main levels in the organisation, ranging from the national delegates to the Board of 
Directors at the policy level and the General Manager and the Departments at the 
operational level. 
The GCNA had a relatively flat organisational structure. As depicted in the internal 
hierarchical schematic (Figure 2.2), the national assembly of delegates was the highest 
decision-making body with the responsibility for electing the Board of Directors, and taking 
broad policy decisions, which included  decisions on bonus payments, loans and overdraft 
facilities, The next level of authority was the Board of Directors, which was responsible for 
implementing the decisions taken by the national delegates, within the guidelines set out 
in the Nutmeg Industry Ordinance No.8 of 1946. Finally, the Board of Directors was 
accountable to the farmers and the government through the Minister of Agriculture for the 




Figure 2.2 GCNA Internal Administrative Structure  
 
Source. Robertson, 2006 
. Notwithstanding the above provisions, the extent to which a Board fulfills the wishes of 
the national delegates is a function to which the said wishes are in coherence with the 
prevailing objectives of the Board at the time. The evidence to this will be discussed in 
chapter 5. This involves the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement, in which the 
national delegates requested that prior to visiting Indonesia for discussions on the 
Agreement, the Board should obtain proper counsel on the matter and prepare an agenda 
for that visit. This research found no evidence that this advice was acted upon. 
 
2.4.3.9 Role of the Manager / CEO and Functions of Department 
Section 69 (1) of the Nutmeg Industry Ordinance specifically provided a general outline of 
the role and responsibility of the Manager. According to this section,  
―the Board may appoint a fit and proper person to be 
Manager at such salary and upon such terms as his duties 
and functions and on such other conditions as the Ministry 
may approve.‖   
Subsection 2 outlined the powers of the Manager: ―The manager shall be the chief 
executive officer of the Association and shall have all such powers and perform all such 
duties as may be entrusted to him under subsection (1). The subsection further specifies 
that, 
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Farmers  




Board of Directors -  9 
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by Government , 6 
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 ―He shall attend all meetings of the Association and, if 
required by the Chairman so to do, the meetings of the 
Board and of every committee of the Board.‖ 
 Whereas in principle the above outlined the powers of the manager, the long practice 
within the GCNA was that the chairman takes in the role of the CEO and the manger 
becomes the implementer of the decisions of the Board and the wishes of the chairman. 
Anecdotal evidence known to the researcher as a result of his association with the GCNA 
confirms this view of the roles of the chairman and manager. The case of Renwick was an 
exception to this general practice.  
A third internal layer within the Association was the departments that report directly to the 
Manager. The Association had three departments: Shipping, Accounts and Administration. 
The Shipping Department was responsible for the preparation of all documentation for the 
exporting of nutmeg and mace. This included, but was not necessarily limited to, such 
activities as receiving the order, verifying the orders from the importer, verifying the 
availability of stocks, obtaining quotations on transportation (cargo) for shipping, 
preparation of relevant customs documents, etc.  
The Accounts Department was responsible for managing the finances of the Association. 
This included obtaining payments for sales and settling costs incurred by the Association. 
One of the major functions of this department was the preparation of the annual bonus 
payment. 
The Department of Administration was responsible for maintaining the overall proper 
administrative activities of the Association. They would conduct a series of activities that 
could be classified as customer service, human resource management and operations. 
There is no documented role for these departments. Whereas it is true that the core of 
their activities were fixed, there appears to be a tendency for the roles of these 
departments to change depending on the manager‘s leadership style and the level of 
activities of a particular Board. This was particularly the case of the Administration 
Department.  
 
2.4.3.10 Payment Structure 
The Association operated a dual payment system, one being an advanced payment, and 
the other a bonus (end of financial year) payment. On delivery of produce to the receiving 
stations, the producers were paid an advanced rate (Section 57) that was fixed each 
fortnight by the Board of Directors. The Act also provided for a ―bonus‖ payment to be paid 
at the end of every year of operations, representing the difference between the advanced 




of practice the board informed the assembly of delegates on the proposed bonus amount, 
to which the assembly discusses and offers advice, which may or may not be accepted by 
the Board. The issues surrounding the level of advance payments is one of the key 
functions of the Board; and for which the membership has no input, Nonetheless, the 
cultural mindset of the membership is set to the belief that  there has never been a time 
when an advanced price was too high. Finally, the Board members are remunerated at 
rates set and agreed upon by them. 
 
2.5. Marketing of Grenada‘s Nutmeg and the Global Value Chain (GVC)  
In order to facilitate the export of nutmeg and mace, the GCNA operated an international 
network of three agents, in Brussels, New York and Canada. The moving of nutmegs from 
farm to market required a series of steps which involved a number of players. The 
mapping of such a process is depicted in figure 2.3 below. It sets out the varied paths that 
nutmegs travelled as it reaches the foreign markets for consumption.  
Prior to the devastation of the nutmeg industry caused by Hurricane Ivan in 2004, 
Grenada, together with Indonesia, met approximately 90 per cent of the world‘s demand 
for nutmeg and mace. According to UNFAO (2004), annual world production of nutmeg 
was estimated to be 9,000 to 12,000 tons and mace 3,000 tons. Indonesia accounted for 
approximately 80 per cent, while Grenada accounted for approximately 10 per cent. The 
market for nutmeg and mace oil was estimated to be about 150 tons annually.  
The aspiration of farmers and the government and the people of Grenada was that this 
export commodity, once described as ―Grenada‘s Black Gold‖ (Brizan, 1979) would make 
a major contribution in the country‘s efforts to alleviate poverty, increase economic growth 
and improve living standards. However, the position of Grenada in the global value chain 
(GVC) for the commodity places a limit on the contribution that nutmeg exports can make 
to fulfilling these aspirations.   
The GVC provides a comprehensive schematic view of how nutmeg from Grenada finds 
its way on to the international market. It highlights the various stages and nodes it passes 
through. Grenada sold its nutmeg to importers via agents who deliver directly to 
importers/brokers in Europe and USA and Canada. Europe accounted for approximately 
80 per cent of GCNA annual sales. The brokers sold whole or broken nutmeg products to 
manufacturers/processors, who in turn converted the seeds into various types of oils and 
chemicals as per specifications for inputs into the food–processing, pharmaceutical and 




Figure 2.3 provides a simple schematic of the process flow of moving nutmeg from 
farmers‘ fields to the international markets. 









Source: Developed by researcher 
Figure 2.3 shows the six steps along the process flow involved in moving nutmegs from 
the farmers‘ fields to the market. The first involved the farmers‘ production and harvesting 
of nutmeg and mace for delivery to the GCNA‘s receiving and processing stations. The 
second stage was that performed by the GCNA receiving and processing station. They 
are involved in purchasing, basic primary processing activities such as grading of the nuts 
and mace, storage for exports, management of unsold stocks, and delivery of the 
products to the seaport for shipping to their various market destinations. In this stage, the 
GCNA sold the majority of its products to its overseas agents/brokers such as Catz 
International and Fooks & French. At the same time, it also sold a limited quantity of 
nutmegs to local retailers who packaged and sold to tourists and home users, including 
restaurants and bars. 
The next step in the process (stage 3), involved the brokers and agents. After purchasing 
bulk products from the GCNA, they then resold (at a margin) in smaller quantities to 
traders (4a in Figure 2.3) and processors (4b). The traders performed many functions 
including purchasing in smaller quantities, processing the product further to meet market 
requirements (such as cracking and mixing with nutmeg from other origins), and 
distributing smaller quantities to retailers and wholesalers, including specialist herbal 
shops, supermarkets and domestic users. Unlike the agents and brokers, they did not 
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maintain large stocks, whatever amounts they held were sufficient to meet the immediate 
needs of their market. 
On the other hand, the processors (4b) were once referred to as grinders. It is at this 
stage the major transformation of the nutmeg from seeds into different oils and chemical 
compounds such as myresticin and oleoresin for use in various sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals, food and beverage takes place. The next step (5) in the delivery process 
involved wholesalers and retailers who, based on the demand for the processed and 
semi-processed products, purchased from traders and processors.  
The final step (6) involved the industrial users/customers who used or made available the 
compounds and chemicals output from the processors to the type of customers mentioned 
in step 4. It is assumed that it is at this stage in the delivery process, that the most value 
added on nutmeg and mace are achieved, since the compounds/chemicals are mixed into 
recipes to produce the appropriate products. 
The figure shows that local participation in the GVC in Grenada was in the first two stages 
of the GVC (stage 1 in which farmers grew, harvested and delivered the nutmeg to the 
GCNA and stage 2 in which the GCNA processed the nutmeg for export). The rest of the 
activities such as distribution, marketing and sales, production of higher value added 
products were conducted by foreign companies which were likely to gain the most from 
the above activities. Additionally, from the governance of GVC perspective, it shows 
where control  of the chain resides. It resides close to the buyers who value it most as an 
input into higher value added products or as final consumption items.  
 
2.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The above provides critical background information on Grenada, the island which 
produces the second largest amount of nutmeg in the world (Indonesia being the largest 
supplier). It described the socio-economic conditions of the people, it scanned the 
economic landscape and outlined the economy of the country, but more important and 
specific to this dissertation, it established the central importance of nutmeg to export 
earnings and the GDP of the country, and by extension the welfare of the members of the 
GCNA and, indeed, the entire population. It provide the underlying rationale for the 
stakeholders of the GCNA to be interested in the formation of a nutmeg cartel during the 
period under review in this study.  
The chapter further discusses the legislative framework (Nutmeg Industry Ordinance Act, 
Chapter 215 of 1947) which identifies and establishes the major stakeholders of the 




presents a schematic overview of the stages Grenada‘s nutmegs follow from farm to 
market. By so doing, this chapter provides the context for GCNA‘s partnering with 
Indonesia in the formation, and later demise of a nutmeg cartel between the GCNA of 
Grenada and ASPIN from Indonesia during the period 1986-1992.  
Grenada‘s history and economy since being colonized by the Europeans were heavily 
based on the export of primary agricultural commodities to Europe and other parts of the 
world. The geography and climate of the tri-island state were conducive to agriculture, 
given the rich volcanic soil and largely favourable tropical climate. The local population 
was largely agrarian, with government, retail trade, restaurants and hotels proving an 
increasing share of the island‘s economic activities (GDP). In the 1980s the agriculture 
sector, mainly bananas, cocoa and nutmeg, experienced generally low and declining 
prices, and efforts were made to stop this decline and increase prices in order to prevent 
any further decline in the agricultural industry, where possible, evidenced by GCNA‘s 
attempt at entering into a cartel relationship with ASPIN of Indonesia, which failed but 
achieved short-term price increases. The global demand for nutmeg and its by-products in 
the pharmaceutical, food and other industries, has helped to create a meaningful 
livelihood for thousands of Grenadian families over the decades and contributes to the 
country‘s national income and foreign exchange earnings, particularly when the prices are 
good.  
The GCNA, being a monopsony organisation; the sole purchaser and exporter of nutmegs 
in Grenada, by reason of the 1947 Nutmeg Industry Ordinance Act, was positioned to 
build a massive infrastructure across the state that allowed it to manage the purchase, 
processing, sales and export of all nutmegs to the outside world, i.e. it controlled the 
supply of nutmeg in Grenada. The proceeds were used to improve the standard of living 
of its members and, by extension, the nation. The Grenada Government has taken a great 
regulatory and management stake in the industry, given its importance for the nation‘s 
balance of trade and GDP.  
This chapter has further discussed the legislative framework which identified and 
established the major stakeholders of the GCNA. It highlighted the major aspects of the 
ordinance as it relates to this dissertation and presented a schematic overview of 
Grenada‘s nutmeg value chain. By so doing, this chapter provides the context for GCNA‘s 
attempts at partnering with Indonesia in the formation and demise of a nutmeg cartel 
between the GCNA of Grenada and ASPIN from Indonesia, during the period 1986-1992. 
However, the analysis of the period extends to 1995 in order to discuss the second 






Chapter 3 - Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study is about the failed attempt by one set of primary stakeholders, the Board of 
Directors of the GCNA, to form a nutmeg cartel with ASPIN of Indonesia. It examines the 
reasons for undertaking such an initiative, the absence of the preconditions necessary for 
cartel formation and sustainability and the reasons for the failure of the attempt. The study 
has a number of facets and therefore a review of work in a number of areas related to 
these facets has been undertaken.  
Section 3.2 reviews aspects of the stakeholder literature since the motivations and actions 
stakeholders are relevant for understanding the attempts at forming the cartel and later 
actions. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on cartels in general, and agricultural 
commodity cartels in particular since at the core of the study is the attempt to form a cartel 
and its failure. Section 3.4 focuses on issues relating to the global value chain, since the 
issue of the relative retention of value added in producing countries is a core motive 
driving the desire for collusive agreements such as cartels. Section 3.5 deals with 
information asymmetry by examining the disparity which exist in agent-buyer 
relationships. Section 3.6 presents the summary and conclusion of this chapter. 
 
3.2 Stakeholder Theory and Its Importance for This Study 
One broad definition of stakeholder theory is that it is,  
 ―a view of capitalism that stresses the interconnected 
relationships between a business, its customers, suppliers, 
employees, investors, communities and others who have a 
stake in the organisation‖ (http://stakeholdertheory.org).  
This section explores and defines key concepts, processes, framework and perceptions 
from the stakeholder literature to provide the theoretical and contextual basis for 
explaining why some of the key stakeholders made decisions and acted in the ways in 
which they had done in relation to the performance of the GCNA and with respect to the 
formation and collapse of GCNA‘s relationship with ASPIN. 
The literature on stakeholder theory contains many authors and definitions of 
stakeholders, which is not required to be repeated in this thesis. This review focuses on a 
few pertinent definitions. According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders are those who are 
affected by and/or who can affect the achievement of the firm‘s objectives. Stakeholders 




benefits and to whom the organisation has therefore incurred obligations of fairness. 
Typically, these include groups such as employees, customers, suppliers and 
communities (Phillips, 2004). It is also argued that stakeholders need not be limited to 
individuals or groups, but may also be inanimate objects such as the earth or animate 
beings such as animals (Schlange, 2009). Finally, Crane and Matten (2010, p.62), define 
a stakeholder as; 
―an entity, which either is hampered by, or benefits from the 
corporation, or whose rights can be violated, or have to be 
respected by the corporation.‖   
Much of the stakeholder literature focuses on business corporations and how they 
balance the interests and concerns of stakeholders. For example, Greenley and Foxall 
(1997) used the stakeholder approach to study consumer and non-consumer stakeholder 
orientation of UK companies, and found that a frequent problem faced by companies 
trying to balance the competing interests of stakeholders is both the scarcity of resources 
and skill capacity, along with the complexity that is brought about by networks of strategic 
alliances. Others, such as Harrison and St. John (1998) used it to study the management 
and partnering with external stakeholders, and found that partnering yields benefits such 
as an increased success rate of products, and more favourable regulatory policies. Gupta, 
Polonsky, Woodside and Webster (2010) used it to examine the use of external forces on 
cartel networking dynamics, and found that the bargaining power of intermediaries 
increases with the advent of new and powerful actors, and that international regulators are 
less favourable to cartels like De Beers7.  
Prior to the erosion of the relationship between De Beers and its intermediary partners 
(actors), De Beers was one of the most successful and longest lasting cartels, controlled 
by one family, first the Rhodes family (until the death of Cecil Rhodes in 1902) and then 
the Oppenheimer family, in one form or other, to today (Gupta et al, 2010 citing Spar, 
2006a). Prior to the 1980s, as a single cartel De Beers controlled both the supply and 
demand of resources, as the company was both a producer and purchaser in the 
exchange process (Gupta, et al., 2010). This dual role gave De Beers comprehensive 
control over the supply and demand for diamonds (hence its monopolistic cartel). 
However, during the 1980s De Beers‘s operation was affected by external political 
changes which were occurring in South Africa and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). These changes led to the erosion of government support for a cartel, which 
eventually led to new entrants into the market, resulting in competition, This, in turn, led to 
a loosening of the network relationships between  De Beers and its network partners 
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 De Beers was the world‘s diamond cartel based in South Africa, operating as both a buyer and 




(actors, intermediaries), allowing them to become competitors themselves, thus 
fundamentally eroding De Beers‘s control of the market.  
Oates (2013) uses stakeholder theory for explanation of institutional changes. Stakeholder 
theory has also been used to study social entrepreneurship to provide a descriptive case 
to demonstrate stakeholder salience on management salience (Burga and Rezanaia, 
2016). Details on salience are discussed in section 3.2.3.  
Notwithstanding its widespread use, Mainardes et al (2011) called for more studies of 
stakeholder theory as it relates to organisational performance. For this study, the 
stakeholder approach has been adapted to examine the influence of principal 
stakeholders on a cooperative‘s decision-making, since most of the literature on the 
subject matter referred is concerned with the decision makers within commercial 
enterprises balancing the interests of owners and managers against the other 
stakeholders. However, this researcher‘s interest in this case touches on how the 
ownership and governance structure of the GCNA and the influence of external 
stakeholders affect the decision made by the GCNA, and those who benefit from its 
commercial success, as it pursued a failed attempt to form a cartel. 
 
3.2.1 The Development of the Stakeholder View of the Firm 
Stakeholder theorists‘ views contrast with the neo-classical stockholder approach which 
argues that corporations belong to stockholders and therefore must be run in their interest 
(Kaler, 2006 and Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). The stakeholder theory holds that groups, 
even those without economic claims on an enterprise, should be taken into consideration 
when decisions are being made by the organisation (Kuratko, Hornsby, & Goldsby, 2007). 
According to Freeman et al (2004), values (and not just maximising value for 
shareholders) are a part of doing business. Kochan and Rubinstein (2002) suggest that 
corporations should cause a fair corporate value distribution to stakeholders. 
On the other hand, a stockholder is defined as: ―an individual, group, or organization that 
holds one or more shares in a company and in whose name the share certificate is 
issued, also called shareholder; (British); ―A company or individual who holds supplies for 
manufacturers‖ (http://www.businessdictionary.com). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the 
differences between the stockholder‘s and stakeholder‘s view of the firm. In figure 3.1 (the 
stockholder`s view), the arrows are uni-directional, showing the relationship that the 
claimants affect the firm but that the firm has no effect on its claimants, while figure 3.2 
(the stakeholder‘s view) shows that claimants affect and are affected by the firm in a two-





Figure 3.1 Stockholder/ Investor View of Firm 
 
Source: Turnbull (1996,n.d) 
Figure 3.2 Stakeholder View of the Firm
 
Adapted from Freeman (1984: p. 25) 
 
Stakeholder theory has developed in response to two drivers. One was the reaction to the 
traditional neoclassical economic position on businesses pursuing profit maximisation and 






















fundamentally a reflection of human behaviour, there are always contrasts between 
narrow self-interest and concern for others. Hence, stakeholder theory sought to widen 
this latter concern. The other driver was the attempt to provide an explanation of the 
financial and economic turbulence affecting businesses in the USA in the 1980s 
(Freeman, 1984; Abzug andWebb, 1999, citing Savage, et al., 1991).  
 
3.2.2 Strands in Stakeholder Theory 
This section will discuss the different strands of stakeholder theory and their 
interconnectedness. Donaldson and Preston (1995) distinguish three strands: descriptive, 
instrumental and normative.  
Figure 3.3 shows that these three strands are not necessarily disaggregated but are 
nested  
within each other, with the outer circle representing the descriptive aspect which 
represents and explains the practice; the middle circle representing the Instrumental 
aspect which provides support to the descriptive and possesses predictive powers; and 
the inner circle which represents the normative aspect. 
Figure 3.3 Three Aspects of Stakeholder Theory 
 
Source: Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 73. 
 
3.2.2.1 Descriptive Theory 
According to Zanden and Sandberg (2009, p.7), the descriptive strand describes and 
explains ―specific corporate characteristics and behaviours.‖ A number of researchers 
have used this strand to describe the characteristics and behaviours of firms. They 
include: Brenner and Cochran (1991) who described the nature of the firm (1991); Wang 
and Dewhirst (1992) who focused on issues involving the board of directors and how they 
think of the interest of corporate constituencies; and Clarkson (1991) and Rowley (1997) 








Donaldson and Preston (1995, p.71) further propose that, 
 
―the descriptive aspect of stakeholder theory reflects and 
explains the past, present and future states of affairs of 
corporations and their stakeholders. Simple description is 
common and desirable in the exploration of new areas and 
usually expands to generate exploratory and predictive 
propositions. (All such activities shall be called descriptive).‖ 
 
 Brenner and Cochran (1991) use stakeholder theory to, inter alia, describe how 
organisations operate and help predict their behaviour. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Instrumental Theory 
The instrumental strand deals with the financial effects on the corporation, of the firm‘s 
actions towards stakeholders (Jones, 1995; Egels, 2004, citing Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). These researchers suggest that there are two different and inconsistent 
interpretations of instrumental stakeholder theory. The narrow instrumental strand is 
defined by Donaldson and Preston (1995) as a framework for examining the connections, 
if any, between the practice of stakeholder management and the achievement of various 
financial performance goals. The broad instrumental stakeholder theory, as represented 
by Jones (1995) and Berman et al. (1999), has as its main focus an analysis of the type of 
relationship the firm should have with its stakeholders in order to maximise value. 
 
According to Berman et al (1999), the broad instrumental interpretation is close to 
shareholder value maximisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Friedman, 1970). The 
development of instrumental stakeholder theory has been accredited to Jones (1995), 
who used economic literature and the preponderance of asymmetrical information in the 
marketplace to argue, that if firms act ethically they are likely to be more competitive, 
which is synonymous with maximising shareholder value. Moreover, Jones (1995) based 
his theory on the following three assumptions about the firm-stakeholder relationship:   
 
(a) Firms have relationships, called contracts, with many stakeholders and can therefore 
be seen as a ‗nexus of contracts‘ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or a set of principal–
agent relationships between managers (as agents) and their stakeholders (as 
principals)‖; 
(b) Firms are run by professional managers who are their contracting agents; and 
(c) Firms exist in markets in which competitive pressures do influence behaviour but do 





The use of the instrumental strand in this thesis gives rise to the attendant issue of agency 
theory. This issue is of importance to this thesis in two respects: first, for theoretical 
reasons, as it is intertwined with stakeholder theory, as agents are stakeholders of 
organizations; secondly, from a practical and operational point of view, since the case 
involves the decision-making of the board of directors of GCNA, who are agents for the 
broader membership of the GCNA. Additionally, the development and demise of the cartel 
between the GCNA and ASPIN involve the use of various actors who were acting on 
behalf of the principals in the case. 
 
3.2.2.3 Normative Theory 
The third strand (normative) prescribes how organisations ought to treat stakeholders. It 
contends that firms should consider stakeholder interests, not only for instrumental or 
strategic purposes, or because the stakeholder is perceived to possess power, legitimacy 
or an urgent claim on the organisation (Mitchel et al., 1997), but also out of moral 
obligation (Butterfield, Reed, & Lemax, 2004). 
Whereas these three strands appear to be clearly distinct, Jones and Wicks (1999) argue 
that there is an overlap between normative and instrumental strands of the theory. An 
example of such overlap is cited in (Butterfield, et al., 2004) descriptive case analysis, 
which has instrumental and normative implications for stakeholders and target firms. The 
case involved the United States Department of Energy‘s attempts to clean up three 
nuclear sites which were closed and the extent to which collaboration between the various 
stakeholder groups – mainly government and the community-- was inclusive. It was found 
that the instrumental stakeholder perspective focused on how relationships with the 
stakeholder groups can be managed. This view closely resembles the normative strand 
which focused on the end result of management actions, i.e. the ethical outcomes of why 
managers should pay attention to certain stakeholder groups and the obligations which 
accompanies such actions. The descriptive strand was used to describe and tell the story 
of the sites. These represent the overlap which has been cited above. 
 
3.2.3 Theoretical Underpinning of Stakeholder Identification 
The literature on stakeholder identification8 and salience9 contain divergent views on who 
should be considered to be stakeholders (Pouloudi and Whitley, 1997) or who really 
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 Stakeholder identification refers to knowing what kind of stakeholder actually exist (Mitchell, Agle 
and Wood (1997), 
9
 Stakeholder salience refers to the priority which should be placed on the type of stakeholder 




matters and who counts (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997). It aims to provide a basis for 
resolving some of the differences in definitions and assumptions about who the 
stakeholders are. In other words, the use and application of the framework, as presented 
in Table 3.1, is decidedly context-driven. For example, Freeman (1984), used the 
framework to evaluate the impact of the external environment on organisations. Preston 
and Sapienza (1990), Evan and Freeman (1988), and Jones (1995) also used the 
framework to bring to bear ethical considerations as a basis for assigning benefits to 
various interest groups  
The stakeholder identification framework calls for identifying the relevant groups or 
stakeholders in relation to the issue(s) to be addressed. In order to achieve this, 
Freeman‘s (1984) definition of a stakeholder, and Mitchell et al.‘s (1997), stakeholder 
identification and salience framework in which salience is defined as, ―the degree to which 
managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims‖ (Eesley and Lenox, 2006, p.766) 
are used, and given the nature of this case study, the term management here will be 
interpreted to mean the Board of Directors of the GCNA. This is further discussed in 
chapter 4. 
Stakeholder analysis is necessary not only to identify the stakeholder groups, but also to 
clarify the consequences of their actions in connection with organisational changes. It is 
important to identify all stakeholders for the purpose of identifying their impact in relation 
to this study. 
This thesis uses Mitchell et al. (1997) methodology of identifying stakeholders‘ attributes 
of power to influence the firm. Mitchell et al (1997) draw on the work of Etzoni (1964, p.59) 
who defined ―power as the extent one has or can gain access to coercive (physical 
means), utilitarian (material means) or normative (prestige, self-esteem, social) means to 
improve their well-being.‖  Legitimacy is taken from the work of Suchman (1995, p.574), 
who defined legitimacy as a, 
 ―generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, belief and 
definition. Mitchell et al (1997, p.967) defined urgency as it 
relates to the stakeholder‘s claim on the firm as ― the degree 
to which stakeholders claims call for immediate attention, 
where the ‗degree‘ depends not just on time-sensitivity but 
also on how critical the relationship is with the stakeholder 
or the importance of their claim.‖  
It is argued that the more attributes stakeholders are perceived to have, the greater their 




According to Friedman and Miles (2006), citing Flagestad and Hope (2004), classes of 
stakeholders can be identified by the possession of one or more of three attributes: power, 
urgency and legitimacy. The issue of stakeholder influence and power was also discussed 
by Baumfield (2016), who indicated that if stakeholder influence (i.e., salience) in both 
commercial and political arenas is based on power, then the key to increasing customer 
influence is to increase their power. These attributes will be discussed in the following 
section using the construct of Mitchell et al. (1997) summarised in Table 3.3. 
Table 3. 1 Stakeholder Constructs  
Construct  Definition 
1. Power A relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get 
another social actor, B, to do something that B would not have 
otherwise done. 
Bases Coercive – force / threat  
Utilitarian – material / incentives 
Normative – symbolic influences 
2. Legitimacy  A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values and beliefs 
Bases Individual, organisational, societal 
3. Urgency  The degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention 
Bases Time sensitivity – the degree to which managerial delay in attending to 
the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder 
Critical – the importance of the claim or the relationship to the 
stakeholder 
Source: Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997, p.869). 
The above framework has been criticised by many, including Wolfe and Putler (2002), for 
the method used in determining the groups, and for presenting a segmentation approach 
drawn from the marketing field. Williams and Zinkin (2006) criticised the impossibility of 
serving groups with conflicting interests, while Kaler (2006) argued that the definition is 




concerns, the framework of Mitchell et al. (1997) has been supported by Gago and Antolin 
(2004) as acceptable in the mainstream of the stakeholder literature. 
According to Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) in using the stakeholder analysis framework, 
it is important to address four critical issues: (a) determining what is a stake and who has 
the right to it; (b) determining the stake of each group; (c) determining how well 
expectations are met, and (d) adjusting strategy. The following addresses each of these 
critical issues. 
 
3.2.4 What Is a Stake and Who Has a Right to It 
Freeman (1984) identified three groups of ―stakes‖: equity stakes, which are those held by 
persons who have direct ownership in the organisation; economic stakes, which are held 
by persons with an economic interest but not an ownership interest such as employees, 
suppliers, etc.; and influencer stakes, which are held by persons with the propensity to 
exert influence (e.g., government agencies, consumer advocates, etc.). 
 
This step is a critical aspect of this study, since it helps bring the spotlight on the rationale 
for the interventions undertaken by the Board of Directors of the GCNA in attempting to 
establish the cartel, and as a consequence, which of the stakeholder groups were 
expected to be the main beneficiaries of such interventions (i.e., who had the right to 
benefit from such a stake or the interest to be derived from the nutmeg cartel). In this 
regard, the Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) framework will be used to identify the 
stakeholders of the GCNA. 
 
3.2.4.1 Determining the Stake of Each Group  
It is necessary to distinguish what is meant by a ―stake‖ since the stakeholder theory is 
based on the concept of ―stake‖ or ―interest‖ (Freeman, 1984). There are two schools of 
thought on what determines the ―stake‖ of a group.  One school represented by Ring and 
Van De Ven (1994) argues that for a stake to exist there must be an actual relationship 
with the firm. The other school, represented by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) argues 
that the potential relationship can be as relevant as the actual one. It ought to be 
recognised that stakes can also evolve over time, since what is an ethical issue today may 
be an economic or legal one tomorrow (Carroll, 1999). Moreover, Carroll (1996 p.73) 
argues that, 
 ―to appreciate the concept of stakeholders, it helps to 




share in an undertaking. The idea of a stake... can range 
from simply an interest in an undertaking at one extreme to 
a legal claim of ownership at the other extreme.‖ 
 
3.2.4.2 Determining How Well Expectations are met 
The extent to which expectations are met depends on the stake of the particular 
stakeholder group in the organisation. The stakeholder management principle suggests 
that management strategy must reflect the interest of its various stakeholders (Noland & 
Phillips, 2010).  
Different stakeholders have different and competing expectations (Grimmer, et al., 1999; 
Polonsky, 1995; Donaldson, 1999; Unerman and Bennet, 2004). According to Friedman 
and Miles (2006), investors‘ interests are to maximise profits and managers to increase 
their power and influence (David, 2005). Moreover, many consider stakeholder 
management as part of a firm‘s strategy (Hillman, et al.,2001; Markides, 2003) which 
allows it to succeed, by creating and exploiting a unique strategic position in the industry. 
Additionally, Friedman and Miles (2006) point to two research projects conducted in 
England by Ogden and Watson (1999), which found some alignment of conflicting 
concerns by different stakeholder groups, but little evidence of management responding to 
diverse stakeholder interests.   
 
3.2.4.3 Adjusting the Strategy  
It is a truism that firm-stakeholder relationships are very complex (Johnson-Cramer and 
Berman, 2010), and therefore it is difficult to effectively meet expectations on an ongoing 
basis without adjustment to strategies. This involves readjusting corporate priorities to 
bring the firm in line with stakeholders‘ interests (Polonsky, 1995, citing Roberts and King, 
1989). According to Pitts and Lei (2003), strategy refers to the plans and programs 
employed to compete successfully. Therefore, successful and sustainable organisations 
require strategic adjustment to their strategy (De Wit and Meyer, 1994; Hammer and 
Champy, 1993). It therefore means that the continuous realignment of strategy is a key 







3.2.4.4 Stakeholder Classification and Legitimacy 
In addressing the issue of stakeholder classification, Freeman (1984) classifies 
stakeholders based on two dimensions: (1) the nature of the stakeholder group‘s stake in 
the organisation, as explained by their ownership, economic, or social stake, and (2) the 
type of influence which the stakeholder group has on the behaviour of the organisation. 
Such an influence can be described as formal, contractual, regulatory, economic and 
political. By undertaking such a classification, managers like the Board of Directors of the 
GCNA, can better understand the needs and power of their stakeholders (Harrison and St. 
John, 1994). Table 3.2 serves to explain Freeman‘s classification.  
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All paid managers and 
directors of for-profit 
and non-profit 
organisations 













Social Regulatory agencies 
Unpaid trustees and 








Source: Adapted from Freeman (1984, p.63) 
Table 3.2 serves to provide some overarching directions in helping to identify the 
claimants to organisations‘ resources, and their influences on its strategy and actions. The 
definition offered by Freeman (1984) on stakeholder theory also implies that there exist 
internal (primary) and external (secondary) stakeholders. Preston and Post (1975) 
theorised that the stakeholders could be classified as either primary or secondary. 




―the basis for exchange relationships between it and the rest 
of society‖ (Preston and Post 1975, p.75). Preston and Post 
(1975, p.96) argued that stakeholders should be considered 
secondary when their relationships or activities were 
―ancillary or consequential to its primary involvement 
activities. ― 
Authors such as Jawahar and Mc Laughlin (2001), Clarkson (1995) and Jones and Wicks 
(1999), have argued over the importance of the primary (internal) stakeholder, whereas 
others such as Berman, Phillips and Wicks (2005) have argued that organisations rely 
upon actors outside the organisation for much important and critical resources, Freeman‘s 
(1984) classification is deemed a useful tool in prioritising the multiple stakeholder groups 
which are linked to organisations. A primary stakeholder group is one without whose 
continuing participation the organisation cannot survive as a going concern. Such groups 
involve shareholders and members, investors, employees, customers, intermediaries, 
suppliers and governments, as is the case of the GCNA. This definition finds consistency 
with the definition as proffered by the Stanford Institute. 
Secondary stakeholders influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the 
organization, but who are not engaged in the transactions with the corporation and are not 
essential to its survival. Such stakeholder groups include media, non-governmental 
organisations, and special interest groups. Secondary stakeholders are seen as providing 
aid to the primary stakeholders (Eesley and Lenox, 2006). 
The importance of the primary group of stakeholders was highlighted by Clarkson (1995) 
who argues that a corporation‘s survival and continuing success depends upon the ability 
of its management to create sufficient wealth, value or satisfaction for all primary 
stakeholder groups (Jawahar and Mc Laughlin, 2001, p.397, citing Clarkson, 1995). In 
contrast, Heath and Norman (2004, p.2) argue that some stakeholders hold superior 
claims to the organisation by stating that, 
―in cases where these interests conflict, the demands and 
interests of some stakeholders… must be moderated or 
sacrificed in order to fulfill basic obligations of other 
stakeholders.‖ 
The concept of legitimacy in the literature on stakeholder theory was discussed 
extensively by many scholars including Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997); Evan and 
Freeman (1988); Carroll (1979); Clarkson (1995); Donaldson and Preston (1995); and 
Suchman (1995). In this regard, Suchman (1995) posits that there are three fundamental 
bases on which legitimacy can be grounded: pragmatic (power); cognitive (habitual); and 
moral (positive normative evaluation). Jones‘s et al. (2007) and Philips‘s (2003) discourse 




However, Philips (1997) postulates that the concept of legitimacy remains imprecise within 
the stakeholder literature as well as inconsistent with other literatures important for the 
study of organisations. Gioia (1999) cited by Wolfe and Putler (2002) indicates that 
normative theory is overly simplistic and does not adequately reflect the realities that 
managers face. Donaldson (1999) alludes to an unresolved issue of the convergence 
between normative and instrumental stakeholder theory. 
Moreover, there is an overarching emphasis on corporate response to stakeholders‘ 
claims and demands, and less emphasis on the interrelationships between the firm and its 
stakeholders, and the consequence of such relationships on performance (Donaldson, 
1995). Many scholars and practitioners such as Mahoney (2004); Turnbull (1996); Jones 
(1995); Bailur (2007); and Kuratko et al. (2007) have used stakeholder framework as a 
decision-making device to help determine the impact of decisions on different groups.  
 
3.2.4.5 Summary on Review of the Stakeholder literature  
The literature review of stakeholder theory has shown that there are three major strands: 
descriptive, instrumental and normative, different aspects of which will be applicable to 
this study. This theory has been used by many to assess the performance of firms. It has 
provided the theoretical framework for stakeholder identification, classification and 
legitimacy. It has established what the stakes of different groups are and helped to gauge 
how expectations are met. The review has established a stakeholder view of the firm, its 
determinants and measurements for performance. 
Nonetheless, stakeholder theory has its limitations. Stakeholder theory seeks to suggest 
that there ought to be some harmonious relationship between the competing claims of 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, etc., and that the benefits to an organisation and the 
operations of the organisation should give consideration to these groups. The claims 
between each group are competing and as such the attainment of such a view -- 
distributive justice -- is not realistic. The theory has failed to provide a framework for 
equitable consideration of the issues and sharing of the gains from the organisation to all 
its stakeholders. In fact, this theme could form the basis of future research work. 
The context of this case study is different from that of a firm with stockholders. This case 
concerns a cooperative with members, not stockholders. The main concerns of the GCNA 
primary stakeholders are obtaining higher and stable prices. Additionally, it is the 
information and power asymmetries and the external context which the primary 





3.3 Cartels  
3.3.1 Introduction and Definition 
This section looks at selected literature on cartels since the core of study is the 
examination of the failed attempt at a cartel. It examines the nature of cartels as well as 
their purpose and origin. It will also look at types of cartels, why some succeed and others 
fail.  
Cartels are well known concepts in the economic, trade and legal fields. Connor (2002, 
p.4) defines a cartel as, 
 ―an association of two or more legally independent entities 
that explicitly agree to coordinate their prices or output for 
the purpose of increasing their collective profits‖ whereas  
Grossman (2014, p.2) notes that, 
 ―they are collusive agreements among firms in what 
otherwise would be competitive industries.‖  
Others see cartels as price coordination units and commercial agreements (Levenstein 
and Suslow, 2006) and regulators of markets (Fear, 2016).Stenegel (2014) underscores 
the monopoly nature of cartels: ―where the sellers coordinate their activities so well that 
they behave in effect like divisions of one enterprise, rather than as a competing business, 
that make independent decisions on quantity and price.‖ In a fully effective cartel the 
members act jointly to control supply and to maintain prices higher than market-clearing 
prices. In the case of a homogeneous product, every cartel member would sell at the 
same price. Where there is a degree of product differentiation, a market price for a 
specified product may be set with agreement in differences in prices for products with 
different specifications. Cartels could either seek to maximise profits or maintain stable 
prices above the market-clearing price.  
Three necessary conditions for a cartel to maintain prices above market-clearing prices 
are that: (a) the cartel members control a very large proportion, if not all of the supply; (b) 
there are natural or strategic entry barriers which prevent new entrants from entering the 
market by offering the product at lower prices, and (c) members of the cartel either have 
no incentives to ―cheat‖ on other members of the cartel or the sanctions against such 
cheating are sufficiently severe to prevent cheating (Stigler,1964). The final condition also 
applies to existing suppliers who are not members of the cartel. The importance and 
relevance of these conditions are developed further in this section and in the case-study 




Cartels are recognised as one of the clearest forms of anti-competitive conduct against 
which there are sanctions in countries with effective competition policies. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its Policy Brief on 
Prosecuting Cartels without direct Evidence of Agreements notes that. 
 ―Cartels are agreements among competitors fixing prices, 
allocating markets or rigging tenders (bids). They are the 
most harmful of all types of competition-law violations and 
should be sanctioned severely.‖ 
(http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels.).  
However, some cartels are condoned or actively supported by governments with no legal 
sanctions against them, providing a rationale exists for distinguishing between private and 
public cartels.   
A private cartel is one formed between two or more private-sector companies, normally in 
contravention of competition law. Cartels condoned by governments fall within a broader 
class of agreements, typically in primary commodity markets, between two or more 
countries (Stocking and Watkins, 1949 and Spulber, 1989). Within this class, International 
Commodity Agreements (ICAs) are normally agreements between a number of supplying 
and consumer countries, with the aim of maintaining stable and fair prices for commodities 
prone to price instability, because of supply shocks (Gilbert, 2004). The second category 
is cartels which are agreements between producers with a greater emphasis on 
maintaining prices above the market-clearing price. These are referred to in the thesis as 
publicly condoned agreements or cartels as appropriate. 
Conditions conducive to cartel formation exist in oligopolistic markets with at least some of 
the suppliers controlling a significant portion of the supply, and hence the ability to 
influence market price through changes in levels of supply (Stengel, 2014). Regarding 
international commodity agreements and cartels, it can be argued that they are responses 
mainly by developing countries to realise inter alia the stabilisation of their export prices, 
the improvement in their income / revenue from exports, attempts to improve their terms 
of trade and development prospects. Whereas this strategy may provide welfare gains for 
the exporting country, the opposite might be true for the consuming countries, if the price 
is stabilised at a level which is too high (Kravis and Lipsey 1978). However, relatively 
small numbers of commodity agreements and cartels have the market power to sustain 
high and stable prices over a certain period of time and eventually fail.   
There are also examples from developed countries of governments limiting competition to 
improve export performance. Tilton (2004) found that in Japan, after years of government 
support for cartels, the Japanese Fair Tarde Commission (JFTC) became more agressive 




cartels. In the United States, the Webb-Pomerene Act made an exception from anti-trust 
regulations, for American companies to form export associations which could set prices 
and specify quantities to be supplied by members. These state-led policies are seen as 
instruments for fostering economic growth and development, such as in the United States 
and Japan. Commodity agreements or cartels have existed for such commodities as 
diamonds, oil, coffee, sugar, cocoa, wheat, wool, rubber and tin. Therefore, the 
establishment of a cartel for Grenada could also yield positive benefits in terms of 
increased prices (Brizan, 2002; interview with Lord, 19 March, 2015). 
 
3.3.2 Economic and Political Justifications for Cartels 
International trade between countries is integral to their development aspirations, and as 
such countries are continuously seeking ways to maximise the benefits from trade, 
including using such mechanisms as commodity agreements and contracts, especially 
when they are unable to do well in achieving price stability and preventing price decline 
within the open competitive space. International commodity agreements are used as a 
means of permitting developing countries to gain control of their own resources and the 
stabilisation of prices, since such stabilisation tends to promote welfare gains as a means 
of maintaining or improving the terms of trade with rich countries (Kooroshy, Preston and 
Bradley, 2014; Brizan, 1979; Kravis and Lipsey, 1978; Daviron and Ponte, 2005; and 
Farfan, 2005). 
In the 1950s, Prebisch (1950) theorised on the ―deteriorating terms of trade‖ for primary 
commodities from developing countries. He noted a general reduction in prices of 
commodities from developing countries while the prices of manufactured goods from 
developed countries were rising. The situation of Grenada, with the continuous and 
chronic price volatility experienced in the commodity market (fluctuation in demand and 
prices) for its agricultural commodity exports and widening trade deficit before the attempt 
at forming the cartel described in Chapter 2, is consistent with the views of those in 
support of international commodity agreements (Brizan, 2002; Prebisch-Singer,1950; 
Gereffi, 1994; Krugman, 2014). 
Countries and producers who are dependent on primary commodity trade are faced with 
falling prices over time for their exports, while the prices for imports keep increasing. 
Therefore, the producing countries find it difficult to finance their imports as well as to 
keep pace with the cost of production. Such a situation could be damaging to the 
economies of primary commodity-producing countries (Kooroshy, Preston and Bradley, 
2014; Page and Hewitt, 2001).The fluctuating low level of pricing provided the economic 




agreement (Filson, Keen, Fruits and Borcherdeng, 2001; Brizan, 2003). It is due to this 
fluctuation in commodity prices that Krugman (2011) refers to as   boom-and-bust cycles. 
 A number of scholars on cartels such as Connor (2002), Grossman (2004), Levenstein 
and Suslow (2006), and Murciego (2013), theorise that one of the main rationales for 
cartel formation is the desire on the part of its participants to earn super–normal profits, as 
output falls and price rises. Peterson (1958) proffered the view that cartels are 
arrangements between two or more countries which seek to fix prices, reduce or eliminate 
competition, and thereby increase profits. However, studies conducted on the late 
nineteenth century German steel industry by Kinghorn and Nielsen (2004) found little 
empirical support for the above view.  
For countries that are heavily dependent on single or a few export commodities, volatility 
in commodity prices implies a very high burden in terms of uncertainty, reduced average 
export earnings, reductions in domestic output and employment, and a host of other chain 
effects. The reductions of price fluctuations for imported primary commodities (mostly food 
and raw materials) also hold great attraction for policy makers in the developed 
industrialised countries, especially after the external shocks and inflationary pressures 
they experienced following the oil price rise in 1973 and a consequent commodity boom  
Kooroshy, Preston and Bradley (2014), argued that global pressure on resources 
contributes to government interventions and active interference in markets using a variety 
of tools. There are four methods by which commodity prices for producers can be 
stabilised: price compensation schemes; buffer stock schemes10; multilateral contracts; 
and export controls (El Baghdadi and Suliman, 1989).  The case of the cartel under study 
falls under the export controls category, more precisely an attempt at control of exports 
coordinated by two parties.  
 
3.3.3 Dangers and Challenges Posed by Cartels 
Cartels are not a panacea for solving the price volatility and profit-seeking objectives of 
producers from developing countries. They are faced with many problems and success is 
not guaranteed. Indeed, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) placed the challenges faced by 
producing cartels into three categories: selecting and coordinating the behaviour of 
                                                          
10
 Buffer stock schemes are price and supply stabilizing schemes operating in the volatile  
agriculture market run by governments and organisations where they buy stocks of traded products 
at floor prices when supply is high and sells when supply is low at higher prices, because supply 




members; monitoring members‘ behaviour to deter defection from agreement; and 
preventing the entry of new firms into the industry. 
Additionally, Jensen-Eriksen (2011) cites implementing cartel agreements as equal to that 
of the most complex government agreements. Moreover, cartels are seen as unstable and 
inefficient since the higher prices can act as an incentive for new suppliers to enter the 
market. As new suppliers enter the market and weaken the market power of cartel 
members, some of them may have an increasing incentive to cheat (Plahte, 1994). The 
International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO 1973) and the International Sugar Agreement 
(ISA, 1947-85) are two examples of agricultural commodity cartels which existed and 
employed price controls and quota restrictions as mechanisms aimed at achieving higher 
prices for their members. To some degree they were successful for a while but then failed 
for a variety of reasons. In the case of ICCO, it was due to disagreements about how to 
‗share the spoils‘ when prices were raised, disagreements about what the ICAs were 
meant to achieve and their inability to control prices (Gilbert, 1995). With regards to the 
ISA, Gilbert theorised that its eventual failure was complex and interrelated. However, 
some reasons for its failure included poor drafting of the agreement which led to confusion 
over its interpretation, and the denial of access of Cuba to the American markets. The 
other producing countries were called upon to make up for the short fall to the U.S. market 
but they were unwilling to do so and the adverse market conditions made attempts at 
price stabilisation impossible (Gilbert,1995).   
 
3.3.4 The Success and Failure of Cartels 
Cartels have had varying degrees of success in terms of their profitability and longevity. 
Several factors, including competition, technology and adaptability, impact the success 
and longevity of cartels. Tilton (2004, p174), defines cartel success as meaning two 
things.  
―First, an industry maintains an agreement aimed at 
supporting prices, either directly or by limiting supplies. 
Second, the  agreement helps an industry over the long 
term to keep prices above levels that would otherwise be 
determined by the pressures of supply and demand,‖ 
 however, while some cartels have been able to raise prices over a long period, others 
have not been so successful (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006, p.43).  Secondly, the extent 
to which a cartel is successful has generally been measured by its duration (Dick, 1996) 
and profitability (Eckbo, 1987 and Griffin, 1989 cited by Levenstein and Suslow,2006, in 




On the other hand researchers like Utton (2011) describes failed cartels as short-lived and 
inherently unstable agreements, like the case of the International Sugar Agreement (ISA). 
However, Grossman (2004) states that there is no single measure for assessing the 
success or effectiveness of a cartel. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) concluded that the 
median duration of commodity cartels is five to six years. Eckbo (1976) observed that 
some cartels last for under one year while the longest-lasting existed for 18 years, while 
Griffin (1984) found cartels lasting under one year, at the minimum end of the scale, and 
as long as 29 years at the maximum.  
Igami (2012) studied the International Coffee Agreement which lasted for 24 years (1965-
89). This agreement is seen as one of the world‘s most successful cartels, and is credited 
with the economic growth of Colombia and for its ability to maintain high prices through 
the establishment of an international quota agreement. It is further argued that the 
economic decline of Colombia was accompanied by the abandonment of the said 
agreement (Rettberg, 2010). 
Thirdly, successful cartels have developed appropriate mechanisms in order to survive, 
such as third-party intervention. In fact, Zimmerman and Connor (2005, pp.9-14) identified 
five categories of factors which determine cartel duration, success and failure: 
1. Market structure. It is suggested that industry concentration, cartel market share, etc., 
impact cartel longevity; 
2. Internal cartel organisation. It is assumed that third-party verification and monitoring 
contribute to cartel longevity.  Stigler (1964) proffered that in order to sustain collusive 
behaviour, participating firms must seek to control free-riding and cheating incentives. 
In the absence of such effective mechanisms for monitoring, control and self-control, it 
is easy for firms to defect from the cartel and thus cause it to become short-lived; 
3. Industry specification. It was found that the fewer substitutes that exist for products, 
the greater the chances for cartel success; 
4. Unfavourable external macro-economic conditions. Steady or declining economic 
conditions create instability in cartels which eventually leads to collusions and decline; 
5. Antitrust law environment. The use of global anti-trust legislation acts as a disincentive 
for cartel formation. 
Rettberg (2010), and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) also agreed that in places where 
cartels are formed in highly concentrated industries, and where the agreement is able to 
be monitored to prevent cheating, the necessity to collude is stronger than going it alone, 
thereby contributing to the cartel‘s success and longevity. Additionally, Jensen-Eriksen 
(2011, p.186) argued in his study of European Paper Cartels, (1959-1972) that the 




―administrative headquarters, the availability of raw 
materials, and support of restrictive trade practices by the 
European Economic Community, among others. The ability 
of producing countries to maintain high prices and having 
national and international arrangements to monitor and 
police such arrangements are key to cartel success.‖ 
 (Rettberg, (2010), and Utton (2011) suggest that in order to assess the impact of a cartel 
on revenue or profitability, one needs to compare the difference between the before-cartel 
prices vs. the after-cartel price, and multiply by the duration of the cartel and the amount 
of products sold. 
Despite the apparent success of cartels like the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), which wield great power, and the International Cocoa Agreement, 
there are also cases of failed cartels.  
Regarding cheating by cartels, each member may have an economic incentive to cheat on 
any collusive agreements that are reached. They may not respect production quotas or 
they may cheat by offering lower prices. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and Grossman      
(2006) underscore that cheating was the least cause of cartel failure, but that the more 
salient reasons for failure include the following eight factors:  
1. The number of decision makers. Indeed, the higher the number of 
participants/decision-makers in a cartel, the greater the possibility for cheating. 
Increased membership levels make communication, negotiation and enforcement 
more difficult; 
2. Industry concentration. Players in a less-concentrated market must keep prices low in 
order to remain competitive, while large player in a highly concentrated market have 
the incentive to collude and find it easier to maintain high prices and profits. 
3. The nature of demand. The less elastic the demand, the more the incentive to form a 
cartel since revenue and profits would increase with higher price. 
4. Organisational factors. Factors such as decentralised management impact negatively 
on the administration of the affairs and profits of the cartel, as well as the decision-
making process; 
5. Antitrust enforcements. These can reduce the lifespan of cartels as they encourage a 
free and open market, aggressive competition among sellers, and competitive prices; 
6. Product homogeneity. This enforces lack of product differentiation and thereby limited 
choices; 
7. Entry barriers. If entry barriers are low, non-cartel members find it relatively easy and 
attractive to enter the market in response to high cartel prices. Low entry barriers 
shortens the longevity of cartels as actual rivals or threats of potential rivals reduces 




8. Pricing and government factors. In their examination of the political constraints on 
government cartelisation‖, Libecap and Smith (2004) in Grossman (2006) adds that 
cartelisation suffers from issues which can limit its success such as output prices, 
individual quotas and political constraints. They also conclude that government 
intervention can influence the behaviour of cartels, since they can, among other 
things, do such things as enforce agreements and competition policy. 
Other experts in the field have concluded that in addition to the above factors which are 
necessary for the development and success of cartels, other factors contribute to the 
success or failure of cartels: the ability of participants to follow through on commitment 
and avoid defection (Kooroshy, Preston and Bradley, 2016);  maintaining market prices at 
the desired prices and above are less likely to reduce participating firms‘ compliance with 
the agreement and defer cheating  (Moxnes, 2016); reducing information and price 
asymmetry (Tabarrok and Cowen, 2015; Utton, 2011); the level and consistency of 
interaction between the participants  and finally, the greater the differences between the 
products, the easier it is for customers to substitute one firm‘s product for that of another 
and, in turn, increase the chances of cheating by participating firms (Kooroshy, Preston 
and Bradley, 2016)   
 
3.3.5 Summary on Cartels 
The formation and longevity of cartels are premised on the existence of the presence of a 
number of critical factors such as industry concentration, organisational factors, control of 
supply, participant‘s adherence to the rules, and information symmetry. 
It appears that the goal of a cartel is specifically to raise prices, determine output, restrict 
market supply and maximise joint industry profits. To the extent that these goals are 
attained, along with profitability and longevity, cartels are deemed successful, the average 
lifespan being about five to six years. To the contrary, failed cartels are those that are 
short-lived and unprofitable. Nonetheless, considering both types studied, they all face 
inherent challenges. Considering those cartels studied, their ability to develop appropriate 
mechanisms to survive brought success.The fact that cartels continue to impact the 
economic fabric of communities and nations speaks to their importance. Nonetheless, 







3.4 Global Value Chain (GVC) 
3.4.1 Introduction to Global Value Chains (GVC)  
Integration into the global economy is seen as a vital condition for development, and 
presupposes the capacity and ability of stakeholders in developing countries to have full 
information (information symmetry), thus allowing them to capture the full benefit from 
trade gains.  Therefore, the issue is not one of just access to international trade but how to 
do so gainfully. The concept of the global value chain (GVC) offers a framework for 
conducting such an evaluation. 
The concept of the GVC has evolved over the years from commodity chains (CC), global 
commodity chains (GCC), global value chains (GVC) and, more recently, the Manchester 
School theorised, on Global Production Networks (GPNs) (Bair, 2014). Hopkins and 
Wallerstein (1986, p.159) defined commodity chains as, 
 ―a network of labour and production processes whose end 
result is a finished commodity‖.  
Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark (2016) theorised that global value chains 
(GVC) refer to the full range of activities that are performed to bring a product from 
conception to market. It is the series of activities that link firms, workers and consumers 
around the world and often provide the stepping stone for firms and workers in developing 
countries to integrate into the global economy. GVC is also concerned with how global 
production and distribution systems are organized in terms of what is produced, how it is 
produced and the physical production flow (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002).  
According to Bair (2014) the commodity chains reveal links between producers and 
consumers that would otherwise be concealed by commodity chain forms, where the goal 
is often to create an implicit link between workers in the south and consumers in the north, 
The GVC framework allows for an understanding of how global industries are organised 
by examining the structures and dynamics of the different actors involved in the given 
industry (Gereffi, 1994). The GVC offers a valuable tool for discussing the commodity 
problem, especially those experienced by Commodity Dependent Countries (CDCs). GVC 
analysis dissects the full range of cross-border activities involved in the process of 
bringing products from conception to final consumption, with the aim of examining four 
fundamental dimensions (Gereffi, 1994): 
1. The input-output model which identifies the main activities or segments in the GVC 
and includes the following activities: (a) inputs; (b) production; (c) packaging and 
storage; (d) processing and distribution, and (e) marketing. 




3. Governance which refers to the way the chain is controlled and coordinated and 
where power and authority lie. Power is defined as the ―driveness‘ within the chain‖ 
and at the firm level, where power is held and wielded and accumulated in different 
centres by different actors. 
4. Institutions which refer to the establishment of, and links between, the institutions that 
form part of the GVC across borders. 
The first two factors are described as descriptive, describing the situation within the chain, 
while the latter two are defined as causal, helping to establish the relationship between 
the cause and effect within the chain. 
 
3.4.2 Governance of GVC  
According to Bair (2014) citing the work of Raworth and Kidder (2009) that addressed the 
difference between defining governance as a coordination function as in GVC governance 
theory, and understanding governance as ‗driveness‘. Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon 
(2005, p.85) described governance as, 
 ‗based on three factors: A. The complexity of information 
and knowledge transfer required to sustain a particular 
transaction, particularly with respect to product and process 
specifications; B. the extent to which this information and 
knowledge can be codified and, therefore, transmitted 
efficiently and without transaction-specific investment 
between the parties to the transaction; and C. the 
capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the 
requirements of the transaction.‖ 
 Bair (2014) citing Raworth and Kidder (2009) show networks with significant 
asymmetrical relations between buyers and suppliers. 
The governance of GVC provides a tool for the understanding of how a chain is controlled 
and coordinated, identifies the main actors in the chain and who has more power than 
others. It is the ―authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material 
and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain‖ (Gereffi, 1994, p.97). 
Therefore, the authority and power within GVC is seen as either buyer-driven or producer-
driven. It is the use of this type of analysis which led Banga (2013) to conclude that, 67 
per cent of total global value under the GVC accrue to Organisation of European 
Developed Countries (OECD) countries, while 2.5 per cent accrue to New Industrialised 
Countries (NICs) and Brazil, Russia, India, China and Korea (BRICK), while only 8 per 
cent of the total value added occurs to all other Developing Countries (DC) and Least 




to nutmegs remained in Grenada, between 1966 and 1979, the rest remaining in the 
consuming countries. 
 
3.4.3 Participation and benefits of GVC 
Value chain participation is defined in terms of the origin of the value added that is 
embodied in exports both looking backward and forward from the reference country, in 
which ―Backward Participation Index refers to the extent to which domestic firms use 
foreign intermediaries‘ value added activities in a given country, while Forward 
Participation Index captures the extent to which a given country‘s exports are used by 
firms in partner countries as inputs into their own exports‖ (koopman et al,2011,p.14)  
There are many ways in which firms can participate in the GVC. Examples include 
farming, extraction of natural resources, research and development, manufacturing, 
design, management and marketing. The type of participation is determined by the nature 
of the value creation process, the type of product, and geographical location (Kowalski, et 
al, 2015). Both the backward and forward participation indices are measured as shares of 
the referencing countries‘ exports. 
The benefits of GVC participation include the country‘s ability to enhance its productivity, 
increase sophistication, diversify exports, and increase the supply of products (Gereffi, 
1994; Kowalski, et al, 2015; Koopamn et al., 2011).  
The participation/insertion of Small Developing Countries (SDCs) like Grenada, into the 
global trading mechanism is seen as necessary for development through commodity 
exports. It is argued that better prospects for these countries lie in moving towards 
differentiated products with a higher content of technology, skills and innovation, which 
would allow SDCs to benefit from the opportunities brought about by globalisation (Farfan, 
2005). 
It has been argued that SDCs that have a significant reliance on commodity exports, face 
numerous problems (Farfan, 2005; Sandiford, 2000; Briguglio and Kisanga, 2004 and 
Wint, 2003 and Wignaraja, et al, 2004; Fleming, Rao and Fleming, 2006), ranging from 
declining agricultural prices, deteriorating terms of trade, lack of competitiveness, and 
vulnerability to external shocks.  For purposes of this thesis, it was Farfan (2005) who 
provides the most appropriate and succinct identification and explanation of the real 
problems faced by commodity exporting countries. Among the issues discussed, there are 




1. External barriers. Farfan (2005) argued that, at the global level, the power 
dynamics in most commodity chains have shifted against developing exporting countries 
as traders. Processors and retailers who are located in the developed consuming 
countries are moving to secure dominant positions in the chain, therefore, when such 
asymmetry power positions are established, producing countries are finding it difficult to 
move away from the low-margin processes in which they are engaged, and be able to 
capture some of the downstream value added offered by marketing, distribution and 
design. Although he offered as a solution diversification into industries that are 
technology-based and labour-intensive, he reminded his readers that these countries are 
still faced with tremendous challenges, such as the rapid pace of technological change as 
well as the technology gap between the producing and consuming countries. 
2. Internal level issues.   
Farfan (2005), like Bruguglio and Kisanga (2004), indicates that small producers lack the 
capacity to appropriately respond to external challenges, because  their productive 
systems  lack the scale and coordination capacity required to serve global markets 
efficiently. This lack of capacity partly contributes to over 65 countries still being reliant on 
primary commodities11 for 50 per cent of their export earnings. Hence, Prebisch and 
Singer (1950) theorised that real income growth of Commodity Dependent Countries 
(CDCs), is constrained by the long-term structural tendency for commodity prices to 
decline, relative to that of manufactured goods.  One of the reasons for this tendency to 
exist, is what has been established before, i.e. the value added and power in the 
commodity value chain is resident in the consuming countries where the lead firms 
resides, value added activities are carried out, and value is retained (Brizan, 2000; and 
Daviron and Ponte, 2005). 
A simplified model of a global value chain is illustrated in figure 3.4 which describes the 
different nodes and geographical linkages at different stages of processing. The figure 
depicts two major sets of geographies involved in a typical agricultural commodity, GVC 
one denoted by producing countries and is in border with global lead firms in developed 
countries. The border between the two sets of countries is denoted by the vertical lines. 
The commodity producing countries are involved in the basic tasks of extraction and basic 
processing. It is at this level that the extracted products are mainly stored. As indicated by 
Daviron and Ponte (2005), it is the producing countries that bear the cost of holding and 
maintaining stocks. It also indicates that with regards to perishable products, whenever 
such occur, most of the extraction, basic processing and storage  occur within the firms at 
the ―upstream level‖ of the GVC. At the downstream nodes, the key value added activities 
                                                          
11
 Wood and Mayer (1998) defined primary commodities as unprocessed or low processed 




such as trading, marketing and retailing which are dominated by global firms in developed 
countries occur. 
Figure 3.4 is critical in focusing the attention of policy makers in heavily commodity 
dependent countries, such as those in developing countries in areas where they need to 
take action in order to gain and retain greater value for their producers and their countries. 
This part of the downstream value chain, also represents areas where exporters from 
developing countries experience information and pricing asymmetries; a problem which 
affects their ability to maximise value from their exports. 
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Farfan (2005, p.6) argues that,  
 ―the growing market power of downstream players is the 
first clue to understanding the inability of commodity-
dependent economies (CDEs) to move into high-value-
added activities such as distribution, marketing and 
retailing.‖ 
 Lead players in commodity chains have secured dominant positions as a result of four 
major strategic developments. The first is consolidation, especially among retailers and 
distributors. In horticultural chains, for example, global trade is increasingly dominated by 
a smaller number of ―northern supermarket‖ (Gibbon, 2000). In the coffee industry, 40 per 
cent of global trade is controlled by four trading houses and 45 per cent of the retail 
market is dominated by only three roasters (Oxfam, 2002). Conversely, producers have 
become more fragmented, largely as a result of the systematic dismantling of international 
commodity associations and the entry of new suppliers following the wave of market 
liberalsations in the 1980s and 1990s (Gibbon, 2002).  
Another factor contributing to the growing market power of downstream players, 
particularly distributors, has been increased supply chain coordination capabilities. In 
many commodity chains, international trading houses have been adopting modern supply 
systems such as just-in-time delivery, and are able to offer retailers a consistent quality at 
less volatile prices. These capabilities derive from the ability of international distributors to 
accumulate large volumes from different sources, invest in sophisticated inventory 
management systems, and exert complex hedging options in financial markets (Gibbon, 
2002). In addition, when international distributors hold less market power than retailers – 
as it is increasingly the case in most commodity chains – they tend to seek higher 
profitability by depressing upstream prices, hence affecting profit margins in producing 
countries (Petkova and Zhang, 2005).  
 A third source of market power specific to retailers is branding, which nowadays plays an 
overriding role in reaching consumers. CDEs seeking to export to developed markets are 
increasingly reliant upon brands dominated by global lead firms. Branding is arguably one 
of the most diffuse and difficult barriers to overcome, and because it stems from market 
knowledge, it is almost exclusive to downstream players.  
A final driver explaining the governance shift in favour of downstream players (market 
power), is technological innovation on the use of primary raw materials. In the case of the 
coffee industry, for example, roasting techniques have evolved into flexible processes that 
combine different varieties of species in order to obtain a standard quality. Roasters, 
therefore, have become less dependent on single producers, hence increasing their 




Brizan (2003, ) also confirmed the market power of the firms in the North, through the cost 
of value added by the producing countries. He cites the case of the Grenada ―nutmeg 
industry trade over 14 years (1966 to 1979) and argues that of the value of EC$1,022 
million which was generated during the period, only a mere 6 per cent of that value.‖ This 
situation has not changed since then. A review of figure 2.2 in this thesis shows, that 
Grenada continues to remain at the upstream end of the supply chain, performing the 
basic functions of extraction, initial processing and storage. These are basic functions 
which do not yield much value. However, the key value added functions of sales, 
marketing, further processing and distribution take place in the consuming countries. This 
evidence further highlights where the real market power lies in the commodity chains; it 
lies within the firms that add the higher proportion of value added which gets transferred to 
the consumers. 
Therefore, the place of Grenada in the GVC ensures that it carries the major cost of 
extraction and storage, costs which it has to carry either by bank loans, overdrafts or by 
reducing the price of nutmegs and mace to its members - the farmers. 
Another related factor contributing to the declining power within the commodity chain is 
that of the inelasticity of demand for commodities. The demand for agricultural 
commodities has low price and income elasticities (Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Brizan, 
2000; Stigler, 1950), which implies that a reduction in price or increase in income for a 
commodity such as nutmeg will result in proportionally lower increase in demand. In 
principles this should imply that a higher price set by colluding producers would lead to 
higher revenue. In practice, the demand response to a higher price may not be inelastic 
since customers may prefer to substitute for a product when the price increases. The 
supply response of existing producers and new entrants also needs to be considered. 
Both these elements are of relevance for this study as we will observe.   
The law of demand states that the more of a product will be demanded when there is a 
drop in price. Price elasticity measures how much demand changes in relation to the price 
change, but the extent of the response will depend on a number of factors including, 
whether the goods is a necessity or not, the availability of close substitutes (Mankiv, 
2011). This in turn affect price elasticity supply for goods, which is a measure of the extent 
to how supplies change given the change in prices (Daley and Farley, 2011) 
Supply and demand elasticities, with respect to price need to be low (inelastic – absolute 
values below 1 and the lower the better) for a cartel to be effective and sustainable.  The 
supply elasticity has more than one dimensions. The first is that in the short-term the 
supply elasticity (more precisely the production capacity elasticity) is low because it takes 




full capacity (e.g. if all the nutmeg are not being harvested because of low prices or 
producers or intermediaries have stockpiled nutmeg), the supply elasticity in response to a 
price increase could be high. The supply response could be that of the cartel members as 
well as non-members. If there is a high supply response to the prices raised by cartel 
members (through parallel exporting by Indonesian exporters) or non-cartel members, the 
additional supply would put downward pressure on the market price.  
A Low demand elasticity is conducive for a cartel since it implies that customers will not 
cut back on demand substantially in response to a higher price. More precisely, if the 
absolute value of elasticity is below 1, for a price increase of 1 per cent, demand will 
reduce by less than 1 per cent and as a consequence the revenue will be higher. This 
requires that there are no close substitutes or customers do not find it possible to cut back 
on the use of the product. The basis notions of supply and demand elasticities are 
relevant for explaining the weakness of the Marketing Agreement as a cartel as the case 
study analysis demonstrates (see chapters 5 and 7). 
 
3.4.4 Summary of GVC 
The above discourse provides a broad overview of the GVC and its relevance for the 
unfolding discourse in this case. It sets the context for describing and explaining 
Grenada‘s participation in the GVC as described in figure 2.3, which traced Grenada‘s 
nutmeg supply chain from farm to the consumer, which resonates with the work of Farfan 
(2005) as displayed in figure 3.4. 
The above section describes the GVC as an integrative process involving actors and 
resources, which take a product from concept to market, identify the nodes and where 
power and authority reside. It also establishes the key framework used in GVC analysis 
and highlights the benefits of participation. It indicates where the roles are played and 
where power resides. The development challenge vis a vis the barriers faced by 
producing countries was highlighted. It shows that the producing countries, by virtue of 
place in upstream activities conducted tasks of extraction, basic processing and storage.  
The above section also provides a framework for value-added analysis, as well as the 
methods by which countries can participate in the GVC. The understanding of the GVC 
helps to aid countries‘ path to integration into the international trading mechanism and the 






3.5 Information asymmetry 
3.5.1 Introduction to information asymmetry. 
The issue of the availability of adequate and equal information between parties to an 
agreement has been long debated (Cowan and Toan Do, 2003; Leuz et al, 2006; Vojech, 
2013; Acklerof, 1970; Stiglitz, 2000). Information asymmetry refers to a situation in which 
some agent in a trade or negotiation possesses information which other agents involved in 
the same trade do not have (Toan Do, 2013; Akerlof, 1970). Information asymmetry can 
also occur after the conclusion of an agreement, such as the hiring of an agent; this is 
referred to as a moral hazard.  
Despite the widespread availability of information today, there are still many occasions 
when parties who are about to agree on a business, trade or other such issue, one party 
may tend to have some information than the other. This situation is referred to as adverse 
selection Toan Do, (2003, citing Akerlof, 1970); Spencer and Steward, (1973); Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1976). 
The issue of information asymmetry of relevance for this study is represented by the 
principal-agent relationship.   
The principal-agent relationship is often discussed in the context of governance of large 
firms where the shareholders and the principals and the members of the board and 
managers are their agents. However, the principal-agent relationship and asymmetric 
information within it are also relevant where an agent is a broker and buyer and the 
means of access to markets and source of information about market conditions and other 
sellers. Sellers of primary commodities with limited resources and ability to acquire 
knowledge and information independently are in a weak information asymmetric situation 
in their relationship with brokers and intermediaries providing access to the market. 
Reliance on the agents for additional information about the market places the principals in 
a more vulnerable position. This observation is of relevance in this case as we will 
observe in later chapters.  
Notwithstanding the above challenges posed by information asymmetry, there are those 
that argue that it could be a source of competitive advantage for diversified firms                
(Nayyar, 1990; Tabarrok and Cowen, 2015; Leuz, et al, 2006). 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
Chapter 3 provides the underlying conceptual framework for this research, by highlighting 




connects all aspects of this thesis and seeks to underscore the preferred approach, while 
providing the path to understanding why the particular research method will be adopted. 
The literature review covers a wide but interrelated set of topics in relation to the question 
posed by this research, including global value chains,  cartels, stakeholder theory, 
business relationships and performance. However, at the core, or primary literature for 
this study, is that of stakeholder, global value chains and cartel theories. 
The literature on stakeholder theory is still developing and as such, does not adequately 
address some of the critical issues of this research. Indeed, whereas the literature speaks 
to some issues of the relationship between stakeholders and firms, it does not adequately 
elucidate the factors that influence stakeholder interventions. Neither is it conclusive on 
the relationship between stakeholder interventions and the performance of the firm. 
Additionally, whereas Jones (1995) and Donaldson and Preston (1995) hypothesize about 
the connection between actions and outcomes in the context of trust between managers 
and stakeholders, they do not demonstrate how stakeholder interventions affect the 
performance (outcome) of firms‘ activities.  
The literature on cartels and GVC provide useful insights into the rationale for commodity 
exporting countries to be persuaded to develop and engage in various forms of collusion, 
such as International Commodity Agreements. Their persuasion reflects their ambition to 
improve the economic status of their citizens by inserting themselves into the GVC.  The 
simplified GVC of Farfan (2005) depicts the typical situation that developing countries 
versus their developed trading partners. It shows that developing countries are extractors 
and basic processors of commodities, while the developed countries perform the higher 
end value-added activities and as a consequence retain a greater share of the value, 
which is generated in the GVC. The use of the GVC also highlights where power really 
lies in the GVC. This chapter also discussed the existence of information asymmetry 
between developed and developing countries and between principals from 
developing/producer countries and their agents, and how the existence of information 







Chapter 4 - Research Methodology and Data Collection 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to establish the theoretical and methodological framework used in this 
study. It outlines the qualitative methodology employed and the associated authenticity 
and validity issues. It answers the questions: What was done? How was it done? Where 
was it done? Why was it done? The rest of the chapter is divided into three main sections: 
Section 4.2 - Research Approaches. Sub-section 4.2.1 locates the research within its 
ontological and epistemological foundations. While Section 4.2 2 presents the qualitative 
case-study approach. The ethical issues relating to this study, the types and sources of 
relevant data are also explained.  
Section 4.3 deals with Data Collection and Analysis. Sub-section 4.3.1 covers data 
collection methods and analysis. It outlines the triangulation method (Jick, 1979) used to 
collect primary and secondary data from multiple sources. Sub-section 4.3.2 examines the 
question of reliability and the accuracy and validity of the case while Sub-section 4.3,3 
deals with: accuracy, validity and reliability. Sub-section 4.3.4 discusses the limitations of 
the case-study approach in terms of possible sources of shortcomings of the case. Finally, 
Section 4.4 summarises the chapter. 
The main research questions addressed are:  
Research question 1. 
What factors and interactions with other stakeholders influenced the GCNA Board of 
Directors‘ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement 
to operate as a cartel? 
 
Research question 2. 
How did the interventions of other parties (external stakeholders) impact the creation, 
performance and the eventual collapse of the Marketing Agreement? 
 
Research question 3. 
Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA Board persist in trying to keep 








4.2 Research Approaches 
In this thesis, the phenomenon of interest, is the impact of stakeholders‘ intervention on 
the performance of firms, particularly the case of the GCNA, focusing on the decision-
making processes by key stakeholders within the GCNA, which led to the attempt at cartel 
formation and the demise of such efforts between the GCNA of Grenada and ASPIN of 
Indonesia. 
 
4.2.1 Ontological and Epistemological Social Constructionism as a Philosophical 
Approach to this Research 
Methodology conventionally refers to knowledge of the techniques, or methods used to 
study empirical phenomena (Lehaney and Vinten, 1994). In a broader sense, 
methodology pertains to the philosophy of science (Kaplan, 1964). It indicates the ways in 
which theories, methods, models and assumptions are interrelated (Kuhn, 1970). Methods 
can also be considered as paradigms which are, 
 ―universally recognised scientific achievements that for a 
time provide model problems and solutions to a community 
of practitioners‖ (Kuhn 1970, p.8). 
 Scholarly findings are thus framed to a considerable extent by the conception of, and 
approach towards, the phenomenon of interest (Mir and Watson, 2000).  
Easton (1995) urges researchers to explicitly state their underlying assumptions and 
values, as these influence their decision concerning their research strategy. Researchers‘ 
assumptions and values, however, ought to be rooted in some depth of realism that seeks 
to reflect the world around them, and the world which we attempt to influence. Therefore, 
implicit to the undertaking of this research is the way I perceive the world (GCNA and its 
Joint Marketing Agreement with Indonesia) and the reality around us (ontology) as well as 
what we know about, or wish to know about it (epistemology). The reality is that GCNA 
and ASPIN attempted to enter into a cartel arrangement aimed at restricting the supply of 
nutmeg and mace on the world market, which led to an increase in the price of nutmeg 
and mace for a brief period but the arrangement collapsed within three years, placing the 
GCNA in serious financial difficulties. What this study seeks, inter alia, to do is establish 
the circumstances and processes of decision-making within the GCNA, Indonesia and the 
market for nutmeg which led to the eventual demise of attempts at forming the cartel.  
This reflects what Guba (1990) refers to as the paradigm of the researcher, where 
ontology relates to what is the reality or what is the nature of the social entity (GCNA and 




of this study, epistemology refers to how we get to know about the decisions and actions 
which led to the formation of the cartel and its demise.  
Berger and Luckman (1996) view phenomena and constructs such as organisations as 
socially constructed, and as such their meanings are continually being accomplished by 
social actors (Bryan and Bell, 2003). Giddens (1976) noted that organisations are 
continually being constructed and reconstructed through the interplay of multiple actors 
and material artifacts. Morgan and Smircich (1980, p.494, cited in Saunders et al., 2009), 
concur with Giddens (1976) by explaining that the social world is a pattern of symbolic 
relationships and meanings sustained through a process of human action and interaction. 
Hence, the research subjects (the GCNA and its stakeholders), as well as the individual 
actors in the business relationships, are the participants who continuously construct their 
social reality and that of the organisations which they represent (Denzin, 2001). In this 
research, these are individuals participating in the communicative and symbolic, and in 
other processes of developing the cartel. Hence, in looking at the relationship, this thesis 
takes the subjectivist approach which characterises the organisation as a socially 
constructed entity, a label used by individuals to make sense of their social experience 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003). By subjectivist approach, I also mean the philosophical method 
adopted by most qualitative researchers, in which the researcher/ observer interacts with 
the subject being observed in trying to understand what happens, it is a qualitative method 
involving the use of small samples and where everything is contextual 
(Ratner,2002;Holden and Lynch, 2004)  
It is within this context that this research will portray the development and demise of the 
attempt at forming the world‘s first nutmeg cartel, focusing on the episodes, and the role of 
the actors and decision-makers as stakeholders. 
The case-study research method employed is located within the broad realm of discourse 
as text and representation (i.e., the narratives of the story as told by actors, agents and 
onlookers). As a consequence, the selected methodology endeavours to show how the 
discourse, as interplay between the text (written data gathered from the archives of the 
GCNA, such as , minutes of GCNA Board of Directors Meetings and other meetings News 
Paper articles)  and talk ( this refers to the interviews and discussions held with some of 
the key actors and observers to the story) , was actually used by stakeholders in 
constructing, reconstructing, and deconstructing the cartel as a business relationship 
within the context of the stakeholders‘ roles in strategic management in general, and 
relationship management in particular; and hence the use of the triangulation method in 




It is also guided by the views of Dreher (1994, pp.289-291cited in, Morse, ed) on critical 
issues in qualitative research methods, where the author writes: 
 ―Data pertaining to human behaviour and events are 
derived basically from three sources: what people tell us, 
what we observe, and the products of human activity such 
as documents and records.‖  
This statement has informed the use of unstructured interviews and archival records as 
the main sources of data collection in this work. 
 
4.2.2 The Qualitative Case-Study Approach 
The qualitative case-study approach has been used by social scientists to study real-life 
situations. It highlights the details of contextual analysis of events, and their conditions 
and relationships (Soy, 1997). This theoretical and conceptual framework is different from 
the quantitative approach which is described as seeking to answer questions of what has 
happened or is happening, while the qualitative method answers why something is 
occurring (Miles and Hubberman, 1994), although such classifications have been 
described as ―blurred‖ by Gill and Johnson (2002). Quantitative methodologies do seek to 
answer the why question by attempting to investigate cause and effect. Qualitative 
methodologies seek more in-depth explanations.  
This case study is positioned within the qualitative method. Yin (1994, p13) defines a case 
study as ―an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident.‖ In order to understand how and, more important, the processes by 
which the stakeholders in the GCNA and ASPIN influenced or created the marketing 
agreement and why the agreement failed, a single in-depth case study has been 
undertaken (Yin,1994; 2003). 
In selecting a research method, it is important to establish what is referred to as ―good 
research‖ which requires internal, external, construct and conclusion validity. Internal 
validity measures the extent to which empirical analysis shows causal mechanisms. A 
study with a high internal validity goes beyond mere correlation and differentiates between 
causal and spurious relations (Yin 1994, Miles and Huberman 1994). A sound case study 
analyses in detail causal relations among relevant factors, and thus has a high internal 
validity (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994). External validity refers to the ability to generalise 
one‘s study to other situations. In order to do so, it is necessary to have a good 
representation of the population under research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This is an 




as does the quantitative approach. There is still an external validity in qualitative research 
which allows for the result findings to be replicated and generalised (Yin, 2003a; Falk and 
Guenther, 2006) 
Construct validity indicates the degree of congruence between an empirical model and the 
actual phenomenon of interest (Yin 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994). In essence, it 
refers to the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from the study to the 
theoretical construct of the study. Regarding the above issues on research validity, it 
became evident that it was necessary to explore different sources of data. According to 
Stake (1995) examining evidence from alternative sources of data is a form of 
triangulation and could be part of a protocol to increase validity and accuracy. The case 
study is thus a good instrument to study static and dynamic complexity, to scrutinise 
queries of why and how (Yin 1994).  
 
4.2.2.1 Rationale for a Qualitative Case-Study Approach 
According to Yin (2003), there are three types of case studies: exploratory, descriptive 
and explanatory. An exploratory study seeks to define the research question and derive a 
hypothesis. In such a case, the data are collected before the research questions and 
theories are formulated. Descriptive case studies serve to describe different 
characteristics of a phenomenon. Such a method requires a theory in order to guide the 
collection of the data. Explanatory cases serve to explain the course of events and to 
relate how decisions and things happened. This case study is of the explanatory type 
since it examines a past situation in some depth to answer the how and why questions. 
Descriptive case studies are also argued to be appropriate when the unit of analysis is the 
organisation (Yin and Heald, 1975). The descriptive methodology case provides for 
explanatory and exploratory types of research. The main aim of explanatory research is to 
identify any causal links between the factors or variables that pertain to the research 
problem. The main aim of exploratory research is to identify the boundaries of the 
environment in which the problems, opportunities or situations of interest are likely to 
reside, and to identify the salient factors or variables that might be found there and be of 
relevance to the research (Van Wyk, 2006). Despite the above advantages of these two 
types of research, there are some limitations in their use. It is important that the 
researcher acknowledge those weaknesses, so that the validity of the research is not 
compromised. According to Yin and Heald (1975), the quality of the case is as good as 
the information collected, and the focus on aggregate data may not give sufficient 




the researcher to the case may bias findings, and may therefore lack statistical reliability 
and internal validity. 
Moreover, according to Tellis (1997) case study is a triangulated research strategy. The 
case study tends to use multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) in order to capture 
different facets of reality or to corroborate the evidence. When different sources are used 
(i.e., when data are triangulated), the case study thus has a high construct of validity (Yin 
1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). The present research deals with the 
simultaneous influences of different stakeholders, reactions to these influences, and the 
outcome of the alliance that was forged between the GCNA and ASPIN, and as such the 
case-study methodology is further justified. The case-study method has been used by 
many researchers in various fields. For example, Greve, et al (2010) used it to investigate 
inter-firm relationships; and Martin and Eisenhardt (2010) used it to study cross-business-
unit collaborations in multi-business organisations.  
The case-study approach allows the researcher to gain insights from individuals who were 
part of the construction of social reality of creating or observing the creation of the cartel 
(Lincoln and Guba, 2003; Yin, 1994, 2003). It allows for a detailed and intense study of a 
single unit (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The case study is thus a good instrument to study 
static and dynamic complexity, and to scrutinise queries of why and how (Yin 1994). 
Finally, the triangulation approach used in this study seeks to establish what happened 
rather than the cause and effect of events, although there are elements of cause and 
effect in the case study. 
 
4.2.2.2 Rationale for Selecting the GCNA 
The GCNA was selected for three broad reasons. First, it is important for Grenada‘s 
national economy and as a source of income for a substantial number of farmers, as 
outlined in chapter 2. By 1986, the GCNA was the largest single business organisation in 
Grenada, with a peak membership of over 6,000 and a stakeholder structure embedded 
since its formation in 1947. The GCNA provided direct and indirect sources of income for 
approximately one third of the population of Grenada; therefore its performance had 
always been an important issue for policy makers. Moreover, the GCNA was perceived by 
many as having significant political influence on its membership, and as a consequence, 
its operation was a constant source of discourse at a national level. Secondly, GCNA was 
chosen for personal professional reasons, since this researcher had keen interest in 
understanding why the cartel was formed, and why it lasted for the short period it did. 




contribute towards national development policy with regard to GCNA‘s future operations 
and organisational design. 
 
4.2.2.3 Ethical Considerations and Gaining Access to the GCNA 
Research ethics is an important issue in any social science research (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Consequently, a main aspect in conducting academic research is to 
ensure that the necessary research ethics are observed. For example, ethical 
considerations require, inter alia: 
1. Securing permission and interest of participants to participate in the study; 
2. Ensuring that the information will not be misused; and 
3. Taking the moral responsibility to protect informants. 
The study has followed the Aston Business School‘s Research Ethics Guidelines which 
are in compliance with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Research 
Ethics Framework.  
Gaining access to the organisation was possible because the researcher‘s interest was 
known by most of the management team, and members of the Board of Directors. The 
researcher initiated some phone calls to the chairman of the Board of Directors and to the 
manager‘s secretary, where details of the researcher‘s needs were provided and access 
to the required information attained. It was important to follow the formal channels and 
thus avoid gaining access to the data in an unethical manner. The main sets of 
information the researcher requested were minutes of meetings from 1985-1995, including 
relevant documents, reports, and correspondence relating to the relationship between the 
GCNA and Indonesia, and copies of the audited financial statements for the period 1985-
1995. A request for an interview with the then Chairman was also made. Although it was 
granted, it did not prove useful or applicable to this research since the interviewee had no 
relevant knowledge about my research topic. 
Nevertheless, gaining access to the organisation was not without its challenges, as there 
were concerns about the way in which the information could be used against the 
organisation. It was necessary to reconfirm to the Chairman of the Board of Directors that 
the non–pertinent information to which access was being granted, would be kept 
confidential and not be publicised or used against the organisation, its board members, 
employees and members. The researcher was also able to get valuable information from 
others who did not wish to be quoted, as they felt that they were in vulnerable situations 
since information attributed to them could be detrimental to their careers and livelihoods in 





4.2.2.4 Types and Sources of Data 
According to Yin (2003) there are six sources of data/ evidence-gathering for conducting 
case studies: 1) documentation; 2) archival records (although this is similar to 
documentation, it is precise to the issue under research); 3) interviews; 4) direct 
observation; 5) participant observation; and 6) physical artifacts. It is this use of mixed 
sources of data-gathering that is referred to as triangulation (Jick, 1979). 
This case study used three of the above sources. Documentation is one of the sources 
used since it is stable and not created for the specific purpose of the case study. 
Additionally it can be reviewed repeatedly and covers an extensive period of time. With 
regards to archival records, they are the same as documentation but also contain 
quantitative data. In the case of interviews, its use was premised on its ability to provide 
specific information on the case-study topic, and was deemed insightful, providing causal 
inferences and explanations. The other three sources (physical artefacts, direct 
observation and participant observation) did not prove to be of any relevance to the case. 
Since the case was not occurring in real time, there was no need for cultural insights, and 
direct participant observation was not possible to the extent required since most of the key 
players were either dead or resided outside of Grenada.  
Also, Silverman (2001) makes a distinction between two types of data: (a) those that are 
naturally occurring, and (b) those that are researcher-provoked. Naturally occurring data 
consist of textual artefacts, correspondence between the parties to the agreement, 
audited financial statements and minutes of meetings, including reports from meetings 
with associates, which appear to be similar to Yin‘s (2003) definition of such data. 
Researcher-provoked data in this study are acquired through interviews, discussions and 
other interactions with key actors such as members of the Board of Directors and 
management of GCNA, representatives of traders, and Moermon of Catz International 
B.V. and Hachamoff of JHB International.12 The collection of the above two types of data 
from a number of sources provides a strong basis for the triangulation to develop as rich a 
picture as possible of the issues being investigated (Yin, 2003). The two types and 
multiple sources also make it possible to cross-check and cross-reference the information 
collected to enable the development of a reliable body of knowledge and narrative. It also 
enabled the research to follow the flow of activities through various streams as they 
occurred (Silverman, 2001). 
In summary, several data sources were used to provide as authoritative, reliable, valid 
and meaningful primary and secondary source of information as possible for this research. 
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The sources were the GCNA Annual Reports, statistics from the Government Central 
Statistical Office, relevant documents and data from the Grenada Public Library, the 
Library of the University of the West Indies in St. George, the British National Archives 
(UK), the online university library, the International Trade Centre (ITC), the ASPIN/GCNA 
Agreement, and the GCNA–JHB International Agreement13. Information was also 
collected from local newspapers, and talks and interviews with key stakeholders. 
 
4.2.2.5 The Research Method Explained 
This section provides practical information on how the research was conducted, and in 
particular how data were collected to ensure that the results of this research could be 
trusted and replicated in similar environments and circumstances. 
The study started with some broad questions associated with the challenges faced by 
Grenada‘s nutmeg sector and the role of the GCNA in coping with them. This initial 
investigation was exploratory in nature and identified issues which warranted further 
investigation. These issues included: 1) the stakeholder composition of the GCNA as a 
cooperative and the organisational type it represented, and 2) the extent to which its 
ownership and monopsonistic nature as the sole buyer in Grenada of nutmeg for exports 
had affected its decision-making and performance. The formation of the cartel, its short 
period of survival and its eventual demise were identified as a focal episode worthy of 
systematic and in-depth study to address some of the issues identified above.  
Hence, the initial phase of the study was exploratory and descriptive. This phase formed 
the basis for identifying the theoretical frameworks and the qualitative case study research 
methodology for the in-depth explanatory analysis. The initial literature review following 
the exploratory and descriptive work identified the frameworks and theories outlined in 
chapter 3. The case-study methodology for the explanatory part is outlined below.  
The stakeholder analysis framework was used to identify the stakeholders of different 
types and other actors and observers. The following were identified as the main 
stakeholders: the nutmeg farmers, the GCNA Board of Directors and management; the 
CEO of Catz International; and previous Ministers of Agriculture. The ministers were 
important stakeholders because the Government of Grenada, through its ministers, 
appoints representatives to the Board and approves the Board. Data collection followed 
on from the above and a plan was developed for data collection and analysis.  
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4.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection involved collecting primary and secondary data. The primary data, also 
referred to above as researcher-provoked, covered semi-structured interviews and 
discussions with key actors and stakeholders as noted earlier. Secondary data collection 
fell into two categories: company or company-related documents and non-company 
documents. The company data included GCNA Annual Reports, financial statements, and 
minutes of meetings and archival records from the GCNA for the period 1985 to 1995. The 
records of 120 Board of Directors (BoD) meetings (1985 to 1995), comprising of over 508 
pages, were reviewed in order to make sense of the rationale, thinking and discussions 
that preceded decisions of the BoD. Of the 120 meetings which occurred during that 
period, there were 237 references made to the relationship between GCNA and ASPIN 
and 37 meetings, in which key decisions and actions with respect to the development and 
demise of the relationship were made. The researcher was also able to find sporadic 
newspaper articles which directly related to the GCNA and the developments under 
investigation.  
 
4.3.1 Procedure for Gaining Access to Data 
While continuing to review the literature, the researcher made arrangements with the 
GCNA to gain access to the data. This process was hampered by the unavailability of 
much of the archival records for the period 1985 to 1989 because of the damage to 
GCNA‘s head office in 2004 caused by Hurricane Ivan. Notwithstanding these difficulties, 
the accountant (Joyce John) was very helpful in providing copies of the financial 
statements, as well as securing the help of one of the members of her department who 
was instrumental in helping the researcher to find the required statements and records 
including audited financial statements of the GCNA.  
In order to compensate for the loss of data from the company‘s archives, some of the key 
players were sought out and interviewed. The interviews were recorded electronically and 
notes were also taken. These procedures tracked the discussions, decisions and conflicts 
that surrounded the decisions of the primary stakeholders during the period under 
investigation. The approach was used with Grenadian interviewees and international 
actors, namely directors and employees of Fooks and French, a buyer of Grenadian 
nutmeg; JHB International, GCNA‘s agent for Europe, and Catz International, GCNA`s 
largest buyer at the time. In addition to formal interviews, some discussions with the 
GCNA stakeholders had to be informal because of the reluctance of the subjects to 





4.3.2 Researcher-Provoked Data 
It was important to decide ideally which persons should be interviewed. However, the 
persons interviewed and the timing of interviews were constrained by the people‘s 
availability and willingness to be interviewed, and whether their memories were sufficiently 
intact after such a long passage of time. Initially, informal discussions were held with 
some key actors and surviving members of the Board of Directors from the time of the 
episode being investigated. Based on this, a list of persons to be interviewed, which 
included former government ministers and GCNA board members, was compiled. A semi-
structured interview questionnaire was designed (See Appendix 2). The information 
collected from these interviews allowed for the validation of the archival data, enabling the 
filling in of some of the gaps in the recorded date and lost data, much from the damage 
caused by Hurricane Ivan.  
 
4.3.3 Data Collection and Confidentiality 
An important concern that arose during this phase was the issue of confidentiality and 
reliability of the informants. Whereas many of those persons were willing to discuss issues 
involving and surrounding the GCNA, they did so on the basis of absolute confidentiality. 
This has to be recognised in the context of a very small and close-knit community.  
Open-ended, audio-recorded interviews with key informants were conducted and 
transcribed. These audio-taped interviews reflected semi-structured discussions with key 
actors and informants in the industry. This approach was deemed appropriate in order to 
provide a climate for openness for the discussions. A more direct, specific and structured 
approach might not have allowed for the degree of actor participation achieved by this 
method. 
The selection of the informants was undertaken on the basis of personal knowledge of 
members of the GCNA, time and cost of reaching those persons, and the assumed 
knowledge of the agreement between the GCNA and ASPIN. In addition to field work 
undertaken in Grenada, field work was also conducted in Rotterdam with Catz 
International and in Brussels, where the manager of JHB International (GCNA‘s sole 
agent for Europe), Vigi Hachamoff, was also interviewed. The information obtained from 
the interviews has been presented in narrative and temporal bracketing forms in chapters 






4.3.4 Methods of Data Analysis 
The data collection was followed by data classification and analysis which are explained in 
this section. The data were classified into three inter-related areas: 1) textual artefacts 
such as minutes from the meetings of the Board of Directors, reports on meetings with key 
stakeholders in the network, which formed the agreement between the GCNA and ASPIN, 
correspondence between the parties to the agreement and other relevant reports and 
documents; 2) analysis of the audited annual financial statements; and 3) information 
emanating from discussions and talks held with key actors. 
 
4.3.4.1 Treatment and Analysis of Textual Artefacts 
The minutes of meetings were placed in an Excel spreadsheet in order to classify the 
information and help bring order to the analysis. The key issues and references which the 
researcher identified for the analysis were the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement, Recondition 
Nutmeg14, GCNA financial performance, and the recruitment of the new agent, JHB 
International. Each of these issues was allocated a number ranging from 0 to 4, where: 
0 – indicated where there was no discussion on the ASPIN-GCNA Agreement 
1 – indicated reference to the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement 
2 – indicated reference to reconditioned nutmeg 
3 – indicated reference to GCNA‘s financial situation 
4 – indicated  reference to JHB International, the new nutmeg agent  
(A sample of the above is contained in Annex 3) 
 
Sorting based on this classification made it easier to identify dates, actors and content in a 
chronological order, and the identification of issues pertinent to the case (presented in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7), with a focus on the textual artifacts that were used to capture the 
mood and sense-making of the talks between the actors in the negotiations. More 
specifically, the method sought to identify the decisions and activities that related to and 
influenced developments in the nutmeg cartel episode. 
 
4.3.4.2 Treatment of Primary Data   
The third type of data analysis in this study is the treatment of the primary data emanating 
from discussions and talks held with key actors in the situation. The data collected were 
audio-recorded and transcribed to create each account which was annotated to establish 
relationships, trends, and the roles of key actors. Stakeholder information was properly 
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labeled, dated and classified to avoid contamination of data and to facilitate referencing 
for future analysis. Having obtained an appreciation of the story, and insights into the ebb 
and flow of the relationship, it was necessary to proceed to establishing the key timeline of 
the events which followed.  The data collected from these semi- structured interviews form 
an integral part of the narrative which is detailed in chapters 5, 6 and 7.   
Overall, the evidence was used to assess the level of influence that the stakeholder 
groups and key individuals (actors) exerted on the decisions and actions. These actors 
also sought to establish the stakeholders‘ source of power and assess performance of the 
GCNA through the episode amongst other issues. The evidence was combined to provide 
context, meaning and understanding of the episode being investigated, using Langley‘s 
(1999) sense-making method which is outlined below. 
The sense-making method of Langley (2007, p.694), adopts the process by which 
meaning is given to an experience for two reasons. 
 ―Firstly, it implies the possibility that a variety of ―senses‖ or 
theoretical understandings may legitimately emerge from the 
same data.‖ Secondly, ―it implies that the closing of the gap 
between data and theory can begin at either or both ends 
(data and theory) and may often iterate between them.‖  
The seven sense-making strategies are detailed in table 4.1, identifying them as: 
narrative, quantification, alternate template, grounded theory, visual mapping, temporal 
bracketing, and synthetic strategy. These strategies are assessed on the basis of key 
anchor points, the fit with data process complexity, specific data needs, good theory 
dialectics, and forms of sense-making. 
 
For purposes of this study, two of the above strategies were employed. They are: the 
Narrative Strategy and the Temporal Bracketing (Ann Langley, 1999) Strategy, since they 
are best able to provide the time sensitivity and bracketing of the events, while the 
narrative allows for an easy way to tell the complex story of the rise and fall of a 
relationship. 
 
According to Langley (1999), this strategy involves the construction of a detailed story 
from raw data. This strategy has been used by authors such as: Pettigrew (1985) and 
Pettigrew and Whip (1991). The adoption of this strategy involves the use of descriptive 
narratives (or realistic tales); these narratives are also the traditional tool of ethnographers 
(Van Maanen, 1988) and they frequently play a key role in studies of cultural change 
(Bartunek, 1984).  
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Fit with Process 
Data Complexity 
Specific Data needs ―Good Theory‖ Dialectics Forms of Sense 
Making 





One or few rich cases can 
be helped by comparison 
High on accuracy; lower 




Quantification strategy Events, 
outcomes 
Focuses on 
―events‖ and their 
characteristics. 
Eschews ambiguity 
Needs many similar events 
for statistical analysis: one 
of few dense cases is best 
High simplicity; potentially 
high generality; modest 
accuracy (abstraction 





Theories Adaptable to 





One case is enough. 
Degrees of freedom come 
from multiple templates 
Each theory can be 
simple and general. 
Together, they offer 
accuracy, but simplicity 
and generality disappear 








Adapts well to 




Needs detail on many 
similar incidences. Could 
be different processes or 
individual-level analysis of 
one case 
High accuracy. Moderate 
simplicity. May be difficult 
to go from substantive 








Fit with Process 
Data Complexity 







Deals well with 
time, relationships, 
etc. Less good for 
emotions and 
interpretations 
Needs several cases in 
moderate level of detail to 
begin generating patterns ( 
5-10 more) 
Moderate level of 
accuracy, simplicity, and 
generality. Not necessarily 





Phases Can deal with 





One or two detailed cases 
are sufficient if processes 
have several phases used 
for replication. 
Accuracy depends on 
adequacy of temporal 
decomposition. Moderate 
simplicity and generality 
 
Mechanisms 












events into typical 
sequences 
Needs enough cases (5+) 
to generate convincing 
relationships. 
Moderate level of detail 
needed for internal validity. 
Modest accuracy (but 
much better than 
questionnaire research). 










4.3.4.3 Temporal Bracketing Strategy 
Temporal bracketing represents a way of structuring the description of events over time, 
thus allowing the charting of events and incidents such as the circumstances leading up to 
the cartel, its initiation, subsequent developments and the collapse of the cartel. Hence, 
this strategy allows for the decomposing of events over time, thus proving good 
descriptive temporal utility (Langley, 1999). Chapter 5 provides an overview of the 
temporal bracketing of the events, which is a decomposition of the story in manageable, 
understandable portions to break longitudinal data into successive periods (Langley, 
1999). 
Despite its usefulness, temporal decomposition can create certain distortions. For 
example, there is no guarantee that the discontinuities observed in a process will naturally 
synchronise to produce unequivocal periods. As a consequence, accuracy is likely to 
range from moderate to high, depending on the appropriateness of temporal 
decomposition and the robustness of the analysis (Langley, 1999).The use of narrative as 
an analytical tool has been increasing in use over the years (Holloway and Jefferson, 
2000; Riessmann.1990). 
The use of the temporal bracketing and narrative is premised on their very close similarity 
and interconnectedness, which are deeply embedded in their structures as part of 
Langley‘s (1999) framework. More important, as qualitative tools they provide three 
features which are essential for this study. First, they are chronological, representing a 
sequence of events; secondly, they are meaningful; and thirdly, they are inherently social 
(Elliott, 2005). 
 
4.3.5 Determining the Reliability, Accuracy and Validity of the Case 
Langley`s (1999) process strategy illustrates that there are trade-offs between accuracy, 
generality and simplicity, where the object of the strategy is to map the terrain and 
highlight the fact that a good process strategy takes different routes. This coincides with 
the view expressed by Langley (1999, p.706): 
 ―the idea that multiple templates can produce better 
understandings may also be generalised to the use of 
multiple strategies, again, provided the combinations are 
complementary and provided simplicity is not compromised 
in the attempt to achieve integration.‖  
 
Table 4.2 provides a scale of the elements of the sense-making strategies on the three 
areas of accuracy, simplicity and generality. It shows that narrative, grounded theory 
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temporal bracketing, and visual mapping are high on accuracy but low on simplicity and 
generality. Synthetic strategy, quantification and computer simulation are low on accuracy 
but high on simplicity and generality. This framework allows its users to determine which 
is best to use, given the context of their case. Hence, this case found that narrative and 
temporal bracketing were best suited for use in explaining and describing what happened 
during the period under review. 
 
The ordering in table 4.2 demonstrates the ranking that is allotted to each element of the 
strategy; there are variations among specific applications. For example, while accuracy 
and simplicity are almost always in opposition to one another, the generality of emerging 
theories will depend on other factors such as the degree and scope of replications and the 
source of the conceptual ideas. There have been constant calls in scholarly literature for 
more in-depth process research that will add to a better understanding of organisational 
phenomenon. This thesis makes a contribution in this respect.  
 
Table 4.2 Sense-Making Strategies, Accuracy, Simplicity and Generality 





































Source: Langley, 1999, p.706. 
While recognising the importance of the above strategies in presenting data from case 
studies, this case is, however, concerned with narrative and temporal bracketing strategy 
which Langley considers relatively high on accuracy, but low on simplicity and generality. 
The results from this study, therefore, will present a highly accurate account of the events 
studied in a simplified manner. The results, therefore, will be reflective of a particular 
situation but can also be applied   to similar agreements. Nevertheless, the sense-making 
from the findings applying the theoretical frameworks (notably the conditions required for 
commodity agreements and cartels to survive, the position of commodity producers, 
notably small economies, in the global value chain and decision-making in entities 
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managing the commodity exports with information and knowledge asymmetry and 
management weaknesses), shows patterns of cause and effect which can be generalised 
to other situations. Further, the methodology adopted can be replicated in studies of other 
organisations.15  
The issue of accuracy surrounds the mixed set of data which were collected. The first set 
is the financial data contained in the Annual Financial Statements of the GCNA and the 
Central Statistical Office. The second set of data relates to recurring data, such as the 
minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors, reports and newspaper articles. The 
third set of data relates to non-recurring, researcher-provoked sets of data which were 
obtained from interviews and conversations using the semi-structured approach. With 
regard to the financial statements and statistics provided by the GCNA, these are 
generally regarded as reliable, since they are audited by a reputable accounting firm. The 
statistics from the GCNA demonstrate a high level of consistency through the years. The 
statistics provided by the Ministry of Finance Central Statistics Office are generally 
regarded as accurate and reliable, as well, being the official repository of such data. 
For issues of accuracy, validity and reliability of the qualitative data referred to above as 
recurring and non-recurring and researcher-provoked, Denzin and Lincoln (2003) and 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) emphasise the trustworthiness of the investigation. In Guba and 
Lincoln‘s construct of trustworthiness, 1) credibility, 2) transferability, 3) dependability, and 
4) conformability were identified. 
1. The issue of credibility. The credibility of the research in this study was enhanced 
in three ways. First, the financial data used are considered to be reliable and were 
externally audited statements. Second, multiple sources were used (triangulation) to verify 
the data contained in reports and minutes of meetings. This involved conversations with 
actors such as Hachamoff (JHB International), Moermon (Catz International) and 
management and members of the Board of Directors of the GCNA. Third, the 
communications channels between the researcher and some key actors were opened, 
thus allowing the researcher to return to them from time to time to double-check 
information provided or to seek clarification on issues.  
 
2. The issue of transferability. The key issue according to Lincoln and Guba (1985) is 
whether the results of the findings are transferable to other contexts. Transferability in the 
form of generalisability of findings and use of methodology have been discussed earlier in 
section 4.2.6 in relation to sense-making strategies. Furthermore, the study uses 
stakeholder analysis to examine the implications of the motivations and actions of 
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 Also see the discussion on ―transferability‖ in qualitative research below. 
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stakeholders on a commodity marketing cooperative. The mode of analysis and the 
findings are transferable to other such cooperatives in Grenada and to other developing 
countries.  
 
3. The issue of dependability. The question that arises is whether the process of the 
study is consistent, and reasonably stable over time, and whether the research was done 
with reasonable care and, therefore, is dependable. This study sought to ensure that the 
process was reliable. This is seen in the thoroughness of ensuring the credibility of the 
data. Authenticated data from GCNA were consistently used as well as verified through 
inter-actions with other key actors.  
The use of multiple sources of data is also evident. When there was need for clarity, the 
researcher either returned to the source and/or verified details by using other sources to 
cross-check. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the issue of dependability also 
has to do with the extent to which the research process is connected to theory. Chapter 3 
and earlier parts of this chapter have identified the theoretical contexts of this study. 
Additionally, the research methodology employed included triangulation, allowing for the 
use of multiple sources to tell the story, while relying on Ann Langley‘s sense-making 
(narrative and temporal bracketing) framework to report the findings. An attempt was 
made to ensure through cross-checking and reviewing that the narrative and explanations 
were appropriately rooted.  
 
4. The issue of conformability that every finding can be traced back to the original 
source where the facts were first encountered.  
 
The narrative strategy adopted by this thesis is deeply rooted in the raw data. The 
researcher is keenly aware that although the narrative strategy is high on accuracy while 
being relatively low on simplicity and generality, a trade-off is expected since the single-
case-study method is focused on particularity and does not easily lend itself to generality 
(Yin, 1994). Nevertheless, it has been noted earlier that forms of generality can be 
achieved with respect to the findings and the methodology.  
 
4.3.6 Challenges and Shortcomings of this Case 
There are five possible sources of errors / shortcomings in the case:  
1. The unavailability of pertinent data. As explained earlier, one of the difficulties 
encountered during this study was missing data due to the damage done to GCNA‘s main 
office and the consequent loss of records caused by Hurricane Ivan. Consequently, some 
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data for the period 1985 to 1988 were not available, in particular records of minutes of 
meetings. 
 
2. The lost narratives from key actors/ informants. The researcher was unable to obtain 
the ―voice‖ of the members of the Board of Directors that negotiated the GCNA-ASPIN 
Marketing Agreement Of the seven members who negotiated the agreement, four died, 
one is suffering from Parkinson‘s disease, one refused to participate in the survey and two 
are now residing outside of Grenada and cannot be reached. This affected the ability of 
the researcher to obtain more information on the formative stage of the relationship 
between the ASPIN and GCNA. 
 
3. The discussions/ interviews/ talks held with key stakeholders. Although valuable, the 
information obtained could be of questionable validity because it is highly subjective and 
not necessarily representative of all the other key stakeholders involved in the cartel 
relationship. 
 
4. The minutes of the meetings obtained. These might not have sufficiently captured the 
content, depth of explanations, and nuances of the context in which the events unfolded. 
 
5. Financial constraints. These prevented the researcher from travelling to Indonesia in 
order to obtain some first-hand information from some of the actors in the episode. 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter describes how the empirical research was carried out through the use of the 
case-study methodology but also touches on why it was done. Relevance was found in 
the work of Gummesson (2000) who stated that a fundamental challenge facing 
management researchers is to find access to reality, pre-understanding and 
understanding. The process in this study detailed a dynamic study of the nutmeg cartel 
episode from the perspective of the GCNA. The qualitative research method adopted 
utilises multiple sources of data as a triangulation approach for verification (Jick, 1979) 
and for enhancing the richness of the context and the narrative. Table 4.3 summarises the 
multiple sources used for data collection, the key stakeholder groups used to collect the 





Table 4.3 Multiple Sources of Data for Triangulation and Enhancing Richness  






Key individual actors of 
the GCNA, and the global 
nutmeg industry supply 
chain (including farmers) 
To gain their understanding of the 
GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement 
Archival records GCNA  archives To obtain background and context, 
minutes and records of minutes leading 
up to, and covering the period of the 
Agreement 
Annual Financial 
Reports of the 
GCNA 
Members of the GCNA 
Board of Directors and 
staff government, banks, 
agents 
To obtain audited data on the financial 
performance of the GCNA, before, 
during and after the period of the cartel 
to assess the impact on the financial 
situation of the GCNA and payments to 
members   
Source. Developed by the author 
 
The chapter explains the research method and the ethical considerations governing the 
research, and examines the sources of data, as well as the treatment of data and the 
method of data recording. The data has been used to create the composite narrative of 
stakeholders‘ motivations, decisions and actions related to the formation of the cartel and 
the financial and economic implications of the episode for the GCNA and its members. 
In constructing the composite narrative, the timeline of the key and important events were 
identified and sequenced to provide a deeper understanding of the case. This approach 






Chapter 5 – Attempts at the Creation of the GCNA–ASPIN Nutmeg Cartel 
 
5.1 General Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the context, actions and decisions made between 
1979 and 1986 leading up to the Joint Marketing Agreement between the GCNA in 
Grenada and ASPIN in Indonesia, using the data from multiple sources and the 
approaches described in chapter 4, and the theoretical frameworks reviewed in chapter 3. 
It answers the research question: What factors and interactions with other stakeholders 
influenced the GCNA Board of Directors’ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint 
GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement to operate as a cartel? 
 
 This chapter is organised into three major sections. Section 5.1 outlines the general 
factors favouring the formation of cartels; Section 5.2 deals with the global nutmeg trade 
with specific reference to Grenada and Indonesia and Section 5.3 discusses the trading 
and financial performance of the GCNA(1980-1985, Section 5.4  presents the summary 
and conclusion of the chapter. 
 
5.1.1 General factors favouring the formation of cartels 
5.1.2 Grenada‘s trade and economic situation (1980-1985) 
Chapter 2 shows that Grenada‘s trade balance was in deficit and deteriorating between 
1980 and 1985. Three agricultural primary commodities, cocoa, bananas and nutmeg 
together accounted for a high proportion of export earnings (61 per cent in 1985). In such 
circumstances governments seek means by which to improve the trade balance. For a 
small island economy dependent on imports for essential consumer and producer goods, 
two of the options are to: (a) increase export earnings from the conventional primary 
commodities and improve the stability of these earnings, and (b) develop alternative 
sources of foreign exchange.  
While Chapter 2 identified cocoa, bananas and nutmeg as the three major agricultural 
primary commodities, Table 2.5 shows that over the period 1980 and 1985 the earnings 
from nutmeg and their share increased substantially. More importantly there is a 
substantial difference between the three crops on Grenada‘s production and exports in 
relation to the total world exports. For example, Grenada‘s cocoa production and exports 
in 1985 were respectively 4,775,964 and 4,490,412 lbs respectively (2,133 and 2,067 tons 
respectively). These volumes are about 0.1 per cent of the total global production of cocoa 
for the year 1984/5 at almost of 1.96 million tons (ICCO, 2015). 
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Grenada‘s share of global banana exports in the 1980s was also small, about 1 per cent 
of the total. Further, as noted in chapter 2 (section 2.3.3) while banana exports to the EU 
were protected under the Lome Convention, they were coming under the increasing 
competitive pressure from exports from Latin American countries producing on larger 
scales. Table 2.4 and 2.5 show declining exports and export earnings of Grenada‘s 
bananas. Hence, the prospect for exerting any influence over international prices and 
Grenada‘s export revenues from cocoa and bananas was virtually non-existent. Nutmeg 
appeared to offer a different prospect. As noted earlier, Grenada was the second largest 
exporter supplying 10 per cent of exports while Indonesian producers exported 80 per 
cent of the world‘s nutmeg (Marks and Pomeroy, 1995). The combined market share of 90 
per cent between the two countries appeared to provide a prospect for exercise of control 
over the supply if the two countries, precisely the suppliers in the two countries could 
cooperate on supply and prices. Chapter 2 (section 2.5) shows that in Grenada GCNA 
had control over the export of nutmeg by statute. The situation on the Indonesian side was 
different (see Table 5.7).           
The following discourse details the above rationale. The talk and text evidence presented 
later in the chapter shows, the primary stakeholder groups within the GCNA, members of 
the Board of Directors and the former Grenadian Minister of Agriculture and Prime 
Minister, George I. Brizan, believed that one of the ways of controlling this precious 
Grenadian natural resource, Grenada‘s Black Gold, was to have control over setting 
prices (Interview with Brizan, 20 June, 2007). This was considered possible by these 
stakeholders because they were persuaded that Grenada and Indonesia could jointly 
control supply and prices in the nutmeg market. The formation of ASPIN in Indonesia to 
coordinate export of nutmeg and the support and persuasion of the CEO of Catz 
International, Mr. Huietma from Holland, were instrumental in reinforcing the stance of 
these stakeholders (Interviews with Renwick 5 August 2006; Lord19 March 2015; Logie 
17, April 2015; Moermon 20, May 2010). 
The literature review highlights conditions necessary for the formation and survival of 
cartels (see section 3.3). The primary stakeholders in the GCNA believed that these 
conditions could be created in the global nutmeg market by GCNA and ASPIN. The 
formation of GCNA in 1947 and the formation of the ASPIN in 1985 appeared to provide 
the ―legal‖ conditions for the formation of the cartel, while the fluctuating and low prices 
provided the economic incentive to enter into an agreement (Filson, Keen, Fruits and 
Borcherdeng, 2001; Brizan, 2003).  
The desire on the part of the primary stakeholders in GCNA to increase prices for 
nutmegs was reinforced by the wish to improve farmers‘ incomes and livelihood (interview 
with Renwick 20, June 2006) and to contribute to improving the balance of trade which 
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was in deficit between 1980 and 1985 and worsening over this period as shown in 
Chapter 2 (see section 2.3 and Table 2.6). This situation was a major concern to policy 
makers at the time (Interview with Brizan,   20 June, 2007) 
George I. Brizan (Interview with Brizan15 May, 2005, and 20 June, 2007) argued that 
among the reasons for commodity agreements, such as that attempted by GCNA and 
ASPIN, is to allow developing countries to gain control of their own resources and stabilise 
prices and improve the terms of trade for poor countries exporting primary agricultural 
commodities.  
 
5.1.3   Indonesia‘s Balance of Trade 
The trade balance and terms of trade reasons for the nutmeg marketing agreement were 
not as relevant for Indonesia which had balance of trade surpluses since the 1960s. 
Additionally, unlike Grenada, nutmeg was not a major national export commodityi. 
Therefore, the motivation for the marketing agreement is focused on achieving higher and 
more stable prices for nutmeg producers. The relatively low importance to Indonesia of 
nutmeg in relation to the rest of the economy may be an explanation for the end of the 
agreement after a short duration. 
Unlike Grenada, Indonesia‘s balance of trade has been in surplus since the 1960s, 
averaging USD764.55 million, with average economic growth of 3.7 per cent annum 
(www.eaber.org). Additionally, unlike Grenada, nutmeg was not a major national export 
commodityii.  It therefore means that the income obtained from the sale of nutmeg was of 
less importance to Indonesia‘s national income and development than that of Grenada. 
Therefore the deteriorating terms of trade argument for the formation of the Agreement for 
Indonesia was not a major condition, as far as Indonesia was concerned.  One would 
therefore argue that the major factor for Indonesia‘s involvement in the cartel were the 
prices obtained by the nutmeg exporters (Thiatien, 1995), who were the primary 
stakeholders in the global nutmeg trade. 
Table 5.1 below shows that export earnings for Indonesia declined from US$23,348.0 in 
1981 to 18,689.0 in 1983 but rose slightly (11.0 per cent) in 1984 to US$20,754.0 but 
declined again in 1985 to US$18,527.0 Million. During the same period, imports increased 
from US$16,542.0 million in 1981 to 17,726.0 in 1983 but declined in 1984 and 1985 to 
US$15,047.0 in 1984 and US$12,705.0 in 1985. As a consequence, the trade balance 
(visible – goods and services) declined from US$6,806.0 in 1981 to US$963.0 in 1984, a 
decline of US$5,843.0 or 85.0 per cent. However, by 1985, the trade balance increased to 
US$5,707.0. Despite the trade surplus experienced by Indonesia during the period under 
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review, there were years when exports declined (1982, 1983 and 1985 by 15, 5 and 11 
per cent respectively). 





Growth Imports  (US$) 
% 
Growth 







1982 19,747.0 -15 17,854.0 -8 1,893.0 
1983 18,689.0 -5 17,726.0 0 963.0 
1984 20,754.0 11 15,947.0 -15 5,707 
1985 18,527.00 -11 12,705.0 -16 5,822.0 
Source: Satiotomo (1998) citing International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986. 
 
5.1.4 The Global Nutmeg Trade and Global Price Behaviour of Nutmeg 1980-1985. 
Nutmeg is a commodity that is produced in developing countries but consumed mainly in 
developed countries, and as such its demand and price condition will exhibit the inherent 
problems of commodity trades between developing and developed countries such as, 
fluctuating demand, unstable and generally low prices, and technical and non-technical 
barriers to trade (Le Clair, 2000; Krugman, 2011).  
The global production of nutmeg is estimated to be 9,000–12,000 metric tons and of mace 
1,500-2000 metric tons ( Interview with Brizan, 20 June,2007) with Indonesia supplying 80 
per cent and Grenada 10 per cent, with marginal amounts produced by Malaysia, India, 
Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea. The major nutmeg consuming countries are the United 
Sates (15 per cent) and Europe (64 per cent), with Japan, Nigeria, Vietnam and Saudi 
Arabia being the other noted consuming countries (Interview with Brizan, 20 Iune, 2007). 
Table 5.2 shows the level of exports, earnings and price per kg obtained by both countries 
for the export of nutmeg during the period 1981–1985. It shows that both Grenada and 
Indonesia supplied the nutmeg market with 44,112 kg of nutmeg over these five years. 
With Indonesia supplying 32,401 Kg, while Grenada supplied, 12, 711 Kg.  Indonesia 
supplied 71 per cent of the supplies and earned 67 per cent of the income, while Grenada 
supplied 29 per cent of global supply and earned 33 per cent.  
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The amount of nutmeg supplied in the above table does not match the general stated 
global supply of shared production between Indonesia and Grenada of 80/20 percentage 
respectively. This amount can and does vary from year to year depending on production 
conditions, such as climatic, production of trees in the two countries and demand 
conditions in the importing countries. Nonetheless, the percentages accredited to both 
countries reflect the general trend over time and not necessarily a year on year 
determination. 
According to Logie, former Secretary and General Manager GCNA (1988-1995), 
approximately 80–90 per cent of Grenada‘s nutmeg was sold to the European Market, 
15per cent to North America and the balance to the rest of the world ( Interview with Logie 
5 April, 2005). According to the Daniel (1994), the distribution network for nutmeg has 
been influenced by the dominant position of the two suppliers in the market (Grenada and 
Indonesia), in that Grenada (GCNA), worked through a few major buyers such as Catz 
International and Fooks and French (Grenada selected a sole agent for Europe, Canada 
and the USA in 1988), and Indonesia‘s nutmegs were sold mainly to Netherlands, 
Germany, Japan, UK, Saudi Arabia and the USA, while Sri Lanka sold to Kuwait, and 
Bahrain and Papua sold to the Netherlands. 
According Lord and Robertson (interviews with Lord, 19 March, 2014. Robertson 20 
August,2006), annual global supply for nutmeg in the 1980s/1990s0s was estimated to be 
9,000 tons, which was generally below world average of between 10,000 and 12,000 tons 
per year, while consumption was estimated to be around 8,000–9,000 tons. Therefore, 
there was an oversupply of nutmeg of approximately 3,000 tons per year on the market 
which was reflected in the price received by the two suppliers. 
The global oversupply of nutmeg inventory was generally held by two sets of key players 
in the GVC nodes: the suppliers like the GCNA and foreign agents and brokers who also 
purchased for speculative purposes and/or held stocks to meet unexpected demand. In 
the case of the GCNA, by June 1984, they were holding 6,401,191 lbs of nutmeg, valued 
at EC$3,734,920 (GCNA Financial Statement & Trading Summary, 1984)  
Despite Indonesia‘s higher sales volume as compared with Grenada‘s, the latter received 
a higher price per kg for its nutmeg, ranging from US$1.76 in 1981 to US$1.29, except in 
1985 when Indonesia received US$1.38 per kg and Grenada US$1.29 (Marks and 
Pomeroy,1995). This general difference in prices (Interviews with Moermon, 22 October 
2009; Hachamoff, 10 October 2008) was because of the better quality of Grenada‘s 
nutmeg, as reflected in the amount of aflotoxins contained per 100 kg of nutmegs (Dr. 
David Drown, Minutes of the Board Meeting, August 19, 1986). 
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Table 5.1 shows that both countries were experiencing declining export prices and total 
income from the sale of nutmeg between 1980 and 1984. This decline in prices could be 
attributed to the effect of the global economic downturn during the mid-1980s. Table 5.4 
shows that between 1981 and 1984, both Grenada and Indonesia appear to have 
compensated for the falling prices by increasing their supplies of nutmeg (see table5.1). In 
the case of Grenada, exports increased by 91 per cent from 1.721 million kg 1981 to 
3,284 million kg in 1985. The increase in price in 1985 could be attributed in part to the 
news of the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Grenada and 
Indonesia (Interview with Moermon 20 October, 2009). 
The above discussion focuses on prices since the low farm gate prices appeared to be the 
proximate cause for the intensification of efforts to form the Agreement with ASPIN. the 
level of satisfaction of members of the GCNA with its Board of Directors is assessed to a 
large degree by the level of advance prices and bonus payments they receive for their 
nutmegs (anecdotal evidence). The global price situation, as reflected in the fluctuating 
and low prices provided the immediate catalyst for the external stakeholder and principle 
buying agent, Huitema, the then CEO of Catz, to call for a joint agreement between the 
GCNA and ASPIN on the one hand, and Ferguson, Board member of the GCNA on the 
other, to suggest to his colleagues that, 
 ―someone should go to Indonesia every year to obtain first-
hand information on the situation there,‖ (Minutes of Board 
meeting July 23, 1985).  
Ferguson‘s recommendation seems to suggest the lack of sufficient and appropriate 
information asymmetry which the GCNA Board and certainly himself was feeling which in 
turn gave them the feeling that they were unable to control the market as they would have 
liked. 
During the period under review the joint total volume of nutmeg nutmegs exported from 
Indonesia and Grenada amounted to 45,112 Million Kilograms at a value of US$52,542 




Table 5.2 Indonesia and Grenada Volume and Value of Export in Nutmeg, 1981-1985 
Indonesia Grenada 
Year Volume Value Unit 
Value 
($/Kg) 
Volume  Value Unit Value 
(US$/Kg 





(US$ 000) Average 
Price per 
Kilo 
1981 5,557 6,374 1.15 1,721 3,035 1.76 
1982 7,723 6,254 1.07 2,040 3,086 1.51 
1983 6,284 6,732 1.07 2,774 3,732 1.35 
1984 6,717 7,410 1.10 2,892 3,257 1.13 
1985 6,120 8,442 1.38 3,284 4,220 1.29 
Total 32,401 35,212 1.15  12,711 17,330 1.41  
Source: Marks and Pomeroy (1995). 
The above discussion reflects a structural problem faced by the nutmeg industry; the 
general fluctuating but downward trajectory in market price conditions for which the 
primary stakeholders in the GVC, both in GCNA and ASPIN, would seek to exert control 
over supply and price by ensuring that they took collective actions to first stabilise prices 
and then to influence them upwards. In order to do so, they required some form of 
organization to act as a cartel, and hence their perseverance to work towards a 
mechanism which was established in 1986. 
 
5.1.5. Trading and Financial Performance of the GCNA, 1980–1985  
This sub-section addresses another of the factors – the trading and financial situation of 
the GCNA during the period 1980-1985, which provide evidence on the historical and 
proximate causes for seeking closer market collaboration with Indonesian exporters. It 
details the fluctuating but general downward trending of prices and income received by 
the GCNA and its membership. The section presents data on the proportion of income 
shared between the GCNA and farmers during the period, though some of the income 
retained by the GCNA is to meet the costs of receiving, processing and selling and 
operating  the GCNA. 
 
5.1.5.1 Export Price Received by the GCNA and Paid to Farmers (farm gate price) 
Table 5.3 indicates the export price per unit received by the GCNA and the percentage 
changes, the amount paid to the farmers and the percentage of shared export earnings 
between the GCNA and the farmers for the period 1980–1985. The table shows that the 
price per pound of nutmeg declined from EC$2.48 to EC$1.35 in that period, a decline of 
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45.6 per cent. It also shows the volatility of the price received by the GCNA and shared 
with the farmers ranging from a difference of EC$1.03 in 1980 to EC$0.27 in 1985. In 
other words the farmers received between 42.6 (1982) and 78.7 (1985) per cent of the per 
pound price of nutmeg received by the GCNA. The declining export price received by the 
GCNA was generally accompanied by a reduction in the farm gate price received by the 
farmers,  
As indicated in chapter 2, GCNA membership received two types of payments per year: 
the first being the advance payment, which they received when they conducted a sale with 
the GCNA (See Table 5.3); the second type of payment they received at the end of the 
GCNA trading year was the bonus payment, which was a share of the GCNA‘s annual 
trading surplus. This bonus was paid to the farmers around the third week of December 
(See table 5.3).  
Table 5.4 shows that the advance price per pound of nutmeg received by the farmers 
declined by 54.0 per cent between 1980 and 1983 and by 61.0 per cent from 1980 to 
1984. However, there was an upturn in price to EC$1.08 or 82.3 per cent in 1985 as 
compared to 1984. This fluctuating but generally declining price trajectory was described 
in the following terms by Lord (Interview with Lord, 19 March, 2015.), the former General 
Manager of GCNA,  
―…as the lowest prices received by the GCNA and the 
farmers for over 10 years, a situation which could not be 
allowed to continue. A solution had to be found and, as 
such, the offer from ASPIN was timely and God-sent.‖ 
Therefore, the fall in price was a strong catalyst for the creation of the nutmeg cartel and 
psychologically prepared GCNA for the offer from ASPIN, so much so that when the offer 
came Lord saw it as divinely inspired/ orchestrated, rather than looking closely at all the 
socio-economic and political parameters and ramifications involved (Interview with Lord 






Table 5.3 Export Price per lb of Nutmeg Received by GCNA and paid to farmers, 1980-
1985 




Export Price per 
pound in EC$ 
received by GCNA 
GCNA 
Price per lb paid 





GCNA received and paid to 
farmers 
 
1980 2.48 1.45 41.5  
1981 2.26 1.28 43.4 
1982 1.93 0.86 55.4 
1983 1.60 0.80 50.0 
1984 1.41 0.90 36.2 
1985 1.35 1.08 20.0 
Source: GCNA Trading and Financial Reports 1980-1985 
The above trading situation within the GCNA resonates with the findings of Davririno and 
Ponte (2005). This was an untenable situation, as the continuing relatively high farm gate 
prices to farmers as a proportion of the total export price would lead to financial problems 
for the GCNA, if the situation were not reversed. The  prices reflect a political strategy on 
the part of Board members to maintain the support of the farmers for re-election purposes, 
and in the broader socio-economic context to maintain a certain level of income among 
farmers and safeguard national peace, given the large numbers of nutmeg farmers and 
families across the six parishes of the state (Interview with Brizan, 12 May, 2007).  
The declining prices received by the GCNA as well as that transferred to the farmers, 
would have had all primary stakeholders contemplating possible actions to stem such 
decline 
 
 5.1.5.2 Bonus Payments Received by farmers during the period 1980 – 1985 
As indicated previously, the Nutmeg Ordinance of 1947, sections 56 and 62 (2), 
respectively, provide for two sets of payments (advance and bonus) to be made to the 
primary stakeholder farmer group of the GCNA.  
It is therefore important to highlight the extent to which the farmers‘ stakes were served. 
Table 5.4 shows that the farmers received EC$13,869,843 or 21 per cent of GCNA‘s 
income of EC$ 64,948,676 by way of bonus payments, during the period 1980-1985. It 
further shows that the payment declined from EC$4,369,467 in 1980 to EC$1,203,000 in 
1984, and to zero payments in 1985. The highest percentage of payment was distributed 
in 1981, when 41.0 per cent of the income was paid and the lowest of 10 per cent was 
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paid in 1983, despite the increased income. The reason for this low payment was found in 
the 1983 Trading & Financial Report, which stated that this was ―as a result of the 
continuing worldwide economic recession and tight money market‖ (GCNA Financial 
Statement and Trading Summary Report, 1983). The lack of bonus payment in 1985 
reflected the poor trading and financial performance of the GCNA during the 1984-85 
financial year. Additionally, the GCNA paid a high per cent (74.7 per cent) of their export 
income to farmers by way of the advanced payment. This would have depleted the 
resources of the GCNA and its ability to make its usual bonus payment in 1985, as well, of 
reserve or emergency funds, provided for by the Grenada Nutmeg Ordinance 1947, but 
which never materialised. 




















1980 11,839,000 4,369,467 5,068,528 9,437,995 79.7 
1981 9,786,726 3,997,656 4,751,660 8,749,316 89.4 
1982 10,640,716 3,099,720 5,228,020 8,327,740 78.3 
1983 11,736,305 1,200,000 3,336,748 4,536,748 38.7 
1984 8,478,401 1,203,000 4,422, 374 5,625,374 66.3 
1985 12,467,528 0 4,673,414 4,673,414 37.5 
Total 64,948,676 13,869,843 23058370 41350587 63.7 
Source: GCNA Annual Financial Statements and Trading Summaries 1980 –1985 
 
5.1.5.3 Summary of Payments to Farmers as a Percentage of GCNA‘s Income, 1980-
1985 
As shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4 the GCNA paid farmers 63.7 per cent of the income 
earned during the period, ranging from a high of 89.4 per cent in 1981 to 37.5 per cent in 
1985. During the period 1980 to 1982, the GCNA paid in excess of 78.0 per cent of their 
total income to the farmers. These payments reflected the relatively high income received 




The low payout was due in part to the volatile trading performance in prior years, as well 
as the increase in direct expenses from approximately EC$3,000,000 in 1984 to EC$ 
5,000,000 in 1985, an increase of 67.0 per cent ( Interview with Logie, 17 April 2006). The 
total payments made by the GCNA to the farmers however, does not seem to follow any 
particular pattern or deliberate policy as stated in the Nutmeg Ordinance, but more so the 
aspirations of the Board of Directors at that time (Interview with Logie, 2 April 2015) 
It therefore meant that with a membership of an annual average of 6,000 farmers and their 
families (accounting for approximately 30 per cent of the island‘s population of 100,000), 
each farmer-household received an average of EC$6,891.76. Given that farmers were 
interested in cartelisation in order to improve the prices received for nutmeg, one can 
deduce that they deemed this amount insufficient. They expected cartelisation to increase 
their average annual income and improve their socio-economic status. 
 
5.1.5.4 Trading and Financial Performance of GCNA, 1980-1985 
Table 5.1 shows that during the period under review, the GCNA exported 17,330 Kg or 
29,234,479 pounds of nutmeg or 86 per cent of the quantity of nutmeg available for 
export, and 2,315,713 pounds of mace, of the available 2,704,251 pounds or 85.6 per 
cent of the quantity of mace available for export. During the same period the GCNA 
earned EC$64,948, 676, and paid to the farmers a total of EC$41,350,587 or 63.7 per 
cent of total income earned. 
The above discourse highlights the volatile but declining earnings which the GCNA was 
receiving during the period, a critical factor that created the basis for the creation of 
cartels, since cartels are likely to be formed when the market price falls below a desired 
level or below a level that people perceive as fair (Moxnes, 1989; Brizan, 2003; OECD, 
2007; Le Clair, 2010).  
The declining export price received by the GCNA and passed on to the farmers by way of 
declining advance and bonus payments (see table 5.3 ..) was a significant  factor that 
propelled the GCNA Board of Directors into attempting to forge the marketing agreement 
with ASPIN of Indonesia. One of the ways agricultural policy makers have attempted to 
stop such declining income and welfare gains is through regulations which can be 
considered to be anti-competitive and in this regard, politicians can be swayed by their 
constituencies to use government-owned or influenced businesses for revenue-raising 
purposes (Baumfield, 2016) 
The fluctuation and decline in prices were experienced both by Grenadian and Indonesian 
exporters. In Grenada‘s case, the fluctuations in price and income started in the late 
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1970s and continued into the 1980s. They led the Board of Directors to make the following 
commentary in its 1980 Annual Report: 
―In view of yet another substantial drop in the trading 
surplus, as compared with the years 1976 to 1978, and with 
a view to boosting the Reserve Fund the surplus for 
distribution to the growers, the board has given serious 
consideration to the financial hardships being experienced 
by growers because of the inflationary cost of living 
generally and the steep rises in all agricultural inputs 
(fertilizers, transportation, labour, etc.) and to the difficult 
position of those producers who suffered damage to their 
nutmeg cultivation by Hurricane Allen in early August. On 
the other hand, the board had to take into account the 
possible consequences of a cash liquidity problem being 
caused by too large a depletion of the reserves in view of 
the unfortunate fact that revenue from trading thus far for the 
current year from July 1980 is falling even below last year‘s 
and with the market outlook continuing to be very 
discouraging.‖  
(GCNA Financial and Trading Summary, 1980, p15). 
In 1983, the GCNA experienced a slight recovery over the previous two years in quantity 
exported (see Table 5.4), but at a lower price per pound as compared with the previous 
two years. This 1983 Financial Statement and Trading Summary highlighted the state of 
the market by concluding the following:  
―The market for Nutmegs remained very depressed during 
the year under review as a result of the continuing world-
wide economic recession and tight money market… The 
Association was able to export greater quantities of 
Nutmegs than the previous year, albeit at slightly lower 
prices due to stiff competition and selling pressures from 
Indonesia, and other principal producers.‖  
GCNA Financial Statement and Trading Summary, 1983, p15. 
This trading and financial situation continued into 1984 as indicated in table 5.10, resulting 
in the following comment by the GCNA:  
―The market for nutmegs continued to be depressed during 
the year under review and this resulted in a fall in both the 
quantity and value of nutmeg exported.‖ 
 GCNA Financial Trading and Summary Report, 1984, p.15. 
During the period 1980 - 1985, the GCNA produced 31,456,412 lbz of exportable nutmeg 
and 2,707,251  of mace, of which 29,234,479 pounds or 92.9 per cent of nutmeg and 
2,315,713 lbs or 85.6 per cent of mace were exported, generating income of 
EC$68,742.080 or an average of EC$13,748.416 per annum year, in the midst of 
depressed market conditions and economic recession. The farmers‘ share of earnings 
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amounted to EC$41,350,587 or 63.7 per cent. The poor trading and financial situation of 
the GCNA, which led to the conclusion by the Board, demonstrates that the GCNA was in 
need of a sales solution that would render a stable and increasing income, and as such, 
any proposal that seemed to provide such a benefit received a positive response. 
An indicator of how the GCNA managed in the short term interest of farmers as primary 
stakeholders, and how the objective of pursuing the interest of farmers led to the 
formation of the marketing agreement could be seen from the payments made by way of 
its annual bonus payments and the overall payments received as a percentage of the 
overall income received by the GCNA (see table 5.4). 
 
5.2 Formation of the Joint Marketing Agreement 
This section will address the following  
1. The decision-making processes of primary stakeholders (the GCNA Board of  
Directors) and the role of Catz as a key interlocutor in forming the cartel; 
2. The formation of ASPIN International and the formation of ASPIN (Indonesia) (1980 – 
1986);  
3. The negotiation between GCNA and ASPIN (talk and text between the parties) leading 
to the formation of the cartel; and  
4. The Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Marketing Agreement between the 
GCNA and ASPIN.  
 
5.2.1 The Decision Making Process and its Implications for the Attempting to Form the 
Nutmeg Cartel  
Chapter 3 (Research Methodology) and Appendix 4 highlight the process by which the 
archival data were treated, using an integrative theoretical approach that includes 
Langley‘s (1999) sense-making method to treat and classify data chronologically in 
columns as a form of temporal bracketing. The narrative provides elaboration and 
interpretation. The talk and text evidence related to the formation of the cartel is presented 
in the rest of the chapter.  Chapters 6 and 7 address the operation of the Marketing 
Agreement while it was in existence and its collapse respectively. 
In order to better understand the talk and text and locate the various stakeholder 
groupings in the context of the formation of the cartel, it is useful to understand the 
stakeholders from the perspectives of: (a) who they were and their classification; (b) what 
were their stakes and who had a right to such stakes (Mitchelle, Agle and Wood, 1997), in 
the GCNA in particular, and the nutmeg industry in general, and (c) how well their 
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expectations were met via the operations of the GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement.  A 
key question is concerned with the impact of these stakeholders on the decision-making 
of the GCNA. It is also useful to understand the following concerns: in whose interest was 
the cartel being formed? Who were the expected beneficiaries? And were there conflicts 
of interest based on the stakeholder groupings? In order to better understand the above 
issues, the stakeholder analysis was applied.  
Table 5.5 summarises the interests of the various stakeholders with a focus on the 
primary stakeholders and how their objectives relate to the formation of the Marketing 
Agreement. It forms the basis for the later examination of the operation and end of the 
Marketing Agreement. Jensen (2001) argues that if stakeholder theory should seek to pay 
attention to all groups/constituents that would  not attainable The validity in our use of  
table 5.5 lies in its power to identify the stakeholders, and with the appropriate tools, use it 
to unearth the objectives or perceived stakes/interest of the stakeholders. Moreover, it 
helps to establish which stakeholder groups are most important and carry most influence 
by virtue of their urgency, power and legitimacy in the formation of the Marketing 
Agreement. 
Table 5.5, while seeking to present the theoretical stakeholder analysis framework for 
determining the stake of each group, also provides and brings to the fore the issue of who 
or what really counts, and therefore shows the conflicts of interest that exist when dealing 
with relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process, as it relates to the creation of 
the nutmeg cartel (Argle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999). The use of the above 
stakeholder framework helped the researcher to identify 12 key stakeholder groups within 
the GCNA construct, consisting of nine national and three external (foreign-based) 
stakeholder groups. On the basis of the above framework, the four most important 
stakeholders of the GCNA in order of priority are: the membership of the GCNA; the 
Board of Directors; the Government; and the trading agents. The 12 groups of GCNA 
stakeholders have been further categorised into primary and secondary groups, based on 
the classification by Mitchell, et al (1997).  
The primary group of stakeholders comprises the following: 
1. Board of directors 
2. Membership of the GCNA 
3. Government  
4. Management 
5. Financial intermediaries (banks) 
6. Trade agents/brokers 
7. Staff/employees.   
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The secondary group of stakeholders comprises the following; 
1. Competitors 
2. National community 
3. Media 
4. Suppliers of non-product inputs. 
5. Retailers  
6. consumers 
Among the members of the primary stakeholder group, the GCNA Board of Directors is of 
critical interest to this thesis. . It is useful to understand the profile of this group in order to 
describe their interest and influence, and relate their contributions to the debate on the 
formation of the nutmeg cartel. Table 5.6 presents the profile of the GCNA Board 
Members and Management, their stake in the GCNA and in their attempt at the formation 




Table 5.5 Determining Stakeholders‘ Stake in an Organization 
Stakeholders 
(Primary) 
Basis of Relationship Objectives of Stakeholder 
 Power Legitimacy Urgency  
1. Board of 
Directors 
Coercive – force or threats can 
be applied to other stakeholders 
Utilitarian – material / incentives 
can be provided to other 
stakeholders, e.g., the level of 
advanced payment and bonus 
payments to be paid to farmers, 
renewal of agent contracts, salary 
increases to staff.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The bases for legitimacy was 
established by powers 
vested in the Board from the 
Nutmeg Industry Act 1947. 
Criticality – the time-
bound nature of 
advanced payments 
and bonus, as well as 
the deadlines set for 
the execution of 
tasks by managers. 
Increased export prices, 
stable prices, increased 
annual bonus, maintaining 
the power/legitimacy and 
influence of the Board, i.e. 





Coercive – threat of not electing 
or re-electing individual members 
to the Board of Directors, or to 
threaten to sell to would-be 
competitors. 
Normative – to attend the annual 
general meeting of the GCNA, 
Utilitarian – to influence 
managers and staff salary. 
The right to vote at AGMs to 
elect members to the Board 
of Directors, as established 
by the Nutmeg Industry Act, 
1947, and exercise national 
political influence. 
As individuals, they all have 
property rights to the assets 
of the cooperative. They are 
the sole suppliers of the 
cooperative products. 
Without them the 
cooperative will cease to 
exist.  
Time – demand for 
immediacy of 
payment for crop 
delivered, and 
payment of annual 
bonus. 
High pay-out of advanced 
payments and annual 
bonuses. 
Low or restrained 
payment to staff, agents 
and other service 
suppliers. 
Financial support from 
government in times of 
need. 
3. Government Coercive –  high, can force 
changes to legislation or ―take-
over‖ control of the Board of 
Directors 
As established in the 
Nutmeg Industry Act, 1947 
Timely payment to 
farmers as a means 
of maintaining 
economic and social 
stability. Since the 
GCNA pays no taxes, 
Maintenance of the 
industry as a source of 
income to farmers and the 
maintenance of economic 





Basis of Relationship Objectives of Stakeholder 
 Power Legitimacy Urgency  
there is no income to 





Normative –  managers are 
symbolic leaders of the GCNA, 
since the real responsibility for 
the management is entrusted to 
the Board of Directors  
Individual – based on 
qualification or competence, 
and as delegated by the 
Board of Directors. 
Criticality – 
maintenance of the 
relationship between 
the cooperative  
(Board of Directors) 






Coercive – threaten to withdraw 
financial services such as 
overdrafts or to facilitate loans. 
Utilitarian – offer attractive rates 
of interest on loan and other 
financial products and services. 
Societal – a fundamental 
institution of society  
Time sensitivity – 
timely payment of 
GCNA‘s accounts  
To maximize earning 
opportunities for 






Coercive – threat of strikes, or 
other forms of industrial actions. 
Utilitarian – necessary to facilitate 
the workings of the cooperative.  




employment of contract 
Time sensitivity – 
timely completion of 
all tasks relating to 
the purchasing and 
exporting of nutmeg 





Coercive – threaten to initiate 
action to change the legal shield 
of the GCNA – break the 
monopolistic. control of the 
industry  
Societal None  Maintain GCNA as a 





Coercive – non delivery of key 
inputs such as bags, insecticide, 
etc. 
Organizational - as suppliers 
of inputs.  
Time sensitivity - 
ensure timely 
delivery of supplies. 
To maximize revenue 
from GCNA, and maintain 





Basis of Relationship Objectives of Stakeholder 
 Power Legitimacy Urgency  
9. Media  Normative – symbolic influence, 
exerts little or no influence on the 
GCNA or other stakeholders. 
 Societal – as a vital 
institution of society. 
Organizational – based on 
public reputation. 
Time Sensitivity – 
expectation that 
request for 
information would be 
forthcoming from the 
GCNA. 
To obtain news worthy 




    
1. Trade 
Agents 
Utilitarian – they are critical in 
finding buyers, establishing 
export prices. 
Normative – representative of the 
GCNA on the international 
market. 
Organization – as contracted 
by the Board of Directors for 
purposes of making sales for 
the GCNA. 
Time sensitivity – 
they must ensure that 
nutmeg is delivered 
to the customer on 
time and that claims 
made by buyers are 
attended to in a 
timely manner. 
Criticality - timely 
settlement if claims 
and delivery of 
products are 
necessary for good 
relationships. 
To secure markets, enter 
into sales contracts and 
earn higher 
commissions/profits.  
2. Competitors Coercive – threat to undercut 
world prices. 
Utilitarian – offer of colluding on 
world prices. 
A source of competitive 
products. 
Virtually non-existent 
in dealing with 
GCNA. 
To obtain higher prices 
than GCNA or to 
collaborate with the 
GCNA to eliminate 
competition.   
3. Wholesalers Coercive – could use marketing 
intelligence information to 
manipulate prices, unknown to 
the suppliers, with whom they 
A key source of marketing 
information, may also supply 
grinders/processors of 
industrial and domestic oils 
Non-existent with the 
GCNA 
To obtain the lowest 
prices and thus allowing 
them to maximize prices 





Basis of Relationship Objectives of Stakeholder 
 Power Legitimacy Urgency  
have no relationship 
 
Utilitarian - Knowledge of the 
market including key buyers and 
thus the ability to influence prices   
and other value added 
nutmeg based products 
 
role as middlemen in this 
trade is to maximize 
income at the expense at 
those in the value chain 
who come before and 
after them. 
4. Retailers Utilitarian – possess knowledge 
of final consumers, their changing 
tastes and behaviour. This 
information is critical in informing  
production and supply issues  
A key source of consumer 
information and provider of 
supplies to the final 
household consumer. They 
also supply value-added 
nutmeg-based products to 
the final consumers 
Has no direct 
relationship or claim 
to the GCNA but are 




activities can impact 
on global prices 
To ensure that they have 
a consistent supply of 
nutmeg-based products at 
a price and quality that 
their consumers are 
willing to pay 
5. Consumers Final consumer of the products 
and bi-products of nutmegs. If 
they do not buy the products 
there is no market for nutmeg 
Buyers of nutmeg and bi-
products or value added 
products from nutmeg.  
Criticality- the 
demand for the 
products are time 
bound and should 
attain certain quality 
standards. 
To obtain the highest 
quality product at the 
lowest price. 





Table 5.6 Profile of the Composition of GCNA Board Members and Management, their 
Stake in the GCNA and Cartel, 1985-1987 
128 
 
Source. Developed by the researcher 
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5.2.2 The Story of the Attempts to Create the ASPIN-GCNA Marketing   Agreement 
The narrative of the attempts to create the cartel is based on the findings from the archival 
records, financial reports and interviews with key stakeholders from GCNA and three 
international nutmeg traders. The story is sequenced in a mostly chronological order, 
noting the key events, incidents and relationships, tapered by congruent and conflicting 
interests and set against the backdrop of a nutmeg market that was experiencing 
fluctuating but generally declining prices. The interests of the different players have 
shaped the outcome in an interesting way. 
The story of the failed attempt at forming the first nutmeg cartel will also be told using the 
following: Langley‘s (1999) temporal bracketing and narrative framework; Van de Ven and 
Ring (1994) framework on business relationship development; Levenstein and Suslow‘s 
(2006) cartel formation; Mitchell, Argle and Wood‘s (1997) stakeholder identification and 
strategy; and the negotiation phases from  Corvette (2006).   
 
The report on the text and talk, which occurred during the development and demise of the 
ASPIN-GCNA Joint Marketing Agreement between the two organisations, is presented 
using Langley‘s (1999) bracketed timeline in a chronological order. It forms the narrative 
of this chapter. The table which contains the snapshot of events and the timelines is 
presented  below in table 5.7,  a  brief summary of the events that occurred leading to the 
development of the cartel between the ASPIN and the GCNA, as well as the actions on 
the part of the stakeholders in that regard. 
The timeline is divided into six major columns: Column (1) identifies the date of the 
events, column (2) the event(s), column (3) the nature of the event(s), column (4) the 
consequences of the event(s), and column (5) highlights the stage of the relationship, at 
the time of the event, while column (6) indicates the influence of the particular stakeholder 
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Increase 
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The above summary table forms part of the narrative on the text and talk which were 
captured during the field work. It reveals the motivations, acts and thinking of the various 
stakeholders as the relationship evolved over time, as is presented below.  
 
5.2.3 Pre-negotiation Stage 1979–1885 
Though it was not known then, the formation of the GCNA in 1947 provided the basis and 
instrument for the attempt at the formation of the first Nutmeg Cartel in 1986/87.   As 
indicated in Chapter 2, the formation of the GCNA took place in response to the demand 
by Grenada‘s nutmeg farmers for an organisation that would be to their benefit. In order to 
bring the demand of the farmers into fruition, the participation of the legislature was 
necessary in formulating the legislation to establish the GCNA. Additionally, the 
government provided some initial start-up capital. By so doing, the government 
established itself as a primary stakeholder in the GCNA.  
The decision to attempt to form a joint marketing arrangement (Cartel)  between the 
GCNA and Indonesian exporters started with GCNA sending a single delegate in the 
person of its then Secretary and General Manager (Renwick) to Indonesia. According to 
Renwick (Interview with Renwick August 5, 2005), the Board of Directors of the GCNA, in 
its attempt to increase the earnings of farmers and to provide a stable export income, 
decided that such a visit should be undertaken. He visited Indonesia on March 15, 1979. 
The immediate purpose of the discussions with the stakeholders in the Indonesian nutmeg 
trade was to come to, 
 ―Some sort of marketing arrangement that would lead to 
cooperation rather than competition on the international 
market for the benefit of farmers and both countries.‖ 
(Interview with Renwick, August 5, 2005). 
With regards to the outcome of this visit, Renwick stated (Interview with Renwick, August 
5, 2005):  
―I was met by Government officials… The visit served to 
establish personal relationships with some of the exporters 
from Indonesia, and to provide a better understanding of the 
Indonesian nutmeg industry… It laid the basis for the 
eventual formation of the cartel in 1986.‖  
The  first visit to Indonesia in 1979 by the GCNA marked the beginning of many years of 
other interactions and negotiations that would eventually lead to the formation of the 
GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement in 1986 (Interview with Renwick, August 5, 2005). 
This first encounter by the two parties, according to Van de Ven (1994), marked the 





5.2.4 The Role and Impact of the CEO of Catz International on the Pre-bargaining Stage 
The role of Catz in this phase is to be seen from two perspectives: that of the GCNA and 
Catz itself.  First of all, according to Renwick (GCNA), the Indonesia visit was encouraged 
by Huitema (CEO of Catz International), who had a longstanding relationship with the 
GCNA, from its creation in 1947. This relationship flowed over into a personal one as well, 
as both Renwick and Huitema stayed in each other‘s home while visiting each other‘s 
country, to the benefit of each other‘s organisation. It is believed by many in the GCNA 
that despite the failure of Renwick‘s visit to Indonesia in 1979 to establish cooperation 
between the two markets, Catz International continued to make representation to the 
Indonesian exporters to do two things: (1) to form a domestic association like Grenada‘s; 
and (2) to establish corporation between themselves and the GCNA, in order to obtain 
better prices on the international marked (Interviews with Messers Robinson, 25 April, 
2008); Alfred Logie, April 17, 2015; and Lord, March 19, 2015) . 
Alfred Logie, trained in economic planning and former manager of GCNA, also notes in 
Grenadian Creole English: ―If there was no Huitema, there was not going to be no Cartel,‖ 
(Interview, April 5, 2015), thus underscoring the influential role of Catz in the different 
phases of the cartelisation process of the Grenada-Indonesia nutmeg industry. In fact, 
Catz was viewed both by GCNA and the Indonesian exporters, at the time, as the leading 
global nutmeg commodity trading company, whereas more recent research by Marks and 
Pomeroy (1995) established Catz as the third-leading global trader in nutmeg, buying on 
the one hand, over 50 per cent of Grenada‘s nutmeg prior to and during the cartel years.  
Catz used its economic relationship and its long-term preferred buyer relationship with the 
GCNA to influence GCNA‘s pricing policy. Lord. (Interview with Lord, 19, March, 2015) 
notes the following: 
―GCNA preferred forward sales, which was what Catz 
offered. Huitema would arrive in June (start of the nutmeg 
year) and would buy 50.0 per cent of the year‘s crop at a fix 
price for forward shipment – Catz had the power to out-
purchase other buyers like Rocker & Slann, who would 
purchase like 75 tons – as part of the contract the GCNA 
would agree NOT to sell at a price lower than what Catz 
paid, as well as providing Catz with a quality discount of 5-7 
per cent.‖ 
This evidence shows both the economic and psychological influence Catz had on the 
GCNA, in its move to drive the signing of the marketing agreement, with the ultimate hope 
of cartelisation of the nutmeg industry with Indonesia 
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According to Moermon - current CEO of Catz International – (Interview with Moermon 4 
October, 2010), Huitema earned the nick-name of the ―nutmeg man‖ in Indonesia because 
of his years of doing business there and his knowledge of the global nutmeg industry. 
Huitema formed the nexus and interlocutor in the relationship between the two parties; the 
conduit through which information flowed.  
The influence of Catz International on the visit by Renwick to Indonesia in 1979 and its 
subsequent interventions in key decisions, within the GCNA and ASPIN, and events 
leading to the formation of the cartel, led Lord, a trained economist and former General 
Manager of GCNA (1987-1992), to conclude that what happened in 1986, was the ―CATZ-
A-LISATION‖ of the global nutmeg industry and not the cartelisation (Interview 19 March, 
2015). He further proffered that, 
 ―all of the market information which Mr. Renwick would 
have presented to the Board came from the lips of Huitema,‖  
thus establishing Huitema as a key distributor of market information leading to key 
decisions by the GCNA via Renwick. Based on the data studied, no evidence was found 
regarding independent market research done by GCNA on the global nutmeg market. 
Logie, (Interview, April 5, 2015) former Secretary and Manager of GCNA, concurred with 
the views of Lord on the influence of Huitema on the GCNA, with regard to the formation 
of the cartel. He notes:  
 
―Catz played on the ignorance of the GCNA; the GCNA 
relied on Catz for its market intelligence. The General 
Manager – Mr. Renwick, would receive information from 
Catz and use that information and his influence (based on 
his long years as General Manager) to influence the Board 
and obtain their concurrence, and that is what he did when 
the request for cooperation was received from Indonesia.‖ 
 
The above shows the asymmetry of information which existed between the GCNA and 
Catz. The GCNA, with no independent intelligence system to obtain market information, 
relied on its largest buyer to so provide, one who had conflicting interest with the GCNA. 
Catz‘s interest was to obtain the best deal (lowest price) from the GCNA, which would 
then allow it to sell at high prices to its buyers, while the GCNA was on a constant search 
for higher prices and larger sales volume. These two conflicting objectives of the two 
stakeholders were contradictory and would therefore impact on the longevity of the Joint 




Catz International‘s CEO Huitema continued his personal efforts to organize the 
Indonesian exporters into a similar organization like the GCNA, with the aim of 
establishing the institutional framework for controlling the international market for nutmeg 
to his company‘s benefit, as well as that of his producers-stakeholders. The key role 
played by Huitema expanded the business network beyond GCNA and Indonesia 
exporters to include himself and thereby effectively establishing a de facto triad leading to 
the formation of the cartel. 
From the perspective of Catz International, Neumann (Interview, 4 October, 2009) its 
current CEO, the influencing factor which propelled his company to encourage the 
collaboration between the nutmeg producers in Grenada and Indonesia was:  
―the selfish interest of our company, which is to make more 
money, but this, was not only for us, for sure the farmers of 
Grenada and Indonesia also have the same desire to obtain 
a higher price for their nutmegs.‖ 
During this pre-negotiating phase between the Indonesian nutmeg exporter and the 
GCNA, Huitema made numerous trips to Grenada and Indonesia in order to encourage 
both countries to form this partnership (Interview with Neumann, 4 October,  2009). Catz 
deemed this to be useful since it would bring order to the market and help to increase 
prices, which are key objectives or the rationale for the formation of cartels (Levenstein 
and Suslow, 2006). Therefore, Huitema, acting as the nexus to the two major producing 
countries, began to negotiate the marketing arrangement, long before it happened in 
1986/87, He was encouraging the Indonesians to form a legal association that would 
provide the basis for negotiation with the GCNA to form the world‘s first nutmeg cartel. 
With this knowledge of the market and purchasing power, he was manipulating the 
negotiating process and players before they agreed to discuss the possibilities of forming 
some sort of international agreement to control the supply and prices of nutmeg. 
Moermon (Interview, 4 October, 2010), described the company and its involvement in the 
development of what was meant to be a cartel as follows: 
―Catz has been trading in commodities for the food industry 
since its formation in 1856. In the 1980s Catz trade in 
nutmegs consisted of 80.0 per cent of Grenada‘s and 20.0 
per cent from Indonesia. This was so because the nutmeg 
from Grenada was preferred by the trade since it was 
deemed to be of better quality, as compared to Indonesia‘s. 
Despite Catz position as one of the largest traders of 
nutmegs on the international market, we were not satisfied 
with the prices we were receiving for the products. We 
therefore had an interest in increasing prices, and our 
profits, as well.‖ 
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He continued to describe the mutual desires of the main stakeholders in the nutmeg 
industries in both Grenada and Indonesia, by stating the following:  
―Catz also felt that the leadership in the nutmeg industries in 
both Grenada and Indonesia would have an interest in 
taking actions that would deliver higher prices to the farmers 
in their respective countries.‖ 
Catz therefore felt that there was some convergence between its company‘s objectives for 
higher prices and profits on one hand, and the desire of nutmeg farmers in the two major 
producing countries for higher prices on the other. 
Furthermore, Moermon notes (Interview, October 4, 2010):  
―There was no sense in continuing the competition between 
the two major producers. In Indonesia, there was intense 
competition with hundreds of traders and exporters, and with 
international competition emanating from Grenada, and 
therefore with such intense competition it can only lead to 
downward pressure on prices. It is within that context, that 
intense efforts were undertaken by Huitema (travelling 
between Grenada and Indonesia) to bring about some 
stability in the marketing situation.‖  
As a result of this analysis by Catz, the then CEO, Huitema, embarked on a process of 
negotiation (unknown to at least the GCNA), influencing both the Indonesian and 
Grenadian industry leaders to establish a marketing mechanism which would regulate the 
global supply of nutmegs. This marketing strategy conceived by Catz was ―to provide the 
world with just a little less than what the world required but also to increase prices.‖ 
(Interview with Neumann, 4 October, 2010). This is an example of information asymmetry 
between the GCNA and Catz International. 
Therefore the nutmeg diplomacy of Catz International in this pre-bargaining stage was to 
accomplish the following: set up the conditions for the GCNA and Indonesian nutmeg 
exporters to meet and collaborate in a long-term, cartel-like organisation to its greater 
benefit, while sharing the spoils with the would-be cartel participants, while in the short 
term, it worked to maintain good socio-economic relations with the GCNA and control/ 
influence its pricing mechanism. This is what Van De Ven and Scott Poole (1995; p.526) 
referred to when they concluded that ―organizational development and change are 
influenced by diverse units and actors both inside and outside the organization, which 
means that different influences may be acting simultaneously on the organization, with 
each impacting its own particular momentum to the development process.‖    
Huitema‘s active involvement in the nutmeg trade in Indonesia provided him with the 
influence he needed among the nutmeg traders in order to create the domestic 
mechanism for regulating the nutmeg trade in Indonesia. This would later prove to be a 
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critical step on the way to forming the Marketing Agreement between Indonesia and 
Grenada. According to Neumann, (Interview, September 4, 2009), Huitema was able to 
convince the authorities in Indonesia that they needed to establish such an export and 
regulatory body for the export of nutmegs. As a consequence, the ASPIN was formed in 
1986, which was followed by the GCNA/ASPIN Agreement. 
Lord (Interview, March19, 2015), while agreeing that the macro trading and financial 
factors, mentioned in sub-section 5.2.3.4 above, influenced the formation of the Joint 
GCNA–ASPIN Marketing Agreement and their attempts at forming a cartel, also 
suggested another set of proximate reasons why the directors of the GCNA were anxious 
for a solution to the unstable prices it was receiving, was also due to a micro level factor -  
membership of the GCNA:, According to Logie (Interview 17 April,2005) ―many members 
of the GCNA had taken loans with the Grenada Development Bank (GDB)iii, and as such 
the reducing income received by farmers made it difficult for them to meet their loan 
obligations, which in turn negatively impacted on the profitability of the Bank.‖  
Therefore, the declining income received by the nutmeg farmers was beginning to affect 
the GDB and consequently on their ability to finance other key sectors in the country. It 
was having what is referred to as ―contingency effect‖ on the operations of the bank. A 
situation which the government of the day (sole owners of the GDB and a primary 
stakeholder of the GCNA), could not have allowed the situation to continue. 
Therefore, the key factors which prompted the GCNA to consider at this pre-bargaining 
stage the formation of a cartel-like association with Indonesian nutmeg exporters, was the 
need to increase and stabilise prices on the international market and the desire to earn 
more money for their membership by entering into a marketing arrangement, in the same 
way that the oil producers were doing (referring to Organisation of Oil Producing and 
Exporting Countries). It was the hope of the Board of Directors of the GCNA that such an 
instrument would be used to exert control over the price of nutmeg on the international 
market, according to Renwick (Interview, 2006). 
From the perspective of the external stakeholder, Catz International, the trading 
turbulence existing on the international nutmeg market was injurious to Grenada, 
Indonesia and Catz - as a major buyer of nutmeg from both countries. Recognising the 
absence of leadership, knowledge and experience in the industry in both countries to 
undertake initiatives to stabilise and increase the global price for nutmeg, Huitema 
adopted the role of the global nutmeg ambassador to help bring about the conditions 
necessary to the formation of some type of marketing mechanism that would control the 
supply and price of nutmegs. The creation of ASPIN was integral to the commencement of 





5.2.5 The Creation of ASPIN 
Up until 1985 the nutmeg market in Indonesia was not organised into a single unified 
entity similar to that of the GCNA. The development to which the above refers is the 
formation of an association of Indonesian nutmeg exporters aimed at controlling the 
export of Indonesian nutmeg to the international market. This association which came to 
be known as ASPIN was formed on 12 March, 1985, when the then military government of 
General Suharto, promulgated Ministerial Decrees No.107 and 108/KP/111/1985. These 
decrees, as announced by the Minister of Agriculture in Indonesia, established ASPIN as 
the sole export-marketing organization of Indonesian Nutmegs (Tirtawaninta, 1995.). It 
was an Exporters‘ Association, representing 46 out of the approximately 200 exporters in 
Indonesia -- less than 25 per cent of the total number of exporters.  A legal entity had to 
be constituted to commence negotiations with the GCNA.   
Prior to March 12, 1986, Indonesia had no central organisation for the export of nutmeg. 
This activity was undertaken by hundreds of operators and exporters competing against 
each other, which over time led to a reduction in the export price of nutmeg to the 
Indonesian exporters and smuggling through Singapore. In such an environment, it was 
impossible to undertake any initiative to collaborate with another institution. Therefore, the 
formation of a cartel had to be predicated on the establishment of the appropriate 
institution which could be the interlocutor with the counterpart organisation. For example, 
OPEC is made up of intergovernmental organisations. The International Cocoa 
Organisation is made up of intergovernmental organisations, and the International Sugar 
Agreement is also an intergovernmental organisation. It was therefore a prerequisite that 
that there should be the existence of two or more organisations before cooperation could 
be had, hence the necessity to have two organisations established on more or less equal 
footing, both in Indonesia and Grenada, to give effect to any agreement to cooperate. 
In order to establish the legitimacy of ASPIN, on 12 April 1986 a General Assembly of 
ASPIN was convened in order to approve the corporate plan, which provided the 
executive of ASPIN the authority it needed from its membership to proceed with the 
corporate work program. By so doing, the stakeholders of ASPIN provided the legitimacy 
which ASPIN needed to negotiate with the GCNA for the formation of the cartel. Details on 
the organizational structure differences between GCNA and ASPIN are provided in Table 
5.8. 
This phase in the development of the cartel was characterised by the combination of three 
interlocking factors. First, there were the ongoing efforts at lobbying the authorities in 
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Grenada and Indonesia by Catz International. The second factor was the ongoing desire 
of the Board of Directors of the GCNA to forge this partnership with the Indonesian 
Nutmeg Exporters. The third factor was the heightened desire on the part of the 
Indonesian Exporters to receive higher prices for their products, which was a mutual 
objective with the GCNA. The above factors combined to give birth to the decree which 
established ASPIN as the single exporter of nutmegs from Indonesia. 
There was little available information on the decision-making process leading to the 
formation of ASPIN, except the undesirability of the fluctuating but generally declining 
prices obtained by Indonesian nutmeg exporters and the need to reverse this trend. The 
formation of ASPIN however, while seeking to organise the exporters into a single 
authority for the export of nutmeg to the international market, had some differences to that 
of the GCNA, which will be looked at in the following sub-section.  
 
5.2. 5.1 Differences in the Organizational Structure of GCNA and ASPIN  
The organisational structures of GCNA and ASPIN are critical to understanding the 
nature, operations and outcome of their business relationship and/or ―nutmeg cartel,‖ and 
to pose the question to what extent the cartel would be able to sustain itself? 
As indicated in Chapter 2, in Grenada the GCNA is the sole buyer of nutmeg from the 
farmers, and the processor and exporter of nutmegs and mace. Unlike in Indonesia, the 
Grenadian farmer sells his nutmeg directly to GCNA, and GCNA then enters into sales 
contracts with its agents and buyers overseas. In Indonesia, the nutmeg farmer sells the 
nutmeg to a local merchant who then resells to a regional exporter or middleman. This 
middleman or exporter then allocates a portion of his sale to ASPIN, which then sells it on 
to Catz or another external trading company. It shows that whereas nutmeg changes 
hands in Grenada once before it reaches the export market, in the case of Indonesia it 
changes hands four times, thus increasing the export cost of the Indonesian nutmeg 
exporters. 
Additionally, ASPIN and GCNA have some fundamental structural differences as 
highlighted in table 5.8. The table highlights four fundamental dissimilarities between the 
two organizations. First, ASPIN is a new organisation as compared to GCNA, which by 
1987 had 40 years of experience in trading in nutmegs. Second, it is an exporters‘ 
organization (non-cooperative) while GCNA is a cooperative producer organization. Third, 
the GCNA has domestic and export monopoly control over nutmeg, while ASPIN has 
―legal rights‖ to export nutmeg. Fourth, in Grenada, all nutmeg farmers have to be 
members of the GCNA, while membership to ASPIN is voluntary for exporters, and as 
such, only 46 out of an estimated 200 exporters were members of ASPIN. 
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Table 5.8 Institutional Differences Between the GCNA and ASPIN 
Structural Elements Grenada – GCNA  Indonesia - ASPIN 
Legal entity Cooperative - Grenada 
Cooperative Nutmeg 
Association (GCNA) 
Association – Indonesian 
Exporters of Nutmeg 
Association (ASPIN) 
Year founded 1947 1985 (officially started doing 
business in 1986) 
Legal status Association of producers Association of exporters 
Regulatory authority Domestic and export 
monopoly 
Export monopoly  
Membership requirements Owners of, or persons 
having, legal access to 
nutmeg 
Buyers of nutmeg and 
approved for export by the 
Ministry of Trade 
Membership  All nutmeg farmers in 
Grenada 
46 out of approximately 200 
exporters 
Domestic and Trading 
patterns 
All producers sell directly to 
GCNA 
ASPIN  buys nutmeg from 
less than 50 per cent of 
exporters via traders and 
middlemen 
Business activity Buys and processes green 
nutmegs to a dried state 
and exports 
Buys and exports dry 
nutmegs and mace 
Source: Developed by researcher,from data derived from Alfred Logie (Interview, 2015) 
and Plathe (1994) 
In essence, the above shows that GCNA exercised greater control over the production, 
sale and export of nutmeg, as compared to ASPIN, which did not possess such vertical 
integration or control over the Indonesian nutmeg industry. Whereas they both had legal 
legitimacy, only GCNA had numerical/ producers/membership legitimacy, because ASPIN 
had control over less than a quarter of the market. This lack of control of the nutmeg 
industry on the part of ASPIN would ultimately impact on the operations and longevity of 
the attempts to form the nutmeg cartel. It left the door open for smuggling, cheating and 
defection by members of ASPIN because non-ASPIN nutmeg exporters were able to 
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obtain higher prices outside of those given by ASPIN. In other words, the competitive 
fringe was getting higher prices than the Cartel members (Moxnes, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the dissimilarities between GCNA and ASPIN, the formation of the latter 
was necessary to lay the institutional foundation and legal framework for the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Memorandum of Agreement (MoA). 
 
5.3 The negotiation between GCNA and ASPIN (talk and text between the parties) leading 
to the conclusion of the ASPIN-GCNA Joint Marketing Agreement.  
 
5.3.1 Preparation and Introduction for the Indonesia Meeting  
During the period spanning the receipt of the invitation from ASPIN (Minutes of GCNA 
Board Meeting, 10 January, 1986) in which they requested cooperation on the 
international nutmeg market to the departure of the GCNA delegation from Grenada to 
Jakarta, Indonesia, the offer of joint cooperation from ASPIN was addressed at three 
GCNA Board Meetings and one General meeting of its national delegates. The outcomes 
of these meetings are detailed below. 
 
First Meeting: Receipt of Offer from ASPIN  
Board meeting January 10, 1986 
The GCNA Board was psychologically prepared for the negotiations with Indonesia in as 
far as the ―starve the market philosophy‖ of Huieima was concerned. It was the most 
dominant thought in the minds of Board members, when they received a market report 
from Renwick on January 10, 1986,  
―informing of developments in Indonesia with respect to the 
trading of nutmeg… and a desire of the exporters to 
cooperate with the Association (GCNA) in the trading of 
nutmeg and mace on the world market,‖ 
 (Minutes of GCNA Board Meeting, 10 January, 1986, p. 5). 
In the ensuing discussions which followed the said report, the GCNA Board responded to 
the news of the request by stating that they were ―pleased with the long desired action on 
the part of the Indonesian exporters and further considered sending a delegation for 
discussion.‖ (Minutes of GCNA Board Meeting, January 10, 1986, p.5). Additionally, Mr. 
Renwick explained that ―during his visit to Indonesia in 1979, discussions were held 
regarding the formation of an association but it did not materialise [then] due to the 
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complex situation existing at that time,‖ (Minutes of GCNA Board Meeting, January 10, 
1986, p.5). 
 
The complex situation to which Renwick referred related to three issues:  
(1) Grenada‘s March 13 Revolution of 1979. He noted:  
―While in Indonesia, I learnt of the overthrow of the 
Government of Grenada by the New Jewel Movement – 
―Jewel Boys‖ -- so when I got to London, I decided to travel 
to Canada, to spend time with my family there and to 
monitor the situation from there, before deciding on 
returning to Grenada.‖ He continued: ―The situation seemed 
very chaotic from the outside, so I thought it best to stay 
away until the situation settled down.‖  
(Interview with Renwick, August 5, 2004) 
 
(2) The military government which was in power in Indonesia at the time, and  
(3) The laissez-faire state of the Indonesian nutmeg market. To the latter, Renwick 
noted the following: 
―The Industry in Indonesia was not as organised as that of 
Grenada‘s GCNA. There were hundreds of exporters, with 
no established organization for exporting the product, quality 
standards or processes in place. It was reminiscent of the 
nutmeg industry in Grenada, prior to the formation of the 
GCNA in 1947.‖ 
(Interview with Renwick, August 5, 2004) 
 
Renwick also noted: 
―There were not much possibilities for any agreement 
between Grenada and Indonesia. Firstly, there was not a 
single exporter of the product, there were many/hundred 
exporters and that would have made the possibility of an 
agreement difficult. Additionally, the political situation in 
Grenada at the time was not conducive for proceeding with 
such discussions‖. 
 
Therefore, the above circumstances made it difficult to conduct discussions leading to the 
establishment of any type of collusive business relationship with Indonesian nutmeg 
exporters. The creation of ASPIN was a necessary condition to the meeting in Indonesia. 
On the matter of the proposed visit (mentioned above) to Indonesia in 1986, Renwick 
further informed the Board that Huitema had informed him ―that he was planning on 
visiting Indonesia soon and requested to have a member of the Association (GCNA) 
present during his visit to Indonesia.‖ His personal and business relations with Renwick 
and the GCNA, on the one hand, and his business interests for Catz, on the other, may 
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have influenced this business poker move, giving him the confidence to table such a 
request through GCNA‘s Chairman of the Board. 
The Board rejected the request, stating ―that his request cannot be acceded to at this 
time. Members further considered it inappropriate for a buyer to participate in the 
discussion at the level envisaged, but agreed to seek the assistance from United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)  or Government of Grenada to travel to 
Indonesia,‖ (Minutes of GCNA Board Meeting, January10,1986). The assistance 
mentioned here refers to financial assistance, (Interview with Noel, 23 April, 2010). 
Second Meeting on offer from ASPIN: Board Meeting January 22, 1986 
At the GCNA Board meeting of January 22, 1986, it was decided to send a delegation to 
Indonesia for the purpose of entering into direct negotiation with ASPIN. As a result, a 
three-person delegation was formed, comprising of: 
1. Norris James – Chairman of the Board of Directors  
2. Clarence Ferguson – Member of the Board of Directors  
3. Robin Renwick – Manager of GCNA  and personal friend of Huitema 
Following the order above, the team therefore included a small retail business owner/ 
farmer, farmer/ landowner, and finally a qualified administrative functionary/ farmer of the 
GCNA. 
Before the delegation left for Indonesia, word had leaked out in the market about the 
impending agreement between the two nutmeg producers. This prompted inter alia, a visit 
to the GCNA from a major buyer/stakeholder of nutmeg from Holland Herweijer of 
Messers Man Producten, on March 25, 1986. Herweijer was a former employee of 
Huitema, but left to form his own company. During his meeting with the Board of Directors, 
he briefed members on the stock position in Indonesia and the formation of ASPIN. He 
further made three major points to the Board: 
1. ―Whereas it will be easier to do business with ASPIN, he is 
doubtful whether ASPIN will exist for any length of time.‖ 
2. ―If price increases, the food industry may soon be looking for 
cheaper alternatives and even the consumption of mace 
could be affected.‖ 
3. ―[I am concerned] about Catz intention to orchestrate the 
formation of the proposed association between the 
Association and ASPIN, and that Huitema had been playing 
an internal part in ASPIN‘s affairs and that ASPIN was 
following his urgings.‖  




The above statements reveal four major issues: 1) It showed that the proposed 
association between the ASPIN and GCNA had such an impact that a major buyer 
(stakeholder in the international nutmeg trade) was galvanised into visiting Grenada to 
voice his opposition to the proposed arrangement; 2) the statement from Herweijer 
confirmed the suspicion of the Board of Directors that Catz International played an integral 
part in the formation of ASPIN; 3) it brought to the fore conflicting and competing interests 
and stakes of various stakeholders; and 4) It revealed an evolution in the use of nutmeg 
related products/ substitutes that on the one hand would impact on exports/sales primary 
producers, and on the other, the strategic use of such market information/ intelligence by 
Herweijer to create the psychological and economic conditioning that may have pulled 
GCNA to his side (in addition to his blowing the whistle on the operations of his ex-boss) 
and thereby benefit from any future pricing arrangements with the GCNA. 
As a result of the above, the members of the Board expressed their doubts regarding 
Huitema‘s information:  
―There is room for doubt regarding Mr. Huitema‘s 
information to the Board,‖  
(Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, 
January 22, 1986,p. 7). 
 In essence, Herweijer succeeded in his efforts to undermine the credibility of the market 
information circulated by Huitema, his former boss and present competitor.  
During the meeting, Hudson Mc Phail voiced concern about the level of preparation of the 
delegation and urged that, 
 ―a program of activities be prepared and that the objectives 
and purpose of the visit be deliberated upon prior to the 
delegations departure.‖  
He further expressed concern over ―Catz‘s intention to orchestrate the formation of the 
proposed association between the GCNA and ASPIN and that Mr. Huitema was playing 
an integral part in ASPIN‘s affairs and ASPIN is now following his urgings.‖ He also noted: 
―Huitema was not trustworthy. His closeness to ASPIN and his role as a major buyer of 
Grenada‘s nutmeg placed him in a position where he could manipulate the two institutions 
into an arrangement that benefitted him and not the GCNA nor ASPIN. Moreover, he was 
the sole catalyst to the agreement, he had a vested interest in the global nutmeg market,‖ 
(Interview, April 17, 2015). 
Given the political alignment of the Board members, the recommendations of McPhail 
should have been accepted and implemented, but due to the nutmeg politics of Ferguson 
and James, his suggestions were not implemented, since the issues he raised were still 
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on the table by the time the GCNA General Meeting took place May 26, 1986 and 
captured in the Minutes of the GCNA Board, August 26, 1986. Mc Phail‘s advice and that 
of the delegates at the annual general meeting resonate with the expert view of Ring and 
Van de Ven (1994) regarding negotiations. His model indicates that during the negotiating 
processual cycle there will be a phase of assessment based on efficiency and equity and 
personal interactions. Mc Phail‘s comments show that he was assessing the extent to 
which the GCNA was prepared to ensure that equity would exist between the GCNA and 
Indonesia, since he was suspicious of the role of Huitema, as well as the smuggling which 
plagued the Indonesian nutmeg industry. During one of my discussions with him on the 
issue of the cartel, he stated that his, 
 ―knowledge of the geography of Indonesia and the ease at 
which smuggling occurs made him doubt the ability of 
ASPIN to control the nutmeg trade in the same way as 
GCNA‖ (Interview, April17, 2015). 
The discussions of the Board indicated the deep concerns and uncertainty of members 
regarding the proposal from ASPIN since it appears to be on the ―urgings‖ of Huitema. 
These uninformed suspicions are indicative of the absence of and disparity in the 
information which the majority of the GCNA Board felt existed between themselves and 
the other stakeholders. 
 As a result, a motion to delay the visit until September was moved by board member (one 
of the farmers‘ representative) Theophillus George. The motion was supported by the 
majority of members, but Ferguson, abstained. This was an interesting piece of 
manipulation on the part of Ferguson, since a few months before he had proposed a 
closer working relationship with Indonesia.   
Ferguson‘s abstention exposed the political alignment and power play among Board 
members. Lord explained in this manner:  
―This abstention must be seen in realms of political power 
play between certain board members. You see, Ferguson 
had an intolerance for Mr. Renwick, because of his political 
alignment with Mr. Gairy. Whereas ―Fergie‖ (Mr. Ferguson) 
had misgivings about the proposal, he went along – l believe 
- because he wanted a trip to Indonesia. But he abstained 
because he knew his partner James would have the majority 
of the Board‘s support, so he (Fergie) calculated that his 
abstention would not have had any negative consequences 
on the trip taking place.  As a matter of principle, he (Fergie) 
is an avid opponent to Mr. Renwick, so on one hand he 
would like the opportunity to travel to Indonesia, but on the 
other, he is not anxious to be seen as overt supporters of 
Mr. Renwick and Huitema,‖ 
 ( Interview with Lord , March 19, 2015). 
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Another instance of the political power play which ensued on the Board during the period 
under discussion was that of James‘‘s use of the GCNA to achieve his political ambition. 
In Lord‘s view,  
―Mr. James was keen to demonstrate to his party leadership 
– the New National Party (NNP) - that if he could establish 
relationship with Indonesia and achieve an increase in the 
price of nutmeg for farmers, then he could achieve similar 
things for the country. He was keen to use the proposed 
agreement to galvanize support for himself and his political 
party in order to achieve personal political support.‖  
(Lord Interview, March19, 2015).  
The above discourse demonstrated that the Board of Directors was not as homogeneous 
a group as it should have been. It gives an indication of the type of conflict of interest 
which existed between this primary group of stakeholders on the critical issue of business 
and income for the GCNA. According to Lord (Interview, March19, 2015): ―People 
supported ideas on the Board, depending on who proposed the idea.‖ 
The political alliances in table 5.14 is presented to provide a better context and 
understanding of why Board Members were likely to give support for an idea or not, and 
the rationale for their position. The table provides a list of 10 names of Board Members 
who served during the period of the negotiations with ASPIN  and the subsequent attempt 
to form the first nutmeg Cartel. In addition to identifying the members by names, table 
5.14, highlights their individual academic qualifications, political party affiliations and 
alliances at the level of the Board of Directors. While at the same time indicating how the 











Therefore, by the end of the second preparatory meeting, the three delegates were 
selected to represent GCNA in Indonesia. Due to the intervention of another external 
stakeholder, Herweijer, another nutmeg trader, there is a shift in the Board‘s perception of 
Huitema‘s roles and intentions regarding the establishment of a business relationship 
between GCNA and ASPIN. This section also unveils the internal power play and political 
dynamics among Board members (primary internal stakeholders) and their impact on their 
decision-making process, as they prepare to send delegates to negotiate the association‘s 
affairs in Indonesia. 
 
 Third Meeting: General Meeting of the GCNA, May 26, 1986 
The third meeting leading up to the start of negotiations with ASPIN was held with the 
general membership. The documents and records of the archive do not show that the 
Board sought any advice from the government on the matter. Instead, the Board only 
seemed to have consulted with its membership at its annual general meeting in May 1986. 
At this meeting of the general membership, several concerns were tabled and 
recommendations made. The concerns were the following:  
1. Skepticism about the level of preparedness of the local delegation for such an 
important meeting; 
2. Whether the benefits of the meeting outweighed the costs; 
3. Catz International was threatening to blackmail the Associationv. 
The following recommendations were made by the membership: 
1. That the meeting between the GCNA and ASPIN take place in Grenada; 
2. With Indonesia being the ― GCNA‘s greatest competitor, it was important to establish 
contact with them; 
3. A Government technocrat should be part of the delegation to Indonesia. 
Source: Minutes of Special Meeting of the GCNA Board, August 26, 1986. 
The above discussions reflect the thought pattern of the delegates, who while being keen 
to develop a business relationship with ASPIN, were cautious about the process, 
preparation and outcome. Notwithstanding, none of these recommendations were actually 
taken up during the preparatory meeting to enter into the joint marketing agreement with 
the Indonesian exporters.  
 Fourth Meeting: Board Meeting September 2, 1986 
The GCNA Board held a fourth meeting September 2, 1986 in preparation for the first 
face-to-face or direct negotiation between GCNA and ASPIN in Jakarta, Indonesia. The 
major outcome of the meeting was a mandate that no agreement should be concluded 
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without the authorisation of the full Board, three months following GCNA‘s first meeting 
with ASPIN, and not before ASPIN‘s visit to Grenada (GCNA Board Minutes of September 
2, 1986).   
Following the September meeting, the GCNA three-man delegation left Grenada to enter 
into direct negotiations with ASPIN. When applying the Ring and Van de Ven (1974) 
framework, this fits into the start of the negotiating phase or the initiation phase by 
Corvette (2007). 
The above reporting of the talk and text highlights the roles of the key players/ 
stakeholders in the pre-bargaining stage of the attempt at cartelisation, as the 
stakeholders sought to put in place the instruments and mechanisms aimed at regulating 
the supply flow of nutmeg  and which would impact the price of the global market for 
nutmeg. As a key member of the nutmeg market network, Catz‘s role in the preparation of 
the terrain for the formation of the first nutmeg cartel between GCNA and ASPIN confirms 
a triad rather than a dyad relationship of the primary stakeholders. It unveiled the rationale 
for Catz‘s involvement in the process of forming the first nutmeg cartel. 
 
Negotiation Stage 1985-1986 
Initiation Stage 
According to Corvette, the initiation stage which coincides or resembles the commitment 
phase of the Ring and Van de Ven (1994) negotiation framework represents the signing of 
contractual instruments between the negotiating parties. This section therefore relates to 
the signing of the MoU between GCNA and ASPIN. 
Based on the minutes of the GCNA Board Meeting of September 16, its delegates 
provided verbal reports on the ―negotiation‖ held during the week of September 10 with 
ASPIN. Also present at that meeting with ASPIN was Huitema, CEO of Catz International, 
in the capacity as advisor to the ASPIN negotiation team. 
During the meeting a pre-prepared MoU was presented to the GCNA delegation. There is 
no evidence from the GCNA Minutes of the Meeting of September 16, 1986 to suggest 
that the negotiating parties were engaged in a due bargaining process to arrive at an 
agreement. The evidence further suggests that the negotiating process went from 
initiation to intensification and closure, without any genuine back and forth as would be 





5.4 The Memorandum of Understanding and Joint Marketing Agreement between the 
GCNA and ASPIN (Appendix 5) and reactions, 
 
 Main Features and Articles of the Memorandum of Understanding  
The MoU consisted of two pages, comprising six articles in the form of objectives. The key 
elements were as follows: 
Article 1 promotes the marketing of nutmeg and mace on the international market; 
Article 2 promotes technical cooperation, particularly in areas of technology and 
sharing of expertise in the cultivation and production of nutmeg and mace; 
Article 3 encourages cooperation between the two producers in the promotion of 
nutmeg and mace with the aim of increasing the world consumption of 
nutmeg and mace; 
Article 5 provides for the alteration or modification or amendment of the agreement 
by mutual consent; 
Article 6 provides for the MoU to come into force on the date after its signing and 
seeks to continue in force unless one party gives notice in writing of their 
intention to terminate the agreement. 
 
5.4.1 Other Moves by Huitema of Catz International during the Negotiation Phase – from 
MoU to MoA. 
 
Huitema, being integral to the negotiations between the GCNA and ASPIN, and who acted 
as advisor to both parties prior to the negotiations (and was then on ASPIN‘s negotiating 
team), gave ASPIN an unfair advantage during the negotiations, since as an international 
nutmeg trader, he knew with accuracy what was being negotiated between GCNA and 
ASPIN and how the outcomes of these negotiations would impact on the international 
nutmeg market. Lord (Interview, March19, 2015) said: ―Mr Huitema bought significant 
amounts of nutmeg while the negotiations were underway in Indonesia and requested that 
GCNA should remove itself from the market for a few months.‖  
Indeed, on August 28, 1986, Catz placed an order for 190 tons of nutmeg – one of the 
largest single orders ever in its dealings with the GCNA, to be delivered between 12 
September, 1986 and April 1987. Moreover, his proposed price per ton was below that 
offered by one other buyer, Man Producten. For example, Catz offered to buy 50 tons of 
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defective nutmeg at US$5,250 per ton, and 100 tons of SUNS at US$4,000 per ton, while 
Man Producten offered to buy 150 tons of defective at US$5,600 and SUNS at US$6,000 
per ton respectively (meeting of GCNA Board of Directors, September 2, 1986). This 
further testifies to Catz‘s influence on the two nutmeg producers to its own benefit, as 
evidenced by  Man Producten  offer of  US$350 more for defective and US$2,000 more 
for SUNS than Catz, while  Man Producten‘s offer was rejected in favour of Catz‘s. .  
Finally, while Catz remained the largest single buyer of Grenadian and Indonesian 
nutmegs and an active player in the formation of the Agreement, no mention was made of 
it in the Agreement. Catz was given the sole buying rights to purchase nutmeg from 
ASPIN, as well as being the major nutmeg agent and buyer for Grenada consolidated 
significant buyer power in Catz International.  
 
5.4.2 Intensification and Closing Stages of the Negotiating Process and its Implications  
Notwithstanding the mandate of the Board of Directors of the September 7 meeting and 
the expressed concerns of the GCNA membership, the three-man delegation signed a 
MoU on September10, 1986 with ASPIN in Indonesia, without the authorisation of the full 
Board. This action represents the collapsing of the intensification and closing stages of a 
normal negotiating process.  
The hurried and independent action by the GCNA delegation raised a number of issues 
relating to the power and influence of ASPIN and Catz, on the one hand, and the 
weakness of the GCNA‘s team, on the other (Interviews with Lord, March 19, 2015; Logie, 
April 6, 2015). The presence of Catz in the meeting, in the capacity of advisor to ASPIN, 
further contravenes GCNA Board‘s decision not to negotiate with ASPIN in the presence 
of the purchaser (Catz International) at the January 10 meeting. Catz‘s position and role in 
the meeting also confirms GCNA‘S suspicion of Catz as a facilitator and manipulator of 
the impending agreement between ASPIN and GCNA. 
Additionally, the inexperience of the GCNA team in the negotiating process, as well as 
Huitema‘s personal relations with the General Manager of GCNA might have impacted on 
the hasty outcome of the ―negotiations.‖ The fact also that two executive members of the 
GCNA Board (the Chairman and the Secretary, with Ferguson being the de facto Deputy 
Chairman and also referred to as the ―crown behind the throne‖) conducted the 
―negotiation,‖ probably made them feel empowered to sign the MoU, contrary to the 






5.4.3 Reactions to the Signing of the MoU by the GCNA Board of Directors 
When the GCNA head office received a copy of the signed MoU, they were very 
disappointed with the high-handed operations of their delegation. Moreover, what is not 
understood is whether Grenada‘s delegation was brought under any pressure or 
manipulated to so do by the other side. According to Mc Phail, the Indonesian exporters 
were quite wealthy, as compared to Grenada‘s farmers. 
An emergency meeting was held to discuss the matter on October 14, 1986, following the 
return of the three-man delegation. The minutes do not indicate an agenda for the 
meeting. The meeting began with members asking the delegation: ―What was achieved?‖ 
The Chairman, James, responded that ―a Memorandum of Understanding was reached 
and an agreement to be ratified by the Board was drafted,‖ (Minutes of a Special Meeting 
of the Nutmeg Board, September 14, 1986,p1). 
Some members of the Board expressed their dissatisfaction with the procedure and 
outcome of the meeting and recorded eight major points, three of which are relevant to the 
cartel matter: 
1. the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding was 
contrary to the decision taken at the Board meeting of 
August 26, 1986; 
2.  ―the presence of Mr. Huitema of Catz International was 
accepted [by the GCNA Delegation] without resistance, 
despite the fact that the Board was totally against his 
participation in the meeting.‖   
 (Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Nutmeg Board, September 14, 1986, 
p.2); and 
3. Despite the above and other concerns, the Board noted 
―that higher prices had already been obtained beyond the 
prices stipulated in the agreement.‖  
(Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Nutmeg Board, September 14,1986, 
p. 2) 
At the end of the meeting, the Board decided not to confirm the proposed agreement in 
its current state and to seek legal advice on same, since the signing of the agreement, in 
contravention to the expressed decision of the Board, was illegal.   
 
The absence of data and memory recall from the actual negotiations impacted on the 






 5.4.3.1 Reaction by the Market to the Signing of the MoU 
By the first signing of the MoU of 1986, the export price per pound of nutmeg increased to 
EC$2.23, up from EC$1.41 in 1984 and EC$1.35 in 1985, while mace increased to 
EC$8.12 compared to EC$4.49 and EC$7.93 during the same period. Thus, the GCNA 
earned approximately EC$20,765,586.00 from the sales of nutmegs in 1986. This 
represented an actual increase of approximately EC$8,298,058.00 or 66.5 per cent on 
sales over 1985. This, it was assumed, flowed out of the joint marketing activities on the 
part of GCNA-ASPIN, as well as the publicity which arose from signing of the MoU.  
This view was supported by Renwick (Interview 2006) and Hachamoff of JHB 
International, on their reflections of the collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement. They 
both expressed the view that businesses do not like cartels or monopolies and once the 
nutmeg industry learnt of this agreement, it took steps to hedge against what was 
expected, which was, the expected increase in prices. JHB International was selected by 
the GCNA to become its sole marketing agent in Europe (Interview 2009), replacing Catz 
International. 
 
5.4.4 Implementation Stage 
Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation of the MoU by the GCNA Board, it was allowed to 
stand until the drafting and signing of the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement in 
1987. ASPIN was invited to come to Grenada to ratify the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing 
Agreement of which the MoU became an integral part. In fact, the contents of the MoU 
became in essence the main articles of MoA. This ratification of the MoU and signing of 
the Marketing Agreement between GCNA and ASPIN took place almost a year later on 
March 26, 1987, in Grenada, which finally put into place the world‘s first nutmeg cartel. A 
delegation came from Indonesia to do the signing, bringing the negotiation phase to an 
end and commencing the commitment/implementation phase of the business relationship, 
under Ring‘s and Van de Ven‘s (1994) business relationship framework. This stage of 
commitment allowed for the parties to determine their contracting terms and governance 
structure. Based on the archival records of the GCNA, there is no evidence that the GCNA 
had prepared the MoA or played any part in its preparation.  
 
5.4.5 Terms of the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement and Discussions  
As indicated in section 5.4.4, the parties graduated from the MoU and signed the MoA on 
26 march 1987. The core elements of the MoU did not change, however, four additional 
elements were introduced into the MoA. They were put into four articles as follows; 
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Article 1 established the minimum prices for all tradable grades of nutmegs and mace, 
and include provisions for adjustments to be made on some grades; 
Article 2 sets the total exportable volume at the sum of 8,550 tons of nutmegs and 
1,200 tons of mace of which ASPIN was allocated 6,300 tons of nutmeg and 
1002 tons of mace, while GCNA was allocated 2,250 tons of nutmeg and 198 
tons of mace;  
Article 3 catered to modifications or alterations to the agreement that were only to be 
made by mutual consent of the both parties; and  
Article 4 outlines the conditions for the implementation of the Agreement, which 
required consultation on issues such as: 1) the system of monitoring; 2) the 
supply and demand for mace; and 3), the production and marketing of nutmeg 
and mace in other nutmeg producing countries.  
Source: Joint Marketing Agreement between ASPIN and GCNA, 1987 
Whereas the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement provided for the general increase 
in the pricing structure for nutmegs and mace; it nonetheless contained a number of 
critical issues hinging on parity and sustainability. These issues include: price differential 
mechanism, buffer stock, control of supplies, technical cooperation and central 
organisation.  
 
5.4.5.1 Price Differential Mechanism 
In the logic of cartels, prices should be uniform for all participants of the cartel. However, a 
price differential mechanism was put in place, offering varying prices between the two 
parties.  In fact, Article 2 of the ―Agreement‖ sets out the minimum prices which were fixed 
for the period January 1, 1987, up to and including December 31, 1987. Now, ASPIN and 
other Indonesian nutmeg traders received nutmeg and mace from four major sources 
(Siauw/Ambon, Banda, Ternate and Papua New Guinea). See table 5:9. It is interesting to 
note that for identical products ASPIN obtained either the same or higher prices than that 
of Grenada, when Grenada was producing a better quality nutmeg. For example, the price 
for Grenada‘s sound and unsorted nutmegs (SUNs) was equivalent to the grades ABCD 
from Siauw, but slightly higher than in Ternate by US$10 but US$110, than that from 
Papua16, whereas the prices obtained for the Grade 2 nutmeg were lower for GCNA, as 
compared to all of ASPIN-Indonesia‘s sources.  
                                                          
16
 The reason for the differences in the prices, based on grade of the products from the various 
islands in Indonesia is not available. 
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With respect to mace, the price for ―whole mace‖ was lower, except in the case of Papua, 
as well the grade 2 (broken mace), which was lower in three of the locations, except in 
Papua where it was the same (see table 5.10).. 
Table 5.10 Comparative Prices for Nutmeg and Mace between the ASPIN and GCNA in 
US$ 1987 
Type of Product Source  and Price per ton of nutmeg and mace 
Nutmeg Siauw Banda  Ternate Papua GRENADA 
ABCD   6,000  5,950 4,850 6,000 
SUN - Grenada‘s equivalent 
to Indonesia‘s ABCD 
    6,000 
110s  6,350  6,300  6,000 
110s       
80S – 6,650  6,600  6,650 
Mace Siauw Banda  Ternate Papua GRENADA  
Whole – Indonesia  13,500  13,450 9,500 11,750 
Broken II 11,500 11,250 11,450 10,000 10,000 
Source: Joint Marketing Agreement between the GCNA and ASPIN, 1987. 
Whereas the Joint Marketing Agreement established the pricing structure which forms the 
basis on which the intended cartel would operate, the question was: Would the operations 
of the cartel bear that out? The details on the operations of the GCNA within the context of 
the attempt at cartelisation will be examined in the following Chapter Seven, ―The 
Performance of the GCNA during the period of Attempted Cartelisation.‖ 
Unlike most cartels or ICAs, such as cocoa, coffee, tea and sugar, the Joint GCNA-ASPIN 






5.4.5.2 Lack of Buffer Stock  
There was no buffer stock established between the parties as part of the Joint Marketing 
Agreement or as a node on the GVC, which would be used to fill immediate unexpected 
demand, and influence the supply of the products on the market. The inventories were 
held by the key stakeholders in the chain, namely the producers GCNA in the case of 
Grenada, and while in Indonesia inventories were held partially by ASPIN, the licensed 
traders, and Catz International. The data for GCNA show that at the beginning of the 1986 
Financial Year, the accumulated stock of dry nutmeg was 1,778,499 pounds (GCNA 
Financial Statement and Trading Summary, 1986). At an average market price of 
EC$2.23 per pound, the cash value if sold would have amounted to EC$3,966,053.   
 
5.4.5.3 Control of Supplies  
There was no indication as to the extent to which the production or buying of nutmeg 
would be controlled, although the agreement provided for limiting the amount of nutmeg 
and mace to be made available (the supply) to the international market. This meant that 
the GCNA and ASPIN, particularly GCNA, which is mandated by the Grenada Nutmeg 
Ordinance Act of 1947 to purchase all saleable nutmegs produced by the farmers in the 
cooperative, would have no choice but to expend its financial resources both by 
conducting such ―artificial‖ purchases without secured sales at appropriate prices and by 
bearing the costs for the management of continued stock build-up. These were 
fundamental weaknesses of the Agreement, which left the GCNA with huge stock piles of 
nutmeg and mace by the end of the agreement. 
 
5.4.5.4 Technical Cooperation 
Although most of the articles in the MoU formed part of the Joint Marketing Agreement, 
the tenets of ―Technical cooperation‖ (Article 2), was not elaborated upon. The MoU and 
MoA expressed the commitment on the part of the GCNA to provide technical assistance 
to the ASPIN as it relates to, providing institutional assistance to ASPIN, as well as 
measures to enhance the quality of its nutmeg and mace, by reducing the level of 
aflatoxins found in Indonesian nutmegs, this case study found no evidence of this article 





5.4.5.5 Central Organisation 
The literature on cartels shows that the success of cartels require some form of central or 
independent organisation of the participating parties. However, the MoA did not make 
such a provision. Therefore, the MoU and MoA represent a compromise of group and 
personal stakeholder interests, and are not necessarily the optimum solution for the 
marketing condition faced by both these organisation. 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
The integrative method used to construct the story of the attempt to create the world‘s first 
nutmeg cartel, has helped to establish the main events of the narrative, and identify the 
key players-stakeholders and their interests regarding the creation of the cartel, along a 
timeline. The following primary data sources were used: structured and unstructured 
interviews with stakeholders, and archival records, including minutes and annual financial 
reports of the GCNA. The discourse on the attempt at the formation of the GCNA-ASPIN 
Nutmeg Cartel brought the archives of the GCNA to life. It provided the details of the talk 
and text discourse, the decision-making processes and the internal and external 
negotiations, which took place within ASPIN and GCNA, and in particular the GCNA, as 
well as between the GCNA and ASPIN. 
The signing of the MoU between the GCNA delegation, comprised the Chairman of the 
Board, James, Deputy Chairman of the Board, Ferguson and the General Manager of the 
GCNA, Renwick, and delegates of ASPIN (President of ASPIN, Jantje A. Worotitjan; Vice-
President, T. Palwar; Marketing Manager, Charles Sutjiawan, and H.E. Bahar). The MoU 
was ratified by a Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement in 1987, with delegates 
coming from Indonesia to Grenada.  
The signing of the MoU followed seven years of ―nutmeg diplomacy‖ (1979-1986), largely 
orchestrated and led by Huitema of Catz International, who at this time was believed to be  
the number-one nutmeg purchaser in the world. However, more recent market research 
by Marks and Pomeroy (1995) placed him third at that time. Renwick personal friend of 
Huitema, was the first GCNA representative to establish face-to-face contact with 
Indonesian nutmeg exporters in 1979, with the urgings of Huitema. 
The initiation of attempts to enter into the Joint Marketing Agreement, as a precursor to 
form the Nutmeg Cartel was born out of the need to achieve four things: to stabilise and 
increase prices of nutmeg; to control/restrict the supply of nutmegs to the market; to 
consolidate GCNA and Aspin as the dominant suppliers of nutmeg and mace; and to 
increase the income of the nutmeg farmers in both countries, and thereby retain a greater 
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share of the value of the export commodity. The formation of any attempt at controlling the 
nutmeg market was more essential to Grenada, where nutmeg played a much more 
important role in foreign exchange earnings, employment generation and the GDP, as 
compared to Indonesia where the nutmeg industry did not even feature in the country‘s 
major export commodities. In Grenada, nutmeg held either the first or second position on 
the country‘s commodities export index. In the ‗80s it held the number one position. 
The varying and conflicting interests of the different stakeholder groups, as well as their 
scope of personal, economic or political influence, coloured the steps in the attempt at   
the forming of a nutmeg cartel. The Board of Directors of the GCNA showed itself to be an 
incohesive group, dominated by Ferguson, James and Renwick, evidenced by their 
breaching the mandate given by the Board of Directors to not sign any agreement during 
their visit to Indonesia in 1986. Of course, they did the contrary. The GCNA delegates 
appeared to have gone to Indonesia under-prepared and somewhat unqualified to 
undertake international trade negotiations with ASPIN, again not following up on the 
suggestion made by the membership of the GCNA to have a government technocrat 
accompany the Grenada delegation.  
GCNA‘s hasty signing of the MoU, handed to them by the other side in Indonesia, raised a 
number of concerns and questions. It demonstrated asymmetry of information and roles, 
since ASPIN seemed to be more informed and prepared than GCNA for the negotiations. 
ASPIN also benefitted from the global market knowledge and experience of Huitema of 
Catz International, who attended the negotiations in the capacity of advisor to ASPIN, 
when the GCNA Board had prior to this rejected his attendance at such an event. It further 
shows that the GCNA entered into the negotiations with ASPIN as an unequal partner, 
which would later impact on the operations of the Joint Marketing Agreement and their 
attempt at cartelisation Of course, it is well established that Indonesia was the world‘s 
number one nutmeg supplier, whereas, the quality of Grenada‘s nutmeg was deemed to 
be of a higher quality. Despite the unauthorised signing of the MoU, it was allowed to 
stand and one year later became an integral part of the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing 
Agreement. 
Without Huitema, the chances of attempted cartelisaion would have been very slim, if not 
non-existent.  As we have seen before, he played an integral role in encouraging 
Renwick‘s first visit to Indonesia in 1979, inspiring the formation of ASPIN in 1986 as a 
necessary precondition to the negotiations to form the cartel. He would have had to help 
exert political influence on the Indonesian military government and prepare the turf for the 
negotiation between the two parties in 1986 and 1987. Nicknamed the ―Nutmeg Man‖ in 
Indonesia, he therefore influenced all the stages of the process at attempted cartelisation. 
He also succeeded in determining the marketing and sales strategies/ policies of the 
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GCNA and ASPIN. The extent to which he was provided with personal assistance from a 
member or members of the GCNA Board is a matter of further study, since such an issue 
touches on and involves the role of primary external stakeholders in the formulation of 
internal policies of third business concerns. 
The intervention of another external nutmeg stakeholder, Herweijer of Man Producten, in 
the pre-negotiation stage helped to unmask some of the maneuvers and company 
interests of Catz International, as he sought to enter the play to influence GCNA against 
forming the cartel. In his view, the cartel would not work because the market does not like 
cartels and monopolies. 
Notwithstanding, the period of attempted cartelisation was of great significance to all 
parties concerned, since it set a framework, despite the weaknesses of the MoU and the 
MoA, for future trade in nutmeg and mace for the next four years.  
The creation of the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Nutmeg Cartel was in response to the micro and 
macro financial and economic needs (particularly the GCNA) of the stakeholders 
concerned, with Catz maneuvering and acting as an enabler in the background. At the 
micro-economic level, members of the GCNA Co-operative were consoled by entering into 
a business relationship with ASPIN of Indonesia, which they thought would have been 
able to control the export of nutmeg from Indonesia in a similar manner to which the 
GCNA was doing in Grenada, the world‘s largest supplier of nutmeg. 
This historical business relationship offered them the prospects of an improved socio-
economic status at a time when market prices were experiencing high levels of price 
volatility with general declining trends. This is in keeping with the literature on the 
formation of commodity cartels, which argues that the need to stabilise and increase 
prices are two of the important economic rationales for the formation of cartels.  
At the macro level, the importance of the nutmeg sector to the Grenadian economy was of 
greater significance, unlike Indonesia, where the sector represents less than 1 per cent of 
their GDP. Grenada‘s nutmeg sector averaged 20 per cent of GDP. Therefore, the 
impetus for the success of the business relationship (GCNA-ASPIN) was stronger for 
GCNA at both the micro and macro level.  
The use of the Stakeholder Analysis Framework allowed for the successful classification 
of the different stakeholder groups into primary and secondary stakeholder groups and 
determined their socio-economic and political interests which were all brought to bear on 
the decision-making process of the GCNA and the negotiating process and its outcomes.   
The involvement of Catz International and Man Producten in the pre-negotiating phase (in 
the case of Catz, all phases of the negotiation process) underscores the importance of 
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external stakeholders within the global nutmeg market value chain, and the role they 
played in the development practices of sales polices, marketing strategies and the pricing 
mechanisms of the two major suppliers of nutmeg. The strength of ASPIN/Indonesia and 
the dominant purchasing power (Gereffi, 1994, described power as the ―driveness‖) within 
the GVC of Catz International helped to position the GCNA as a weaker partner in the 
relationship -- so much so, that the inexperienced GCNA delegates were unable to use 
the strengths of their products to secure a better marketing arrangement. This asymmetry 
in the stakeholder relationships and interests set a negative tone for the longevity of the 
cartel, especially as Catz aligned itself with ASPIN during the negotiation. 
Given the profiling done using the Stakeholder Analysis Framework, which describes the 
political and personal ambitions/alignments of Board Members, one can assume that this 
impacted on the decision by the GCNA Board to accept and ratify the MoU, but it is also 
done against the backdrop of higher economic gains, whereas, they were mandated by 
the Board not to sign any agreement. Furthermore, there is no evidence from the archives 
of the GCNA that the government of the day (a major primary stakeholder in the GCNA) 
issued any policy advice on position, or guidance on the proposed Agreement. 
.This study also brings to the fore the different stakes, and thus conflict, which are 
ingrained within organisations such as cooperatives, and which have a multiplicity of 
stakeholder groupings with their accompanying rights and privileges. 
One of the outstanding outcomes of the cartelisation process is the demonstration of the 
influential role of Huitema in influencing the global nutmeg supply chain. His influence on 
the global nutmeg trade earned him the nickname ―the Nutmeg Man‖ in Indonesia, while 
Lord characterised the role of Huitema and the Agreement as the ―Catz-a-lisation‖ of the 
global nutmeg industry. 
Regarding the negotiating process, the archives showed that the GCNA arrived at the 
bargaining table inexperienced and without expert assistance, thus exposing themselves 
to further marginalisation on the part of the Indonesian team that was ably assisted by 
Renwick‘s personal friend, Huitema of Catz International. 
Overall, the attempt at forming the Nutmeg Cartel mirrors the political and economic 
rationale for the establishment of cartels as evidenced by a commodity market that has a 
product with little or no close substitute, the existence of monopoles and oligopoly 
markets, desire for increased prices, income on the part of producers and a desire to 
exercise control over natural resources by developing countries in order to obtain a 
greater share of the value-added from their products. 
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However, as the remaining chapters show, the absence of key conditions such as the 
inability of ASPIN to control the supply of nutmeg from Indonesia and the lack of, or 
deficiency of, information about the global market from the GCNA side, led to the early 




Chapter 6 - Operation and Performance of the Marketing Agreement 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the operations and performance of the GCNA during the period 
1986-1990 as the implementation of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement 
unfolded. The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 6.2 addresses stakeholders‘ 
interventions, implementation and operations of the agreement and its impact on 
performance.  Section 6.3 focuses on the key factors, affecting the performance of the 
Marketing Agreement during the period 1986-1990.  A series of measures will be used to 
evaluate the degree of effectiveness of the performance of the agreement at several 
levels: cartel duration and performance at the institutional, micro and macro levels.  
Section 6.4 presents the performance outcomes of the implementation and operations of 
the agreement. It discusses the revenue impact on the GCNA and farmers, as well as the 
impact on the national economy. Section 6.5 presents the talk and text of the period in 
order to highlight the interactions of the key stakeholders. Section 6.6 presents the 
chapter summary and conclusion. 
 
6.2 Stakeholders‘ Implementation and Operations of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement on 
Performances  
This section addresses the implementation phase of the agreement using Langley‘s 
(1999) framework (narrative and time bracketing of events) which were highlighted in 
order to bring attention to the different phases during the period of implementation. For the 
purposes of this thesis, operations refer to the organisational and governance structure 
that facilitated the implementation and management of the Agreement, such as the type of 
monitoring mechanism of each participant, the establishment of an organisational entity 
arising from the establishment of the cartel; as well as the coordination and organisational 
structure to help solve problems as they occur (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Hay and 
Kelly, 1974). These reflect some of the issues which affected the performance of the 
agreement as the stakeholders sought to operationalise the Agreement.  
This section puts forward the view that the GCNA entered into implementation of the 
ASPIN – GCNA Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which was signed on September 
15. 1986 and the Joint Marketing Agreement which was signed on 26 March 1987 (see 
table 5.13). with three perceptions: (a) that ASPIN had significant control over the export 
of nutmegs from Indonesia; (b) GCNA and ASPIN between them controlled a very high 
share of the international market and as such could exert control on the international 
supply of nutmeg and mace, and (c) that Catz International was the most important trader 
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in the International nutmeg market. Given these perceptions, the GCNA Board of 
Directors felt that the Marketing Agreement would operate as a successful cartel.  
The signing of the MoU and the MoA signaled the start of the implementation of the 
Marketing Agreement which was intended to coordinate and control the supply of nutmeg 
and mace to international markets. The intended coordinating mechanism for the 
Agreement did not materialise and was partially responsible for undermining the longevity 
of the attempt. 
Within the context of stakeholder theory, the Marketing Agreement was reached within the 
broader context of stakeholder influences on both sides and the Global Value Chain for 
Nutmegs. GCNA and ASPIN had their separate existences, though in comparison with 
GCNA, ASPIN was a very new entity formed in 1986. As noted in chapter 5, the declining 
export prices obtained by Grenada and Indonesia created a common cause to stabilise 
and increase the price of nutmeg. It is this mutual interest which led to the Marketing 
Agreement. From an operational perspective, the implementation of the GCNA-ASPIN 
Agreement should be considered to be an attempt at operating a cartel. 
The formation of the Agreement was influenced by their respective groups of 
stakeholders. The previous chapter provides an account of the influence of GCNA‘s 
stakeholders in the formation of the Marketing Agreement. The interactions and indeed 
the relationship between the two entities appeared to work initially, though there were 
inherent weaknesses in the functioning of the Agreement and the two organisations‘ 
control of the market, such as ASPIN‘s inability to control the supply of nutmeg from 
Indonesia and GCNA‘s lack of information on the actual market conditions and the leading 
players in the market. After about two years the situation deteriorated further as the 
Government in Indonesia moved to implement the economic liberalisation under pressure 
from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The condition in which the 
implementation of the agreement took pace led to the widening of the gap between what 
the GCNA perceived as an Agreement aimed at establishing a cartel and the actual 
situation in which there was absence of conditions necessary for the establishment of a 
cartel. How these conditions affected the performance of the Agreement is discussed in 
section 6.3. 
The impetus for the Agreement was reinforced by concerns about the deteriorating terms 
of trade voiced by individual stakeholders such as Brizan (1979), an academic and 
advocate for the GCNA to obtain a greater share of value-added for nutmeg farmers and 
Grenada.  There were also stakeholders of ASPIN who were giving voice to the need for 
increased prices (Tirtawinata, 1995). The timeline leading up to the formation of the 
marketing agreement could be traced back to the formation of the GCNA in 1947, followed 
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by a visit by GCNA representative to Indonesia in 1979 on the part of the GCNA. While on 
the part of Indonesia, the timeline could be traced back to the meeting with the delegate 
Renwick) from the GCNA representative in 1979 – prior to the formation of ASPIN (Table 
5.13) - when the idea was first discussed in face-to-face meetings, and continued through 
Huitema of Catz International as the intermediary until the formation of ASPIN in 1985, 
and culminating in the signing of the MoU in 1986 and the subsequent MoA in 1987. 
During the time period Catz International was integral to the entire process, being the 
facilitator on both sides in the evolution of the MoU and MoA, as the company seeks its 
commercial interest. 
 
6.2.1 Operations of the GCNA–ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement between 1986-1990 
As indicated above, operations is interpreted in the vein of Levenstein and Suslow,2005, 
2006; Eckbo,1976; Griffin (1989) to mean establishing the organisational structure for the 
proper functioning of the Agreement as a cartel, and the internal processes that allow for 
the free flow of communications between GCNA and ASPIN. Such a structure was never 
created for the Marketing Agreement and was possibly one of the factors contributing to 
its short duration.  
It is important that operational issues are given primary consideration in the effectiveness 
and success of the Agreement.  There were three challenges which needed to be 
addressed: 
1. selecting and coordinating the conduct of all  participants to control total supply 
and allocation of supply between participants; 
2. monitoring the conduct of cartel participants to detect and deter non-
compliance with the Agreement, and 
3. preventing new entry or expansion of sales by non-partners to the agreement 
or parallel exporters. 
A joint entity or coordination mechanism would have been required to address these 
challenges. The GCNA was such an agency for coordinating and managing the supply of 
Grenada‘s nutmeg made possible by the legal framework (Grenada Nutmeg Industry 
Ordinance, 1947, CAP.125). As noted earlier, the GCNA had a board of directors, 
management structure, committees, a network of receiving and processing stations and a 
system for the payment of advance and bonus payments. Unfortunately the MoA did not 
contain such an entity. 
In order to examine the operational aspects of the Marketing Agreement with the lens of a 
cartel, a review of the MoU (1986) and MoA (1987) has been conducted to determine 
whether these agreements provided for a functional governance structure. The MoA 
indicates that it did not establish any specific structures or mechanisms for the operations 
of what was hoped to be a cartel other than instituting the quota and pricing system in 
articles 2 and 3. Article 4 (1) (a) called for ―the system of monitoring the Agreement‖ but 
failed to provide details of the mechanism to be established. The lack of a mechanism 
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contrasts with some other international commodity agreements such as the International 
Cocoa Agreements, International Tin Agreement and the International Sugar Agreement 
(Hillman, 2010; LeClair, 2016; Fear, 2016). In the case of cocoa there have been a series 
of agreements which the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) has been instrumental 
in negotiating and implementing. Some specific responsibilities of the ICCO have been set 
out below.  
1. The ICCO head quartered in London with regional offices in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. Their main task was to coordinate the activities of the subsidiary bodies and 
committees of the organisation. 
 
2. The International Cocoa Council was the main decision-making body. It met twice per 
year and would hold special sessions if the situation required it. Its main function was 
to ―determine the strategy of the organisation in addition to supervising its financial 
policies and to review its proposed work programme and budget for each cocoa year.‖ 
 
3. The ICCO Economic Committee‘s main functions were to review cocoa statistics and 
statistical analysis of cocoa production, as well as to examine and make 
recommendations for funding under the common fund for commodities. 
 
4. The Administration and Finance Committee was responsible for supervising and 
administering the budget of the director. 
 
5. An expert working group on stocks worked to support the ICCO secretariat. 
The fact that the ICCO is alive and functioning today and that the attempt at forming a 
nutmeg cartel failed could in part be due to the existence of such structures at the ICCO 
and its absence in the case of the GCNA-ASPIN attempt at cartelisation. An important 
difference between the International Cocoa Agreements and the nutmeg Marketing 
Agreement is that the former were commodity agreements between exporting and 
importing countries with the aim of sustainable development of the sector. The omission of 
an operational mechanism for implementing the Marketing Agreement reflects the lack of 
organisational and international business experience on the part of the GCNA‘s primary 
decision makers, notably the Board of Directors of GCNA. The majority of whom were 
elected by the membership and lacked the critical skills needed to recognise this 
deficiency (see table 5. 6).  
Article 4 (b) of the Marketing Agreement (1987) calls for consultation on ―the supply and 
demand of nutmegs and mace on the international market.‖ As indicated before, whereas 
these statements are embedded in the agreement, they fail to detail how this would be 
achieved or what organisational entity is to be developed for this purpose. The article 
further fails to provide any indication of the purpose for monitoring. In addition to this 
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limitation, the ability of the parties in the Marketing Agreement to take effective actions to 
control the global supply and price was limited because the conditions required for such 
control did not exist. 
Unlike the GCNA with respect to the supply of nutmeg from Grenada, ASPIN was unable 
to exert control over the flow of nutmeg to the international market from Indonesia 
because of the following reasons:  
1. Less than 25 per cent of all Indonesian exporters were members of ASPIN and 
consequently a large proportion of the Indonesian supply was outside ASPIN‘s control. 
2. With Indonesia being an archipelago with over 17,000 islands and nutmeg growing 
distributed over many islands, Indonesian borders were highly porous facilitating 
―smuggling‖ of nutmeg from Indonesia by members of ASPIN and non-members. 
3. Arrangements for monitoring the international supply of nutmeg and controlling it were 
lacking, partly because of the lack of institutional arrangements complementing the 
Agreement and the high potential for smuggling from Indonesia. 
4. With specific reference to the GCNA, attempts to restrict international supply with 
increased production by farmers led to build up of large stocks financed partly from 
reserves but with the greater portion financed by bank loans. The evidence shows that 
GCNA found it impossible to finance these stocks over time. 
Article 4 (2) provided that ―Each party to the Agreement undertakes to give to the other 
party a statement of its sales and sales prices every six months‖. The above did not 
indicate what measures would be taken on the basis of the information provided. 
Moreover, this research found no evidence that the parties complied with this aspect of 
the agreement, a critical aspect for the stability and longevity of the Agreement (Chang, 
2016). The Agreement lacked incentives for good performance or penalties for non-
compliance. According to Levenstein and Suslow (2006) most successful cartels are 
those that develop organisational mechanisms that accommodate fluctuations in the 
external environment. Provision for such flexibility was not build into the Agreement and 
as the following account will show such flexibility was not in evidence during its operation.  
GCNA‘s stakeholders based their confidence in the Agreement on the experience of the 
operation of the GCNA as an effective monopsony. GCNA‘s control of the supply of 
nutmeg was founded on its legal status established almost 69 years ago in 1947, 
functioning procedures for paying its members and an infrastructure for receiving and 
processing nutmeg. The assumption was that ASPIN was capable of putting in place 
similar arrangements for controlling Indonesian supply. Under such circumstances GCNA 
and ASPIN could have controlled their joint supply.    
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The lack of detailed and strategic planning and conceptualisation impacted negatively on 
the Agreement. The legal structures and operations of the two entities, GCNA and ASPIN, 
also affected the operations, for whereas GCNA had national reach and control of the 
local market, ASPIN only had about 25 per cent control, rendering the Joint Marketing 
Agreement porous, weak and open. 
 
6.2.2 Stakeholders‘ Perspectives on the Performance of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint 
Marketing Agreement (MoA). 
Section 6.2 have set the context for describing the operations and performance of the 
Agreement and identified the circumstances which were against the success of the 
Agreement as a cartel. In spite of the unfavourable circumstances, GCNA‘s internal and 
some primary stakeholders were active in the formation of the Agreement and in its 
operation. This section examines these stakeholders‘ part in the formation of the 
Agreement in spite of the unfavourable circumstances.  
Chapter 5 presented the factors which influenced or triggered the joint agreement and 
indeed its performance and longevity. These factors included but were not necessarily 
limited to: (a) the desire to retain a greater share of the income from the value-added 
emanating from the export of nutmeg: (b) the volatile financial situation of the GCNA; (c) 
the nature and characteristics of the international market for nutmeg, notably the price and 
demand volatility; (d) the long held view of successive GCNA board members of the 
necessity of an alliance with Indonesia, and (e) the belief that the supply of nutmeg and 
mace to the international market could be controlled. 
There were other factors which affected the implementation and operations of the 
agreement, they include: the market conditions following the signing of the agreement, 
reliance on international agents for access to the market and the role of the agents as 
facilitators in the implementation of the Agreement; the associated information asymmetry 
which accompanies such arrangements; actions on the part of the key stakeholders in the 
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Stakeholder theory recognises that different types of stakeholders are concerned with 
performance on different dimensions including financial and social (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Preston and Saprienza, 1990). These authors also concluded that major 
stakeholders within firms, gain or lose collectively rather than at each other‘s expense. 
Clarkson (1991, 1995) presented a shareholder framework as a means of defining, 
gathering and organizing descriptive and performance data about a company and its 
stakeholders. Other scholars including Coff (1999) and Kochan and Rubenstein (2000) 
focus on employees.  
 
In this study the focus is on decision making by primary stakeholders in the GCNA. The 
objectives of the different groups of primary stakeholders in either making the decision to 
form the Marketing Agreement or supporting the decision are broadly consistent. The 
GCNA Board of Directors took the decision to form the Agreement to achieve higher and 
more stable prices over time. This was clearly in the interest of the member since it would 
enable the GCNA to pay higher prices and bonuses. The Government of Grenada was 
also in favour of the agreement because of the favorable effects on the balance of trade 
and the approval of a substantial proportion of the electorate. These objectives and 
related performance indicators are consistent with Utton (2006 2011) and Levenstein and 
Suslow (2006) who identify duration and effect on price as measures of a cartel‘s success.  
 
The focus of the rest of the chapter is to understand, through the narrative of the 
operations phase of the Agreement, what led to the decision to form the Agreement given 
that the conditions for its success as a cartel did not exist.  
 
6.2.3  Application of Langley‘s Chronological Ordering of Events to the Operation Stage 
and end of the Agreement  
Table 6.1 summarises the events which signaled the start of the operation stage of the 
Agreement and effectively its end. As they occurred, highlighting the factors which 
affected the Agreement, including the interaction with the primary stakeholders and 
factors that influenced the process of forming the Agreement and its operation. The major 
events were the signing of the MoU and MoA in 1986 and 1987 and ASPIN‘s changed 
policy following the Indonesian government‘s decision to deregulate commodity boards. 
 
Table 6.1 contains 6 columns, each of which is briefly explained. Column1 highlights the 
year of the event; column 2 shows the event, decision of action taken during that year; 
column 3 highlights the factor (s) which affected column 2, column 4 shows the 
consequences/outcome(s) of the actions which were taken in column 2; column 5 explains 
the stage or describes the agreement and column 6 identifies the stakeholder group that 
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influenced or is affected by the decisions or actions during the life of the agreement. The 
chronology considers 1990 as the year the agreement collapsed and is therefore treated 
in chapter 7.  
 
Table 6.1 shows that between the signing of the MoU in 1986 and 1990 (ASPIN changed 
its sales policy in 1990 moving away from Catz as the main export buyer to liberalizing the 
market), the average international market price for nutmeg increased by 309 per cent and 
that received by farmers by 202 per cent between 1986 and 1988 but then fell by 70 per 
cent by 1990. However, the 1990 price of EC$3.04 per pound was higher by 63 per cent 
than 1986.  It is argued that the decline in price which started in 1988 was initially 
triggered by ASPIN‘s changed sales policy as indicated in table 6.2 (Interview with Lord, 
19 March 2014). Additionally, Marks and Pomeroy (1995) also argued that by 1988, the 
supplies reaching the market via Singapore was a major factor which contributed to the 
excess supply on the market and the resulting declining in prices,  
The empirical evidence in this case found that the time line for duration of the agreement 
had undergone three episodes and thus provided three options. 
 
Option 1: 15 September 1986 to February 1989, representing the period from the signing 
of the MoU to the announcement by ASPIN of its change in sales policy which excludes 
Catz as the sole buyer and the introduction of competitive bidding, which was a deviation 
from the spirit and expectations when the agreement was entered into. In this case, the 
duration of the life of the agreement is estimated to be 2.5 years. 
 
Option 2: 15 September 1986 (signing of the MoA) to 25 May 1990. This covers the period 
from the signing of the MoU to the receipt of official notification from ASPIN which stated 
that as from 25 May 1990 ASPIN ceased to be the sole exporting agency for nutmeg from 
Indonesia. This option provides for life span of 3.8 years. 
 
Option 3:  this episode starts with the signing of the MoA in March 1987 to the cancellation 
of ASPIN‘s sole exporting license on 25 May 1990. This option provides for a life span of 
2.7 years. 
 
Within the context of the literature, the cancellation of the changes introduced to ASPIN‘s 
sales policy represents an episode in the life of the agreement and not the end of the 
attempt at cartelisation. As a consequence this case proposed that the life of the 
agreement to be option 2 (3.8 years). This option is selected because of the price 
increases which accompanied the signing of the MoU. Others such as Lord and Moermon 




The duration of the agreement is also intertwined with its collapse, and therefore some of 
the issues which are detailed below will be further discussed in Chapter 7. Sections 6.3 to 
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EC$4.12 in 1988 to EC$3.04 
in 1990 











Source:  Developed by researcher.
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6.3. Factors Affecting the Performance of the Agreement  
The performance analysis will consist of the measures identified in Figure 6.2: objectives 
of the MoA, duration of the Agreement; quotas and pricing;   export revenue received by 
the GCNA;   farm gate prices and bonus payments paid to farmers. 
 
6.3.1 Objectives of the MoA–Quota and Supply Issues  
One of the key aspects in assessing the factors which affected the implementation and 
performance of the MoU and MoA is that of the objectives of the agreement as outlined in 
the MoA (Appendix 4), which addressed the issue of quota allocation and supplies. 
 Quota/Volume allocation Issues 
The Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement (1987) provided for the two major global 
suppliers of nutmegs to jointly supply 8,550 tons of nutmeg or 95.0 per cent of world 
estimated demand of 9,000 tons and 1,200 tons of mace with ASPIN supplying 6,300 
metric tons and Grenada 2,250 metric tons, while ASPIN was expected to supply 1,002 
tons of mace and Grenada 198 metric tons., at prices outlined in appendix 4.  
This aspect of the discussion on the MoA is critical since it deals with the matter of 
compliance by the parties to the agreement. A key issues has arisen from the above 
allocation, is the basis on which the estimated world demand was established. The MoA 
did not identify the source for such a decision. Therefore, it appears that the estimate was 
based on the educated guess of the suppliers rather than on sound objective facts.  
The other issue which has arisen has to do with the management of supply by the parties 
to the agreement. In this regard there were two provisions:  Article 2, p.3  states, 
 ― any additional quantities to be placed on the market in 
1987 shall be subject to negotiations‖, and ,‖ in the case any 
one party cannot supply its agreed share and /or the 
additional quantities assigned, then the other party shall 
automatically fulfill the shortage.‖  
The article failed to provide details on the basis or methodology to be applied when 
deciding on the additional quantities to be placed on the market and the mechanism for 
doing so. For example, if the situation requires ASPIN to fulfill an order to a GCNA 
customer, there was no protocol for meeting this immediate demand nor for any future 
engagement by ASPIN with the customer. The existence of such ambiguity in the 
agreement increases the possibilities of conflict between the parties, which in turn can 
lead to instability and ultimate failure. 
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Using independent data supplied by the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1992, Table 6.2   
shows that at no time during the period of the agreement were the primary stakeholders 
collectively or singularly able to consistently comply with their set quota. The data reveal 
that Indonesia supplied beyond its quota in 1987, 1988 and 1990; only in 1989 did it 
supply under its quota (3,269 metric tons).  In 1986 and 1987 the GCNA supplied over its 
quota by 320 tons (negate the data for 1986 since most of the sales for that year were 
contracted in 1985). However, for the remaining duration of the Joint Marketing 
Agreement, it under-supplied its quota by a maximum of 238 tons in 1989. 
Table 6.2 also shows that the partners to the agreement collectively exceeded the agreed, 
8,500 metric tons from 1987 to 1988, but failed to meet the requirement in 1989 and 1990, 
when sales amounted to 5,181 metric tons or 39.0 per cent less than the agreed quota 
amount.  This case also found that ASPIN was the less compliant of the two partners. In 
the meantime, re-exports from Singapore (a non-nutmeg-producing country) was in 
excess of Grenada‘s supply, while it approximated half the amount of Indonesia‘s market 
supply, except in 1989 when it exceeded the ASPIN‘s supply by 146 tons. Since ASPIN 
did not include all of the nutmeg exports (estimated at 25 per cent), not all of the nutmegs 
reaching Singapore from Indonesia were illegal/smuggled. The nutmeg from Indonesia 
that was considered parallel exports (as far as the joint agreement was concerned) was 
from ASPIN members who sought to obtain sales and income from Non-ASPIN sources. . 
The absence of verifiable data from Indonesia makes it difficult to conduct in-depth 
analysis on the state of the nutmeg industry there.  
The above implies that there was no discipline and compliance to the agreement entered 
into by the two major stakeholders to the agreement, and that absence of compliance to 
the agreement was a contributing factor to the decline of efforts aimed at cartelisation, via 
the instrument of the joint marketing agreement (Chang, 2016)  
Table 6.2 shows that during the period the objective of restricting supply by both parties to 
8,550 tons was not effectively met, as both parties exceeded their quota amount except in 
the case of Indonesia (1989) when its exports declined, and in Grenada whose exports 
from 1988 to 1990 fell below the agreed quantities. The reason for Grenada‘s 
performance in that period was accredited to its commitment not to exceed its obligation 
to the agreement, as well as the lack of demand from the international buyers, which was 
in essence the foreign buyers‘ reaction to the higher prices which accompanied the 
signing of the agreement in 1987 (interview with Lord 19 March, 2015). The reaction of 
demand to the increases in price is reflective of the elasticity discussed in section 3.4.3. 
The evidence suggest that the price elasticity of demand for an increase in price of 
nutmeg even in the short term is high, as nutmeg users and consumers cut back on 
consumption or seek substitutes. Stockpiling of nutmeg by traders in anticipation of the 
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price increase under the market agreement may also have contributed to the fall in 
demand post agreement.  
GCNA‘s desire to comply with the agreement was also expressed by then Secretary to the 
GCNA BoD, , Ms. GIttens, who stated,: ―the quota system imposed on the market during 
the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement was the main cause of the present large stock holding by 
the association, since GCNA refused to satisfy orders once its quota was met.‖ (Minutes 
from GCNA BoD Meeting 15 July, 1991). Similar sentiments were also expressed by 
Moermon, who stated, that Grenada was the only true partner to the agreement (Interview 
with Moermon, 20 October, 2010). These statements reflect the extent of compliance to 
the agreement by the GCNA. 
 Table 6.2 World Exports of Nutmeg by Indonesia, Grenada and Singapore (re-exports) 
1985 – 1990 
Source: Data obtained from Commonwealth Secretariat, 1990 and compiled by 
researcher 
According to many observers, authors, and traders such as Logie (Interview with Logie 5 
April, 2005); Lord (Interview with Lord, 19 March, 2005), and Pomeroy and Marks, 1995), 
and as discussed in other parts of this report, ASPIN was unable to control the flow of 
nutmegs from Indonesia on the global nutmeg market because all exporters were not 
members; this inability on the part of ASPIN to control exports from Indonesia fuelled the 
parallel sales from Indonesia to Singapore. This inability on the part of ASPIN was an 
inherent problem which was not in keeping with the conditions necessary for the efficient 
and successful implementation of the joint agreement nor for the development of a cartel. 
The extent to which the agreement could have survived depended on the ability of its 
partners, particularly ASPIN to control supply and prices. However, as highlighted above, 
the inability of ASPIN to control the flow of nutmegs to the international market meant that 
more nutmegs were reaching the international market than was anticipated by the 
agreement. 






  metric tons Metric tons  
Sum of  Indonesian 








metric tons  Metric tons   
1985 8,008 3,521 11,529 2,677 14,206 
1986 6,622 2,951 9,573 2,342 11,915 
1987 8,870 2,576 11,446 1,425 12,871 
1988 6,755 2,031 8,786 3,193 11,979 
1989 3,269 1,912 5,181 3,415 8,596 
1990 8,493 1,960 10,453 7,391 17,844 
 180 
 
Table 6.2 also serves to demonstrate the variance from the two major global producers 
and the demand of world imports. It shows that during the period 1986–1990, world 
imports ranged from 11,831 to 12,930 tons, while exports ranged from 11,915 tons to 
17,844 tons (Tirtawinata,1995). The import figures as stated here must not be confused 
with the previous data on world consumption of nutmeg since what is imported is not 
necessarily what is consumed, and hence agents and brokers like Catz and Fooks& 
French were also holders of large quantity of unsold stocks. Additionally, the data on 
imports and consumption seem to range depending on the source of the data. 
The variance between world exports and imports suggest the existence of a structural 
problem of oversupply in the global nutmeg market. This problem is not new to the 
nutmeg trade, since as early as 1950 the Jackson Commission Report, 1950, p.3 stated: 
―The world produces two and a half times more nutmegs than it consumes.‖  Forty-two 
years later (1992) this structural supply problem was described in the Grenada‘s 
delegation report from Indonesia as follows:  
―The present supply of nutmegs on the world market 
exceeds the demand thereby creating a buyers‘ market and 
resulting in significant drop off in prices. The present annual 
world production is estimated at 12,000 tons while the 
estimated consumption is 900 tons.‖  
(Grenada Delegation Report, 1992). 
 
One of the key questions, therefore, which emanates from the above data, is where does 
the rest of the excess stocks/inventory resides? As shown in discussion on the GVC 
(Chapter 2 and 3), most of the unsold stocks were held by the producers and to a lesser 
extent by agents and brokers. In the case of Indonesia, the stocks were held by ASPIN, 
domestic exporters, while in the case of Grenada, the GCNA was the main holder of 
unsold stocks This evidence further proves that the commodity trade was ―buyer-driven 
and not producer-given,‖ 
 
Therefore, in terms of the GCNA‘s and ASPIN‘s ability to realize their quota objectives, 
this was not achieved, especially in the case of ASPIN. Marshall and Mark (2012) concur 
that compliance is also critical to the success of a cartel but that compliance comes from 
the internal workings of the cartel and each member‘s willingness to be so compliant 
 
6.3.1.1   Pricing Issues 
The second major essential feature of the Joint Agreement, and hence the effort at 
cartelisation, is that of control of the pricing mechanism in order to keep prices high, since 
technically, in the absence of collusion it is the relationship between supply and demand 
which establishes the price of a product. . It is important to examine how the established 
 181 
 
pricing objective was realised. Some experts (Connor, 2007; Eckbo, 1976;  Levenstein 
and Suslow, 2004) have argued that price increases are not the sole objective of all 
cartels but that it includes other objectives such as market share expansion, and the need 
to reduce and/or eliminate competition. It is true that in the case of the GCNA-ASPIN 
attempts at cartelisation, the primary objective was to increase the price of nutmeg over 
and above the then market price, or at a price higher than what would be obtained in the 
absence of collusion, by restricting the quantity of nutmeg available on the market. As a 
consequence, the analysis of the extent to which the pricing objective of the cartel was 
achieved will be assessed by comparing the prices prior to the 1986/87 Agreement versus 
that obtained during the attempt during 1987-1990. 
The evidence suggests (see Table 6.3) that during the period 1987–1989, this pricing 
objective was achieved, as the prices obtained were in excess of the agreement, but 
started to decline from 1989, reaching the lowest point in over a decade.  
Table 6. 3 highlights the prices obtained by the GCNA before and during the period of the 
agreement. The table indicates that price volatility continued during the implementation of 
the agreement for all grades of nutmeg. The variances in price for SUNS ranged from 
US$5,400 which is US$600 less than the agreed quota price, and US$1000, in excess of 
the said agreed price. This volatility was reflective for each product range (see table 6.4).  
The pricing situation for mace was no different from that of nutmeg, as the price for mace 
traded in excess of US$3,000 above that which was agreed to by the agreement. (James 
newspaper interview Grenada Today, June 22, 1990). 
Table 6.4 provides a comparison of the prices as per agreement and the average prices 
received by the GCNA during the period 1986-1989, by which time the prices began to 
decline, and the relationship entered a dissolution phase. 
Table 6.3 shows that during the period 1987–1989, the GCNA achieved the pricing 
objectives as established in the agreement. However, this level of pricing was not 
maintained for very long, as prices started to collapse by 1989 (see table 6.5.) due to the 
excess supply of nutmeg reaching the international market. (Interviews with Renwick, 20 
June, 2006; interview with Lord, 19 March2015; Interview with Logie 5 April, 2015; and 
Tirtawinata, 1995). 
This issue will be revisited and expanded upon in Chapter 7, to show how this factor 
contributed to the decline and failure of the attempt at the cartelization of the global 




Table 6.3 Comparison of Price Levels as per Joint GCNA-ASPIN Agreement 1986 vs. 
Prices Actually Received by the GCNA 
Type/Grade          of 
Nutmeg 
Prices Set by the 
Agreement (US$) 
per Ton (1986/87) 
Prices Actually Received 
(US$) per Ton during 
(1987-1990) 
SUN 6,000 5,400 – 7,000 
110 6,200 5,200 – 7,500 
80 6,650 5,200 – 7,500 
Defective 6,650 5,000 – 7,200 
Type/Grade of Mace    
Number I 11,750 14,850 
Number II Not available 8,000 – 13,200 
Broken 10,000 5,000 – 9.000 
Source: GCNA/ASPIN Agreement (1986) and Grenada Today Newspaper (1990) 
 
6.3.1.2 Duration 
Within the context of cartels, such as the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Agreement (Scherer, 1970), 
successful performance is described in terms of the duration of the agreement. Dick in 
Grossman (2006) expressed the view that cartels, whose primary purpose is to fix prices, 
tend to be unstable because such contracts tend to attract fringe competition and 
therefore affect the longevity of such agreements. Studies undertaken by Levenstein and 
Suslow (2006) conclude that the average duration for such contracts is five years, and 
many may break up in less than one year. Hence, an examination of the duration of the 
sustainability of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement is worth considering in an effort to establish 
the longevity of the effort to maintain the agreement. 
Despite the use of duration as the most common measure of performance, this singular 
measure is deemed unsatisfactory. Levenstein and Suslow (2006, p: 45) observe that 
―cartel duration is the most common measure of cartel success, because it is the most 
easily measured, but it is clearly unsatisfactory in capturing the economic impact of 
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cartels.‖ It is precisely for this reason that other indicators have been used to help assess 
the performance of the Agreement as a cartel and in particular its impact on the GCNA. 
According to Levenstein and Suslow (2006) cartel duration depends on four major factors: 
(1) The Number of Firms and Industry Concentration 
In theory and intuitively the higher the concentration of supply in a small number of 
firms the greater the chances of a cartel surviving and fulfilling its objective of earning 
high profits for its members. This is because a smaller number of firms with the 
common objective of maximizing their profits would have it in their interest to prolong 
the cartel and abide by the rules. Under cartel conditions it is critical that supply be 
controlled as part of the strategy to maintain prices at high levels. A cartel can only 
drive prices up by having its members cut back or vary production based on demand 
from time to time (Hirshleifer, Glazer and Hirshleifer, 2005). Such coordination is 
easier with high concentration of supply. 
  
However, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) observe that there is ambivalence in the 
empirical findings in this area. They further found that duration was negatively related 
to firm concentration, and that empirical results are ambivalent on the issue. Dick 
(1996a) finds a negative association between concentration and the likelihood of cartel 
formation, and did not find any clear empirical relationship between the two.  On the 
other hand Utton (2012) identified a high level of market concentration as a condition 
for the success of cartels while Posner (1970) finds a more positive relationship 
between firm concentration and success of cartels. 
 
GCNA perceived that market concentration was high on the assumption that ASPIN 
was capable of controlling a high proportion of nutmeg exports from Indonesia. In 
practice ASPIN‘s control of the supply of Indonesian nutmeg was low and short-lived 
leading to the effective end of the Agreement in just over 2 years as detailed below,  
 
 
(2) Large Customers 
There is growing evidence from contemporary international cartels that successful 
collusion is possible in industries with a few large customers. In the case of the GCNA-
ASPIN Agreement, Catz was the single largest buyer and agent for both members of 
the cartel (until February 1989, when by virtue of policy changes, they were no longer 
the sole agent for ASPIN‘s nutmegs), but was not the largest global buyer and reseller. 
The archival records suggest that the change in policy from one major buyer to 
multiple buyers, which occurred in Indonesia in 1989, contributed to a decline in prices 
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and served as a major contributor to the shortened duration of the cartel. However, 
whereas Catz was the largest customer for direct purchase from the producers, the 
real influential customers were the wholesalers, retailers and processors who 
processed and marketed most of the raw commodity to industrial users. The demand 
for the raw commodity is a derived demand, its demand is a function of the demand for 
the products that use nutmeg and mace. 
 
(3) Nature of Demand  
Levenstein and Suslow (2006), citing Eckbo (1976), found that cartels are able to raise 
prices substantially only if demand is sufficiently inelastic and there are few short-term 
substitutes. This condition appeared to be met for nutmeg and mace which are used in 
very small quantities in food processing and by consumers. Given the levels of 
consumption, price elasticity would be expected to be low. However, if the cartel 
members do not control most of the supply (given the existence of parallel exporters), 
their attempts to keep prices high would be undermined by non-cartel suppliers.  
 
Table 6.2 indicates that the average international market price started to increase from 
1986 but started to decline by 1989. The reasons for this decline were attributed to the 
increase in supplies from Indonesia, which was indicative of the inability of ASPIN to 
control the market , as well as the fact that the price increase was so significant (300 
per cent) in such a short period of time, that it was unsustainable.  
 
(4) Cartel Organization and Learning.   
It is argued that in order for such collusive agreements (as those intended to establish   
pure cartels) to be effective   organizations involved in such a process must 
understand and learn how such agreements work, This is deem to be important since 
the extent to which these organisations learn about the relationship to which they 
become engage the greater would be the chances for success.  Learning on 
monitoring and structuring of incentives to prevent cheating are also important in 
achieving success. 
 
6.4 Performance of the agreement 
6.4.1 Production, Revenue and Income Analysis of the agreement 
This sub-section serves to explain the financial performance of the GCNA during the 
period of the Joint Agreement, through the use of specific financial ratios.  
Policy makers, nutmeg farmers, the business community and the general population in 
Grenada had expressed concerns about the highly publicised financial ―boom and bust‖ 
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which had punctuated the life of the GCNA. These concerns reached a peak during the 
period of the GCNA/ASPIN Agreement. During the almost five years (on and off 
relationship) of the agreement, the GCNA‘s income experienced a high of EC$42.5million 
in 1988 and a low of EC$13 million in 1991. 
Since the financial performance of the GCNA was of critical importance to the country, it is 
therefore important to dissect the financial/accounting performance of the association in 
this discourse, and place it within the narrative and chronology of events relating to the 
performance of the cartel.  
 
6.4.1.2. Production Delivery and Exports of Nutmeg and Mace from GCNA, 1986-1991 
The third aspect of analysis of the performance of the agreement is that of the production 
and delivery of nutmeg and mace to the GCNA by farmers. It seeks to analyse to what 
extent the increasing price influenced the level of production by the farmers  during the 
period of the attempted cartel During the period 1986-1990, the GCNA purchased from its 
members a total of 29,355,698 pounds of nutmeg and 3,136,981pounds of mace (GCNA 
Financial Statement & Trading Summaries, 1986-1991). Table 6.5 shows that in 1986, the 
year of the signing of the Agreement, the GCNA bought approximately 5,148,799 pounds 
of nutmeg and 474,360 pounds of mace. During the years 1987–1990 nutmeg production 
ranged from 6,018,669 to 6,086,949 in 1990. Therefore between 1986 and 1990, the 
production of nutmeg increased by 938,105 pounds, or 18 per cent, while mace increased 
from 474,360 in 1986 to a high of 741,344 pounds in 1988 or 56,3 per cent, but declined 
to 634,636 pounds in 1989 and finally declining to 606,614 pounds in 1990, but remained 
higher than 1988. 
There are three main reasons for that occurrence. First, there was virtually no known 
natural commodity substitute for nutmeg and mace, even products such as cloves and 
cinnamon are not very good substitutes. During the years 1987-1990, it was rumored that 
one of the unintended consequences of the sharp price increase was the intensive 
research conducted by processors and users in the GVC for the development of synthetic 
nutmeg oils, smells etc. in order to replace the authentic nutmeg (Interview with 
Robertson, 16 July, 2005). However, by the time the agreement collapsed there was no 
confirmation that there was any success in that regard as a replacement for Grenada‘s 
nutmeg. In this regard, it did not confirm Herweijer‘s predictions in the short term 
regarding competition coming from that sector, due to the rise in ―cartel nutmeg prices.‖  
Second, even if non-synthetic substitutes could have been found, it was not yet on the 
market and had to be plated and processed, which would take time, it was estimated that 
it would take a long time to transfer land from nutmeg to that of other crops. Additionally, 
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the substitution process would be costly and irreversible in the short run. It would also be 
difficult to convince farmers who were versed and skilled in nutmeg production, to switch 
from nutmegs to other substitute crops, despite the fluctuating farm income they received 
from nutmegs. This, in fact, represents a major entry barrier to entering the nutmeg 
market. 
Third, a new crop would also mean reskilling those persons who were already used to the 
production of nutmeg, to which of course a cost would be attached, as well as a 
consequent loss of income. The small nutmeg farmers never earned enough to save; they 
lived at a subsistence level, and changing would plunge them into dire economic crisis.  
Additionally, the reason purported by many (Brizan, Renwick, Robertson, Logie and Lord) 
for such increased deliveries by the farmers is the increased earnings received by the 
GCNA, which accompanied the signing of the Joint Agreement. As per GCNA‘s modus 
operandi, the increases in the export price were passed on to the farmers by way of 
increases in the farm gate/advance price and bonus paid to the farmers.  
Therefore, at the micro-economic level, the farmers-stakeholders, driven by their need to 
earn higher income, especially when the price paid by the GCNA matches or exceeds 
their expectations, increased the delivery of the commodity. The following pricing 
discussions will establish the relationship between the increased farm gate price and the 
volume of nutmeg delivered to the GCNA, and thereby increased pressure on the GCNA 
to get the additional supplies onto the market. 
 
6.4.1. 3. Export Revenue Earnings by the GCNA  
The fourth aspect of analysis of the performance of the agreement is that of the export 
revenue earned by the GCNA during the period of the attempted cartel. Table 6.6 
highlights the revenue earned by the GCNA on the global market and how it was shared 
with the farmers, by way of advanced and bonus payments to the farmers, during the 
period 1985–1990.  
The effect of the signing of the MoU in securing the high price was stated by the manager 
at a board meeting on 4 October, 1986: ―The higher prices had already been obtained 
beyond the prices stipulated in the Agreement.‖ 
As a result of the increased export price prevailing on the international market, the GCNA 
benefitted through increased revenue. At the end of the 1985 nutmeg year the GCNA‘s 
annual revenue totalled EC$12,467,528. By the end of the nutmeg year in 1986, revenue 
increased to EC$20,765,580, an increase of EC$8, 298,052 or 66.5 per cent on sales of 
7,531,145 pounds of nutmegs and 485,998 pounds of mace. The increased quantity sold 
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was above the annual production for the current nutmeg year. The additional amount was 
obtained from unsold stocks from the previous years. 
Table 6.4 also show that revenue increased as exports declined from 1986–1988. From 
the signing of the Agreement in 1986 to 1988, revenue increased by 105 per cent. 
However, by 1989, total revenue started to decline and continued to 1990 by 31 per cent.    
The reasons for the decline in exports and revenue were attributed to a number of factors 
such as the impact of parallel exports of nutmegs from Indonesia via Singapore; changes 
in ASPIN‘s sales policy from a single buyer to multiple buyers,  and the unexpected 
deregulation of the Indonesian market which came by way of a decree from the 
Government, as part of its IMF-inspired structural adjustment program, and the Catz 
decision to release the large stocks of unsold nutmegs which they were storing in 
Rotterdam warehouses.. All of these factors combined to increase the supply of nutmeg 
onto the market and thereby cause a decline in the prices. 
The above issues will be addressed in detail in Chapter 7, since these conditions are seen 
as the reasons for the eventual collapse of the Agreement and the demise of efforts to 
establish what was hoped to be a cartel. 
Table 6.4 GCNA Production, Exports and Revenue 1986-1990 
Year Production   Export   Revenue Differences  











1986 5,148,799 474,360 7,531,145 485,998 20,765,586   
1987 6,018,669 680,027 5,284,494 495,160 38,626,440 17,860,854 
1988 6,074,553 741,344 4,995,398 573,205 42,554,991 3,928,551 
1989 6,026,773 634,636 3,961,834 423,959 33,740,654 -8,814,337 
1990 6,086,904 606,614 4,256,330 387,445 29,464,798 -4,275,856 
Total 29,355,698 3,136,981 26,029,201 2,365,767 165,152,469   
Source: Researcher from data extracted from the GCNA, Annual Financial Statement and 
Trading Summary, 1986 - 1991 
Overall, during the life of the agreement, the GCNA generated revenue of 
EC$165,152,469, as compared to EC$55,162,948 between1980-85. This demonstrates 





6.4.1.4 Export Unit Price for Nutmeg and Mace Received by the GCNA. 
The fifth aspect of analysis of the performance of the agreement is that of the export unit 
price received by the GCNA for nutmeg and mace during the period. 
Table 6.5 shows that in 1985, the GCNA received EC$1.35 per pound of nutmeg. It also 
shows that from 1986 to 1990, prices increased steadily to 1989 but declined in 1990. By 
1987, the price increased to EC$6.18, an increase of EC$5.83 or 431 per cent on the 
1985 price. Prices continued to increase but fluctuated to EC$6.96 in 1988. This 
represented an actual increase of EC$5.61 or 415 per cent. The price received in 1989 
declined by a meagre 0.2 cents on that of 1988 to EC$ 6.94. However, by 1990, the price 
had continued to decline to EC$5.76 per pound. Although this amounted to an increase on 
the 1985 base year, it was a decrease on the previous two years (1988-89) by EC$1.20 or 
17 per cent on the peak price in 1989, and EC$ 1.18 or 15 per cent decline on 1989. 
Finally, in 1991, the price fell to the lowest level since 1986: EC$3.11. This represented an 
actual decline of EC$3.85 or 55 per cent lower than the1988 price. 
With regards to mace, the price per pound increased from EC$7.93 in 1985 to EC$8.12 in 
1986. In 1987, the price per pound climbed significantly to EC$11.37, an increase of 
EC$3.25 or 43 per cent. In 1988 and 1989, the price continued its climb to EC$13.51 and 
EC$14.7, respectively, before it declined to EC$12.73 in 1990.  
Table 6.5 Export price per pound  received by GCNA for nutmeg 
and mace 1985 - 1990 
  Price Paid to GCNA Price Paid to GCNA 
 Year Nutmeg p/lb (EC$) Mace p/lb. (EC$) 
1985 1.35 7.93 
1986 2.23 8.12 
1987 6.18 11.37 
1988 6.96 13.51 
1989 6.94 14.7 
1990 5.76 12.73 
Source: Researcher, from data extracted from the GCNA, Financial Statement and 
Trading Summary, 1986-1990 
The  factors which were indicated above for affecting the production/delivery of products 
to the GCNA, which in turn led to increased supply onto the International market, had the 
negative impact on prices, as the quantity of supplies of such undifferentiated products 
increased, it triggered a decline in prices 
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The data show that there is a direct relationship between the international export price 
received by the GCNA and the transfers that went to the farmers, in terms of increased 
farm gate prices and bonuses. 
The above serves to explain the performance of the GCNA with regards to the export 
prices received by the GCNA during the period of the existence of the Joint Agreement.  
Overall, the objective of securing stable and high prices was achieved, but it was short-
lived as the market continued to fluctuate in prices, thus establishing the difficulty of 
attempting to find an alternative sustainable mechanism for the imposition of a price fixing 
mechanisms in the nutmeg market. 
GCNA had an interesting position in the GVC, as it stood between the farmers who were 
at the start of the external nodes in the GVC, as a consequence, the GCNA can be 
described as the controller in the production node since the price they passed on to the 
farmers affected the volume of nutmegs delivered by the farmers. 
 
6.4.2 Impact of the Revenue Earning on the Internal Profitability of the GCNA 
While the gross revenue of the GCNA fluctuated, so too did its internal financial 
performance (see Appendix 4).  A review of the profitability of the GCNA showed the 
following, with respect to the gross and net profit margins. The gross profit is defined as 
the excess in sales over the cost to produce and/or sales multiplied by 100. Hence in 
1988, the gross profit margin was 72 per cent. In 1989 it declined to 51 per cent.  This 
performance could have been attributed to the declining gross income received by the 
GCNA from export sales (see table 6.6), and the increase in the cost of produce from the 
farmers, as well as the increasing provision which had to be made for the unsalable stock 
of nutmegs, which increased from zero in 1988 to EC$6,035,000 in 1989(see Appendix 4). 
This gross profit measure means that for every EC$1.00 of sales achieved, the gross 
profit margin was EC$0.72. 
In 1990, the gross profit margin experienced a slight increase to 52 per cent; this was due 
to the reduced cost of the produce from approximately EC$17.3 million in 1989 to 
EC$15.3 million in 1990. By the time of the collapse of the agreement in 1990, the gross 
profit margin suffered a dramatic decline of 5 per cent, as income declined to EC$12.0 
million from the previous year‘s income of EC$29 million (see Table 6.5). 
With regards to the net profit margin, the ratio is defined as the gross income divided by 
the trading surplus or loss, multiplied by 100. This net profit margin is generally perceived 
by some managers to be the most important financial measurement in determining the 
overall profitability of the business (Kepner & Wysocki (nd). 
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By 1988, the net profit margin of the GCNA was 61 per cent. This high margin mirrored 
the increase in income which amounted to EC$42.O million and a surplus of EC$26.0 
million. By 1989, this ratio declined to 32 per cent. This is in line with the decline in the 
gross income of EC$33.7 million, coupled with the decrease in the trading surplus from 
EC$26 million in 1988 to EC$10.8 million in 1989. By 1990, the net profit margin 
continued its decline from the previous year‘s margin of 32 per cent to 26 per cent. This 
was so as the gross income and trading surpluses continued to deteriorate.  During the 
financial trading year, the Association‘s net profit margin collapsed into negative trading. 
The ratio then was -36 per cent. One of the major contributing factors to this dismal 
performance was the loss of EC$5.1million experienced by the GCNA during that trading 
year. 
A reduced net profit margin indicated that the Association was operating on less or 
reduced cash and therefore not able to finance some of its operations from its own 
resources. While this was occurring, the Board of GCNA became very concerned about 
the declining revenue and the state of affairs of the organisation.  
The review of how the reduced earnings were impacting the narrative and dynamics at the 
GCNA Board level occurred at the meeting of the Board on 14 March, 1989, when 
Ferguson, sensing the need for information to be able to better understand the changes 
within ASPIN, and moreover to reduce the information symmetry of the Board, 
recommended that the Board seek an urgent meeting with Indonesia.  Further review of 
the minutes of the Board showed that up to this that there was no expressed concern 
about the state of the internal finances of the GCNA. 
 
6.4.2.1 Farm gate Prices Received by Farmers-1986-1991 
The fifth aspect of analysis of the performance of the agreement is that of the farm gate 
export unit price received by the GCNA for nutmeg and mace during the period 
It shows the pattern of farm gate prices received by the farmers and also helps explain to 
what extent the financial motivations of the GCNA stakeholders, in general, and of the 
GCNA   BoD in particular, were for participating in the Agreement. 
Table 6.6 shows the farm gate price paid to farmers under the Joint Marketing Agreement 
by the GCNA. It highlights the price increases which accompanied the agreement.  
Moreover, the table highlights the factors which were part of the cross-cutting issues that 
gave rise to the need for joint actions by GCNA and ASPIN. The evidence in the next 
chapter will show that whereas the low level of prices helped spur the attempt at forming 
the cartel, which was followed by dramatically higher prices, these very increases were a 
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major contributor to the eventual collapse of the attempt to form the cartel (Tirtawinata, 
1995). 
During the period (1986–1991), the farmers experienced dramatic increases in their farm 
gate prices, and the value passed on by the GCNA to them as compared to the previous 
five years (1980-1985). Table 6.6.shows that during the period the farm gate prices 
increased from an average price of EC$1.08 per pound in 1985 to an average of EC$3.12 
during the period 1986-1990. The increase represented an average actual increase of 
EC$2.03 or 186.2 per cent. This increase ensured that the farmers received additional 
amounts of money in their pockets, and ultimately into the economy. 
In 1986, the price per pound received by the farmers amounted to EC$2.02. In 1987, the 
price rose to EC$4.02, an increase of EC$2.00 or 99.01 per cent. This increase continued 
into 1988 to EC$4.12 –or 249-per cent increase. However, in 1989, the price began to fall, 
moving fromEC$4.12to EC$3.94, a decline of EC$0.18 cents from 1988, or 4.37 per cent. 
By 1990, the downward pressure in price continued to EC$3.04 or 23 per cent on the 
preceding year. .  
This downward pressure on prices caught the attention of the GCNA Board, prompting 
them to try to obtain marketing information for the first time since the signing of the MoU, 
this research has ascertained. It was within this context of declining international price 
which was passed on to the farmers, that Dr. Guido Marcel was accommodated to provide 
feedback on information he had gathered while on a business trip in the East, and 
Renwick was directed to obtain marketing information on the cause(s) for the decline in 
prices.  
The increased price received by farmers from 1986 to 1991 was indeed extraordinary, 
unique since the start of the export of nutmegs from Grenada in 1919. In fact, farmers 
came to expect that such increases would continue for much longer than they did. Socio-
economically, nutmeg gave an image of profits and wealth, particularly for those who had 
large acreage. Notwithstanding the consequences of this image, it also influenced many 
small farmers to return to their nutmeg holdings. Indeed, many had abandoned their plots 
due to low prices. The archival data show that the number of farmers during the cartel 
years increased from 6,097 in early 1980s to 6,787 in the early 1990s (GCNA, 2008). This 
numerical growth showed the socio-economic impact of the increased prices received by 
the farmers through the reactivation of non-active farmers, as well as its thrust in bringing 
new ones into the industry. Additionally, the price of nutmeg lands increased, as the 
demand for the price received by farmers increased (Interview with Robinson, 18 August, 
2014).   
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Table 6.6 GCNA‘s Farm Gate Prices Received by Farmers and Percentage Changes 










1985 1.08   
1986 2.02 0.94 87.0   
1987 4.02 2.00 99.0 
1988 4.12 0.10 2.5 
1989 3.94 -0.18 -4.4 
1990 3.04 - 90.0 -22.8 
Source: Researcher, from data extracted from the GCNA, Annual Financial Statement and 
Trading Summary, 1986-1990 
During the period under review, the financial benefits received by farmers-stakeholders 
fluctuated. The most positive impact of the attempt at forming the cartel was through the 
pricing mechanism of the GCNA, which allowed them to pass on a significant portion of 
the value they received from the export market to their primary stakeholders, the farmers. 
The financial benefits received also had psychological impact on the Grenadian economy, 
as more farmers were drawn back to primary agriculture in general as a means to secure 
their families‘ livelihood (Interview with Brizan, 20 May, 2006). 
 
6.4.2.2 Total Advance and Bonus Payments to Farmers by the GCNA, 1986-1990 
The total advanced payments paid to the farmers during the period amounted to 
EC$87,359,211. Table 6.8 shows that in 1985, the GCNA Advanced Payments paid 
farmers approximately EC$4, 673, 414 million. However, by the end of the 1986 financial 
year, payments amounted to EC$8.242,493, or 76-per cent increase from1985. As total 
revenue of the GCNA increased, the benefits were passed on to the farmers, and 
therefore as total revenue reached its peak years (1987-1990), so too did the advanced 
payments (see table 6.7). The period 1986-1989 witnessed a significant increase of 121 
per cent. However, the advanced payments declined from 1989 to 1990, as total revenue 






6.4.2.3 Bonus Payments Received by GCNA Farmers 
The sixth aspect of analysis of the performance of the agreement is that of the bonus 
payments received by the GCNA for nutmeg and mace during the life of the agreement. 
This section serves to explain/ compare the impact of the bonuses received by GCNA 
farmers five years prior to, and following, the Joint Marketing Agreement. 
One of the key rationales for establishing the GCNA was to: ―[Bestow]upon producers 
some share of the profits of the export trade which is at present handled by middle-men,‖ 
(Nutmeg Industry Ordinance, 1947) As indicated before, the GCNA payment system 
allows for the payment of an annual bonus, which is based on profits obtained by the 
GCNA. This excess is then distributed among farmers on the basis of the quantity of 
nutmegs sold to the GCNA during that given nutmeg year (Section 64, Nutmeg Industry 
Ordinance, 1947).  
With regards to bonus payments received by the farmers, the effects were equally felt as 
was the case with advanced payments, at the producers‘ end of the GVC. During the 
period-1980-1985, the GCNA paid the farmers approximately EC$10.3 million. The 
membership was approximately 6,766 farmers, who sold nutmeg and mace during the 
bonus years (GCNA, 2008). As a consequence, farmers received an average amount of 
EC$152,264.00 per farmer.  
With regards to the period 1986–1990, bonus payments received by the nutmeg farmers 
amounted to EC$51million or an annual average of EC$8.5 million by 1990, the year that 
the agreement collapsed and the active membership of the GCNA stood at 6,835 (GCNA). 
This increase in membership can be attributed to the fact that nutmeg farmers were 
experiencing price hikes for their produce, and the increased price provided the incentive 
to those farmers who owned nutmeg lands but were not harvesting, due to the then low 
prices, to resume harvesting and delivering to the GCNA. The average bonus payments 
received per farmer during the period amounted to EC$746,159 or an increase of 390 per 
cent, on the previous five years. The following figure highlights the bonus benefits which 
were derived by farmers during the period under review. In 1985 the bonus/surplus 
payments received by farmers amounted to EC$2.0 million. In 1986, the year in which the 
agreement was signed, the bonus payment increased to EC$5 million, representing an 
increase of EC$3 million or an increase of 150 per cent. 
By 1987, the bonus payment increased further to EC$15.0 million. This upward trend in 
bonus payments continued into 1988, when EC$16.0 million were paid out to farmers. 
However, by 1989, the farmers started to experience declining bonus payments in line 
with the decrease in export earnings received by the GCNA. In that year, payments 
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declined to EC$10 million, thus representing a decline of EC$6 million on the previous 
year‘s payment. By 1990, concomitant with the decline in revenue, bonus payments 
declined to EC$5 million. The above narrative has demonstrated that one of the key 
objectives of the GCNA, that of providing increased income to the farmer, was realised, 
when compared to the period leading up to the signing of the Agreement. The financial 
objective is also intertwined with the political objectives of some persons on the GCNA 
Board, particularly James, who hoped to use the success of the agreement as further 
political capital to increase his popularity and acceptance as a candidate in the 1990 
general election. 
Table 6.7 Advance and Bonus Payments paid to Farmers 1985 – 1991 
Years  Advance Payments Made 
to Farmers (EC$) 
Bonus Payments to 
Farmers (EC$) 
1985 4,673,414  
1986 8,242,493 5,000,000 
1987 14,341,376 15,000,000 
1988 14,786,894 16,000,000 
1989 18,157,970 10,000,000 
1990 16,869,762 5,000,000 
Source: Researcher, from data extracted from the GCNA, Annual Financial Statement and 
Trading Summary, 1986-1990 
 
6.4.2.4 Percentage Share of Export Prices Shared between the GCNA and its 
Membership, 1985 –1990 
The seventh aspect of analysis of the performance of the agreement is that of the share of 
the export prices received and shared between the GCNA and the farmers, during the 
period. With regards to the impact on the revenue received by the farmers during the 
period of the cartel, Table 6.8 shows that the farmers received between 52.8 and 90.6 per 
cent of the export prices which the GCNA received for nutmeg, and between 61.5 and 
87.2 per cent for mace. Hence, overall, the farmers were the leading direct beneficiaries of 
the increase in prices, which the GCNA received as a result of entering into the cartel-like 
agreement with ASPIN. The share of the revenue received by the farmers was not 
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surprising because the retention of more of the income earned from nutmeg by farmers-
stakeholders was a key objective for the formation of the GCNA type co-operative. 
Table 6.8 serves to collate, highlight and summarise the direct financial benefits which 
occurred to the farmers (primary stakeholders) during the period. It showed that overall 
the farmers were the main beneficiaries of the price increases, which accompanied the 
Joint Marketing Agreement between the GCNA and ASPIN. It also showed that a 
significant percentage of the export prices received by the GCNA were paid out to its 
membership through advanced and bonus payments. This, in turn, led to an increase in 
the number of farmers returning to harvesting their nutmeg plots, or new ones engaging in 
the leasing of abandoned plots (Interview with Logie, April5, 2015). This modus operandi 
of the GCNA would impair its longer-term financial performance and almost cause its 
financial bankruptcy, when the Joint Marketing Agreement finally collapsed in 1990. 






























1985 1.35 1.08 80.0 7.93 5.25 66.2 
1986 2.23 2.02 90.6 8.12 7.08 87.2 
1987 6.18 4.02 65.0 11.37 9.20 80.9 
1988 6.96 4.12 59.2 13.51 9.10 67.4 
1989 6.94 3.94 56.8 14.70 9.04 61.5 
1990 5.76 3.04 52.8 12.73 7.62 59.9 
Source: Researcher, from data extracted from the GCNA, Annual Financial Statement and 
Trading Summary, 1986-1990 
The benefits which occurred to the farmers are in keeping with the literature on 
stakeholders and their salience, given their stake within the GCNA, which indicates that 
members of the firm who are the primary stakeholders ought to be the main beneficiaries 
of the performance/outcome of their organisation. As such, the benefits so derived further 
serves to reaffirm the view that managers manage for the benefit of their stakeholders, 
given the stakeholder orientation of the firm. However, this research has found that a 
focus on short-term performance could seriously impair the longer-term performance of 
the GCNA, since as income surged with the accompanying high pay-offs to farmers with 
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little or no retained earnings, the GCNA became technically bankrupt (Interview with . 
Brizan 25 July, 2006), this latter point will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
 
6.4.3 Macro Level Performance Measure- Export Performance of Nutmeg Compared to 
the Other Major Export Commodities (Bananas and Cocoa) 
This section is useful since the GCNA‘s participation in the ASPIN-GCNA Joint Marketing 
Agreement was partly presented as an initiative to earn greater returns to farmers, as well 
as to improve the island trade performance from the single most important export 
commodity from Grenada at the time. Chapter 2 detailed the GDP and highlighted the 
importance of agriculture and nutmeg in the performance of the Agriculture Sector in 
particular, and the national economy in general. One of the elements of the GCNA‘s 
performance which is deemed useful in the analysis is to compare the trading and income 
impact of nutmegs to cocoa and bananas, the other two major/leading agricultural export 
crops in the Grenadian economy. Chapter 5 provided evidence of the fluctuating but 
generally declining trend of the export price of nutmeg and of the other major agricultural 
export crops.  However, this section examines the performance of those commodities 
when compared to the nutmeg trade during the period of the agreement, in order to 
demonstrate the short-term income impact of the GCNA. This analysis is important, since 
as indicated before, cocoa and bananas were part of other international agreements (in 
the case of cocoa, Grenada was part of the International Cocoa Agreement, while 
bananas were part of the special EU Banana Regime Trading  Protection Agreement) and 
nutmeg was the only major export commodity for which there was no special international 
agreement.  
 
6.5 Talk and Text on the Operations and Performance of the GCNA and ASPIN Business 
Relationship,  
The above study has shown that the first two/three years of the business relationship 
between GCNA and ASPIN worked well financially, with the primary objective for the 
stakeholders of the proposed cartel being met. However, the relationship came under 
external pressure from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (IMF and WB) 
during the structural reform program undertaken by the Indonesian Government. 
While the GCNA was mainly focused on the price movements on the international market, 
they were unaware of the developments which were occurring with the nutmeg trade in 
Indonesia developments that would lead ASPIN to change its sales policy, thus affecting 
the operations, performance and duration of their effort at cartelisation. It is this interplay 
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between the actions of external stakeholders and the primary stakeholders (producers) of 
the global nutmeg trade that attention is now turned to. 
 According to Soesastro (1989), the 1980s was the period of deregulation in Indonesia, a 
time when such measures were undertaken as part of a wider effort towards structural 
economic reform. This structural reform was part of Indonesia‘s policy response to the oil 
crisis, and the need to reduce the country‘s dependency on revenue from the export of oil. 
The 1980s were marred by the influence of liberal free-market thinking among 
international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, which developed a package of 
liberal economic views that became known as the Washington Consensus. As Indonesia 
contemplated making the reforms dictated by the oil crisis, the liberals within the 
Indonesian Government began to influence their President to liberalise the commodities 
market (Soesastro, 1989).   
As a consequence, in May 1988, a package of measures aimed at deregulating the 
financial and shipping sectors of the Indonesian economy was launched. This led, inter 
alia, to the ending of the ―Plastics monopoly‖ (Soesastro, 1989).  According to Soesastro 
(1989), the performance of the non-oil exports was encouraging and seen as a sign of 
successful deregulation policies, and as such, the full deregulation of the Indonesian 
market was only a matter of time. However, this full deregulation of the nutmeg market 
which took effect in May, 1990, started in 1989 with ASPIN announcing changes to its 
sales policy.  
The deregulation of the Indonesian market impacted the operations and performance of 
the GCNA and also laid the basis for the collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing 
Agreement. In fact, this demise started on February 2, 1989, with the announcement that 
ASPIN would from then on change its export and sales agreement from a sole 
buyer/exporter to open bidding by other licensed firms. The implication of such a 
statement meant that Catz was no longer going to be the sole export buyer of ASPIN‘s 
nutmeg, and therefore the export market for ASPIN‘s nutmeg would now open to 
competition -- a fact that GCNA did not take lightly. This factor will be further detailed in 
chapter 7. 
According to Moermon (Interview, October 20, 2009), by 1989 ASPIN was coming under 
immense pressure from other ―would-be exporters‖ who felt that Catz International held an 
unfair monopolistic position on the Indonesian Nutmeg Market, and as a consequence, 
there was a need to provide a fair basis for the sale of nutmeg from Indonesia. The 
political policy demanded the liberalisation of the commodity sector and fed into that 
nutmeg narrative, i.e. to end the buyer (Catz) monopoly of the export trade in nutmeg. 
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According to Tirtawinata (1992), by the time ASPIN changed its sales policy, there were 
155 requests for exporters‘ licences waiting approval. 
Additionally, the operations and performance of the agreement was affected by the 
increase in the parallel exports via Indonesia, which in fact occurred throughout the 
existence of the agreement (Tirtawinata, 1992).  According to Tirtawinata, (1992) between 
1986 and 1990 re-export of nutmeg from Singapore increased from 2,262 to 7,672 metric 
tons, while Indonesia‘s direct exports increased from 4,734 to 6,391 metric tons 
(Tirtawinata, 1992). These uncontrollable (Non-ASPIN) sales of nutmegs impaired the 
performance of the GCNA and its effort at extending the efforts to form a cartel. In fact, at 
the GCNA Board Meeting of June, 1989, the then manager reported that the smuggling of 
nutmeg from Indonesia was negatively affecting the market, as well as the actions of Catz 
(see chapter 7 for further details).  
In addition to the changes which were introduced by ASPIN, such as moving from a single 
exporter to tender bidding, there was another event that characterised this period: the 
resignation of Charles Sutjiawan, the Marketing Manager of ASPIN. Sutjiawan was a 
major exporter of nutmeg from Indonesia and a key advocate of the cartel. He was one of 
Indonesia‘s signatories to the MoU and the Joint Marketing Agreement between GCNA 
and ASPIN. His departure was interpreted by the GCNA as a sign of the tensions within 
ASPIN; that is to say, between those who were advocating a strengthening of the 
regulation of nutmeg export and those desirous of reverting to the pre-ASPIN era. His 
resignation, therefore, represented a loss of a key partner to the GCNA and the 
furtherance of the agreement. 
Externally it was felt by many, including the GCNA delegation to Jakarta in July 1991.  
Increasing pressure by the IMF and World Bank to liberalise the commodity organisations 
in Indonesia, as a condition for financial assistance for the necessary macroeconomic 
structural adjustment and stabilisation in Indonesia led to the changes in ASPIN, which 
meant that the Indonesian nutmeg trade would revert to what it used to be prior to the 
coming into existence of ASPIN (see chapter 7 for further details).  
GCNA received information that ASPIN decided to reduce the price of nutmeg below that 
in the Agreement in effect bringing it to an end. According to Tirtawinata (1992, p. 32),  
―Indonesia was experiencing slow sales at high prices, 
accumulating stocks, and increased smuggling both by 
unauthorized traders and members of ASPIN, and therefore 
if ASPIN members wanted the trade to move again, even at 
a loss and create the ability to purchase new stock at lower 
prices, then it had to make the decision to lower prices by a 




6.5.1 GCNA‘s Response to ASPIN‘s Decision 
The GCNA‘s response to the above policy changes was a mixture of nutmeg diplomacy 
and internal policy initiatives: meetings with Indonesian exporters; a reduction in farm gate 
prices to Grenadian farmers; and renewed consideration for the establishment of a 
nutmeg oil distillation plant in Grenada. Additionally, the GCNA at its meeting on March14, 
1989, decided to intensify its interactions with ASPIN by formally requesting a meeting in 
order to discuss the declining international prices and to reaffirm their commitment to the 
―Joint GCNA-ASPIN Agreement‖, i.e., the attempts at cartelization. 
As an attempt by the GCNA to gain more information and a better understanding of the 
events affecting the global nutmeg market, decided at its March 28, 1989 Board meeting, 
to accommodate a presentation by Dr. Guido Micelle, a bio-chemist and General Manager 
of the Grenada Produce Chemist Laboratory. He had attended the International Spice 
Meeting in Singapore and gathered certain information regarding the GCNA-ASPIN 
Agreement and other matters which he reported to the Board:  
1. ―That the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement was shaky;‖ 
2. ―There is a favourable market for Grenadian nutmeg, 
especially in Switzerland;‖ 
3. ―The European Economic Community (EEC), American 
Spice Traders Association (ASTA) and Japan are writing 
stricter rules for the importation of spices;‖ and 
4. ―The question of Mycotoxin in defective nutmegs was 
again raising its ugly head.‖ 
This presentation was part of the GCNA's response to ASPIN‘s action. The situation in 
this period was quite complex what with the declining price of nutmegs, the need to 
increase and maintain high prices and ASPIN‘s decision to reduce its price and change its 
marketing relationship with Catz International, creating much difficulties for those having 
to take decisions on the current state and future of the agreement.  
The GCNA Board meeting of April 10, 1989 reported that the offer to meet in Grenada 
was rejected by ASPIN, and instead they proposed meeting in Jakarta. This was the 
dyadic stage of the failure of the relationship, as the communication between the two 
parties intensified, while they both assessed their own situation and made decisions. 
Additionally, other stakeholders such as the Government of Grenada, Catz International 
and Rucker & Slann (UK based GCNA Nutmeg Broker)   were now getting into 
discussions.  
At this stage, the GCNA decided to embark on measures aimed at restoring the 
agreement. This phase intensified when the GCNA Board of Directors on March19, 1989 
agreed to send a two-member delegation to Jakarta, if ASPIN insisted that they were not 
coming to Grenada.  
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On April 19, ASPIN responded (telex of 20/04/1989), agreeing to the meeting but 
proposing that the date of the meeting be changed from May 25 to June15. The GCNA 
Board rejected this offer and insisted on their prior date. In response to GCNA‘s rejection, 
ASPIN counter-proposed by suggesting that the meeting take place in New York. After 
much discussion, the GCNA finally agreed to the date of June15. The two parties finally 
agreed that the meeting would take place on June17 in Jakarta. As a consequence, the 
GCNA confirmed their representatives to the meeting: the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors (Norris James, and the Secretary/CEO Renwick). This decision marked the end 
of a period of uncertainty and anxiety, which existed within the GCNA, as it related to the 
meeting which it hoped, would save the agreement. With the decision to meet, the Board 
hoped that the situation would improve; in other words, that ASPIN would agree to return 
to the status quo, by agreeing to implement the provisions of the Joint Marketing 
Agreement.  
The GCNA remained committed to the pursuance of this agreement, by expanding the 
communication network. However, what GCNA failed to realise was that whereas they 
could deem the agreement to be legal, it was not enforceable by any third party, since 
such agreements are deemed illegal especially in the U.S, except in Germany where the 
courts ruled that cartel contracts are enforceable (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006.) 
On May 25, 1990, the GCNA received a telex from ASPIN informing them that ASPIN 
would cease to exist, following the removal of export restrictions by the Indonesian 
Government.  
Therefore, despite the efforts of the GCNA to persevere with efforts to maintain the 
agreement, its chairman had to finally announce that ―the three–year old nutmeg pact 
signed between the island and it‘s major nutmeg producing partner, Indonesia, has 
virtually collapsed,‖ (Grenada Today, June 22, 1990,p.13.)   
The above response by the GCNA highlighted its lack of capacity to address the 
deteriorating nutmeg market condition which was partially due to information symmetry 
between themselves and the rest of the stakeholders in the GVC, politically driven motives 
by some individual stakeholders on the GCNA Board and a lack of international business 
experience. They were certainly holding on to a perception of the existence of an 
agreement for which there was no reality. 
 
6.6. Chapter Summary and conclusion 
This chapter studied how the interventions of other parties (external stakeholders) impact 
the creation, performance and the eventual collapse of the Marketing Agreement? with 
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specific reference to the GCNA. It covered the period from the signing of the MoU in 1986 
to the official announcement by the chairman of the GCNA, and receipt of confirmation 
from ASPIN, that the agreement had collapsed in May 1990.  
The implementation of the Agreement was guided by the MoU and the MoA, as well as 
the legal structures of the business concerns: GCNA, ASPIN. Whereas the agreements 
provided for some of the general features of cartels, such as the restriction of supply and 
the setting of collusive pricing, but it lacked  details regarding key operational structures 
and procedures, thus rendering it weak and in some cases inoperative and porous to 
challenges from the core  members of the agreement, as well as from parallel exporters. 
Other than instituting the quota and pricing system in articles 2 and 3 of the agreement, 
the effectiveness of the operations of the agreement was hindered by the absence of 
certain regulatory features such as a body of laws/regulations , as obtained in the GCNA 
Ordinance of 1947, structures, organisation and control. The agreement did not establish 
a single entity for its management, so that when issues that threatened its continuity 
started emerging, there was no joint mechanism through which these issues could be 
addressed.  
Additionally, there were operational challenges specific to the local markets of the islands. 
GCNA was obligated to purchase and sell all nutmegs and mace produced by its 
stakeholder-farmers; whereas ASPIN, an association of Indonesian nutmeg exporters, 
had no such obligation to its exporters and in fact ―controlled‖ only about 25 per cent of 
the Indonesian exporters market that was itself plagued by parallel exporters -- a problem 
neither ASPIN nor the Government of Indonesia could control for sheer lack of critical 
mass, reach and influence.  
The performance of the GCNA, and by extension the agreement, was analysed using five 
main criteria. First of all, using the objectives of the cartel, as reflected in its quota and 
pricing elements as contained in the articles of the agreements, it was found that the 
global demand for nutmeg was elastic in response to the price increase under the 
Marketing Agreement. The Agreement was also undermined by parallel exporters and 
suppliers from other parts of the world. The failure of the Agreement to establish new and 
joint institutions including appropriate structures led to the ASPIN‘s inability to control the 
flow of nutmeg from Indonesia, thus leading to excess supply of nutmeg on the 
international market and a reduction in price, which in turn affected price and, eventually, 
the profitability of the GCNA. 
The second group of criteria was that of the export trade of GCNA, including export prices 
received by the GCNA and the distribution of such earnings to the farmers. The evidence 
suggests that whereas the agreement sought to establish the two participants as price 
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makers, they were in fact price takers as they lacked the power/driveness in the GVC to 
exert control over the demand for and price of nutmeg; Catz and other major exporters 
exerted some of that influence. The evidence further shows that as prices declined, there 
were no significant changes in demand, and as such suggested low elasticity of demand 
for nutmegs in response to price reduction. The evidence suggests that Grenadian 
nutmeg farmers benefitted significantly from the immediate increase in prices which 
accompanied the coming into force of the agreement; as parts of the increases in the 
export prices were passed on to the farmers. However, the price increase was of short 
duration because of the combination of global demand and supply conditions.  
A reflective summary of the GCNA Auditors Report on the Statement of Trading for the 
nutmeg year 1988 captured the early impact of the GCNA‘s performance when it 
concluded inter alia that ―the Marketing Co-operation Agreement between the Association 
and the Indonesian Nutmeg Exporters Association (ASPIN) continued to function to the 
benefit of the farmers of both producing countries and market demand continued healthy 
with prices showing further increases.‖ (GCNA Financial Statement and Trading 
Summary, 1988, p.19) 
The third criterion was the duration of the agreement. This is deemed by some experts as 
a key tool in assessing the performance of such agreement. The evidence suggests that 
the attempts at forming the cartel were short-lived (officially by the GCNA is 2.8 years, 
1987-1990), however this case found evidence where the existence can be set as 3.8 
years which started with the signing of the MoU in 1986, since the prices started 
increasing from that point to the official notification of the end of ASPIN‘s license on 25 
May 1990, but with one major episode during that period – changes in ASPIN‘s Sales 
Policy in 1989),  compared with other international commodity agreements and cartels, it 
had a lower-than-average life span. The evidence further shows that the duration itself 
was affected by the absence of the conditions deemed necessary for the formation and 
operationalisation of cartels such as adherence to the agreement, barriers to entry, 
product homogeneity and size of buyers. 
The fourth criterion employed was an analysis of the internal financial operations of the 
GCNA during the cartel period. Primary stakeholders, both of the GCNA (farmers and 
Board of Directors) and ASPIN (exporters), viewed the cartel-like agreements as a means 
to control the supply of the primary nutmeg commodities market by limiting supply and 
increasing prices, which would lead to an improvement in the financial performance of 
their operations overtime, and particularly so in the case of the GCNA. The evidence from 
the series of income analysis shows that the immediate price increase indeed had a 
positive impact on the GCNA and the farmers, but that was short-lived. Additionally, the 
sudden collapse in prices in 1990, due to market glut, led to the technical bankruptcy of 
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the GCNA, which incurred losses and could not meet its financial obligations to 
stakeholders by way of bonus payments.  
An accompanying issue that arises in this study is the absence of counter factual 
evidence, i.e. whether the GCNA could not have achieved a similar level of financial 
performance in the absence of such an agreement. Since the collapse of the latter, there 
was a period (2007-2010) when the global price for nutmeg increased beyond that 
obtained by the cartel (see chapter 7). This is an area for future research so as to assess 
the cartel period with that new period in order to identify the causes/reasons for the 
difference and, as such, establish the necessity or otherwise to ―re-cartelise‖ the global 
nutmeg trade. 
Fifth, the role of known external stakeholders, such as Catz and the IMF, impacted the 
performance of the agreement. The evidence suggests that whereas Catz was a 
significant global trader in nutmeg and held a strategic monopolist position in the GCNA=-
ASPIN export trade, both the GCNA and ASPIN over emphasised Catz‘s role as a global 
monopolist, or allowed itself so to believe thanks to the effective economic and social 
evangelism of Catz; and by information asymmetry which clouded the GCNA‘s capacity to 
make appropriate decisions. In fact, more recent research has shown that Catz was a 
number-three player at the time with control of only of seven per cent of the global nutmeg 
trade with other players: Man Producten, 20 per cent and King Spice, 26 per cent (Marks 
and Pomeroy, 1995). With regards to the role of the IMF/World Bank, the evidence 
suggests that the requirement for deregulation of the Indonesian Commodity Board, in 
exchange for the IMF funded program, was a key factor in determining the duration of the 
Cartel. 
The evidence from the talk and text of the archives suggests that the lack of international 
business experience, naivety and political ambitions on the part of the GCNA Board, the 
asymmetry of information which existed between the GCNA and ASPIN combined to 
negatively impact on the operations and performance of the agreement. Also, the lack of 
interaction between the GCNA, ASPIN and Catz International highlighted a 
communication void during the period which influenced the knowledge base of the GCNA 
in particular, leaving them operating with an information deficit during the period and thus 
affecting the performance and duration of the attempt at cartelisation. 
From a short-term perspective, overall, the agreement generated revenue of 
$165,152,469 during the period of its existence, as compared to EC$55,162,948 between 
1980-85. This demonstrates the positive revenue impact which the agreement had on the 
GCNA. However, the key objective of securing stable and high prices was short-lived as 
the market continued to fluctuate in prices, thus establishing the difficulty of attempting to 
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find an alternative sustainable mechanism for the imposition of price-fixing mechanisms in 
the nutmeg market. Indeed, the overall operations and performance of the agreement. 
The deregulation of the Indonesian market, pushed by the IMF and the World Bank, 
created the conditions for the further dismantling of the dreams of the primary 
stakeholders who were partners in the joint marketing agreement which attempted to form 
the world‘s first nutmeg cartel. The GCNA would end up in virtual bankruptcy (see 
Appendix 4), especially as they were unable to sell their administrative and economic 
model to ASPIN. Although arguably GCNA had the best nutmeg in the world and the most 
eco-friendly practices in the treatment and preparation of the nutmegs, the association 
was unable to use these assets to help establish a viable agreement let alone a cartel. 
This research has identified the fact that the performance of the GCNA during the period 
of the agreement failed because the conditions necessary for the creation of an effective 
cartel was absent: ASPIN lacked control of the Indonesian supply chain, the demand for 
nutmeg appeared to be elastic in response to price increases, the barriers to entry were 
very low, the trade from Indonesia was not well organised, the level of market 
concentration was high but not high enough to exert the influence on the market which 
they thought they had, the wholesalers and retailers buyers/agents and the processors in 
the GVC were the ones who exerted the greatest control of the marketing and distribution 
end of the GVC and, therefore, the Joint Marketing Arrangement was driven by these 
nodes and not the producers. 
In addition to the benefits received to the GCNA and its membership, nutmeg also 
outperformed the other traded commodities in terms of export earnings and increased 
contribution to the national foreign exchange reserves.  
To have kept the impact of the performance of the agreement within the confines of the 
GCNA and its stakeholders did not provide sufficient evidence of the overall results and 
hence performance of the GCNA during the period. And it is for that reason that the 
national economy was introduced into the discourse. 
The income and trading performance of the GCNA during the period, provides further 
evidence of the high elasticity of demand for nutmeg during the period in response to high 
increases. The high level of elasticity is not a conducive condition for a cartel and entry 
barriers were low. As a consequence, the GCNA and ASPIN achieved the short-term 
successes with their attempt at cartelisation. Some of these conditions which affected the 
performance of the agreement will be further detailed in Chapter 7, in order to 
demonstrate how they directly affected the collapse of the ASPIN-GCNA Joint Marketing 





Chapter 7 - Analysis of the Collapse of the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to explain the factors which contributed to the collapse of 
the ASPIN-GCNA Joint Marketing Agreement, formulated to operate as a cartel, gives an 
account of the GCNA Board of Directors‘ efforts to change ASPIN‘s decision to end the 
agreement, and provides insights into why it made these efforts. This chapter therefore 
answers the research question: Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA 
Board persist in trying to keep the Agreement going when it started failing? 
Section 7.2 covers the classical factors influencing the collapse of the agreement as they 
apply in this case. Section 7.3 outlines the role of external stakeholders in the failure of 
the Agreement. Section 7.4 provides an account of the dissolution process of the 
Agreement. Finally section 7.5 presents the chapter summary and conclusions. 
 
7.2 The classical factors contributing to the collapse of the Agreement  
The literature review identified some key conditions required for the durability of 
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) and cartels (see  Chapter 5). Some of these 
factors were referred to earlier because of its relevance to the formation (chapter 5) and 
performance (chapter 6) of the Agreement. This chapter focuses on these factors and 
interdependence between them as they relate to the collapse of the Agreement. The 
factors are: 
1. High market concentration and market features facilitating coordination between the 
major firms (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Utton, 2011). 
2. Substantial entry barriers preventing expansion of supply by entrants into the market 
(Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Utton, 2011). 
3. Participants‘ compliance with the agreement and the absence of cheating (Levenstein 
and Suslow, 2006; Utton, 2011; Marshall and Mark, 2012; Kooroshy, Preston and 
Bradley, 2014). 
4. Existence of an organisational structure, and processes for effective management and 
communication. (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Utton 2011). 
5. Relevance of an economy‘s reliance on a single export commodity and the political 
and legal context. (Marshall and Mark, 2012). 
At the time of negotiating the GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement, both GCNA and 
ASPIN perceived that the necessary conditions required for the success of the cartel were 
either in existence or achievable. However, the two parties‘ perspectives, perceptions and 
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the ability to fulfil their parts of the Agreement differed. The following discussion 
demonstrates that most of the conditions required for the success of the Agreement were 
either absent, extremely weak or deficient. Further some of these factors are interrelated 
and had cumulative effects (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006), resulting in weak functioning 
of the Agreement and its eventual collapse.These conditions are as follows: 
 
7.2.1 Market features, concentration and coordination 
The characteristics of the market represent a key condition for cartel success. It refers to 
the structure of the market in terms of the numbers and sizes of buyers, sellers and other 
actors, as well as the product homogeneity (the extent to which the products are similar) 
and substitutability (the extent to which other or similar products can replace the existing 
one). Each of these forms sub-sections to this major topic. 
According to Grossman (2006 citing Dick (1996) through empirical evidence, and Stigler 
(1964) through theory, cartels have greater chance of success with few large buyers than 
with many small ones. With fewer buyers, their individual buying power would be greater 
and thus be able to influence prices more than if the opposite was true.  
According to Levenstein and Suslow (2006), virtually all studies of market collusion 
examine the influence of the number of firms and market concentration, on their formation 
and success. It was found that a low number of firms and high concentration are 
―consistently and positively related to collusion success‖ (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006, 
p.34). Other studies have shown that cartel duration is negatively related to the number of 
firms in a cartel. The cartel literature indicates that the smaller the number of firms in the 
cartel, the easier it is to control supply and keep the cost  of monitoring low, thus 
enhancing cartel success and longevity (Hay and Kelly, 1976; Eckbo,1976). 
The international supply of nutmeg and mace was dominated by producers in Indonesia 
and Grenada, which between them supplied 90 per cent of the world‘s nutmeg and mace. 
In principle, the market structure comprising of two major supplier firms should have made 
the control of supplies, communication and monitoring of the agreement easier and less 
costly. In practice the conditions for such control did not exist. Whereas, the GCNA had 
monopsony control of Grenadian supply, ASPIN controlled only about 25 per cent of 
Indonesia‘s international supply.  
GCNA sales were heavily concentrated in Europe. A heavy percentage of GCNA sales, 
approximately 75 to 80 per cent, went to Europe, mainly Germany, Holland, United 
Kingdom and Belgium (GCNA Trading and Summary Reports 1980 – 1990; interview with 
Mr Lord, 19 March 2015), while ASPIN sales was heavily concentrated in the United 
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Sates (60 per cent), but also held significant market share in some European countries 
namely, France, as well as the far eastern countries such as Japan and China 
(Tirtawinata, 1995). There was no evidence of coordination of supply between GCNA and 
ASPIN other than an agreement on their quotas which were poorly complied, as noted in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  Further, the parallel suppliers from Indonesia and other countries, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Malaysia according to Daniel 
(1994) - see table 6.2.   
The case of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement indicated that while the small 
number of firms in agreement would be conducive to easy joint decision-making and 
coordination, the actual coordination was very limited, restricted to agreed supply quotas. 
Further the actual concentration of supply was low because of the low proportion of 
Indonesian supply controlled by ASPIN. Further, the high price of nutmeg and mace 
during the early stages of the Agreement brought in increased supplies because of low 
entry barriers against non-Agreement suppliers. These aspects are considered further 
below. 
 
An important question which arises from section 7.2.1 is why the GCNA and ASPIN 
entered the Agreement while the conditions for its success were so unpromising. One 
reason is the role of the nutmeg buyer who acted as the intermediary in the Agreement. 
The nutmeg global value chain (see chapter 2, figure 2.2) shows the number of nodes in 
the chain and the key players. As far as the GCNA was concerned, the evidence shows 
that its control and direct interaction with the market was via its buying/sales agents who 
were resellers of the bulk commodity.  
The GCNA had three major markets: Europe, Canada, and the United States. In Europe 
there were three major buyers: Catz International which bought approximately 50 per cent 
of its nutmeg per year; Man Producten; and Rucker & Slann. In Canada, the GCNA was 
represented by Salford Lewis, while in the US they had no permanent representative. US 
sales were done through the agent in Canada or directly from the GCNA head offices in 
Grenada.  
GCNA‘s supplier chain structure meant that the organisation had limited options through 
which to sell its products, and was therefore in a disadvantageous bargaining position with 
the buyers. The significant reliance on one major buyer (Catz International) to purchase 
half of the supplies is both good and debilitating. On the one hand, half of GCNA‘s annual 
sales was secured, while on the other hand this volume of purchase gave Catz much 
psychological and economic leverage over GCNA‘s sales and pricing policy, thus allowing 
marginal scope for GCNA to openly leverage the unique quality of its produce in its 
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marketing.  Catz also became a central player in the formation of the Agreement as the 
following account shows.  
Catz was appointed the sole buyer of ASPIN‘s nutmeg at the latter‘s inception in 1985 
This meant that while ASPIN had a secure buyer for all its nutmeg, Catz could have 
exerted pricing and purchasing influence on ASPIN as it was doing with the GCNA. For 
the Agreement to succeed, a necessary condition was that ASPIN should rapidly become 
the sole buyer of all nutmeg produced in Indonesia or at the very least a buyer of a very 
high proportion of Indonesia nutmeg. It was also in the strong interest of Catz International 
that this happened. Catz International also envisaged that its role in the creation of ASPIN 
and formation of the GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement would put it in a strong if not 
dominant position for nutmeg and mace in the international market. 
Therefore, if the Agreement had succeeded there would have been benefits for GCNA, 
ASPIN, Catz International, and by implication the nutmeg producing farmers in Grenada 
and Indonesia. However, arguably, GCNA‘s and ASPIN‘s position in the global value 
chain would have been weaker with Catz International being the sole or dominant buyer. 
 The end of the Agreement resulted in financial losses and other adverse effects for all 
three parties. In the short term, the financial losses of each party were related to the 
stocks they held and nutmeg purchased at high prices when the prices fell. In the longer 
term they suffered from price volatility, loss of shares of the respective markets and 
reputational damage.     
As far as the GCNA Board was concerned, the real problem faced by the Agreement was 
the multiple exporters from Indonesia, who sold below the market price agreed upon 
between the GCNA and ASPIN (Daniel,1994), At its meeting on 19 October 1991 (after 
the end of the Agreement), the GCNA concluded that: ―The Indonesian nutmeg exporters 
must be encouraged to achieve the objective of a single selling channel which would 
guarantee greater control of the sale of material originating from Indonesia‖(Minutes of 
GCNA Board of Directors, 19 October, 1991, p.4). In reality, there were many other 
aspects of the situation which worked against the continuation of the Agreement as the 
following account shows. 
 
7.2.2. Product homogeneity and substitutability  
The nutmeg seed is one of four components of the fruit obtained from the nutmeg tree, 
Myristica fragans Houtt (Myristicaceae). About 30-55 per cent of the seed consists of oils 
and 45-60 per cent consists of solid matter including cellulose materials. There are two 
types of oils: (1) the six "essential oil of nutmeg" also called the "volatile oil" accounts for 
 209 
 
5-15 per cent of the nutmeg seed, and (2) the "fixed oil of nutmeg" sometimes called 
"nutmeg butter" or expressed oil of nutmeg accounts for 24-40 per cent of the nutmeg 
seed"(Daniel, 1994). The relative percentage of the different components will vary 
depending on the geographical origin of the nutmeg. Essential oil contains the greater 
number of individual compounds or components, most of which are valuable to various 
industries. Furthermore, the psychotropic effects of nutmeg, as well as most of its other 
pharmacological properties have been attributed to the compounds found in the essential 
oil.(Daniel,1994, p.6) Therefore, essentially, there is significant homogeneity and low level 
of substitutability for nutmeg in industry. However, at the domestic level, the 
substitutability is very high meaning that households and restaurant can easily substitute 
or remove nutmeg and its components from their recipes.  
Product homogeneity is considered a main factor in cartel success since it makes 
monitoring and measurement costs lower. However, if there is scope for differentiation, as 
is the case with Grenada‘s nutmeg, this should have been incorporated in the Agreement 
or recognised in differential pricing. Any differential pricing would have been an outcome 
of negotiations with international traders. While Grenada‘s nutmeg could have 
commanded somewhat higher prices, in practice any such differential was overwhelmed 
by the ease of substitutability of nutmeg, and responses of nutmeg users to high prices 
under the Agreement as described below. 
Herwijier of the UK spice firm Fooks and French  (interview April 22, 2004) confirmed  that 
as the price for Grenada‘s nutmeg increased, importers and users of nutmeg (food 
processors and restaurants) embarked on cost-cutting strategies such as sourcing 
substitutes, reducing the quantity of nutmeg and mace in their recipes, removing nutmeg 
altogether from their recipes, developing synthetics, and/or combinations of the above, in 
an attempt to maintain their competitiveness in their respective markets and reducing their 
reliance on high-cost Grenadian nutmeg. 
The initial high prices of nutmeg and mace at the inception of the Agreement resulted in 
the increased supply of nutmeg and mace from the farmers. Many members of ASPIN 
accumulated stocks ―as everybody seemed to be senselessly attracted to buy more and 
more, expecting the same windfall profits as in the beginning. Traders and exporters were 
willing to accumulate stocks with a turnover of a period of 18 months‖ (Tirtawinata, 1995, 
p.28).  
 
7.2.2.1 Stock Levels in Grenada 
As international sales of nutmeg declined and the amount of product offered by farmers to 
the GCNA increased in response to the high prices, GCNA‘s unsold stock increased. With 
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every passing month of rising stock and declining sales, the GCNA sank further into 
anxiety and despair, as provision for unsalable stock increased from EC$0.0 in 1988 to 
EC$6.0 million in 1989 (GCNA Annual Trading Summary and Financial Statement, 1989). 
Denis Noel painted the situation in these terms: ―The financial circumstances at the end of 
1989 were desperate,‖ (Interview with former Junior Minister of Agriculture, Denis Noel, 
September 27, 2009). 
On 9 January, 1990, a special meeting of the GCNA Board was held for the sole purpose 
of discussing the marketing situation, with a view to developing some strategic response 
to the worsening sales position of the GCNA. At that meeting, the General Manager 
presented a report to the Board, which contained the following highlights, relative to the 
stock position of the Association: 
1. Stocks of No. 2 mace had increased by 75 per cent to 577,000 pounds; 
2. Stocks of No. 1 mace had also increased by 34per cent to 230,000 pounds; and 
3. Sales for the first half of the nutmeg year amounted to EC$17.5 million, reflecting a 
decrease of EC$2 million for the comparative period in 1988. 
The emergence of the high stock problem is not surprising given that the GCNA-ASPIN 
Agreement was developing cracks, as lower-priced nutmegs form Indonesia and other 
parts of the world were getting in to the market. GCNA‘s nutmeg sales were also affected 
by the falling demand in response to higher prices and international buyers‘ stocks 
possibly accumulated in anticipation of the GCNA-ASPIN Marketing Agreement. 
Whereas the GCNA was keen to maintain the high prices it had become accustomed to, it 
was faced with the trading challenge of declining sales; the  uncertainty of a cartel, which 
had no clear prospect of preventing its decline. (See next section on ―How the Collapsed 
Happened‖) and a huge stock build-up which was expensive to maintain. It must have 
been anxious to dispose of a significant portion of its growing stocks, in order to obtain 
money to buy current stocks and free up warehousing space. 
 
7.2.2.2 Stock levels in Indonesia 
ASPIN differed from GCNA in its structure and functions; (see table…), its situation and 
that of its members was somewhat different following the Agreement but they also had to 
cope with high and accumulating stocks. ASPIN, as an association of nutmeg exporters 
did not hold stocks but its members had accumulated stocks in anticipation of continuing 
high international prices. The high stocks accumulated by ASPIN members awaiting 
approval for exports. In an attempt to control the exports of nutmeg to comply with the 
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Agreement, ASPIN was unable to process 155 prospective members‘ applications holding 
high levels of stocks (Tirtawinata, 1995).  
The increase in supply of nutmeg by non-ASPIN members (parallel exporters), as well as 
ASPIN‘s unwillingness to finance stocks held by its members, left ASPIN‘s members 
holding large, unsold stocks of nutmeg and mace. This was an untenable situation for 
ASPIN and its members who also started selling their stocks through the parallel market 
resulting in the downward trending of prices in international markets. Internationally, sales 
from ASPIN declined from 6,561 kg at a price of US$4.93 per kg in 1987, the year of its 
creation, to 3,547 kg and 2,472 kg at reduced prices of US$4.52 and US$4.23 
respectively in the years 1988 and 1989. The GCNA was experiencing similar trends (see 
table 6.5). 
ASPIN, like the GCNA, was unable to get rid of its old stocks and find ways to purchase 
new stocks. The situation was so serious among ASPIN‘s members that they met and 
sent a proposal to ASPIN‘s central management highlighting, among other things, the 
following (Tirtawinata, 1995): 
1. That despite efforts at the domestic and international levels, sales slowed to the point 
where members were facing bankruptcy; 
2. At that time, the price of nutmeg from North Sulawesi was priced at IDR (Indonesian 
Rupiah.2, 5000 per kg and mace at IDR 7,000 per kg. The cost and freight price levels 
sales from ASPIN members would cover 60 per cent of current stocks, while 
smugglers had to sell only 70 per cent at the level held by ASPIN and they would gain 
a margin of 10 per cent, while ASPIN was experiencing a loss; 
3.  Parallel exporters (members of ASPIN exporting outside the ASPIN licence or ASPIN 
non-members)  offered nutmeg and mace to the European and US markets at much 
lower prices than ASPIN‘s. 
 
7.2.3 Barriers against market entry 
Grossman (2006) citing Jacquemin and Slade (1989) amongst others argues that the 
chance of cartels succeeding is linked to its ability to limit entry to the market.  The 
evidence presented above shows that the barriers to entry into the market by Indonesian 
suppliers who were not member of ASPIN was low. In addition members of ASPIN 
exported outside the licence agreement and as noted earlier, producers in other countries 
sold to international traders.  
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ASPIN and the Agreement were confronted with the twin problems of parallel exporting 
from Indonesia by non-members of ASPIN and ―cheating‖17 on the agreement by ASPIN 
members by selling directly to international traders other than Catz International. The 
ASPIN management referred to both these types of parallel exports as smuggling. ASPIN 
had a membership of 51 exporters, while there were over 155 applicants seeking exporter 
status and membership of ASPIN (Tirtawinata, 1995). They would have been engaged in 
parallel exporting (Tirtawinata, 1995). Additionally, the decree which established ASPIN 
and purported to have given it exporting rights, which could not be implemented and 
therefore, did not debar any one from the local nutmeg (Indonesia) trade in nutmegs 
(Logie, 1 October, 1994). 
The story of the ASPIN shows that it was unable to control the activities of competitors at 
home, while at the same time was extremely unhurried in processing the applications for 
membership from other would-be exporters, resulting in the undermining of the quota and 
price fixing agreement and the sustainability of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement.  
Finally, a critical entry barrier is that of the high investment in cost and time to establish a 
viable nutmeg plantation and supply chain. In order to get into the supply chain, new 
entrants must first acquire suitable land in terms of appropriateness of soil type and 
quantity. Second, the field must be prepared in terms of agricultural husbandry, including 
clearing and planting, then waiting an estimated 5-7 years for a nutmeg plant to declare its 
gender and reach its production cycle, and in 15 years reach full maturity, the period when 
it produces at its maximum. The time and effort required for nutmegs will create 
uncertainty, and therefore prospective competitors would not have found the industry 
sufficiently worth their investment.  
There is a link between supply elasticity (especially of cartel non-members) and high entry 
barriers since the latter implies that there is a high cost to non-members entering the 
market, in the case of Indonesia, the parallel exporters were able to supply nutmeg 
independently of ASPIN, and by so doing undermine the Marketing Agreement. Further, 
although the elasticity of supply capacity is low in the short run as noted earlier, there is 
evidence that farmers in Grenada adjust their short term supply in response to prices, 
putting more time and effort into harvesting  when prices are higher and cutting back when 
prices are lower. As a consequence they are able to increase supply in the short term 
(during the crop season) but are unable to do so in the longer term without investing in 
more production capacity. The evidence suggests that short-term supply and demand 
elasticities were high and hence not conducive to the sustainability of the cartel. Longer 
term elasticities would be expected to be higher. 
                                                          
17






7.2.4 Participants‘ Compliance with the Agreement and the Absence of Cheating 
The fourth major factor for the success of a cartel is that of compliance with the 
agreement by its participants and the absence of cheating.18 Table 6.2 and the related 
discussion in Chapter 6 show that there was little or no compliance by the partners with 
the agreed quotas.  Literature on failed cartels is rich with evidence of non-compliance 
and cheating as primary causes of cartel collapse (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; 
Grossman, 2006; Eckbo, 1976). The case of the GCNA-ASPIN agreement was no 
different. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) in their study, which catalogues the causes of 
cartel breakdowns, reported that 10 per cent of cartel breakdown were because of secret 
cheating, that is deception of one party by another. 
While the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement was fragile from the outset, evidence of non-
compliance on the side of Indonesia only reached the GCNA in 1989, when unconfirmed 
reports were received by the GCNA that Indonesian exporters were selling nutmegs below 
the Agreement prices. In 1989/1990, as the cracks in the agreement began to develop, 
Indonesian exports of nutmeg began to increase from 5.5 million lbs in 1989 to 14 million 
in 1990 and 16.2 million lbs. in 1992 (Marks and Pomeroy, 1995, citing  the National 
Statistical Bureau (BPS), Statistik  Perdangangan Luar Negiri Indonesia, Ekspor Jilid l). 
Marks and Pomeroy (1995) indicated that,Since 1989/90, Catz was reported to have 
bought only a fraction of its Indonesian nutmegs directly from Indonesia and purchased 
the remainder through Singapore.  
This conduct of Catz International can be related to ASPIN ending Catz‘s status as sole 
buyer of nutmegs from ASPIN members. This being the case, questions arose about the 
extent to which Catz was a participant in subjugating the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing 
Agreement, which directly contributed to the collapse of the agreement. The actions of 
Catz also raised issues on the rationale for their active involvement in the attempt at the 
formation of the cartel in the first place. The evidence suggested that Catz might have 
adopted the view that they would choose the best commercial option as it saw fit. The role 
of Catz is considered further below in the examination of the role of external stakeholders 
in the episode. The incentive for cheating was inherent in the very nature of the Joint 
GCNA-ASPIN Agreement since the agreement did not include provision for punishment 
for cheating. There were also substantial costs associated with compliance. Marquez 
(1992) states that ―cheating is too great a temptation to resist and the ensuing price 
                                                          
18
Cheating in this context refers to the breaking of rules or agreements to gain an advantage or 
avoid a disadvantage in trading. 
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instability brings the cartel to an end.‖ The collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement 
supports this conclusion but also highlights the costs of not cheating if the cartel is fragile. 
 
7.2.5  Organisational structure and processes for effective management and 
communication  
The fifth critical factor leading to the failure of cartels is the absence of effective 
organisational structures and processes (Grossman (2004); Tilton (1996); Sjostrom, 2006; 
Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).  
The GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement was not supported by an organisation to 
provide administrative oversight and direction (see chapter 5, sections 5 and 6). The 
Agreement set initial prices and quotas through the MoU and MoA (see appendices 4 and 
5) but there was no provision for adjusting prices and quotas and no organisational 
arrangements for negotiating such adjustments or to enforce the agreement, much less to 
deter defection and cheating. The absence of organisational mechanisms that would have 
allowed for flexibility and changes in the operating environment increased the chances of 
collapse of the attempt to form a cartel.  
One of the major weaknesses of the agreement was the absence of formal or informal 
regular interaction between the managements of GCNA and ASPIN. The real-time 
technologies available now were not available in the late 1980s, but even the plain old 
telephone was underused by the two parties. It took almost 30 days for GCNA to be 
informed of the Government of Indonesia‘s trade liberalisation of the export of nutmeg. 
Additionally, the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement was left without a structured medium through 
which data about market conditions could be collected, analysed and shared. In these 
circumstances, the two parties appear to have relied on Catz International for 
intermediation in the formation of the Agreement and its early functioning and market 
intelligence.  
It is argued by some cartel experts that the establishment of a sales and marketing 
agency or representative that is independent of the participating cartel members is a 
useful mechanism for cartel success, as was the case of the ISA and the sugar institute 
(Grossman, 2006). Eckbo (1976) argues that the most successful cartels established 
organisational structures, which among other things accommodated fluctuations in the 
external environment. The GCNA-ASPIN Agreement failed to provide for such a central 
organisation that could have provided critical information on market conditions, behaviour 
of the players, and other types of useful information, and thus advice on effective strategic 
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and tactical responses to these said conditions, and by so doing provide the opportunity 
for greater chances of success of the agreement. 
According to Eckbo, 1976; Suslow and Levenstein, 2006; Suslow, 2002; Grossman, 2006) 
successful cartels establish structures that learn and provide the structuring of incentives 
so that rewards can be provided and punishment exercised when necessary, thereby 
enhancing the sustainability and profitability of colluding members. Unfortunately, the Joint 
GCNA-ASPIN Agreement did not provide for such a mechanism. Therefore, other than the 
benefit of receiving increased prices in ―good times,‖ the Marketing Agreement did not 
provide for any other rewards. Neither did it set out a system for punishment in case a 
member was to deviate from the contract. 
 
7.2.6 Accommodating and supportive political, economic and legal environment  
With regards to the legal environment for the sustenance of efforts at cartelisation, 
Grenada had no legislative or policy restrictions on cartels. In the case of Indonesia, 
whereas, during the early days of efforts there was no such restriction, that changed later 
with the Government of Indonesia‘s acceptance of the IMF/WB structural adjustment and 
stabilization program, in which cartels or commodity boards were abolished in return for 
economic support from these institutions.  
 
7.2.7 Country reliance on a single export commodity and the political and legal context 
It has been argued by Daviron and Ponte (2005); Le Clair (2012) and Kooroshy, Preston 
and Bradley (2014) that the greater a country‘s dependence on a single export 
commodity, the greater the willingness of the country to enter into collusive international 
agreements to manage earnings from exports. In this case, the evidence showed that 
Grenada had a high level of dependency on agricultural commodity exports and for 
nutmeg it had a large enough international market share to have a chance of being an 
important participant in a collusive agreement (see table 6.2 and text, chapter 6). As a 
consequence, the Grenadian policy makers were keen to have such an agreement in 
place to protect and increase export earnings. It was a result of this reliance that the 
Government of Grenada supported the GCNA in forming the Agreement and attempting to 
sustain it even when it was evident that such an agreement was no longer viable.  
However, in the case of Indonesia, as indicated in Chapter 5, nutmeg was not a critical 
commodity in the country‘s basket of exportable goods and balance of trade. As a 
consequence, the Indonesian government was less likely to be committed to the 
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continuance of the Agreement, especially since the need to deal with more major 
economic challenges required the government to abandon the Agreement. 
With regards to the legal environment, in particular competition policy considerations, 
Grenada had no legislative or policy restrictions on anti-competitive practices. In the case 
of Indonesia, at the time of the formation of the Agreement there were no legal restrictions 
that changed when the government of Indonesia‘s accepted of the IMF/WB structural 
adjustment and stabilization program, in which cartels or commodity boards were 
abolished in return for economic support from these institutions.  
 
7.2.8  Summary of Major Conditions for Creating and Maintaining a Cartel 
In order to understand the weak functioning and demise of the Agreement, section 7.2 has 
appraised its situation in the context of the conditions required for effective functioning and 
longevity of cartels. The evidence suggests that while the belief that high market 
concentration in the hands of the two parties could be achieved, the conditions were never 
fulfilled. Further the entry barriers against non-members of the Agreement were low. While 
supply capacity of nutmeg is inelastic in the short run, the actual supply response when 
the prices of nutmeg and mace went up at the inception of the Agreement, partly because 
farmers in Grenada and elsewhere harvested more crop from existing trees (it appears 
that farmers had cut back on harvesting when prices were low) and partly because the 
GCNA and traders had accumulated stock in anticipation of the Marketing Agreement. 
Further, the higher prices reduced end user demand substantially.  
The poor compliance with the agreement and lack of flexibility in adjusting to market 
conditions were because of the lack of an organisational structure and processes for 
managing the Agreement. Only one of the conditions required was partially met, (i.e. the 
strong motivation on the part of the policy makers in Grenada to create a Marketing 
Agreement to attempt to protect export earnings). However, this was not reciprocated by 
policy makers in Indonesia.  
Given that the basic conditions for the Marketing Agreement to function effectively and 
survive for any length of time, the questions of interest are why the GCNA played an 
active part in forming the Marketing Agreement? Why it was not aware of the inherent 
weaknesses in the Agreement?  Why it persisted in trying to keep the Agreement going 
when it started failing. In addition to these unpromising conditions, the next section 
explains the role of external stakeholders in bringing the Agreement to an end. The 
dissolution of the Agreement as a process from the perspective of the GCNA Board has 
been examined in section 7.4 to address the questions of GCNA‘s persistence with the 





7.3  The role of external stakeholders in the failure of the Marketing Agreement 
Another dimension in addressing the collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement is the role 
of four key secondary stakeholders:  Catz International; Man Producten; the Indonesian 
Government and the Washington institutions (the World Bank and the IMF), and US Spice 
Traders. Three of them represent actors in the international spice trade, the other two are 
the policy making and policy influencing institutions. The roles of each of these 
stakeholder or groups in the collapse of the Agreement have been referred to earlier. 
They are elaborated below. 
 
7.3.1 The Role of Catz International 
Catz‘s role in the demise of the cartel must be seen in the historical context of Catz‘s 
longer-term business history with both GCNA and ASPIN which is referred to earlier in the 
thesis. Here, the focus is on the role of Catz from early January 1989 when the 
Agreement appeared to be unravelling. At the GCNA Board meeting of 9 January, 1989, 
the Chairman Norris James introduced the Catz factor into the discourse on the matter, as 
he sought to understand the unfolding situation (changes in ASPIN‘s sales policy and the 
declining international prices). The chairman provided the context for the discussions by 
outlining or previewing what he perceived as the key issues, which according to him were 
GCNA‘s relations with Catz International and with ASPIN. 
There are two critical factors which shaped the relationship between Catz International 
B.V. and the GCNA. The first factor relates to the historical agency relationship which 
existed between the two parties prior to the 1986 GCNA-ASPIN Agreement. According to 
Renwick, as far back as the 1950s, Catz was buying nutmegs from Grenada. Catz was 
also GCNA‘s most important customer, responsible for purchasing between 75–80 per 
cent of the GCNA‘s exports per annum (Interviews with Renwick, 5 August, 2004; 
Hachamoff, September, 26, 2009 and Moerman, 2 September, 2009). Previous sections 
established that, not only was Catz the GCNA‘s single-largest customer, but the CEOs of 
Catz and GCNA shared an extraordinary friendship. In February, 1978, Huitema, in a 
letter to the GCNA, wrote ―ultimately in order to cut out competition and to come to a good 
control of the market and a good marketing situation, we should get together – Both 
Indonesia, Grenada and our company and establish a Joint Marketing Agreement.‖ This 
confirms the overall findings of chapter 5 that Catz International was intimate to the 
formation of efforts to form a cartel and that their decision to purchase outside of ASPIN‘s 
agreement was tantamount to undermining that agreement.. 
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The second factor was Catz‘s long history and knowledge of the Indonesian nutmeg 
market, which along with its insider knowledge of the GCNA, provided Huitema of Catz 
with the platform to influence the formation of ASPIN, broker the agreement between 
ASPIN and GCNA, and made Catz the international agent and main customer for both 
organizations. Catz was responsible for purchasing 100 per cent of ASPIN members‘ 
offering during the first year of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement and 80 per cent thereafter. 
While in the case of Grenada Catz was responsible for 50 per cent of Grenada‘s stock. 
The above, therefore, positioned Catz as the intermediary and prospective beneficiary of 
the continuing Agreement. Catz also stood to lose if the Agreement did not sustain high 
prices and there were leakages into the world market from Indonesia.  
One of the key decisions at the 9 January 1989 GCNA Board meeting was to instruct the 
Board‘s Secretary to address Catz‘s outstanding indebtedness to the GCNA. The above 
decision represented a critical juncture in the relationship between the two parties, as it 
signals the start of the breakdown of the relationship between the GCNA and Catz, with 
the former initiating the process of recruiting a new agent (JHB International). The 
decision reflected growing distrust in of Catz by the GCNA. It was this growing suspicion 
and distrust that eventually led to the replacement of Catz by JHB, and caused Catz to act 
in a manner that contributed towards instability in the market. Marks and Pomeroy (1995) 
indicated that Catz was also a buyer of nutmegs from Singapore. If these purchases were 
during the early stages of the Agreement, Catz could be seen to be undermining the 
stability of ASPIN and the agreement by purchasing parallel exports.  
In an interview, the current CEO of Catz International, Mormon stated that by 1990/91 
Catz‘s warehouses throughout Rotterdam were overflowing with unsold nutmeg and 
mace, and as a business organisation, they had to make a decision about the large 
volume of stock. Catz finally decided around March/April of 1991 to drop its prices and 
make all of the nutmeg available on the market, essentially flooding the market.  Mormon 
argued that whereas their actions were not aimed at destabilising the GCNA-ASPIN 
Agreement, they understood the impact that the action would have on the market.  
This act on the part of Catz International is understandable in the normal business context 
since the holding of stock represents cash investment that was not yielding any profits. 
Worst yet, as the price of the commodity declined, so too did the value of the investment 
in stocks. However, given the place Catz held within the global supply chain for nutmeg, 
and given that they lost the monopoly buyer position with ASPIN (although they remained 
the single largest buyer), the GCNA might have had a basis for generating suspicion. 
However, it should be noted that  before March/April 1991, when Catz started running 
down the stocks of nutmeg and mace the Agreement had come to an end (in mid-1990, 
see section 7.4).   
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Catz was a major if not prime mover in the formation of the Agreement and stood to gain 
or lose depending on its effectiveness and longevity. Marks and Pomeroy (1995) noted: 
―Since 1989/90 Catz is reported to have bought only a fraction of its Indonesian nutmegs 
directly from Indonesia, and has purchased the remainder through Singapore‖. However, 
as the accounts in Chapter 6 and section 7.4 shows, as early as 1989 the Agreement was 
facing problems because the necessary conditions for effective functioning did not exist. 
Hence all the blame cannot be placed at the door of Catz. In this respect it is interesting to 
note Huitema‘s statement some years after the collapse of the Agreement:  
―Grenada and Indonesia operated a more or less successful 
nutmeg cartel under our guidance, when prices were three 
times higher than what they are now until about six years 
ago. They managed to maintain prices at this level for three 
to five years; but then the cartel broke up. This was partly 
because the Indonesian nutmeg sector was liberalised, 
partly under pressure from the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank and partly because the high nutmeg 
prices encouraged smuggling.‖ 
(Source: The Netherlander, 15 February, 1995) 
 
7.3.2 The role of Man Producten 
The other secondary stakeholder with a part in the end of the Agreement was the spice 
trading firm Man Producten and its CEO Herweijer. According to the talk and text 
accumulated by this study, the role of Man Producten was not as critical and expansive as 
that of Catz. They were more reactive than proactive to the situation, visiting Grenada, for 
example, in response to the news of the possibility of the impending association between 
the GCNA and ASPIN. Nonetheless, mention of Herweijer‘s stance against the cartel is 
worthy of accrediting him with some of the responsibility for its collapse. 
In chapter 5, which dealt with the formation of the cartel, reference was made to the 
meeting of the CEO of Man Producten with the Board of Directors of the GCNA, as the 
latter prepared for their first official meeting in Jakarta to discuss the formation of an 
association between ASPIN and GCNA. During the meeting Herweijer‘s overarching 
message, if not a warning, to the GCNA Board, was that the establishment of any 
collaboration between the two suppliers would not be well received on the international 
market, and such dissatisfaction could have an adverse impact on the GCNA, including 
loss of its market share to substitutes for nutmeg and mace. 
The minutes of the Board meeting with Herweijer seem to reflect that the message was 
respectfully received and understood. However, Man Producten was identified by Board 
member Ferguson as one of those who are working to undermine the cartel, since 
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Herweijer had vowed to do everything in his power to undermine the cartel. Ferguson‘s 
view was echoed by Logie, who stated that, 
 ―It was the actions of companies like Man Producten who 
worked ‗overnight‘ to ensure that the Cartel did not succeed; 
they were dead set against the arrangement since they 
knew that it was going to lead to increase prices on the 
world [nutmeg] market,‖ 
(Interview with Logie 5 April 2015). 
Did the threat also involve the purchase of unusually large amounts of nutmeg during the 
negotiation between ASPIN and GCNA, as a manipulation strategy? The large purchase 
could have been an indication that they must have expected the price to remain high 
sufficiently long to benefit by selling at higher prices. This research was unable to obtain 
hard information which detailed the acts of Man Producten in this regard. However, the 
purchasing data from Man Producten, coupled with the talk and text obtained, provided 
the basis to confer that the agents and brokers were acting in their commercial self-
interest, and not necessarily fit into the narrative of Logie and Ferguson.  
The archival records show that on 2 September, 1986, Herweijer, offered to purchase 400 
tons of SUNs at US$5,850 per ton and 150 tons of Defective at US$4,500 per ton, for the 
USSR Market. This offer was not accepted and the GCNA made a counter offer: SUNS at 
US$6,000 per ton and Defectives at US$5,600 per ton. The later offer was rejected by 
Herweijer, stating that. 
 ―he thought the price was too high and [he] needed time to 
consider the counter offer,‖  
(Minutes from GCNA Board Meeting, 2 September,1986,p.12). 
 It was this very issue of ―high price‖ to which Herweijer was opposed and with which he 
was then faced. It is therefore not surprising that he would be seen by members of the 
GCNA Board as one who worked to destabilise the cartel.  
 
7.3.3 The role of the Indonesian Government and the World Bank 
The third secondary stakeholder playing a part in the end of the Agreement was the 
Indonesian government under World Bank influence. This section builds on the 
background and context for the deregulation of the nutmeg market in Indonesia outlined in 
chapter 5. According to the minutes of the GCNA Board on 26 June 1990, a telex was 
received from ASPIN informing the Board ―that as at 25/5/1990 ASPIN ceased to be the 
sole selling organization for nutmeg and mace.‖ This followed the removal of the export 
restrictions on these products by the Indonesian government. 
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The best way to understand the role of the Government of Indonesia and that of the World 
Bank, is to situate the deregulation of the nutmeg export regime within the broader context 
of the necessary, wider economic and trade reforms pursued by the Government of 
Indonesia. Soesastro (1989, p.853) stated that ―The 1980s will be recorded in Indonesia‘s 
history as the decade of deregulation, a time when measures to deregulate the economy 
were undertaken as part of a broader effort towards economic structural reforms.‖ The 
following narrative taken from the text of the World Bank‘s archives provides some of the 
rationale for such action on the part of the Indonesian authorities. 
According to the World Bank (WB) (1991), by 1981, Indonesia experienced a severe 
deterioration in its external terms of trade. During the period 1982-85, the economy had to 
adjust to weakening oil prices (which went from a peak of US$35 per barrel to US$25 per 
barrel), the repercussions of such an external shock, the 1982-84 world recession, and a 
decline in the price of several important primary commodity exports, such as rubber and 
rice; then, in 1986, the oil price collapsed from US$28 per barrel to a low of US$10 per 
barrel. Although oil prices did recover slightly thereafter, net oil export earnings fell by 
US$2 billion between 1986 and 1988. These losses were intensified by the adverse 
effects that international currency fluctuations had on debt service payments from mid-
1985. On average, Indonesia incurred an income loss equivalent to some nine per cent of 
its annual GNP over the period 1981 to 1988.  
 
The responses of the government were two successive stabilization programs (1982-85) 
and 1986-88). While both programs were based on appropriate macro-economic policies 
designed to restore financial stability, the latter program also focused on micro-economic 
reforms aimed at reducing the complexity of the regulatory framework and improving the 
incentive structure, particularly for the commodities and financial markets. The process of 
deregulating the Indonesian economy began as early as 1978, when concern was 
expressed about the heavy dependency on oil and the poor performance of the non-oil 
export sector, among other issues, led to a devaluation of the rupiah in November, 1978. 
By 1982, more measures were introduced in response to the deterioration of the country‘s 
balance of payments issues, such as the relaxation of export taxes along with other 
measures to reduce the trade deficit.   
 
Soesastro (1989, p.857) writes: 
 ―In response, the Government implemented a series of 
―deregulation packages" aimed at increasing private sector 
activity and stimulating non-oil exports. The 1988 
deregulation packages in Indonesia have been heralded as 




 It is not the intention of this section or thesis to provide a technical analysis of the 
reforms, but to provide the broad economic context of the specific areas which are of 
relevance to understanding the impact of deregulation on the ASPIN-GCNA Agreement. 
 
With this in mind some nutmeg officials in Grenada were of the opinion that the nutmeg 
export regime in place within ASPIN, deregulated, to allow the Indonesian government to 
continue to receive IMF and WB support for its on-going program of trade reforms. Their 
view was not farfetched as the following text from the World Bank archives show. 
Commenting on the Export regulation regime in general, the WB had this to say on Export 
Regulation:  
―The trend towards increased export regulation runs counter 
to the move towards greater deregulation of the economy. 
Experience in other countries, which have imposed export 
restrictions, indicates that the dynamic effects of these 
interventions are often negative. These restrictions are 
particularly worrisome where they create artificial barriers to 
entry and are non-transparent. Thus, even in those limited 
instances where there is a case for intervention, the 
appropriate policy instrument needs to be carefully designed 
to minimize distortions." 
(WB Report, 1991, p. viii). 
 
In the above statement, the WB indicated its dislike for export regulation since they are 
not in line with the broader trade and economic reforms undertaken by the government. 
Such institutions as ASPIN and the trade regimes, which they represent, are seen as 
negative and thus reference is made of the experience of other countries in an attempt to 
influence the Indonesian authorities to consider those alternatives. In other words, the WB 
is saying: Do what other countries have done and you have our support. 
 
The second and more specific view from the WB, which provides insights into their 
influence in deregulating the nutmeg regime, came from the 1991 Report (p.4). They had 
this to say about the nutmeg regime; but first, they outline the nature of the nutmeg export 
regime:  
―In the case of nutmeg and Cassia Vera, a Joint Marketing 
Organisation (JMO) is responsible for controlling all exports, 
including those produced by private producers. These JMOs 
have been created by Government Decree [ASPIN was 
created by Decree 107 & 108 from the Ministry of 
Agriculture] as an integral part of the trade association that 
represent the industry. The nutmeg JMO is primarily a price 
setting organization, issuing new export prices every month 
for the different grades of nutmeg.‖ 
 
The WB report (1991, 22 March) then proceeds to highlight what they saw as three sets of 




First, ―The administration and allocation of quotas lacks 
transparency. This holds for both externally and 
domestically imposed quotas. The Ministry or Trade 
Association responsible for allocating quotas rarely 
publishes a list of quota holders and the criteria by which the 
quotas are allocated are not clear… Administration of the 
quota allocation can be slow, which causes some individual 
firms to miss export opportunities and reduces Indonesia‘s 
total non-oil export earnings; 
 
Second, ―The allocation of the resulting quota rent may not 
be in the industries‘ or Indonesia‘s best interests. The 
existence of quota necessarily produces a rent and how 
quotas are allocated determines the distribution of the rent. 
For products where the trade associations are important, 
current holders of the quota rights are often closely 
connected with those that allocate quotas. This creates the 
danger that the trade associations will restrict entry into the 
industry or to ―approved exporter‖ status to protect their 
rents‖.  
 
The WB Report (1991, p. 49) then proceeds to recommend that:  
 
―More open system of allocating quotas would not only allow 
more efficient entrants into the market, but would also 
clearly identify who receives the quota rent, and whether this 
distribution meets the Government‘s objectives‖. 
 
Third, ―The current system can result in a level of market 
power, which is detrimental to efficiency and equity 
considerations. By restricting the right to export to 
designated approved traders, domestic producers of the 
restricted item are denied the opportunity to sell to 
alternative traders or directly to foreign buyers. This can 
result in lower domestic prices, which is likely to reduce 
investment incentives and slow improvement in quality and 
production techniques.‖  
 
 
Following the above, the WB adds: 
―While trade associations are common in other countries, 
these are usually voluntary and not enforced by a 
government policy stipulating that all exports must be 
channelled through its members. Aside from creating a non-
competitive domestic market, it also creates monopoly 
supplier on the foreign market, which is against GATT rules.‖ 
 
The above cited problems and issues which emanated from the WB, with regards to the 
system of preferred trader, of which nutmeg and ASPIN were an integral part, highlighted 
the fact and provided justification for the views of the GCNA Board and that of Ferguson in 
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particular that the WB exerted a significant amount of influence on the government of 
Indonesia‘s decision to deregulate the nutmeg market. 
 
While the WB report expressed those views in 1991, it reflected the policy prescriptions 
and actions from the previous years, and therefore, the telex which was received by the 
GCNA on 24 June, 1990, informing them that in May, 1990, ASPIN had ceased to be the 
sole exporting agency of nutmeg, was the result of the broader trade and economic 
reforms which were undertaken by the Government of Indonesia, with the support of the 
WB. The influence of the World Bank on the Government of Indonesia played a part in the 
formal ending of the Agreement, but as we saw earlier, the absence of basic conditions for 
a viable Agreement had already undermined it before the formal announcement. 
 
7.3.4 Involvement of US traders 
It was the opinion of the GCNA Board of Directors that US spice traders, along with Catz 
International; and Man Producten, were part of a global conspiracy to undermine and 
cause the collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement. Canute Burke, a 
journalist with the Financial Times of London, reported on the collapse of the GCNA-
ASPIN cartel. In addressing the cause(s) for the collapse he cited members of the GCNA 
Board of Directors as accusing certain spice interests in the U.S. for so doing, and at its 
annual general meeting on May 31, a member of the GCNA Board of Directors referred to 
a statement contained in ASTA‘s (American Spice Traders Association) 1990 Annual 
Report. (GCNA is a member of ASTA.), it was felt that ASTA was actively involved in 
pressing the Indonesian authorities to deregulate the domestic nutmeg trade. 
 
However, in response to the GCNA‘s allegations of ASTA‘s role, they stated that it was 
the Cassia Vera market for which they sought deregulation and not nutmeg (ASTA Annual 
Report, 1990; and World Bank Report, 1991). The allegation was further denied by 
ASTA‘s Executive Vice President, Peter Furth, who argued that ASTA, under most 
circumstances, would not intervene on matters relating to price and selling arrangements 
(Plate, 1990). 
 
Therefore, the GCNA, having evidence of ASTA‘s lobbying efforts to deregulate the 
Cassia Vera Market and knowing that both commodities were deregulated at the same 
time (World Bank Report, 1991), cannot be blamed for leveling such allegations against 
ASTA of which GCNA is a member. The fact that ASTA represented such a large number 
of global spice traders  having been based in the US, whose market was open to global 
exporters, gave them the ability to exert influence on foreign authorities in matters 
regarding the spice trade, and access to the US market in particular. ASTA argued, 
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monopolies are not good for business. One can therefore see some rationale as to why 
they would have intervened on the deregulation of the Indonesian domestic nutmeg 
market. 
 
The above account demonstrates the influence which secondary stakeholder groups can 
exert on primary stakeholders. Stakeholder theory has long advocated that firms that 
ignore the needs of a multitude of stakeholders [secondary] face their own peril (Freeman, 
1984), for whereas these secondary stakeholder groups may or may not have contractual 
obligations with the primary stakeholders, anecdotal evidence suggests that these groups, 
by reason of their economic influence and place in the GVC, market intelligence and 
influence, can induce primary stakeholders to respond to their demands. Such secondary 
groups can engage in various forms of actions such as lobbying, public relations activities, 
etc. (Eesley and Lenox, 2006). In this case, the secondary stakeholders cited used direct 
trade actions, such as engagement in the illegal purchase of nutmeg, lobbying the 
Indonesian Government to change its trade policies, and encouragement of the 
deregulation polices of the Indonesian Government, to help break up the nutmeg cartel. 
 
7.4. The GCNA Board‘s decisions and actions in the face of the failing Agreement  
The dissolution of the Agreement as a process, from the perspective of the GCNA Board 
has been examined in this section, to address the questions on why the GCNA Board was 
apparently not aware of the inherent weaknesses in the Agreement and why it persisted in 
trying to keep the Agreement going when it was failing. A straightforward narrative based 
on evidence from the minutes of GCNA Board meetings with commentary has been used 
to outline the stages that the GCNA Board went through: (1) assessing the situation; (2) 
seeking information and solutions independently and by communicating with ASPIN and 
other parties, and (3) eventually accepting the end of the Agreement and start to deal with 
the consequences.  
During the dissolution process, the GCNA Board held 13 meetings in which the 
relationship with ASPIN was discussed. The account  below reports on 14 meetings since 
the 10th meeting the sequence, between a GCNA delegation, ASPIN and two international 
traders, Catz and First Pacitifc, was of high importance in the dissolution process. The 
business relationship process framework of Tähtinen and Halinen (1997; 1999) has been 
used to interpret the dissolution of the Marketing Agreement from the perspective of the 
GCNA Board. The Tahtinen and Halinen framework identifies seven stages in the 
dissolution of a business relationship: assessment, decision-making, dyadic 
communication, disengagement, network communication, the aftermath, and the potential 





7.4.1. Discussion on the collapse of the GCNA ASPIN Marketing Agreement. 
GCNA Board First Meeting, 28 February, 1989 - Assessment Stage  
On 28 February, 1989, the GCNA Board of Directors met in its usual bi-monthly meetings 
to consider some routine issues. However, the manager of the GCNA (Renwick) informed 
the Board of two important events that had occurred within ASPIN that would change the 
course of the Joint Marketing Arrangement. First, ASPIN‘s change in the status of Catz 
International‘s as the sole international buyer of ASPIN members‘ nutmeg and mace.  
This was fundamentally different from the understanding that the GCNA had regarding the 
role of Catz International in controlling the supply of nutmegs and mace by members of 
ASPIN. 
 
Second, was the resignation of Charles Sutjiawan, Marketing Director of ASPIN. These 
events were of major concern to the GCNA, as ASPIN had not consulted or 
communicated with the GCNA on these events. The changes and lack of communications 
from ASPIN left the GCNA contemplating what this meant for the future of the agreement. 
Further, the events were accompanied by the declining prices on the international market 
for nutmeg and mace. At this meeting, the GCNA Board expressed the following views: 
(a) there would be serious repercussions on the international market and for Grenada in 
particular, and (b) these developments were seen as the outcomes of work done to 
undermine the agreement by buyers such as Man Producten B.V. 
 
During the discussions that followed, the following thoughts were expressed by some 
members:  
 Board member  Mc Phail warned against doing anything rash that might precipitate the 
outcome of any  future negotiations with ASPIN; 
 Board member Ferguson blamed Man Producten for the eminent collapse of the 
agreement citing previous faxes and accusing members of moving the vote of no 
confidence in the chairman of the board as a tool to divide the GCNA; 
 Board member Benjamin expressed the view that the problem was with ASPIN and 
not with Man Producten.  
The meeting decided to: (a) monitor the situation; (b) but make no price adjustments or 
other changes at the moment; and (c) direct the Board Secretary to write to ASPIN, 
reminding them of a promise to keep to the terms of the agreement. 
These events were factors occurring during the relationship and had the effect of 
mediating the impact of the relationship, as the per-pound price of nutmeg on the 
international market continued to decline (see table 6.3).  This decline in prices below that 
which was provided for in the Joint Agreement and expected by the stakeholders, could 
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partially be seen as a result of this change in policy which would now create a competitive 
market space, allowing for more bargaining and further price reduction, as each 
international exporter was now competing against each other for sales, and in the 
process, accept lower prices than that which existed before. 
The above discussions showed that the Board lacked appropriate information for a 
balanced assessment of the potential threat to the Agreement, with board members 
blaming different parties for the situation. The possibility of the GCNA re-entering into 
negotiations with ASPIN was also raised. The GCNA, having not been given direct 
reasons for such changes in policy, appeared to embark on a search to obtain reasons for 
the same, as well as to understand the situation. 
Second Meeting, 14 March, 1989 – Assessment, Decision-Making and Attempted 
Restoration Stages 
As a result of the above event, on 14 March, 1989, the GCNA Board of Directors, having 
not had a response from ASPIN, sent a second dispatch requesting a meeting to discuss 
the declining prices of nutmeg and to reconfirm their commitment to the Joint GCNA-
ASPIN Marketing Agreement. This request indicated the need for continuous assessment 
and reassessment of the situation by the GCNA but also the need for information, as they 
sought to assess ASPIN‘s decision, information which would aid, not only in their 
understanding of the current situation; but also in providing further input into the other 
stages of the dissolution process.  
 
During the meeting, Board Member Ferguson proposed, and the meeting agreed, that, 
―the Indonesians should be asked to come to Grenada in 
view of the fact that the last round of talks had been held in 
Jakarta and additionally at that meeting they had promised 
Grenada if the market situation warranted it, they would 
come.  However, if they are unable to come the alternative 
would be to go to Indonesia,‖  
 
(Minutes of the GCNA Board Meeting, March 14, 1989 p. 5).  
The above decision is important to mention since it established the GCNA commitment to 
maintain the agreement and stabilise the cartel, while the responses which follow from 
ASPIN show a less-intense commitment to maintaining the agreement, as would be 
confirmed by future reports from minutes of the GCNA Board meetings. 
 
This stage reflects the overlapping of three stages in the Tähtinen and Halinen (1999) 
framework -- assessment, decision-making and dyadic communication - in the dissolution 
process. First, the GCNA Board‘s attempt to find reasons for the impending dissolution of 
the relationship confirms the assessment stage. Second, it represents the decision stage 
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in terms of the GCNA‘s Board of Directors decision to engage ASPIN by electing to use 
the voice rather than the exit strategy (not to end the relationship). And third, the GCNA 
requesting the meeting and stating its purpose also represented an attempt to restore the 
relationship to its prior position. At the decision-making stage, the parties can choose 
either an exit or voice strategy. An exit strategy ends the relationship, while voice gives 
the opportunity to repair and retain the relationship. The latter is what GCNA attempted to 
do by its decisions and actions. 
 
Third Meeting, 28 March, 1989 - Assessment, Decision-Making, Dyadic Communication 
and Disengagement Stage 
At the Dyadic Communication Relationship Stage, the potential to use either the exit or 
voice strategy is directly or indirectly communicated to the partner (Alajoutsijarvi et al,, 
2000). In this case study, the decision was taken to give voice to the issue – seek and 
confront the other partner on the matter. As a consequence, ASPIN was communicated 
with for a third time in that regard (Interview with Renwick, 2006). Such continuous 
attempts at seeking to obtain reason(s) for what was unfolding represented a search by 
the GCNA to find the real reasons for ASPIN‘s actions. In the meantime, ASPIN was not 
responding, with the consequence of declining international prices and growing instability 
of the cartel.  
 
At this stage, unless the parties agree to perform restorative actions, the relationship is 
likely to enter into the Disengagement Stage. The meeting noted that ASPIN rejected the 
request for the meeting. This rejection represents ASPIN‘s implicit exit strategy, and thus 
the response is indicative that the relationship entered into the disengagement stage of 
the dissolution. However, text from the archives of the GCNA revealed the discussions at 
the GCNA Board meeting on 28 March, which provided further insights into the status of 
the relationship, and the ongoing exercise of the voice strategy which was adopted by the 
GCNA Board of Directors. 
 
One month after the start of communication with ASPIN, in an effort to obtain reasons for 
what was occurring, the Chairman of the GCNA Board grew impatient and frustrated, as 
he reiterated the ―need for a meeting with Indonesia as being absolutely essential and that 
the Board should be prepared to send a small delegation to Jakarta, if the Indonesians 





The attitude of ASPIN and the growing mistrust also came into question by Board Member 
Benjamin who ―questioned the attitude of the Indonesians and suggested that their level of 
cooperation left a lot to be desired, and raised the possibility of a new Agreement being 
considered, seeing that the existing one is not working,‖ (Minutes of the Board of Directors 
of the GCNA, 28 March, 1989). The frustration with ASPIN‘s non-response was also 
expressed by Board Member Ferguson who felt that "ASPIN should be pressed to come 
[to Grenada] but if they would not then GCNA would have to go to Jakarta," (Minutes of 
the Board of Directors of the GCNA, 28 March, 1989). Following much discussion, the 
Board agreed to keep pressing ASPIN to meet with GCNA in Grenada (Minutes of the 
Board of Directors of the GCNA, 28 March, 1989). 
 
The above text also revealed that even at this early stage in the dissolution process, the 
decision-makers in GCNA were keen to restore the relationship or get it on to the restart 
of the relationship.  The restoration of relationship in the midst of a declining relationship 
fits into the business dissolution model of Tahtinen (1999; 2001), which indicates that 
during the dissolution phase, there would be attempts at restoration. 
 
Furthermore, at this stage, business exchange declined and resource ties became weak, 
as ASPIN continued its intransigence to facilitate the meeting. The nature of the 
relationship between ASPIN and GCNA exemplifies the weakening of the bonds 
(agreement to meet when necessary and to keep each other informed on relevant issues 
pertaining to the market) which existed between the two parties.  Furthermore, ASPIN was 
already aware of the trade and economic reforms which were unfolding in Indonesia, and 
the fact that they were not in a position to maintain the relationship with the GCNA in its 
present form, and that the relationship was at the disengagement stage. However, the 
GCNA was at a disadvantage and not fully aware of the structural adjustments which were 
unfolding in Indonesia, and so continued to engage in communication with ASPIN hoping 
to save the agreement. Meanwhile, ASPIN‘s actions continued to show that they were not 
interested in maintaining the relationship (by not providing any explicit response to the 
GCNA‘s requests for a meeting). ASPIN was implying their intention to exit the 
relationship with GCNA. 
 
Fourth Meeting, 10 April, 1989 - Dyadic (between the two parties), Network 
Communication and Disengagement Stages 
While the GCNA continued to intensify its communications with ASPIN (dyadic) to meet in 
Grenada, the GCNA Board was seeking the assistance of Catz International to establish a 
nutmeg oil distillation plant to address the deepening crisis of excessive stock build-up 
(network communication). The continuing communication sent from the GCNA Board to 
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ASPIN and ASPIN‘s continuing negative reactions (Dyadic), forced the GCNA to begin to 
consider alternative uses of its large stock of nutmeg. This thinking by the GCNA, arising 
from the current state of the relationship, forced them to seek assistance from other actors 
in the network such as Catz International. 
The turn to Catz International for assistance seems not unusual, as Catz had been 
GCNA‘s major buyer and seemed knowledgeable on all things nutmeg. It was also 
GCNA‘s way of implicitly passing on information to a network partner as a means of 
informing and managing the communication which would emanate from the collapse of 
the relationship between the GCNA and ASPIN. Catz communicated that given the high 
cost to recondition defective nutmegs at that time, it would not be economically viable to 
enter into the nutmeg oil market. However, given the high price of defective nutmeg 
(which the best grade of nutmeg for distillation purposes) the Board decided to delay the 
decision on the acquisition of the nutmeg oil distillation plant for the time being. 
After almost six weeks, ASPIN finally responded to GCNA‘s request for a meeting, 
proposed for the end of April, but insisted that they were unable to come to Grenada due 
to personnel changes which were occurring in ASPIN. While the GCNA was exploring the 
option of producing nutmeg oil, their interest in securing the meeting with ASPIN was not 
forgotten (actions aimed at restoring the relationship), as James, the Chairman, remained 
mindful of the outcome of the meeting on the market. He informed the Board that "the 
market was awaiting the outcome of the proposed end of April meeting with ASPIN," 
(Minutes of GCNA Board of Directors Meeting, April 10, 1989). 
At the same time, board member Ferguson insisted that ASPIN should come to Grenada 
for the proposed meeting and that "GCNA needed to assert itself." This meeting further 
agreed to send a strongly worded telex to ASPIN, informing them "that the Board found 
the reason which they were advancing for not coming to Grenada to be unacceptable and 
reaffirmed that parties to an Agreement must honour their pledges, and therefore a 
meeting date on or before May 15th in Grenada was essential," (Minutes of GCNA Board 
of Directors Meeting, April 10, 1989).  
ASPIN‘s continued resistance to meet in Grenada increased GCNA‘s mistrust of ASPIN 
while ASPIN seemed to have hoped that GCNA would have understood by then that they 
were no longer interested in maintaining the relationship; but was only being diplomatically 
pleasant towards the GCNA.  




At this fifth meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, where the stability of the cartel and 
the relationship with ASPIN were dealt with, the Secretary informed the Board of the input 
from agent Roger Piper of Rucker & Slann, a spice trader from the UK. Piper advised on 
the following courses of action:  
(a) ―that a joint statement to be worked out via telex with 
Indonesia regarding the current state of the marketing 
agreement‖; (b) ―that the GCNA restructure its price and 
meet with ASPIN‖; (c) ―that the GCNA announce a new price 
structure‖, and  (d) ―that the GCNA meet with ASPIN and 
discuss all problems related to the agreement."  
 
(Source: Minutes of the GCNA Board of Directors Meeting, April 19, 1989.) 
 
The above input from Piper showed that the market was aware of the internal problems of 
the proposed cartel and, as such, was waiting to see prices dip further as demand 
declined. In the context of the dissolution of the relation process, it also represented 
efforts at restoring the relation, while bordering on disengagement. During the period 1988 
to 1989, export sales and revenue earned by both ASPIN and GCNA declined, as 
indicated in table. 6.3. Seeking information and advice from Rucker & Slann indicated that 
the GCNA Board of Directors was seeking assistance to improve its understanding of the 
current and future state of the relationship. GCNA was increasing its efforts to establish 
communication with ASPIN but the efforts appear to be one sided.  
GCNA‘s Chairman indicated the unwillingness of ASPIN to visit Grenada and suggested 
"the time had come for the Board to take the decision as to whether a delegation from the 
GCNA would go to Jakarta to meet ASPIN." Campbell suggested that GCNA should 
restructure its pricing before meeting with ASPIN to discuss all the problems relative to the 
Marketing Agreement (Minutes of the GCNA Board of Directors Meeting, April 19, 1989). 
The Board finally ―suggested a meeting date in June in order to give the Board time to 
prepare as well as taking into account the area and general meeting." (Minutes of the 
GCNA Board of Directors Meeting, April 19, 1989). McPhail suggested that time was a 
key factor in deriving any benefits. Benjamin was opposed to GCNA sending a delegation 
to Jakarta, to which two other members agreed. The decision to send a delegation to 
Jakarta was therefore agreed upon by a slim vote of four in favour, two against and one 
abstention. The delegation was to be comprised of the Chairman and Secretary, who 
were to visit Jakarta on 10thMay, (Minutes of the GCNA Board of Directors Meeting, April 
19, 1989). 
This meeting showed the strained relationship between the ASPIN and the GCNA was 
beginning to be felt in the boardroom of the GCNA, as tension was evident between 
members; this growing tension could be attributed in part to the absence of information 
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regarding the actual situation within ASPIN and that the GCNA lacked the experience of 
dealing with such a situation. 
 
Sixth Meeting, 25 April, 1989 -- Decision-Making and Dyadic Communication Stages 
This stage reflects the ongoing desire on the part of the GCNA to restore the relationship 
by continuing to insist on the meeting with ASPIN. This insistence represents attempts at 
starting negotiations over the existing situation with a view to finding a solution. However, 
by that time, the relationship was operating at two different levels, because in Indonesia, 
the trade reforms were being expedited and, therefore, ASPIN was at the disengagement 
stage of the relationship. They knew that restoring the relationship to what existed before 
was impossible but ASPIN appeared to have hidden this fact from their partner the GCNA 
Board of Directors. 
At that meeting, the Chairman read a telex dated 20/4/89, making a last appeal to ASPIN 
to visit Grenada by May 29th or at the earliest possible date. In what seemed to be 
growing desperation to find answers and solutions to the worsening price for nutmeg on 
the International market, the GCNA Board decided that this would be the last appeal, 
following which the delegation would visit Indonesia (Meeting of the GCNA Board of 
Directors, April 25, 1989). They were very aware of the consequences of not meeting to 
find a solution to the worsening financial and trade situation facing the GCNA and the 
Grenadian economy. 
Seventh Meeting, 23 May, 1989 – Decision-Making and Dyadic Communication Stages  
By May 23, 1989, the continuing brinkmanship between the GCNA and ASPIN regarding 
the location of the meeting continued, with ASPIN acquiescing to the request for the 
meeting but insisting that the meeting take place in Jakarta. However, Chairman James 
responded by insisting that the meeting takes place in Grenada,‖ (Minutes of GCNA Board 
of Directors Meeting, May 23, 1989). 
This Board meeting took place within the context of the decision-making and dyadic 
stages of the demise of the business relationship. The attempts by the GCNA continued to 
demonstrate their desire to restore the relationship in order for them to attain their 
personal objective to be seen as a hero to the farmers, to earn higher incomes for 
themselves and the GCNA, and as well to maintain the perception of the board as an 
effective one which managed its affairs well and was deserving of another term in office.  
It took the GCNA Board of Directors approximately three months before they informed 
their other major stakeholder at the domestic level of the instability of the agreement. This 
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late action on the part of the Board appeared as a sign of desperation to obtain the 
intervention of the Government of Grenada in finding a solution to the ever-worsening 
problem, though in principle the government should have been aware of the problem 
through its representative on the Board. Approaching the government represented an 
expansion of communication within the network to protect themselves from allegations of 
incompetence by allowing the agreement to collapse, or to demonstrate to the 
Government of Grenada that they were being proactive in finding a solution to the growing 
demise of the relationship.  
Eight Meeting, 20 June, 1989 -- Assessment, Decision-Making, Dyadic and Networking 
Stages 
The GCNA continued its efforts at assessing the situation with the cartel in order to make 
decisions, as it continued to engage ASPIN, and at the same time expanding its 
communication to the extended networks, to now include the local Grenada Development 
Bank (GDB). It is evident that the GCNA considered alternative courses of action, given 
the current state of the cartel. The communication with the GDB related to the financing of 
the nutmeg oil distillation plant, which was seen as a solution to erase the high level of 
stocks held by the GCNA. The minutes of the above meeting note the following points that 
are of interest to this study: 
GDB advised in a letter of 9/8/89 that they have received from European Investment Bank 
(EIB) EC$1.2 million for the construction of the Nutmeg Oil Distillation Plant (NDP). The 
Board Secretary explained to the meeting that: (1) Mr. Oscari (Centre for the Development 
of Enterprise) advised that an allocation of $1.0 Million should be allocated as start-up 
cost; (2) Mr. Oscar had projected that the plant could run at a loss for the first five years; 
(3) the interest rate for the loan should be not more than 8 per cent, and (d) that the 
viability of the project depended on stocks of nutmeg exceeding 250 tons. 
During the discussion which ensued, Mr Benjamin stated that: (1) negotiations should be 
entered into with GDB in order to help compare with the best alternative [rate of interest] 
available, and (2) that "The true picture, relative to the nutmeg oil distillation project, was 
not given to the growers." 
Ferguson responded by voicing his opposition to the loan from the GDB, arguing that the 
bank could use the debt which the GCNA would incur to leverage against the Association 
in the future. He contradicted Benjamin by stating that members were presented with all 
information relative to the NDP. The Chairman (James) concluded the discussion on the 
matter by stating that the Board remained committed to the NDP and that negotiations 
with the GDB on the loan would commence while awaiting the feasibility study. 
 234 
 
Four months following the change in ASPIN‘s sales policy, and years of knowledge of the 
persistence of smuggling, news of current smuggling activities reached GCNA, which was 
deemed to be another reason why the meeting with ASPIN ought to take place. GCNA‘s 
decision-makers understood the impact smuggling had on the stability of the cartel and 
were determined to work with ASPIN to resolve it. 
With regards to the continuing communication with ASPIN, Chairman James reported 
that: (1) ASPIN had responded suggesting that the meeting takes place in New York; (2) 
he (James) had rejected the idea of meeting in a third country; (3) he (James) had 
suggested that GCNA send a delegation to Jakarta; (4) and in response ASPIN had  
tentatively agreed to a meeting on 17 July in Jakarta, and (5) he (James) and the Board 
Secretary would attend that meeting. 
 
The above discourse shows it took three months before ASPIN agreed to a meeting. 
During that time the GCNA Board engaged in a search to find a solution to the problem by 
expanding the conversations about the issue to an ever-increasing number of actors and 
stakeholders in the nutmeg supply chain, ranging from domestic to external stakeholders 
(Catz International, Rucker & Slann, the Government and the University of the West 
Indies), and considered the possibility of a nutmeg oil distillation plant to make use of the 
accumulated stock of nutmeg. 
Ninth Meeting, 4 July, 1989 -- Assessment, Decision-Making, Dyadic Communication 
Stages Arising from Existing Factors – the Decision to Attend the Meeting in Jakarta. 
By the time the GCNA delegation left for the meeting in Jakarta, GCNA‘s trust in the 
ASPIN had lowered significantly. This was based on the unfolding events which 
commenced with the unilateral decisions of ASPIN regarding the pricing and sales policy, 
and the manner in which they were forced to acquiesce to the meeting.  
While some members of the GCNA Board of Directors were doubtful about the sincerity of 
ASPIN, they predicted that ASPIN would honour the agreement and that ASPIN would 
operate in a manner which engenders good-will. However as time passed, trust started 
dissipating. Nonetheless, on July 4, it was decided that the GCNA delegation would leave 
for Jakarta on July 8 1989, with the following points for discussions: (1) the existing quota 
system; (2) the prices for various products; (3) arrangements for exchange of information; 
(4) the need for closer cooperation, and (5) a joint statement to the market. 
However, Director Benjamin differed, he felt that the main issue should be adhering to the 
Agreement in place and nothing else, and further, the delegation was advised against 
agreeing to any geographical division of the market. The meeting rejected Benjamin‘s 
suggestions and maintained the points as articulated by the Chairman. 
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Tenth Meeting, 17 July, 1989 -  Assessment, Decision-Making, Dyadic Communication, 
Disengagement and Networking Stages. 
This tenth and very important meeting took place in Jakarta between GCNA, ASPIN, Catz 
International and First Pacific. It is included in this list because of its importance in the 
process of the dissolution of the Agreement and its significance for the GCNA.    
 
The composition of the meeting itself reflected the growing inclusion of additional players 
into the relationship, including a new player, First Pacific, a Singapore-based spice trader 
(World Bank Report, 1991). The researcher did not find any details of the Jakarta meeting 
within the archives of the GCNA, however at its board meeting of 17 August1989, the 
minutes recorded that the delegation returned from Jakarta and the following decisions 
were made: (a) that a new firm, First Pacific, would be responsible for all the day-to-day 
activities of the Agreement while not being a participant in it, and (b) ASPIN would 
continue to be responsible for marketing on behalf of its members. 
 
The introduction of First Pacific to the marketing arrangement with ASPIN, from the point 
of view of this study, had no influence or impact on the continuance of the agreement, but 
represented ASPIN‘s growing disengagement with GCNA. Since there was no central 
marketing agency between the two primary stakeholders to the cartel, ASPIN‘s stated 
dissected role was insignificant, as each of the parties were already operating on their 
own. Hence, the inclusion of First Pacific was a non-event to the idea of restoring the 
arrangement under cartel relationship. This act on the part of ASPIN represented further 
evidence of how weak and naïve ASPIN perceived the GCNA to be. 
 
Eleventh Meeting, 10 October, 1989 – Decision-Making and Disengagement Stages  
Catz continued to immerse itself in the affairs of the GCNA and the Agreement by being 
an interlocutor within the GCNA–ASPIN Agreement with ongoing marketing information. 
On 10 October, the then General Manager Renwick informed the Board that he received 
reports of increasing smuggling of nutmegs from Indonesia via Singapore, from Catz 
International, and that Man Producten was purchasing SUNs-grade nutmeg from New 
York at US$6,600  per ton. The Board advised that Renwick write to ASPIN about this 
issue. The Board also expressed concern about the conduct of Catz International in the 
market. These issues were under discussion while GCNA contemplated its various 
decisions going forward in its relationship with ASPIN. 
It was a cause for concern, as in the experiences with ASPIN from February to October, 
1989, the GCNA was still holding on to the view that ASPIN could have exercised control 
over the ongoing smuggling, in Indonesia. This seems senseless to the onlooker of these 
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events, but more so served to demonstrate the fact that the GCNA was operating in the 
absence of very important information. These events also highlighted the GCNA‘s 
constant but misguided attempts at restoring the relationship with ASPIN, since it was 
self-evident by ASPIN‘s conduct that it was not interested in rescuing the Agreement. 
Further it did not have the capacity for rescue given the basic weaknesses and the 
change in Indonesian economic policy. 
Twelfth Meeting, 9 January, 1990 - - Decision and Network Communication Stages 
The New Year started, and GCNA was still keen to save the agreement, but they were 
also aware that, to date, they had not been able to find a solution to the ongoing problem 
of continued declining prices. It was for this reason that they decided to expand the 
number of organisations and persons into their network, by seeking the political 
intervention of the government.  Therefore they requested the assistance of the Grenada 
Ministry of Trade or the Ministry of Cooperatives get involved in finding a possible 
solution, by travelling to Jakarta to try and save the agreement through the restoration of 
the price of nutmeg and mace to its previous levels. The use of extended networks 
coincided with that of Thatinen (1997, p.14) who argue that ―other network actors can, 
through their actions, influence the focal relationship and its actors, either towards or away 
from the dissolution.‖ The archives of the GCNA don‘t have any record about the above 
decision. This shows that the decision was not followed up on and, therefore, the situation 
remained the same.  
In fact, by January, 1990, the trading situation worsened; the stock of nutmeg and mace 
was increasing; revenue was down, when compared to the same period in the previous 
year to EC$2 million from EC$17.5 million (Minutes of the GCNA Board of Directors, 
January 20, 1990). The decline in revenue also impacted the advanced price and bonus 
paid to farmers, as well as the profits of the GCNA.  By that time, it appears that the 
GCNA Board was now fully convinced that ASPIN and Catz International were acting 
hand-in-glove. It was that thinking which drove Chairman James to suggest to the Board 
of Directors that "the key issue was for the Board to formulate its position on the 
following‖: (1) GCNA‘s relations with Catz; (2) GCNA‘s relations with ASPIN and First 
Pacific PTE; (3) prices relative to stock position; (4) marketing and promotion activities; (5) 
review of the international agents to be used, and (6) review of internal marketing 
structure so as to facilitate quick decision-making.‖ (Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA 
Board of Directors January 9, 1990). 
 
Board Member Campbell suggested they also needed additional information, especially 
on sales and on Catz‘s manoeuvrings. He felt that the Board was being manipulated by 
Catz and as a consequence the advance [payments] paid to farmers could be affected 
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(Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, 9 January, 1990). At this point, 
further conflicts of opinion between Board Members on the role of Catz International in the 
instability of the Agreement emerged. Ferguson argued: 
―That the board should break out of thinking of Catz and 
focus on the $25.0 million sales target for the year; that 
ASPIN was short of cash and the solution was for 
Indonesian farmers to form as association like GCNA; that 
the Board should inquire from ASPIN whether the 
Agreement was still in place; that the outstanding payment 
issue with Catz international should be addressed and that 
delegations should be sent out to the major markets with a 
view to understanding such markets,‖ 
(Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, January 9,1990.p.4). 
The impending demise of the attempt at cartelisation aroused wide-ranging discussions 
within the GCNA as they searched for solutions to the problem they were confronting. 
Board member St. John intervened and suggested that the Board should focus on a 
number of key issues such as to review the production of nutmegs worldwide to see if the 
market was oversupplied and therefore putting pressure on prices; review the Agreement 
with ASPIN; look with urgency at getting a large sale at the best possible price. (Minutes 
of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, January 9, 1990) 
The debate continued within the GCNA to the extent that certain board members began to 
doubt their ability to resolve the challenges confronting the GCNA. This was expressed by 
board member Campbell who said he was  
"not sure whether the Board had the capacity to deal with 
the relevant issues that arose and therefore suggested that 
the GCNA get a competent economist, who could advise it 
on marketing questions, similar to the arrangement which 
the Grenada Cocoa Association has with Mr. Denis Henry,"  
(Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors 9 
January, 1990,p.5). 
Another Board Member, Benjamin, supported Campbell‘s views and reiterated that GCNA 
needed help and that the expertise could not be found inside the association. The above 
views were rejected by the chairman who expressed the view that the present 
administration was ―au fait‖ with the situation and quite capable of giving the board the 
necessary guidance and executing the policies of the board. (Minutes of Meeting of the 
GCNA Board of Directors January 9, 1990) 
The chairman was supported by Ferguson (a farmer representative) who stated that "the 
marketing of cocoa was different to that of nutmegs. I do not see the need for an outside 
economist and that the thinking advanced by Messrs Campbell and Benjamin was typical 
of thinking that reduced farmers to low levels of intelligence, who are incapable of 
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handling their own affairs. This does not augur well and for progress, this thinking must be 
changed," (Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, 9 January, 1990, p.2) 
"The administration was directed to get the necessary 
statistical information on the market so as to provide 
members with the database necessary for the discussions to 
be held with Mr. Klaus Huitema of Catz International B.V. 
and for subsequent decisions on visits to the market," 
(Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, 9 
January,1990:3). 
 
The above discourse revealed how the unfolding dynamics of the collapse of the attempts 
at cartelisation were impacting the internal discourse within the GCNA, as they seemed 
unable to find an appropriate solution. Yet the lead members of the board (James and 
Ferguson) rejected the proposal to obtain external professional inputs.  
 
Thirteenth Meeting, 20 February, 1990 --Network Communication and Disengagement  
On 29 February, 1990, the general manager (Renwick) confirmed the visit of Huitema on 
Saturday, 24 February, 1990. The Board agreed to meet with him on Wednesday, 27 
February. The manager then proceeded to inform the board of claims on the poor quality 
of mace made by Catz International but as usual he was still interested in purchasing a 
quantity of nutmeg and mace (Minutes of GCNA Board Meeting, February 20, 1990). 
Discussion ensued on the matter and Benjamin expressed the following views:  
1. That he was highly suspicious about the manner in which these claims coincided with  
Huitema's visit;  
2. That if Catz International BV was prepared to purchase a substantial quantity of 
nutmeg, a discount would be given instead of an umbrella decrease in price on the 
international market; no umbrella protection would be given; 
3. That the claims from Catz international B.V. would not be accepted. 
 Mr. Ferguson suggested that in order to reduce the GCNA‘s reliance on Catz 
International, they should actively pursue market visits in Europe, North America, and 
South America, (Minutes of Meeting of the GCNA Board of Directors, February 20-, 1990). 
It would appear that the reality of Catz International as a manipulator of the market was 
now being universally accepted by the GCNA Board of Directors, and as a consequence 
they should seek alternative markets/ agents. 
In the meantime the proposed nutmeg oil distillation plant project was still under 
consideration by the GCNA Board. However, the project was delayed due to 
specifications that were missing. Members expressed concern over the additional costs 
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and suggested that it might have been better to purchase the plant with advice from 
Tractebel, the engineering consultants. 
Fourteenth Meeting, 24 June, 1990 -Disengagement and Aftermath Stages 
Finally, the fallibility of attempts at cartelisation was formally brought to the attention of the 
GCNA Board of Directors when a telex was received from ASPIN dated 31/5/90, informing 
the GCNA that as at 25/5/90 ASPIN ceased to be the sole selling organisation for 
Indonesian nutmeg and mace. This followed the removal of the export restrictions on 
these products by the Indonesian Government, (Minutes of GCNA Board Meeting, June 
24, 1990, p 2). Additionally, the GCNA Board reacted by stating that the board should 
remain calm and monitor the situation, and that no premature public statement should be 
made. "A telex should be sent to ASPIN expressing regret over the action of Government 
to deregulate the export of nutmeg and mace and to thank them for their co-operation 
over the past four years‖. 
However, the GCNA had obtained information on the changes in ASPIN prior to the 
receipt of the official correspondence from ASPIN. On June 22, 1990, two days prior to 
the Board meeting, Chairman James gave an interview to the weekly newspaper, 
Grenada Today, which carried the headline ―Nutmeg PACT Collapse.‖ Chairman James 
had admitted to the newspaper ―that the three-year old nutmeg pact signed between the 
island [GCNA] and its major product partner, Indonesia, has collapsed,‖ (Grenada Today, 
1990, p.13).  
He blamed ASPIN for the collapse of the agreement by stating: ―ASPIN had been selling 
at prices below the minimum agreed upon by the two countries to get rid of a substantial 
amount of stock of nutmegs and mace on hand, and that ASPIN had written to the GCNA 
indicating that it could do nothing about it. Since they (ASPIN) can‘t do anything [to stop 
the smuggling and increase prices] then there is no Agreement,‖ (Grenada Today, 1990, 
p.13). 
The GCNA Annual financial statement (1991) reported that its revenue for 1990 fell from 
EC$29,404,798 to EC$13,255,438 in 1991, a decline of EC$16,209,359. This drastic 
decline in revenue was due to the decline in export prices received by the GCNA, which 
fell from EC$5.76 per pound in 1990 to EC$4.58 per pound in 1991. Simultaneously, the 
farm gate price declined from EC$3.04 in 1990 to EC$1, 54 in 1991, a 49.34-per cent 
decline during the same period the advanced payment declined from EC$16,869.762 to 
EC$10,000,000, while bonus payment went from EC$5,000,000 to non-payment. In fact 
this dramatic decline in earnings for GCNA brought it close to bankruptcy and its finances 




Table 7.1 Summary Financial Impact of the Failed Agreement on the GCNA: 1990 - 1991 
Financial Elements 1990 1991 
Total Revenue  EC$29,404,798 EC$13,255,438 
Export Price per pound of 
nutmeg 
EC$5.76 EC$3.11 
Bonus Payments EC$45,000,000 EC$0.0 
Advance payment to 
farmers/Farm-gate price  
EC$3.04 EC$1.54  
Source. GCNA Financial Statement and Trading Summary 1990-1991  
 
7.5  Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This section demonstrates that GCNA became aware of ASPIN‘s diminishing commitment 
to the Marketing Agreement in February 1989. The Agreement ended formally on 25 May 
1990. The evidence gathered in this study shows that there was an absence of a number 
of basic conditions (high market concentration, significant entry barriers, organisational 
structures and processes to ensure compliance and commitment of participants to the 
Agreement) needed for the Agreement to function effectively as a cartel. The chronology 
of the failed attempt showed that it did not proceed along a smooth and logical trajectory, 
but rather through a series of decisions, actions and inaction. 
The section demonstrates the unbalanced nature of the Agreement. GCNA‘s commitment 
to continuing the commitment was strong based on the importance for the GCNA and its 
primary stakeholders (farmer members of the GCNA, the Government of Grenada and the 
GCNA Board Members as agents of the primary stakeholders) of the Agreement and a 
belief in the feasibility of sustaining the Agreement. The belief in the feasibility of 
sustaining an effective agreement in the absence of the necessary conditions was based 
on incomplete information about the nature of ASPIN and non-existence of the necessary 
conditions. 
Because of its commitment to the survival of the Agreement, GCNA continued in its efforts 
to keep the Agreement going when it was failing. However, it did not succeed because 
ASPIN‘s commitment was always lower than that of the GCNA and its powers to control 
the supply of Indonesian nutmeg were also very limited. Eventually, ASPIN could not 
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survive the economic policy reforms in Indonesia formally brining the Agreement to an 
end. 
There were differences of opinion within the GCNA Board on the causes of the failure and 
what could be done to retrieve the situation. However, most Board Members appeared to 
believe more in the malign motivation of international agents against the Agreement and 
the unwillingness on the part of ASPIN to comply with the Agreement MoA and MoU than 
the absence of the basic conditions for the survival of the Agreement.  
The chronology of the talk and text highlighted some of the structural weaknesses in the 
agreement. The absence of an organisational structure and processes for managing the 
Agreement affected its implementation and may have provided ASPIN with the 
opportunity to delay meetings requested by the GCNA and, by so doing, increased the 
lack of trust between the two parties. 
The talk and text further shows the asymmetry of information between the GCNA and 
ASPIN. The chronology of events showed that ASPIN was fully aware of the unfolding 
situation inside of Indonesia and ASPIN, but even when such information was available, 
they seemed not to be able to act appropriately or in a timely manner to inform their 
partner. The GCNA appears to have been naïve and uninformed in dealing with ASPIN 





Chapter 8- Conclusion 
This chapter gives an overview of this research and presents its contributions in section 
8.1. Section 8.2 summarises the conduct of the research while sections 8.3 and 8.4 
present the main and specific conclusions of this research. Finally, section 8.5 presents 
the limitations of the research and the possible areas for future research, and section 8.6 
presents a brief afterword on what occurred between the GCNA and the Indonesian 
Nutmeg Exporters and Catz International. 
 
8.1 General Overview of This Research and Its Contributions 
This study examined the role and behaviour of primary stakeholders of the GCNA in the 
decision-making processes as they related to the formation, performance and dissolution 
of attempts at forming the first International Nutmeg Cartel established between the 
GCNA of Grenada and the ASPIN of Indonesia, against the backdrop of the intervention 
of primary and secondary stakeholders. The research addressed three main questions, in 
order to help focus the study: 
1. What factors and interactions with other stakeholders influenced the GCNA Board of 
Directors‘ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing 
Agreement to operate as a cartel? 
 
2. How did the interventions of other parties (external stakeholders) impact the creation, 
performance and the eventual collapse of the Marketing Agreement? 
 
3. Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA Board persist in trying to 
keep the Agreement going when it started failing? 
 
The study‘s contribution to knowledge arises from the multi-dimensional analysis of the 
evolution of the failed attempts at the development and survival of a commodity cartel. In 
particular, the study demonstrated how in the absence of the conditions necessary for a 
commodity cartel to succeed, the prevalence of information asymmetry and reliance on 
external parties, contributed to the GCNA stakeholders‘ persistence in developing and 
sustaining the Marketing Agreement as an international cartel in collaboration with ASPIN. 
The persistence has been based on misconceived perceptions on the existence or 
achievability of the economic conditions required for the Agreement to function as a cartel 
and belief of the GCNA Board in their own capacities to influence other key stakeholders. 
The study portrays the interactions between the fundamental market conditions and the 
decisions and actions of the GCNA Board as key internal stakeholders representing the 
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interests of larger group of nutmeg farmers. Additionally, the contribution of this thesis lies 
in the way insights are provided and how the empirical data from interviews and available 
archival date have been combined to tell a comprehensive story of the failed attempt by 
the two nutmeg-producing countries at cartelisation from the perspective of Grenada as a 
small island economy.   
The significance of Grenada being a small island economy in this context is relevant for a 
number of reasons. Grenada‘s economy, size and population are miniscule in comparison 
with Indonesia‘s (about 0.1 per cent of the GDP, less than 0.05 per cent of the population 
and less than 0.01 per cent of the land area of Indonesia). Further, Grenada had a 
minority share of the market for the commodity. However, its dependence on its exports 
was significant and a high proportion of households had earnings from nutmeg production. 
For Indonesia nutmegs were a small part of the rural economy and exports and the 
performance of this sector was much less of a concern than the much larger economic 
challenges it faced. Grenadian policy makers, commitment to the Agreement was 
therefore much greater than that of Indonesian policy makers. Being a small economy 
with a minority share of the commodity also made it vulnerable to the market power of 
international traders and reliant on relationships with them for market intelligence and 
advice on managing the sector and international sales.      
At the management and policy levels, this thesis makes a contribution to strategic policy 
decision formulation for the Grenada nutmeg Industry at a time when its stakeholders 
continued to debate issues such as governance and structure of the industry, the 
continuance of the GCNA as a cooperative, and diversification through the movement of 
its products up the value chain. This work will also make practical contributions to 
strategic policy development, implementation and management of the GCNA, other 
commodity organisations in Grenada, and elsewhere. It will also aid public- and private-
sector policy makers and stakeholders who are associated with producer cartels in 
developing countries.   
 
8.2 Conduct of the Research 
An integrative, qualitative case-study approach was adopted, since it allowed for an in-
depth investigation of the phenomenon (Yin, 1994; 2003) by gathering data from multiple, 
reliable, primary and secondary sources (archival records and interviews with key 
participants) in conjunction with the use of relevant sets of academic literature on: 
stakeholder theory and conditions required for the formation and survival of cartels and 
commodity agreements. Part of the study employed the data analysis techniques of Ann 
Langley‘s (1999) strategies on ―temporal bracketing‖ and narrative analysis. A process 
approach was applied to a cooperative organisation operating in the international 
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commodity sector in a small-island/ developing-country context, and operating in a market 
where they perceived themselves as price-makers rather than (the reality) price-takers. 
This integrative case-study approach provides the opportunity to reconstruct the attempts 
at formation, survival and the eventual collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Nutmeg Cartel.  
In collecting the relevant data, a triangulation approach (Yin, 1994; 2003) was used to 
gather data from multiple sources: (a) through interviews with key actors and others in 
Grenada and outside, and (b) archival records of text and financial data from the GCNA. 
With regards to data from the other stakeholders in the story, primary data through 
interviews were collected from Mormon from Catz International and from Fooks & French. 
However, the research did not unearth much published literature on ASPIN or the 
Indonesian nutmeg industry during the period. Two sources of value here were Marks and 
Pomeroy (1995) and Tirtawinata (1992). Langley‘s (1996) sense making – narrative - 
strategy and chronological methodology were relied upon to describe and tell the story of 
the formation and collapse of the GCNA-ASPIN Nutmeg Cartel. The work of Thàtinen and 
Halinen (1994) on the steps in business relationship dissolution was referred to with 
respect to the study of the demise of the Agreement.  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that stakeholder theory is unarguably ―descriptive‖ 
but at the same time recognized the inter-relationships between the descriptive, normative 
and instrumentalist approaches. This research found that in order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the case, all three perspectives were relevant. Whereas 
the descriptive helped to illuminate the entities and actors in the case, the normative was 
used to gain insights into the contractual arrangement and the behaviour of each party 
towards the agreement, while the instrumental strand was employed in establishing the 
framework that looked into the management of the organisation and its performance. 
Nevertheless, the descriptive strand was the main one used since it helped to describe, 
explain and illuminate the issues in the case.  
Concerning the organisation of the work, Chapter 1 introduced the study and outlined the 
issues to be investigated. Chapter 2 presented the context for the study, in particular 
Grenada‘s history, geography and agricultural economy, and demonstrates that the 
nutmeg is one of Grenada‘s leading export products. Chapter 3 reviewed pertinent 
literature in a number of areas relevant for examining the multi-dimensional aspects of the 
investigations, in particular the conditions necessary for the development and survival of 
cartels, and the use of stakeholder analysis in setting the contextual background of the 
case and understanding the perspectives and conduct of internal and external 
stakeholders. Chapter 4 presented the research methodology, covering data-collection 
methods and analysis, including Langley‘s (1999) temporal bracketing approach, issues of 
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reliability, accuracy, and validity associated with a single-case study, and the possible 
sources of errors and shortcomings.  
The next four chapters focused on the investigation of the phases of the failed attempt at 
the formation and operations of the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement and its ultimate collapse. 
Chapter 5 focused on the aspects relating to the formation of the cartel, and answered the 
question ―What factors and interactions with other stakeholders influenced the GCNA 
Board of Directors’ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing 
Agreement to operate as a cartel?  
Chapter 6 discussed the second question of this research: ―How did the interventions of 
other parties (external stakeholders) impact the creation, performance and the eventual 
collapse of the Marketing Agreement?‖ It further described the operational and 
performance aspects separated into two major periods, 1986 to1989 and 1989 to1991, 
representing the periods of short-term pricing success and failure. The latter period is 
presented from the perspective of the talk and text of that period, using Langley‘s 
temporal bracketing and narrative strategy. The third research question addressed is: 
―Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA Board persist in trying to keep 
the Agreement going when it started failing?‖ This question is principally addressed in 
Chapter 7. However, in discussing the ―why did the Agreement collapse‖ part of the 
overlap with the earlier chapters cannot be avoided. The collapse of the Joint GCNA-
ASPIN Marketing Agreement has been analysed using the theoretical lens of Levenstein 
and Suslow (2006), Utton (2011); Marshall and Mark (2012), as well as that of Ring and 
Van de Ven (1994), Thàtinen (1999;2001) and Thàtinen and Halinen (1997).  
 
8.3 The main conclusions of this research 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) suggested that business relationships always need human 
factors to emerge, evolve, grow and dissolve as time passes, and the roles of the actors 
can be conflicting at times. The roles of actors also interact with the underlying 
fundamental factors and perceptions of these factors. A summary of the overarching 
conclusions, below, is followed by more detailed findings and conclusions.  
This thesis arrived at conclusions in seven areas: (a) the motivation of the participating 
primary stakeholders; (b) desire to achieve sustained increased prices overtime; (c) the 
role of external stakeholders the formation and demise; (d) conditions for cartel success; 
(e) implications of objectives for the performance and longevity of the Agreement; (f) 
inability of participating partners to the agreement to stem the influence of external 
stakeholders, and (g) the absence of conditions necessary for the development and 
survival of cartels. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
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On the first area, on the basis of the evidence in this study, it can be concluded that the 
motivation of the primary stakeholder groupings within the GCNA, the nutmeg farmers as 
members and their representatives on the Board of Directors in creating the pressure to 
form the nutmeg cartel, was strong. For the nutmeg farmers and the GCNA Board as the 
agents of the farmers it was based on the desire to stabilise and increase incomes. For 
the Government of Grenada, apart from the political dividend from higher nutmeg prices 
for a significant proportion of rural citizens, it was based on the foreign exchange earnings 
from nutmeg exports.  
The evidence indicates that the impact of the pressure of the primary stakeholders 
resulting in the Agreement provided impressive financial success in the short term but did 
not provide long-term price stability or profitability. It also led to financial jeopardy for the 
GCNA. In this regard, the maximisation of income sought by the members was no 
different from the short-term profit maximisation motive of private shareholders in a 
conventional business. Shareholders, to varying degrees, may have the objective of short-
term profit maximisation or longer-term value maximisation. Arguably, the GCNA 
members as primary stakeholders had an interest in its long-term sound performance. 
Their pressure to form the cartel appears to be based on their perception that higher 
stable prices were sustainable.   
On the second area, the desire for sustained increased prices emerged from a misplaced 
perception that as the world‘s two major suppliers of a primary commodity, Grenada and 
Indonesia could exert significant influence on the international supply of nutmeg and 
thereby become price-makers, rather than remain price-takers. An evaluation of the 
literature on GVC (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Gereffi, 1994; Banga, nd and 
Brown; Derudder, Pamreiter, Pelupessy, Taylor and Witcox; Hopkins and Wallerstein, 
1986) showed that primary commodity producers are fundamentally price-takers who 
lacked the control and power (driveness) of the key high-value marketing and distribution 
end of global commodity value chains. Therefore, a key economic motivation on the part 
of the international stakeholders in Grenada to create this cartel was a desire to retain a 
greater proportion of the value of their exports. Foreign traders and retailers gaining high 
shares of the value of the commodity is what Brizan (2003) referred to as the export of a 
nation‘s wealth and ―neo-mercantilism‖. 
On the third area, the evidence suggests that a secondary and external stakeholder, Catz 
International, through its CEO Mr. Huitema, was the major catalyst in the formation of the 
GCNA-ASPIN Joint Marketing Agreement, since he perceived that with a controlled 
market Catz, GCNA and ASPIN stood to benefit from increased prices, and this was his 
primary motive for steering Grenada and Indonesia into the Agreement. This case found 
evidence of his contribution to the demise of the effort as well, in the words of Moermon of 
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Catz who stated that as sales for nutmeg slowed and their warehouses in Rotterdam 
swelled, they decided to release an unspecified amount of nutmeg on the market which 
led to a further decline in prices. It was this downward spiralling of prices which 
contributed to the proximate causes for the failed attempt at cartelisation. However, it 
should be noted that this release of stocks came quite late, in 1991, by which time the 
Agreement had ended.    
Huitema had a long history of being Grenada‘s single-largest agent and broker as well as 
that of Indonesian nutmeg (37 years by 1991). That experience provided him with a 
significant and possibly unique knowledge of the global nutmeg trade. In fact, at a meeting 
of the Indonesian and Grenadian nutmeg representatives held in Rotterdam on 5 April 
1994, Mr. Huitema declared: 
 ―I think that nobody in this room has been doing business in 
nutmegs and mace as long as I have been.‖  
(Speech by Huitema, 5 April, 1994.) 
His long engagement with the nutmeg trade and GCNA also gave him special access to 
the GCNA through personal relationships and a position of trust at the beginning of the 
episode.    
There were other stakeholders who were against the formation of the cartel. The idea of 
forming the Agreement did not have the support of all international traders. Major traders 
and distributors such as Fooks & French and Rucker & Slann voiced their opposition to 
interference in the market.   
The actions of other external stakeholders also contributed significantly to the demise. In 
the late 1980s, in response to an economic crisis the Indonesian Government entered into 
a structural adjustment programme with support from the IMF and the World Bank. As part 
of the reform package, the Government of Indonesia was required to liberalise all state 
monopolies and commodity export boards such as ASPIN and the Rubber Board. This 
decision to cease control of nutmeg exports was communicated via a Government Decree 
in May 1990 to ASPIN. As a consequence, ASPIN ceased to exist and put an end to the 
Agreement. This indicates, from a stakeholder theoretical perspective, that external 
stakeholders‘ influence and power were more significant in determining the viability of the 
nutmeg cartel than the primary stakeholder groups in GCNA and ASPIN. The case of the 
impact of the external stakeholders -- IMF/WB and the Government of Indonesia -- within 
the context of the failed attempt to develop and sustain the cartel will be revisited later in 
the chapter because of its overarching significance for the events leading to, and the 
eventual demise of, the efforts at cartelisation. However it should be noted that 
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irrespective of this influence, the basic economic conditions required for the Agreement to 
function effectively as a cartel did not exist.  
The fourth area is the conditions that must exist in order to allow for the development and 
continuation of cartels. Each cartel is different; formed in different economic and other 
circumstances, requiring a considerable amount of organisational and other types of skills 
in order to be successful. However, in this case there were a number of factors which 
were absent. These include sufficient control of the market by cartel members, 
compliance with cartel conditions, high entry barriers and establishing a centre of 
operations for the cartel which would combine data on prices, costs and other marketing 
variables to make more informed decisions on prices and quotas and respond to changing 
circumstances. The need for a communications protocol to reduce information asymmetry, 
and to be activated from the centre of operations to handle internal and public 
communications, would positively impact the timeliness, order and direction of information 
flows, factors crucial to achieving smooth operations of the cartel as well as its longevity. 
The conclusion on the fifth area is that sustainability and longevity of a cartel depend on 
the objectives of the cartel with the distribution of benefits between the participants being 
clearly established and met, and based on a sound appraisal of the economic conditions 
necessary for sustainability. In this case, the primary objective of GCNA and ASPIN was 
to obtain increased sustained stable prices over the long term by restricting supplies to the 
market. Whereas this objective is not unusual for a cartel, this research found that this, in 
itself, was not sufficient. Other objectives such as the establishment of a buffer stock and 
other joint ownership mechanisms were absent which served to dilute the cohesiveness of 
the participants to the agreement.  
On the sixth area, the parties to the agreement did not have the market conditions in their 
favour or the capacity to combat the responses of other actors in the sector (producers, 
suppliers, international traders and end users) which worked against the Agreement. 
When the influence of the World Bank and the IMF came to bear on the Government of 
Indonesia which ended the formal status of ASPIN as the agency to control the exports of 
Indonesian nutmeg, any semblance of the effectiveness of the Agreement as a cartel 
came to an end. 
On the seventh area, probably the most important reason for the short duration of the 
Agreement was the non-existence of the basic economic conditions required for 
sustaining the cartel which are outlined in section 7.2 (Chapter 7). They fall into two broad 
categories: (a) economic conditions concerned with market structures, and (b) 
management of the Agreement. The issues highlighted under area six above are related 
to the economic conditions as the responses of the external nutmeg sector stakeholders 
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are consequences of the non-existence of the basic economic conditions, for example low 
share of supply under control of the members of the Agreement and low entry barriers 
lead to non-Agreement with suppliers selling below the Agreement prices and 
undermining it. 
 
8.4 Specific Conclusions on the research questions 
This sub-section will summarise the findings on the research questions addressed in this 
study based on the conclusions summarised in the previous section.   
Research question 1 
What factors and interactions with other stakeholders influenced the GCNA Board of 
Directors’ decision to take initiatives to form the Joint GCNA-ASPIN Marketing 
Agreement to operate as a cartel? 
The first and major factor which influenced the GCNA Board to form the agreement was 
the need to increase prices and retain a higher proportion of the value in nutmegs to the 
farmers. The decision by the GCNA Board of Directors to enter into an agreement with 
ASPIN of Indonesia to attempt to form the first nutmeg cartel was motivated by 
stakeholder, political and economic interests as well as the wider need to foster national 
economic growth and development. 
A central concept in stakeholder theory is that all stakeholders in an organisation are of 
importance to the organisation and the organisation, in return, treats them with fairness as 
stakeholders This was manifested in the application of the Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1979) 
framework on stakeholder analysis, which was used as a tool to determine who the 
stakeholders in the GCNA were, the nature of their stakes and, as a consequence, how 
they should be treated. The need for nutmeg farmers to receive fairer treatment, arising 
from the sale of their produce via the price they received for their produce was one of 
three fundamental objectives for forming the GCNA in 1947, and it was that same 
underlying concept of fair treatment for the farmers which influenced the consensus to 
enter into the Agreement with ASPIN. It was the perception of the GCNA BoD that such 
an agreement would achieve the objective. 
The second factor was the power of the Board to take such strategic decisions on behalf 
of its members. Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) framework helped to identify the interests 
and stakes of the GCNA BoD as well as their dominant role in the formation of the Joint 
Agreement. One illustration was the Board‘s decision to pursue the Agreement with 
ASPIN without proper consultation with the general membership, as well as their refusal to 
adhere to the advice offered by the delegates at the GCNA Annual General Meeting 
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(AGM). The advice and decision of the AGM (1986) required the BoD to develop a 
comprehensive plan prior to meeting with ASPIN. In fact, Mitchell et al (1997), in 
developing the stakeholder constructs, uses power, legitimacy and urgency in order to 
establish the salience of stakeholder groups. The research has found that the power of a 
group is transitional with time and space as evidenced by the refusal of the BoD to accede 
to the advice of the delegates. Indeed, later the external stakeholders such as the 
Government of Indonesia, IMF and the World Bank exerted greater power than the two 
parties to the agreement.  
Within the primary stakeholder group of the GCNA Board of Directors, the individuals had 
personal as well as inter-group interests which were expressed in different forms and 
served as motivators to forming the Joint Agreement. For example, whereas Chairman 
James and Board Member Ferguson had different political allegiances, they nonetheless 
found coherence in their support for the Agreement with Indonesia. That convergence of 
support on this issue was rooted in nutmeg politics in which as members of the Board, 
their overarching objective was to be seen as taking decisions in the best interest of the 
farmers. 
The archives of the GCNA showed that the discussions on the GCNA‘s participation in the 
Agreement were dominated by James and Ferguson, with intermittent inputs from others. 
This research has not found any conclusive explanation for the silence of other Board 
members including the government appointee. It appears that the other members had 
ceded decision-making to those whom they perceived to be the most knowledgeable on 
the industry. Therefore, this key stakeholder group, the GCNA Board of Directors, led by 
two dominant actors driven by a combination of personal political objectives (both nutmeg 
related and national), and combined with their desire to retain a greater portion of the 
value added from the export of nutmeg in Grenada, made key decisions on the 
Agreement. 
A third factor involved the political ambition of key stakeholders in the organisation. The 
political ambition of some members of the Board of Directors and, in particular, the then 
Chairman of the GCNA Board, appeared to be a factor encouraging and supporting the 
formation of the cartel (interviews with Logie, April 4, 2015,  and Lord, March19, 2015).  
In general, members on the Board of Directors who harboured overt or covert political or 
other interests, and who dominated the talk at the Board level, could exert 
disproportionate influence on the decision-making processes and decision outcomes. 
There was evidence that some Board members used the formation of the cartel and the 
resulting short-term higher prices and bonuses for the members to consolidate their 
position by seeking re-election on the Board and to gain political capital with the farmers 
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and their respective political groupings. It has been suggested by Meckling (1976) that 
electing board of directors from the membership could adversely affect management of 
the cooperative because the members may not possess the relevant competence for 
effectively managing the cooperative as a business.  
A fourth factor was the knowledge base of decision-makers within the GCNA. Decision-
makers in commodity marketing organisations, contemplating forming a cartel or taking 
measures to improve their market performance, needed to have sound knowledge of 
market conditions for their products and position of the organisation in relation to other 
suppliers, intermediaries and customers in the GVC. This study found that the Board of 
Directors of the GCNA did not have such knowledge and relied on external advice from its 
agent. The GCNA did not have the knowledge to scrutinise and validate the advice being 
received from the agent. This gap in the knowledge and information base within the 
GCNA widened the information asymmetry, which in turn influenced their decision to enter 
into the type of agreement at the time. This factor is relevant for addressing research 
questions 2 and 3 as well.  
A fifth factor was the economic conditions which served to explain the formation of 
commodity cartels. Regarding this, Stigler (1966) and Schumpeter (1978) held that slow 
growth of exports and volatile but generally declining export prices from commodity-
producing countries have resulted in persistent and expanding balance of payment deficits 
which, in turn, acted as the stimulus for the formation of cartels. 
The data gathered during this research showed that Grenada had continually experienced 
declining terms of trade as its trade deficits widened from EC$M88.6 in 1985 to 
EC$M126.6 in 1990. The research found no evidence to suggest that the need for the 
government to arrest and turn around the declining terms of trade was an economic 
consideration on the part of the GCNA Board of Directors in fostering the drive towards 
the attempt at the formation of a cartel, However, one can assume that there were 
members of the BoD (such as McPhail a teaching colleague of Brizan) who could have 
been influenced by advocates such as Brizan who consistently publicly advocated the 
need for collusion as a counter balance to the neo-mercantilism in the nutmeg trade.  
In the five years leading up to the agreement, the export price received by GCNA, as well 
as the farm gate price paid to the farmers, was on a downward trajectory and needed 
reversing (see Chapter 5, Table 5.2 and 5.3). This downward trending of prices was a key 
economic and social factor which influenced the GCNA BoD into attempting to form a 
cartel. Further, the government policy was influenced by GCNA members who were 
perceived as a large voting block of stakeholders with the potential to influence the 
outcome of national general elections as voters. The Government of Grenada was not 
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directly involved in the formation of the cartel, but was represented by  three individuals on 
the Board of Directors who supported the Board decision to enter into the Joint Marketing 
Agreement, despite the silence of their voices, except that of  Mc Phail. 
A sixth factor concerned with market conditions was the need for regulating the 
International nutmeg market. The literature on cartels argues that cartels are collusive 
arrangements made by firms to regulate markets, restrict the level of output and thereby 
increase prices and profits for the cartel members (Fear, 2006; Dick, 1995; Hook, O‘Neil 
and Toole, 2012; Kooroshy, Preston and Bradley, 2014, Igami, 2012). The study confirms 
these motivations for the attempted nutmeg cartel. 
The rationale to regulate supply onto the International market was identified by others in 
the field (Igami, 2012; Kravis, 2014; Levenstein, 2003). The need for regulating the supply 
chain was of major concern to the GCNA as well as Huitema. In Huitema‗s attempts at 
convincing the GCNA to enter into an agreement with Indonesia, he argued that there was 
an oversupply of nutmegs in the world market. Though there were various estimates 
regarding the global supply and consumption of nutmegs. Huitema advised the GCNA that 
there were 12,000 metric tons of nutmegs produced annually, consumption was only 
9,000 metric tons and, as a consequence, this excess supply exerted downward pressure 
on prices and, as such, there was a need for regulation that required cooperation with 
Indonesia, This argument appears to have strongly influenced the thinking of the GCNA 
BoD with regard to the formation of the Agreement (Interview with Lord, 19 March, 2015). 
A seventh and significant factor referred to above was the influence of external 
stakeholders such as Catz International on the GCNA BoD. This case found that as early 
as 1979, Huitema convinced the GCNA BoD of the need to collaborate with Indonesia for 
purposes of controlling the supply of nutmeg to the market and to this end facilitated the 
visit of a one-man mission (Renwick) to visit Indonesia. Though the effort did not result in 
any immediate positive outcome, it nonetheless demonstrated GCNA‘s initial interests in 
collaborating with Indonesia to regulate the supply of nutmeg. 
An eight factor was the existence of a legal basis. Grossman (2006) agreed that the 
formation of cartels takes place between legal entities where there are no legal 
impediments in the operating environments for such entities to participate in collusive 
agreements such as cartels. This was confirmed by this research and seen as a major 
factor facilitating the GCNA‘s participating in the agreement. Despite Renwick‘s visit to 
Indonesia in 1979 (Interview with Renwick 4 July, 2006), it was not possible to establish 
any type of business relationship with the Indonesian nutmeg exporters, since there was 
no established legal entity in Indonesia through which such an association could take 
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place. The development of the Agreement was possible only after ASPIN was established 
in 1985.  
A ninth factor was political and economic factors. In summary the attempt at forming a 
nutmeg cartel was born out of a combination of political and economic factors as seen 
through the lenses of the primary stakeholders group, the GCNA Board of Directors. 
These factors included the need to consolidate the GCNA and ASPIN as the world 
dominant supplier of nutmeg and mace; the desire on the part of key stakeholders in the 
GVC (internal and outside to the cartel - primarily Catz International) to restrict supply of 
the product and increase prices on the market (Stengel, 2014; Connor,2002; Levenstein 
and Suslow, 2006);the need to retain a higher portion of the value-added to nutmegs in 
Grenada; the need to exert greater coordination and control over the perceived power of 
the middleman in the GVC such as Catz as well as their competitor Indonesia (ASPIN); 
the need to eliminate competition between the world‘s two largest suppliers of nutmeg and 
thereby to  improve the livelihood of the nutmeg farmer.(Interview, with Logie, 4 April, 
2015;Lord,19 March, 2015; and Tirtawinata,1995) all confirmed that the need to increase 
prices was the primary reason for forming the agreement which sought to establish the 
first nutmeg cartel.  
The Agreement was more important for Grenada, where nutmeg played a much more 
important role in foreign exchange earnings, employment generation and the GDP than it 
did in Indonesia where the nutmeg industry did not even feature in the country‘s major 
export commodities. In Grenada, nutmeg held either the first or second position on the 
country‘s commodities export index. 
Research question 2 
How did the interventions of other parties (external stakeholders) impact the creation, 
performance and the eventual collapse of the Marketing Agreement? 
The extent to which stakeholders external to the GCNA–ASPIN Joint Marketing 
Agreement impacted on the development and sustainability of the Agreement has to be 
placed within the context of these stakeholders‘ place, and their relative power 
Chapter 6, continued to demonstrate how the interaction of these stakeholders influenced 
the sustainability of the efforts at cartelisation. It showed that whereas, the GCNA and 
ASPIN were of the misconceived perception that they controlled the supply chain for 
nutmegs, that this was not the truth in the case of Indonesia, where the non-ASPIN 
exporters were able to export via Indonesia to such spice companies as King Spice and 
Man Producten, and Catz International. This evidence demonstrated that there were other 
players in the GVC that exerted greater power and influence over the performance of the 
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market than that of the combined strength of ASPIN and GCNA, as they were able in 
collaboration (deliberate of unintended) with other players in the chain, including what the 
Indonesian‘s described as ―smugglers ―to exert downward pressure on prices. It was this 
pressure on prices that eventually undermined the efforts at cartelization and contributed 
towards its failure. 
This case identified four key official external strategic stakeholders: Catz International, 
Man Producten, Government of Indonesia and World Bank, with Catz being characterised 
as primary while the others were characterised as secondary stakeholders. The actions of 
each of these stakeholders were highlighted in Chapter 7. The evidence from the case 
highlighted the fact that Catz was the main facilitator and advocate to the Joint GCNA-
ASPIN Marketing Agreement without whom this agreement could not have happened. It 
also showed that following the official start of efforts at cartelisation, the company rights as 
sole agents for ASPIN nutmegs were revoked, and ultimately they were purchasing lower-
priced nutmegs from Singapore (Tirtawinata, 1995). Finally the case found that in 1989, 
Catz released tons of nutmegs onto the markets from its warehouses in Rotterdam 
(Interview with Moermon. 20 October, 2010). 
The evidence with regard to Catz‘s role in the development, performance and failure of 
the efforts at cartelisation showed that the GCNA had misconceived perceptions that Catz 
was the largest global buyer of nutmegs, and thus was in an advantageous position to 
dictate market prices and, by so doing, was being unfair to the GCNA and its farmers, 
However, the evidence contradicts that view and showed that Catz was the third-largest 
buyer, and their objective was similar to that of GCNA and ASPIN (i.e. to increase 
earnings and profits) and also that the prices were dictated by buyers lower down in the 
chain, thus confirming the characterisation of  the GVC for nutmegs as ―buyer-driven‖ and 
not ―supplier-driven.‖ The misconceptions of the GCNA regarding what they thought was 
possible under the agreement, and their efforts at cartelisation could be ascribed to 
information asymmetry because of GCNA‘s over-reliance on Catz for information on and 
analysis of the market situation and the role and status of ASPIN in the international 
supply of Indonesian nutmeg. These misconceptions also influenced GCNA's decision to 
persevere with the attempts to preserve the Agreement in the face of the unpromising 
reality. 
Even if the basic economic conditions enabling a cartel exist, organisational structures 
and processes are required for managing the cartel. The cartel literature highlights the 
importance of an effective organisation to manage the cartel (Grossman 2006; Tilton, 
2006; Dick, 1996; Kale and Singh, 1999) state that the establishment of an ―alliance 
function or department can have positive effect on performance of such alliances.‖ No 
mechanisms or organisations to manage the Agreement had been set up. This absence 
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could have impacted the performance and longevity of the Agreement. Further the 
absence allowed some external stakeholders, notably Catz as the intermediary, to exert 
more influence on the Agreement.  
Whereas the conventional literature (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Grossman, 2006; 
Eckbo, 1979) presupposes that cheating (including smuggling) by cartel members is one 
of the main threats undermining them, in this study the non-participating stakeholders 
(notably Indonesian exporters who were not members of ASPIN and producers from other 
parts of the world) also undermined the Agreement. The increasing flows of nutmeg from 
Indonesia onto the world market via Singapore undermined the ability of ASPIN and 
GCNA to maintain high prices. There is some evidence that in these circumstances 
ASPIN did not and could not prevent parallel exporting by its members which is equivalent 
to ―cheating‖ on the Agreement.  
Catz International was a key external stakeholder which actively promoted the cartel. 
However, Catz itself was competing in the nutmeg market with other agents and 
intermediaries including Man Producten who did not have a commitment to the cartel and 
may even have been actively engaged in attempting to undermine the cartel. Therefore, 
Catz probably had no option but to start buying at prices lower than those of the 
Agreement to protect its own position as a seller. 
The Government of Indonesia had key roles in the creation and demise of the Agreement. 
Creation of ASPIN by government decree, intended to control the international supply of 
Indonesian nutmeg was an essential precursor to the Agreement. However, when the 
much greater national need for financial support from the IMF and WB (Washington 
Institutions) for the structural adjustment programme arose, the government had to 
accede to the advice and conditions of the Washington Institutions. A consequence was 
termination of ASPIN‘s intended role as the sole licenser of Indonesian nutmeg exporters 
and its sole international agent agreement with Catz International effectively ending the 
Marketing Agreement.  
Evidently, the Washington Institutions as external stakeholders had an indirect but crucial 
effect on the end of ASPIN‘s controlling role and by extension the end of the Agreement. 
Arguably if the Government of Indonesia had not been under pressure to implement 
economic reforms during the mid to late 1980s, ASPIN may have been enabled to exert 
greater control over Indonesia‘s international nutmeg supplies.    
Research question 3 
Why did the Agreement collapse and why did the GCNA persist in trying to keep 
the Agreement going when it started failing? 
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The formation and collapse of the attempted nutmeg cartel ought to be seen as a process 
and not an event. The process unfolded overtime through the interaction of the principal 
stakeholders, external secondary stakeholders and the absence of the fundamental 
conditions for the development and survival of the Agreement. There is an overlap 
between ―why did the Agreement collapse‖ part of this question and the previous two 
research questions. Nevertheless this part has been included here as a summary of the 
combination of factors contributing to the collapse and their relative importance. The very 
active role of the GCNA in the demise of the Agreement considered principally in Chapter 
7 provides important insights on the process of decision making in the GCNA and the 
quality and sources of information on which it is based.         
The literature on cartel failure confirms that cartel formation and sustainability depend on 
the presence of a number of conditions, high market concentration, commitment of 
members to the Agreement, absence of cheating and defections, high entry barriers, low 
price elasticity of demand and effective and flexible management of the cartel (Kooroshy, 
Preston and Bradley, 2016; Levenstein and Suslow, 2003; 2006; Utton. and Elgar, 2011; 
Marshall and Mark, 2012).  
Chapter 7 (section 7.2) identified and analysed the absence of factors which led to the 
failure of the Agreement as a cartel. The findings in this case support the classical 
theoretical findings listed above. Reliance on nutmeg as an important export commodity 
for Grenada was the single condition which was conducive for the Agreement. However 
the condition did not hold for Indonesia. Further, for Grenada the condition influenced the 
motivation to enter into the Agreement and was not one of the market conditions essential 
for sustaining the cartel. 
Economic features which worked against the Agreement were the high short-run 
elasticities of demand and supply for nutmeg and mace. It was noted in sections 7.2.7 and 
7.3.2 (Chapter 7) that in response to the high prices under the Agreement, demand fell 
proportionally more as end users cut back their purchases and sought substitutes. While 
the production capacity cannot be expanded in the short term, the supply of nutmeg on 
the international market rose as farmers in Indonesia and Grenada and nutmeg producing 
countries harvested more nutmeg and traders released more stock on to the market to 
benefit from higher prices. In these circumstances, during the early stages of the 
Agreement, prices were kept high by the building up of stocks of nutmeg and mace by the 
GCNA, Indonesian traders licenced by ASPIN (ASPIN did not have the mandate or the 
resources to hold stocks) and Catz.  
The Agreement started failing with the continuing imbalance between supply and demand 
since the participants in the Agreement could not continue buying the excess supply. 
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According to Huitema of Catz and others, there was an underlying imbalance between 
supply and demand in the sector during that period, annual global demand for nutmeg 
was about 9,000 metric tons while supply was 12,000 metric tons. Huitema‘s motivation in 
bringing GCNA and Indonesian traders together to form the Agreement was to restrict the 
supply to a level closer to the demand. The nature of evidence and analysis which 
underlay this assessment is not clear. It is also not clear what the balance was in setting 
prices between achieve stability and higher pieces. Price stability would have required a 
buffer stock policy which appears to be absent and ASPIN did not have the resources or 
the mandate to hold a buffer stock.  
ASPIN‘s mandate was to licence Indonesian nutmeg exporters and coordinate and control 
their marketing and selling. Its role included prohibiting the exporting by its members 
outside the Agreement. As a consequence, with ASPIN restricting the level of exports by 
its members, they were left with stocks which they had to finance. When demand for 
nutmegs started to decline, it was reported that some ASPIN members had no option but 
to ―cheat‖ on the Agreement by selling through alternative buyers in Singapore at lower 
prices in order to reduce their stock holdings and ease their financial burdens (Tirtiwinata, 
1995). These actions led to further declines in prices and destabilised the Agreement. 
The internal contradictions and weaknesses within ASPIN were also significant factors 
contributing to the failure of the Agreement. The membership of ASPIN approximated 25 
per cent of the all Indonesian exporters. Further, Charles Sutjiawan, the then Marketing 
Manager of ASPIN, also owned a nutmeg and spice trading company based in Singapore. 
ASPIN delayed the granting of licences to a large number of exporters who were holding 
on to large stocks for which they had no option but to find alternative channels for 
exporting. These internal weaknesses of ASPIN combined to contribute to the failed 
attempt.  
Because the basic economic conditions, market power based on control of sufficiently 
high share of supply, high entry barriers and low price elasticity of demand, did not exist 
and could not be created because of the limitation of ASPIN, the Agreement members 
were price takers and did not have the capacity to make the price.  
The Government of Indonesia had a key role in the formal demise of the Agreement when 
the much greater national need for financial support from the Washington Institutions for 
the structural adjustment programme arose. As part of the economic reforms, ASPIN‘s 
intended role as the sole licenser of Indonesian nutmeg exporters and its sole 
international agent agreement with Catz International were ended effectively ending the 
Marketing Agreement.  
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The rest of this section addresses the persistence of GCNA with keeping the Agreement 
even attempting to revive it when ASPIN considered it to be at and end. GCNA became 
aware of ASPIN‘s diminishing commitment to the Marketing Agreement in February 1989. 
The Agreement ended formally on 25 May 1990. GCNA‘s commitment to continuing the 
commitment was strong based on the importance for the GCNA and its primary 
stakeholders (farmer members of the GCNA, the Government of Grenada and the GCNA 
Board Members as agents of the primary stakeholders) of the Agreement and a belief in 
the feasibility of sustaining the Agreement. The belief in the feasibility of sustaining an 
effective agreement in the absence of the necessary conditions was based on incomplete 
information about the nature of ASPIN and non-existence of the necessary conditions. 
There were differences of opinion within the GCNA Board on the causes of the failure and 
what could be done to retrieve the situation. However, most Board Members appeared to 
believe more in the malign motivation of international agents against the Agreement and 
the unwillingness on the part of ASPIN to comply with the Agreement MoA and MoU than 
the absence of the basic conditions for the survival of the Agreement.  A consequence 
was that the Board continued to attempt to get ASPIN to reappraise the Agreement and 
continue or revive it with adjustments. The position was based on the perception that 
ASPIN had control on the international supply of Indonesian nutmeg or such control was 
capable of being achieved.  
The chronology of events shows that GCNA was not fully aware of the unfolding situation 
in Indonesia and ASPIN, but even when such information was available, they seemed not 
to be able to act appropriately or in a timely manner to inform their partner. The GCNA 
appears to have been uninformed in dealing with ASPIN and at worst incompetent and 
unwilling to seek independent expert help.  
There was asymmetry of information, with serious deficiencies on the GCNA side. This led 
to two critical misperceptions. The first was that Catz International was the largest 
international buyer/trader of nutmegs. The GCNA records are punctuated with this 
reference. The second was that ASPIN could exert control on the international supply of 
Indonesian nutmeg in a manner similar to the GCNA‘s control of Grenadian nutmeg. A 
reason for these misconceptions was the over-reliance on the part of GCNA on Catz for 
information on all aspects of the market and trade and on ASPIN‘s ability and powers to 
deliver the control of Indonesian supply.  
While export prices were high, there was no evidence of discussions at Board level on the 
relationship between GCNA and ASPIN. However, when prices started to decline, and 
clear signs of cracks in the relationship between ASPIN and GCNA emerged, much 
discussion occurred. In one such discussion, the conflict between the political factions of 
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Ferguson and Benjamin emerged. During the meeting, the board‘s attention was drawn to 
the declining export prices and the impact on the finances of the GCNA. As a result of the 
deteriorating situation, Benjamin proposed that the GCNA seek the advice of an external 
independent expert to advice on the situation and the course of action. This proposal was 
interpreted by Ferguson as an attack on his expertise and that of the rest of the Board. to 
manage the affairs of the GCNA, causing him to respond to Benjamin by accusing him of 
―colonial thinking‖ and believing that the board did not contain the intelligence and skills to 
manage the problem and decried Benjamin for harbouring such thoughts.  
The GCNA Board placed the responsibility for the demise of the Agreement on the IMF 
and WB and also on other external stakeholders like Man Producten and ASTA for being 
instigators of efforts to undermine the agreement. In fact, Ferguson referred to the threat 
made by the CEO of Man Producten to ensure that the agreement would not last. 
However it appears that the economic and organisational conditions for a cartel which 
could survive for any length of time and deliver high and stable prices did not exist and the 
GCNA had unrealistic expectations of the Agreement based on information deficit and 
limited communication with ASPIN.  
 
8.5 Limitations of the study and possible areas of further research 
There were a number of practical issues which imposed limitations on this study. The 
events being investigated took place more than two decades ago. While it was possible to 
interview some actors and observers, including members of the Board of Directors, 
government officials and farmers, reliance on their recall was a limitation. To some extent 
it was possible to corroborate and supplement from records but some records were 
incomplete because of their destruction by Hurricane Ivan. 
 
In the case of ASPIN, the constraints were the lack of resources to meet the costs of 
travelling to and undertaking research in Indonesia to seek further corroboration of 
findings and the difficulties of gaining access to relevant documentary sources and 
persons even if resources had been available. Insights from investigations in Indonesia 
would have been helpful on some aspects, for example on why such a high proportion of 
Indonesian nutmeg exporters remained outside ASPIN during Agreement period, 
Huitema‘s relationship with ASPIN and the perceptions which were held by GCNA about 
ASPIN. This constraint was coupled with the paucity of published information on ASPIN. 
This limitation was side stepped to some extent by focusing on the GCNA perspective. 
Nevertheless, more information on ASPIN and access to its records would have enriched 




While some may argue about the validity of generalising from a single-case study, from 
the perspective of contribution to knowledge, the findings from this study strongly point to 
the applicability of the approach adopted in studies of decision making in organisations, in 
particular of commodity cooperatives. The study attempted to investigate multidimensional 
aspects within a specific context. There is no homogeneity in the factors which may cause 
a cartel to collapse or be sustained. The factors which contributed towards the collapse of 
the attempt were standard economic as well as context-driven and specific to the sector 
and the individual actors and organisations. However, the in-depth, multidimensional 
analysis provides a deeper understanding of the interactions between the actions and 
reactions of stakeholders based on their objectives and perception of the context. 
 
Further multidimensional case-study research of this type could improve understanding of 
why commodity cartels are formed, why they fail and why some actors persevere in their 
attempts to continue the collaboration when the fundamental conditions required for their 
success do not exist. Studies of such perseverance could be extended to other types of 
collaborations and decision making within organisations.   
 
Another possible area of research in failed and even existing commodity cartels is to 
explore the extent to which power differential and a country‘s place in the GVC affect the 
development and demise of efforts aimed at creating collusive agreements. On 
stakeholder theory, the questions are concerned with the implications of incomplete 
information and knowledge on participation in commodity agreements and effectiveness in 
decision-making within the context of international trade. 
 
8.6. An afterword on events following the failed attempt at forming the cartel 
The premise for the discourse in this section is contained in chapter 7 which dealt with the 
collapse of the cartel the unravelling of which started in early 1989. It formally came to an 
end on 8 May 1990 by the Government of Indonesia decree No.141/KP/V/1990 which 
effectively ended the existence of ASPIN as the country‘s sole exporter of nutmeg.  
This decision was communicated to the Board of Directors of the GCNA by telex on May 
31, 1990, advising ―that as at 25/5/1990 ASPIN ceased being the sole exporter of nutmeg 
and mace from Indonesia.‖  
The official end of the attempts at cartelisation came as a surprise to the GCNA BoD 
which had been attempting to improve the functioning of the Agreement but with limited 
cooperation from GCNA as noted in Chapter 7.  
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Following the collapse of the Agreement the GCNA was virtually bankrupt; as export 
earnings declined from EC$29.464,798 in 1990 to EC$13,255,439 in 1991 and to 
EC$7,183,607 in 1993. The average export price per pound for nutmegs declined from 
EC$5.76 in 1990 to EC$3,11 in 1991 and to EC$1.38 in 1993. No bonus payments were 
made in 1991 and 1992. The profitability of the GCNA declined from EC$4,714,822 in 
1990 to a loss of EC$6,067,978 in 1991 and a further loss was made of EC$3,541,321 in 
1993. The end of the agreement left GCNA holding stocks of 11 to 14 million pounds of 
nutmegs and 800,000 pounds of mace. The situation prompted Barclays Bank to cancel 
the GCNA overdraft facility.  
Logie, in reflecting on the impact of deregulation of the Indonesian nutmeg market which 
resulted in the closure of ASPIN, said: 
‖Since the Agreement officially ended in May, 1990, nutmeg 
prices have fallen to the lowest in the last 25 years‖ 
(Market report Grenada/Indonesia Cooperation, nd, P.1). 
Then Minister of Agriculture, Brizan, declared the situation was one in which the GCNA 
was technically bankrupt, as the banks stopped honouring cheques from the GCNA, and 
as such he had to get his government to move speedily to find solutions. The government 
then took two decisions to: (a) to replace the existing Board of Directors with an interim 
board. According to Minister Brizan, the current Board was just not capable of managing 
the GCNA; (b) cease its agency relationship with Catz International, and (c) recruit a new 
marketing agent, JHB International, on the proviso that JHB provided the GCNA with a 
loan of US$3,500.000.00.  
In spite of the end of Catz‘s agency relationship with GCNA Huitema persisted in efforts to 
create a new relationship between the GCNA and exporters from Indonesia. In one of his 
attempts before the end of the agency relationship, he had recommended that: 
―it was advisable that the Ministry of Trade or Cooperatives 
in Grenada should proceed to Jakarta to try and sign an 
agreement which would restore the price of nutmeg and 
mace to what it was during the GCNA-ASPIN Agreement‖  
(Minutes of GCNA Board of Directors Meeting, April 
16,1991.p.3). 
At the Indonesia end, a new organization named Berdikari emerged as an exporting agent. 
Details on the composition and other aspects of this organization were not available. 
However, at the urgings of Huitema, a meeting was held in Rotterdam between the GCNA 
and Catz, Berdikari (July 23–27, 1991) which resulted in a proposed Joint Agreement 
(MOU) between the GCNA, Berdikari and the National Federation of Village Union 
Cooperatives (NFVUC) in Indonesia.  
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On 27 August 1991 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the GCNA and 
P.T. PP Berdikari and the National Federation of Village and Union Cooperatives. This 
memorandum, like the previous one with ASPIN, was aimed at controlling the international 
price for nutmeg.  
On 2 April 1991 Berdikari formed a joint venture with Catz International, creating BerCatz 
B.V with Berdikari owning 70 per cent and Catz International owning 30 per cent of the 
shares. Huitema continued his efforts to form an Agreement between Indonesia‘s nutmeg 
producers and exporters and GCNA. In April 1994, following the creation of BerCatz, he 
organised a meeting of representatives of GCNA and Berdikari in Rotterdam against the 
backdrop of continuing price volatility during the period 1991–1995 when Grenadian and 
Indonesian nutmeg producers had received some of the lowest prices for the last decade. 
In Huitema‘s two-page speech (1994) at the meeting, he made eight points: 
1. He was the most knowledgeable person in the room on the nutmeg trade, after being 
in the nutmeg business for over 40 years. 
2. Prices are at their lowest for a long time and the demand for nutmeg is inelastic; 
3. Both producing countries are holding large stocks of nutmeg and mace. 
4. Users of nutmegs are no longer holding stocks but are forcing producing countries to 
keep the stock, which is bad for the producing countries. 
5. He said, ―Collective and united actions are required by the producing countries to 
change the situation around.‖ 
6. He said: ―In the past we have seen that there is only one solution. Between 1985 and 
1990, we, Catz International B.V created cooperation between Indonesia and 
Grenada, prices soared and the farmers in both countries had a better life.‖ 
7. Due to Indonesia‘s short-sightedness the cooperation plan fell apart, causing 
bankruptcy in Indonesia and Grenada is left with large stocks of nutmeg. 
8. Cooperation is needed to regain those days but with rules and agreements laid down. 
The GCNA was offered to be part of BerCatz with a 25 per cent stake but it declined 
(Minutes of Meeting between the Indonesian delegation, GCNA, and BerCtaz, April 7 
1994). No reports of further attempts to form an Agreement between the two countries 
have been found. In 2001, Huitema retired as CEO of Catz International and was replaced 
by Hank Moermon. Mr Huitema died in 2012. 
Since the collapse of the Agreement international prices continued to display the level of 
volatility that is generally associated with international commodity trade. By 1993, the 
GCNA was in a state of chronic depression generating less than EC$10 million or almost 
one third of the lowest income earned since the period of attempted cartelisation. Table 
8.1 shows that from 1992–2014 income volatility for nutmeg continued unabated, 
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confirming the theoretical explanations on the volatile nature and characteristics of 
commodities markets (Brizan, 2003). 
The main features shown by the table are set out below.  
1. The GCNA experienced declining Income initially between 1992–1999 but earnings 
rose between 1999–2005 before a sharp decline in 2006 because of damage caused 
by the Hurricanes Ivan and Emily. 
2. Between 1999–2005 the GCNA achieved its highest incomes since the attempted 
cartel years, ranging between EC$26,139,252 and EC$49,696,270. 
3. One of the primary stakeholder groups (farmers) continued to receive significant 
shares of GCNA‘s incomes up to 2003 but the shares fell in following years because of 
low revenues largely because of the destruction caused to the nutmeg industry by the 
hurricanes. Which provided the catalyst for other producing countries to enter the 
market/  
4. The farmers did not receive any bonus payments in 2008, 2009 and 2010 because of 
low sales. 
5. As noted earlier, in 2004 and 2005, Grenada was hit by Hurricanes Ivan and Emily 
which destroyed over 90 per cent of the island‘s nutmeg cultivation. 
 
Grenada‘s Nutmeg Industry suffered two devastating blows when Hurricanes (Ivan in 
September 2004 and Emily in July 2005) struck the island. As a consequence over 90 per 
cent of the nutmeg trees were destroyed affecting the then registered 6579 members or 
the 1/3 of the population who depends on nutmeg directly or indirectly. As a consequence 
of the hurricanes the number of active farmers dropped to 2500 and the number of 
persons under the poverty line increased from 32 to 38 per cent (Grenada Ministry of 











Table 8.1: GCNA Payments to Farmers as a Percentage of Gross Sales 1992 - 2014 
GCNA sales revenue and advance and bonus payments to farmers (1992 - 2014) in 
EC$ 








    
to Sales 
1992 7,149,362 NIL 7,149,362 9,776,461 73.1 
1993 4,191,803 2,649,780 6,841,583 7,183,607 95.3 
1994 2,795,403 3,999,647 6,795,050 10,497,076 65.0 
1995 3,226,315 3,500,000 6,726,315 11,098,034 61.0 
1996 3,348,420 1,998,262 3,348,420 12,941,866 41.3 
1997 7,575,800 4,222,762 11,798,562 15,224,736 77.5 
1998 8,804,356 4,978,449 13,782,805 21,378,836 56.5 
1999 16,830,183 10,000,000 26,830,183 29,725,407 90.3 
2000 17,539,927 13,003,585 30,543,512 49,696,270 61.5 
2001 17,709,721 10,165,324 27,875,045 35,671,116 78.1 
2002 26,603,374 10,000,000 36,603,374 36,265,467 100.9 
2003 26,603,374 5,000,000 31,603,374 39,543,742 80.0 
2004 14,611,345 3,000,000 17,611,345 26,139,252 67.4 
2005 3,884,513 3,000,000 6,884,513 31,564,730 22.0 
2006 2,015,351 5,000,000 7,015,351 8,645,803 81.1 
2007 2,899,004 250,000 3,149,004 9,825,667 32.1 
2008 3,251,107 0 3,251,107 6,528,414 50.0 
2009 3,739,543 0 3,739,543 6,876,994 54.4 
2010 3,196,432 0 3,196,432 10,533,611 30.4 
2011 6,860,607 700,000 7,560,607 11,262,869 67.1 
2012 9,692,838 
   
3.5000,000 9,692,838 20,228,731 48.0 
2013 9,692,838 1,500,000 11,192,838 20,939,470 53.5 
2014 2,366,444 1,000,000 3,366,444 15,645,360 21.5 
Source: Compiled from GCNA Annual Trading and Financial Reports 1992 - 2014.  
 
Grenada declined from the second largest supplier of nutmegs to number eight in the 
world (see table 8.2), as production declined from 2,300 tons to 250 tons by 2009 (ibid) 
with a recovery to double that amount in recent years.  In an effort to resuscitate the 
industry a number of studies were conducted including:  European Union All ACP 
Commodities Programmes Caribbean Region and the Consultancy to Support Private 
Sector Development through the Increase in Value-Added Capacity of the Agri-Business 
Sector in Grenada (Gordon,2015). The report called for rehabilitation of the industry aimed 
at increasing the availability of nutmeg and mace, while the later report calls for 
amendment of the ―The Nutmeg Industry Act, Cap 215 and the Nutmeg (Regulation of 
Export) Cap 216‖ to include the following:  
 Remove the need to distribute surpluses  
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 Remove the GCNA as the sole exporter of nutmegs  
 Leave the GCNA as the sole authorities required to certify the quality and grade of 
nutmeg and mace prior to export  
  Allow sale of nutmeg and mace to 3rd party local processors (only) for further 
processing for oil and grinding. These products will also need to be certified as 100% 
Grenadian 
 Restructure the board of the GCNA to reduce the control of farmers (majority 
government and independent members) 
 Extend the life of the Board to 3 years between elections; keep the AGM requirement 
(Gordon, 2015). 
These recommendations have ignited much discussion among the board members, 
farmers and the wider society about the future organisational format for the nutmeg 
industry. At the time of writing no decision has been taken on the above proposals. In the 
absence of any type of known collusion, the GCNA was able to achieve its highest level of 
earnings since its inception of almost EC$50 million in 2000. This questions even the 
short term success of the Agreement and the view that commodity producers in this and 
many other sectors are price-takers and not price-makers (Brizan, 2003). 
The farmers generally received high proportions of revenues earned by the GCNA during 
good years leaving very little for investment into the nutmeg sector. This behaviour on the 
part of the GCNA is in keeping with the views of the stakeholder theorists who argued that 
while all stakeholders should benefit from the operations of the organisation, it is the 
primary stakeholder groups, especially those with economic claims (Kochan and 
Rubinstein, 2002) and those with the highest level of power, urgency and legitimacy 
(Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997) who retain most of the benefits. Additionally, with regards 
to the primary stakeholder farmers grouping, their retention of the vast majority of 
earnings from the GCNA is consistent with one of the fundamental cooperative principles 
of ―user benefit‖ which argues that the benefit of the cooperatives should be distributed to 
its users on the basis of their use (Donoso, Shadbolt and Bailey, 2004). 
Persons closely associated with the GCNA had this to say about the manner in which 
successive boards chose to distribute the income of the organisation between them: 
―these boards are incompetent and selfish, they use the organisation for their selfish 
gains, and they don‘t care about the industry, not even the staff members who helped to 
create the wealth of the GCNA over the years. Staff members do not get annual increases 
or bonuses like the farmers, occasionally we get a small one off payment but not salary 
increases. They are destroying the industry, we are near bankruptcy, we are selling 
nutmeg far less than what is required to keep nutmeg price to the farmers. To the levels at 
which they are, but the Board refuses to reduce the farm gate price to the farmers; the 
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price is kept artificially high because most of the board members are nutmeg farmers, so 
they stand to benefit by this high prices, so they really don‘t care about the financial health 
of the industry‖. (Discussion with a GCNA operative, 20 August 2015).In the meantime 
Grenada is now the eighth largest supplier in the world, producing an average of 500 
metric tons of nutmegs per year (Interview with Clyne, 25 July, 2016). The other major 
suppliers ranked by production are shown in table 8.2. 
Table 8.2 The World‘s largest producers of nutmegs by value and volume (2016) 




1 Guatemala 49,973 24,000 
2 Indonesia 39,562 19,000 
3 India 37,626 18,070 
4 Nepal 12,547 6,026 
5 Lao People's Democratic 
Republic 
8,274 3,974 
6 Bhutan 1,457 700 
7 United Republic of Tanzania 1,413 679 
8 Grenada 1,193 573 
9 Sri Lanka 1,145 550 
10 Malaysia 816 392 
Source: www.mapsoftheworld.com (2016) 
The above chapters represent a thorough analysis of the topic for this research. It 
highlights the circumstances which led to the development of a Joint Agreement between 
GCNA of Grenada and ASPIN of Indonesia, which was aimed at creating the world‘s first 
nutmeg cartel. Overall the results of the research shows that the fundamental conditions 
required for the success of such agreement did not exist and as a consequence the 
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Appendix 2 – Semi-Structured Questionnaire 
 
 
This questionnaire is an aid to assist in the collection of data from various stakeholders on 
their observations, perceptions and understanding of the GCNA-ASPIN Marketing 
agreement. 
 
Name of Participant………………………………. 
 
Date of Interview…………………………………… 
 
Location of interview………………………………. 
 
Guide Q1. I wish to engage you in a discussion on the joint GCNA-ASPIN Agreement to form 
a nutmeg cartel during the period 1985 – 1991. What can you tell me about this agreement? 
 
Guide Q2. I understand that there were many motives or motivations behind this agreement, 
what is your view of what contributed to such an agreement? 
 
Guide Q3. Which side benefitted most from this agreement and why? 
 
Guide Q4. How did you think the agreement affected the global nutmeg trade and the 
farmers of both Indonesia and Grenada? 
 
Guide Q5. Understand that Catz International was a key player in all of this, what is your 
view, how do you assess their role? Was it a positive one, lets discuss this? 
 
Guide Q6. Why do you think the agreement collapses?  
 
Guide Q7. What was your role in all of this? And having the benefit of history how do you 
assess that role both from a personal and institutional level? 
 
Guide Q7 (for member of the GCNA Board of Directors). Was the board fully aware of what it 
was getting into?  
 
Guide 7 b. Tell me about the membership, what is your perception of the board and their 
disposition towards the agreement? 
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Appendix 3 – Sample of Listing of Meetings & Coding Scheme 
 
Cods & Meanings. 
0 = No discussion on any of the key issues 
1 = issues with GCNA – ASPIN relationship 
2 = Reconditioned nutmegs  
3 = GCNA Financial situation 
























Visit of klauss Huitema of Catz international 
 






















CDI PLANNED VISIT (Caterz and Oscari) 1_8 OF MARCH TO 




Ferguson, observed that the feasibility study for the distillation 




Ferguson stated, "given the large quantity of defectives and the 
urgency of the matter everything would have to be 
Done to expedite the setting up of the distillation plant. 
Ferguson requested, "that the chairman visits the UWI in 
Trinidad later in the week to request that a multidisciplinary team 
visit Grenada to coincide with the visit of personnel from CDI to 







Appendix 4. Financial Analysis of GCNA 1988 - 1995 
Year / areas of 
analysis. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
BALANCE SHEETS         
CURRENT ASSETS 
        Cash - Current account 4,243,872  3,167,018  379,836  370,900  245,394  305,880  111,211  432,503  
         -  Fixed Deposits 15,750,000  15,250,000  3,500,000  0  0  0  0  0  
Accounts Receivable - 
Produce 5,902,621  2,322,418  8,554,580  2,688,658  1,464,674  1,112,703  1,227,513  757,882  
Other 732,902  613,711  178,166  0  0  0  0  2,000,000  
Inventories 8,686,717  10,492,749  13,171,784  11,268,121  11,489,093  10,082,380  6,002,436  5,013,478  
Total Current Assets 35,316,112  31,845,896  25,784,366  14,327,679  13,199,161  11,500,963  7,341,160  8,203,863  
CURRENT LIABILITIES 
        Bank Overdraft 0  0  0  685,455  2,550,408  3,126,654  731,928  0  
Accounts Payable and 
accrued liabilities 160,043  109,327  512,771  328,133  182,950  1,607,458  1,357,313  1,661,207  
Due to growers - 
uncollected surplus of 
prior years 901,241  400,414  466,714  483,358  446,171  423,572  462,396  527,598  
Balance of surplus 
current year 12,000,000  10,000,000  5,000,000  0  0  0  0  0  
Short Term Loan 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2,000,000  
Total Current Liabilities 13,061,284  10,509,741  5,979,485  1,496,946  3,179,529  5,157,684  2,551,637  4,188,805  
         WORKING CAPITAL 22,254,828  21,336,155  19,804,881  12,830,733  10,019,632  6,343,279  4,789,523  4,015,058  
FIXED ASSETS 4,328,160  6,076,139  10,344,059  12,145,163  11,986,986  12,582,079  12,841,966  12,780,318  
NET ASSETS 26,582,988  27,412,294  30,148,940  24,975,896  22,006,618  18,925,358  17,631,489  16,795,376  
         LONG TERM LOANS 
        
         FUNDS OF THE 
ASSOCIATION 
        Cess No. 1 650,000  650,000  650,000  650,000  650,000  650,000  650,000  650,000  
Cess No. 2 25,160,378  25,989,431  28,744,785  24,325,896  21,356,618  18,275,358  16,981,489  16,145,376  
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Reserve fund 647,612  647,865  629,157  0  0  0  0  0  
Capital Reserve 124,998  124,998  124,998  0  0  0  0  0  
Capital Employed 26,582,988  27,412,294  30,148,940  24,975,896  22,006,618  18,925,358  17,631,489  16,795,376  
         
         
         
INCOME STATEMENTS 
        Gross Income 42,554,991  33,740,654  29,464,798  13,255,439  9,776,451  7,183,607  10,497,076  11,098,034  
Less: Cost of produce 
from buyers 11,827,237  10,370,265  12,934,011  9,805,181  6,767,542  5,674,022  6,840,305  4,224,478  
Provision for unsaleable 
stock 0  6,035,000  1,216,005  2,369,000  0  0  0  0  
 
30,727,754  17,335,389  15,314,782  1,081,258  3,008,909  1,509,585  3,656,771  6,873,556  
         Direct Expenses 3,371,772  4,312,198  4,686,167  3,823,927  3,332,840  2,897,713  3,119,230  3,558,582  
General & Administrative 
Expenses 2,484,750  3,124,027  3,247,550  2,618,526  2,385,959  2,212,852  2,203,754  2,633,528  
 
5,856,522  7,436,225  7,933,717  6,442,453  5,718,799  5,110,565  5,322,984  6,192,110  
         Operating Income/ (loss) 24,871,232  9,899,164  7,381,065  (5,361,195) (2,709,890) (3,600,980) (1,666,213) 681,446  
Other Income (net) 1,174,543  929,889  374,288  646,429  444,079  761,828  1,264,159  482,088  
Trading Surplus before 
reserve for cess 26,045,775  10,829,053  7,755,353  (4,714,766) (2,265,811) (2,839,152) (402,054) 1,163,534  
Cess Reserve for the 
year 10,045,775  3,643,624  3,040,531  1,353,212  983,758  702,169  984,343  1,049,280  
Net surplus for the year 16,000,000  7,185,429  4,714,822  (6,067,978) (3,249,569) (3,541,321) (1,386,397) 114,254  
Grant - Stabex 
       
2,000,000  
Bonus Paid to Growers 
       
3,999,647  
Transfer from reserve 0  2,814,571  285,177  6,528,964  3,953,036  0  0  0  
Due to growers 16,000,000  10,000,000  4,999,999  460,986  703,467  (3,541,321) (1,386,397) (1,885,393) 
         Interest & bank charges 22,705  21,230  21,658  0.0  
   
125,166  
         
         PROFITABLILITY & 
ASSET TURNOVER 
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Return on capital 
employed 98% 39% 26% -19% -10% -15% -2% 6% 
Gross Profit Margin 72% 51% 52% 8% 31% 21% 35% 62% 
Net Profit Margin 61% 32% 26% -36% -23% -40% -4% 10% 
Asset Turnover 160% 123% 98% 53% 44% 38% 60% 66% 
         
LIQUIDITY, GEARING & 
WORKING CAPITAL 
        Interest Cover 114714% 51008% 35808% #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 930% 
Current Ratio 270% 303% 431% 957% 415% 223% 288% 196% 
Quick Ratio 204% 203% 211% 204% 54% 28% 52% 76% 
Average Debtor payment 
period (in days) 51 25 106 74 55 57 43 25 
Stock Turnover period (in 
days) 268 233 340 338 620 649 320   
         GROWTH 
        Sales growth 0% -21% -13% -55% -26% -27% 46% 6% 
Net Asset growth 0% 3% 10% -17% -12% -14% -7% -5% 
gross profit growth 0% -44% -12% -93% 178% -50% 142% 88% 
Net profit growth 0% -58% -28% -161% -52% 25% -86% -389% 









































                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
